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Chapter 1 Introduction 
[1] Overview 
On 11 December 2006 the Commonwealth Parliament passed the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth). The Act contained a large number of criminal offences directly and indirectly related to 
copyright infringement. The stated reasons for increasing the number and scope of the range of 
criminal offences contained in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were that “copyright piracy is becoming 
easier and the law needs to be constantly updated to tackle piracy” and “copyright industries are 
important and need to be supported”.  These cursory explanations are based on the assumption that 
criminal law is both an appropriate and effective tool to support industries which rely on copyright 
protection.  
History tends to indicate that there is an article of faith among law makers and copyright interest 
groups that increasing the scope of criminal liability and the severity of punishment for copyright 
offences can restore the effectiveness of copyright protection that has been eroded by technology. 
Where infringement is visible and can be easily detected, this view might have some merit. 
However, the protection that copyright law affords rights holders has never been quite so 
undermined by technology as it has been over the past fifteen years. 
This thesis examines these assumptions and assesses the effectiveness of the offence regime in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). It considers whether supporting the industries that are being strained by 
technological advancements in the copying and distribution of works can justify criminal sanctions. 
Never before have so many people had access to the tools of reproduction and distribution as they 
do today. Copyright works can be exchanged among internet users around the globe without a real 
risk of apprehension. It is a common proposition that the growth and development of the Internet is 
the primary cause of the current difficulties faced by some sectors of the copyright or publishing 
industries. Digital and internet technologies have been revolutionary in many areas of life, providing 
domestic users with the power to access and disseminate information in unprecedented volumes. 
The drive to digitise analogue material has also significantly contributed to the problem by 
transforming copyright works into information. This has enabled the reproduction and worldwide 
distribution of any material capable of being digitally stored. 
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There have always been those who have been prepared to defy the law and take advantage of 
technological advances to make money from the illicit reproduction and distribution of copyright 
works. However, the reproduction of analogue copies required substantial investment in expensive, 
specialist equipment and its distribution required a network of people who are prepared to break 
the law by selling these copies on the black market. Copyright owners have always had civil remedies 
to deal with such illegal enterprises, and the criminal law complemented this by imposing fines and 
imprisonment for commercial infringement. 
Now, anyone who is computer literate and has a broadband connection now has the means to avoid 
having to pay anyone to acquire digital copies of works: neither the legitimate owner of the 
copyright nor a commercial copyright infringer. Faced with this problem, copyright owners have 
successfully lobbied legislators around the world to implement new laws which have the potential to 
bring otherwise upstanding law-abiding citizens into the criminal justice system. 
[2] Theoretical approach 
The theoretical approach taken by this thesis is grounded in two main themes. The first theme is 
based on the theoretical legitimacy and justifications for criminalising copyright infringement, 
particularly the harm principle theory proposed by the late Professor Joel Feinberg1 and later refined 
by Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr in relation to copyright offences.2 This theory seeks to 
determine to what extent criminal sanctions can be legitimately used for copyright infringement and 
under what circumstances.  
Secondly, the effectiveness of copyright offences in preventing infringement will be examined using 
the social norms theory initiated by the law and economics movement, particularly the work of the 
“New Chicago School”3 which includes notable scholars such as Lawrence Lessig,4 Robert Ellickson,5 
Richard McAdams,6 Eric Posner,7 Richard Posner8 and Cass Sunstein.9 The majority of their work on 
                                                            
1 Feinberg, J., The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. 1 Harm to Others (1984) 
2 Moohr, G.S., ‘The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory’ 
(2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 731; Moohr, G.S., ‘Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws’ (2005) 54 American University Law Review 783 
3 Lessig, L., ‘The New Chicago School’  (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 661 
4 Lessig, L., ‘Social Meaning and Social Norms’  (1995) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2181; Lessig, 
L., ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 943 
5 Ellickson, R. C., ‘Law And Economics Discovers Social Norms’  (1998) 27 Journal Of Legal Studies 537; 
Ellickson, R.C., Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle  Disputes (1991) 
6 McAdams, R. H., ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338, 
McAdams, R.H., ‘Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail’ (1995) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2237 
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the role of social norms was published at the naissance of the Internet, but the importance of this 
work in relation to the behaviour of Internet users has only been of significant application since the 
widespread adoption of broadband technology domestically. In the absence of levels of policing 
equivalent to those in the real world, the inhabitants of the virtual space of the Internet to develop 
their own rules of conduct, as had been predicted by Professor Richard McAdams, Professor Eric 
Posner and Professor Robert Ellickson.10 
The social norms of this virtual space, coupled with the relative anonymity that the online 
environment provides, often means that the substantive laws that govern both the real world and 
this virtual space have been ignored. Nowhere has this been more starkly evident than in the area of 
copyright law. The work of the social norm theorists11 provides the theoretical background against 
which the effectiveness of the criminal offences can be assessed, both as a tool for predicting 
compliance and in formulating better laws. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7 Posner, E. A., ‘The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal And Non-Legal Sanctions On Collective Action’ 
(1996) 63 University Of Chicago Law Review 133; Posner, E.A., ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics 
and the Law’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 780 
8 Posner, R.A., ‘Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law a Comment’ (1998) 27 Journal of 
Legal Studies 553 
9 Sunstein, C.R., ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 903; Sunstein, C.R., 
‘Behavioural Analysis of Law’ (1997) 64(4) University of Chicago Law Review 1175 
10 McAdams, R. H., ‘The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338; 
Ellickson, R.C., Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle  Disputes (1991); Posner, E.A., ‘Symbols, Signals, and 
Social Norms in Politics and the Law’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 780 
11 See Carlson, A.E., ‘Recycling Norms’ (2001) 89 California Law Review 1231; Cheng, T.H., ‘Power, Norms, and 
International Intellectual Property Law’ (2006) 28 Michigan Journal of  International Law 109; Depoorter, B. 
and Vanneste, S., ‘Norms and Enforcement The Case Against Copyright Litigation’ (2005) 84 Oregan Law 
Review 1127; Feldman, Y. and Nadler, J., ‘The Law and Norms of File Sharing’ (2006) 43 San Diego Law Review 
577; Geisinger, A., ‘A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications’ (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review 
605; Gillette, C.P., ‘Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms’ (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 813; Glensy, 
R.D., ‘Quasi-Global Social Norms’ (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 79; Major, A.M., ‘Norm Origin and 
Development in Cyberspace Models of Cybernorm Evolution’ (2000) 78 Washington University Law Quarterly 
59; Meares, T.L., ‘Norms, Legitimacy and Enforcement’ (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 391; Meares, T.L., 
‘Signaling, Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal Law Policy’ 
(2002) 36 University of Richmond Law Review 409; Miller, G.P., ‘Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere The 
Case of Handicapped Parking’ (2003) 71 George Washington Law Review 895; Miller, G.P., ‘Norms and 
Interests’ (2003) 32 Hofstra Law Review 637; Neri, G., ‘Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms - Unauthorized Music 
Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms’ (2004) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 733; Schultz, M.F., ‘Fear and 
Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us about Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law’ (2006) 
21 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 651; Scott, R.E., ‘The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social 
Norms’ (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review 1603; Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the 
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505; Strahilevitz, 
L.J., ‘Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 
359; Wendel, W. B., ‘Mixed Signals Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of 
Explanation’ (2002) 77 Indiana Law Journal 1 
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The importance of social norms as predictive tools for behaviour in unsupervised environments has 
been significantly overlooked in the Australian legal literature. Its value in predicting behavioural 
changes and informing policy cannot be overstated. A lack of awareness of social norm theory within 
the legal community can lead to unrealistic expectations of the ability of legislation to bring about 
behavioural change. If there is a failure to bring about the desired change in behaviour, there is a risk 
that the legislation will be perceived as being too weak and that more robust legislation is required. 
[3] Methodology 
The methodology used by this thesis has largely been determined by the nature of the subject 
matter under discussion. The first part of the thesis is a theoretical examination of the literature on 
harms and social norms theory. The second part of the thesis proceeds as a doctrinal analysis of the 
criminal provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This involved an in-depth examination of the 
meaning and likely interpretations of the offence sections, most of which have not yet been the 
subject of judicial examination. In conducting this examination, reference was made to a wide range 
of statute law, related cases and extrinsic material, in addition to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) itself 
and material accompanying the Act such as the Explanatory Memoranda for the relevant 
Amendment Bills. 
[4] Thesis structure 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part I examines the historic and theoretical background of the 
subject matter; Part II analyses the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in detail; and 
Part III makes recommendations for the improvement of the current provisions. 
Chapter 2 charts the development of criminal sanctions in the copyright law of Australia. It examines 
the context of the technological and political pressures that have instigated legislative change. It is 
important to recognise that the evolution of criminal sanctions has not occurred in a vacuum, and 
that while the use of criminal sanctions may have been an appropriate response to the challenges of 
the past, the changes to the law were specific to the technological and political developments of the 
time. It is clear from the legislative history that the frequency of amendments to the offence 
sections has increased rapidly.  
There were three amendments to the offence provisions between Federation and 1980. Since 1980 
there have been nine amendments that have substantially increased the both the criminal liability 
and penalties for the infringement of copyright and other related rights. Five of these amendments 
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have occurred since 1998, culminating in the current offence provisions brought about by the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). This has caused the number of offences to balloon from nine 
offences in 1912 to one hundred and forty four separate offences today. 
Chapter 3 assesses the extent to which the criminalisation of copyright infringement can be 
legitimately justified and examines the role social norms play in regulating behaviour. The 
broadening of the scope of copyright offences has the effect of transferring the responsibility for 
both deterring and remedying infringement from copyright owners to the Australian government. 
During the same time there has been an increase in the scope of criminal liability, the actual physical 
ability to reproduce and distribute copies of digitised works by domestic actors has increased 
exponentially. Together, this means that many more people have the capability to engage in 
conduct, in their own homes, that can constitute serious criminal offences.   
The application of the harm principle theory in this thesis is used to measure the legitimate limits of 
the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). If each offence cannot be legitimately justified, it will 
mean that the Australian Parliament has curtailed the liberty of its citizens unreasonably. Social 
norms theory explains that the regulatory mechanism of the law is not the sole governing force in 
the behaviour of individuals. More often their behaviour is regulated by the standards and sanctions 
applied to their conduct by their social groups: the social norms of a group. While there is no clear 
consensus about how originate, it is common ground that they evolve to maximise the welfare of 
the group.  This theory can be used to predict how effective the copyright offences will be in 
deterring infringement. 
The offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are must be interpreted in line with the Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Cth), since it supplements all Commonwealth offences, including those under discussion. 
Chapter 4 details the pertinent sections of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which apply to the 
offences and demonstrates the interaction between the two Acts. In order to accurately gauge the 
scope of criminal liability for offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) it is necessary to 
understand the function of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The offences in the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) do not exist as a sui generis scheme of regulation. In common with all criminal offence against 
the Commonwealth, the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are required to be read against the 
general principles of criminal liability the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). This chapter will examine the 
pertinent sections of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) that are supplemental to the sections in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and assist in forming the offences.   
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Chapter 5 examines the extent of criminal liability for the offences concerned with commercial scale 
infringement and dealing with infringing copies which are contained in Part V Division 5 Subdivisions 
B and C of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). These offences are closely related to the exclusive rights 
vested in the copyright owner and form the core of the regime of copyright offences. Section 132AC 
is an offence that can be applied to any form of copyright infringement, provided it is substantial 
enough to cause significant harm to the copyright owner. The majority of the other offences are for 
indirect infringement of copyright through dealings in infringing copies. This is another area of 
copyright law where there have been very few reported cases, either civil or criminal. There are 
three offences in Part V which do not amount to infringements of copyright, but are directed at 
conduct which facilitates the trade in infringing copies: possessing an infringing copy, possessing a 
device to make an infringing copy and advertising the supply of an infringing copy.  
Chapter 6 examines the scope of criminal liability of the offences in four Subdivisions. In Part V 
Division 5, Subdivision D contains offences for the airing of works, sound recordings and films and 
designed to deter unlicensed performances at places of public entertainment. Subdivision E contains 
offences which are directed at preventing the circumvention of technological protection measures 
put in place by copyright owners to curtail copyright infringement. The offences create criminal 
liability for dealings in devices that will enable technological protection measures to be removed or 
circumvented, in addition to the act of circumvention itself. Subdivision F contains offences for 
removing and altering the electronic rights management information, for dealing in copies that have 
had electronic rights management information removed, and for distributing that actual information 
itself. Electronic rights management information is attached to copyright material in order for 
copyright owners to track its use and detect infringements. The final Subdivision under examination 
in this chapter is contained within Part VAA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This Part houses Division 
3 Subdivision A in which house various offences related to the unauthorised interception of encoded 
broadcasts. In addition to creating criminal liability for accessing encoded broadcasts without the 
authority of the broadcaster, Subdivision A contains offences for dealing in the devices which enable 
unauthorised access to encoded broadcasts and for using an authorised decoder to make the 
broadcast available to non-subscribers. These offences address conduct that causes harm to 
subscription broadcasters in addition to copyright owners. With the exception of the offences in Part 
V Division 5 Subdivision D, the offences in this chapter are concerned with the subversion of the 
management and control of copyright in the marketplace, rather than the infringement of copyright 
itself.  
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Chapter 7 examines the scope of criminal liability in offences for breaching performers’ rights. Part 
XIA of the Copyright Act 1968 contains a large number of offences for infringing the rights of 
performers to authorise the recording of their performances. These offences are primarily designed 
to prevent unauthorised recordings of concerts from being commercially exploited by “bootleggers”. 
Before the advent of digital technology and the internet, there was a significant trade in vinyl 
records consisting of unauthorised recording of live performances by popular musicians. Performers’ 
rights were implemented to prevent the exploitation of these performances by individuals 
unconnected to the performer. 
The first part of Chapter 8 examines the offences doctrinally, and makes remedial recommendations 
that will cure any immediate problems in the legislation. The second part of this chapter applies the 
theoretical framework established in Chapter 3 to the offences analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The 
analysis consists of identifying the harm caused by copyright infringement, who or what is harmed, 
and measuring the magnitude of the harm. This will show whether the extent of the harm can 
legitimately justify the attachment of criminal liability in each offence section. Social norms theory 
will then be applied to the offences and will assess the probability of the offence sections being 
obeyed in the absence of detection and prosecution by law enforcement authorities. The final part 
of this chapter assesses the extent to which Australia can modify the offence sections while still 
meeting its treaty obligations. This will be used to make more substantial recommendations for 
legislative changes in the offence sections that are better supported by the social norms of 
consumers of copyright works and are more consistent with the harm principle.  
Based on the analysis of the offences conducted in Part II and the conclusions reached by the 
application of the harm principle and social norms theories in Chapter 8, Chapter 9 assesses the 
appropriateness of the scope of criminal liability in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). There is a place for 
criminalisation of copyright infringement, but great care must be taken to ensure offences for the 
infringement of copyright, and related rights, are consistent with the harm caused by the 
infringement and the social norms of those subject to the operation of the offences. A failure to take 
these factors into consideration will undermine the effectiveness of the offences.   
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PART I History and Theory 
This part examines the fundamental theoretical principles related to the thesis and the trajectory of 
the development of copyright offences. It also explores the theoretical models of: (1) the harm 
principle; (2) general deterrence theory; and (3) the social norms of groups interacting with 
copyright works.   
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Chapter 2 The Development of Copyright Offences in Australia 
[1] Introduction 
This chapter charts the expansion of the copyright offences in Australia. By chronologically tracking 
the changes to the law, a more comprehensive understanding can be gained of the factors that have 
driven the expansion of copyright offences during the last century and beyond. This will assist in 
identifying and tracing the development of the current offences and understanding the underlying 
rationales for their existence.  
There is nothing particularly novel about criminal offences for copyright infringement. Copyright law 
has almost always contained criminal provisions in some form. Even the Statute of Anne imposed 
monetary fines payable to the Crown and the copyright holder in moiety.12 The law of copyright in 
Australia has been no different.  
The copyright law of England was brought with the first British settlers to Australia in 1788. As each 
colony developed, their respective colonial Parliaments passed copyright laws. Shortly after the 
Federation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, a new national copyright Act was enacted in 
1905. Since 1905 the Australian Parliament has passed two copyright Acts. The last of these Acts, the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), is the current Act governing copyright in Australia. All of these Acts, from 
pre-Federation until the present Act,  have contained offence provisions for the infringement of 
copyright and other related rights, and for dealing in illicit copies of works. 
There were three amendments to the offence provisions between Federation and 1980. Since 1980 
there have been nine amendments that have substantially increased the both the criminal liability 
and penalties for the infringement of copyright and other related rights. Five of these amendments 
have occurred since 1998, culminating in the current offence provisions brought about by the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). The pace with which these amendments have occurred has 
principally been the result of external factors rather than deficiencies in the copyright industries. The 
                                                            
12 Copyright Act 1790, 8 Anne c.19 
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external factors, as this chapter shows, have been technological advances in reproductive and 
distribution of copyright material, and agreements that Australia has made with its trading partners. 
[2] Overview 
The critical driving force behind the development of copyright law has been facilitating the 
requirements of the various publishing industries, both at national and international levels. The 
orthodox view of copyright law suggests that without the exclusive rights granted by copyright law, 
the trade in copies of works or other subject matter would simply not be possible,13 although it has 
been posited that this is an article of faith rather than an empirical reality.14 The offence provisions 
are no different in this respect. Their rationale is to deter activities that threaten to disrupt the 
copyright system. In order to facilitate the trade in copyright works, the publishing industries have 
been heavily consulted by legislators, in some cases even drafting the laws.15 This expansion in scope 
has occurred in four dimensions: (1) the subject matter of copyright has been expanded; (2) the 
length of copyright protection has increased; (3) new types of offences have been drafted for 
conduct peripheral to the infringement of copyright and for new related rights; and (4) the 
culpability required for offences has been lowered. The absence of an organised opposition to the 
demands of the publishing industries has meant that the scope has almost never contracted.  In 
addition to expanding the scope, the penalties for the offences have also been raised, in order to 
increase their deterrent value. However, if the need for increased protection is the rationale for this 
expansion in scope, the underlying reason for the perceived need for this expansion has invariably 
been linked to technological innovations which make infringement easier. 
Technological innovation can be seen as a double edged sword for the publishing industries. It can 
create new opportunities for people to produce, copy and disseminate knowledge and 
entertainment in new forms and by using new methods. The same technology can also be used to 
infringe the rights of copyright owners. In many cases, new technological innovations have been 
invented by people from outside the publishing industries, who have treated such innovation as a 
threat to their businesses. The ultimate outcome of the application of technological innovation is 
highly unpredictable. Technologies that were initially treated as apocalyptic threats by the publishing 
                                                            
13 Fitzgerald, A. and Fitzgerald, B., Intellectual Property in Principle (2004) 10; Landes, W.M and Posner, R.A. , 
‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 325, 326  
14 Atkinson, B. The True History of Copyright: the Australian Experience 1905-2005 (2007)  6 
15 See Samuelson, P., ‘Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?’ in Takeyama, L. et al (eds), 
Developments in the Economics of Copyright (2005) 1; Litman J., Digital Copyright (2001); Patry, W.F., 
‘Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective’ (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law 
Journal 139 
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industries have in retrospect been of great benefit to the industry when they are harnessed for the 
creation of new markets and products.16 
[3] Pre-Federation 
Before Australian Commonwealth was formed in 1901, several Australian states had enacted their 
own copyright laws, some of which contained criminal sanctions for infringement. The Copyright 
Registration Act 1887 (Qld) contained an offence of wilfully tendering a false entry in the copyright 
register, punishable by up to three years imprisonment.17 The Copyright Act 1895 (WA) contained 
two offences, both of which were punishable upon summary conviction by a penalty of up to 10 
pounds.18 The Copyright Act 1890 (Vic) was fairly comprehensive. In addition to books,19 designs20 
and works of fine art21 were both capable of copyright protection. Each of these categories had its 
own criminal offence with infringement of a design being the most severely punished by a fine of up 
to 50 pounds.22 The Copyright Act 1878 (SA)23 was very similar to the Victorian statute and contained 
identical offences and penalties. Even before Federation, it is clear that the colonies of Australia had 
accepted a need for copyright legislation and the need for criminal sanctions to encourage 
compliance.  
[4] The Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) 
The first Federal copyright law, the Copyright Act 1905 (Cth), contained a single summary offence for 
dealings in “pirated books” or “pirated artistic works”, punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than five pounds. Pirated books and artistic works were defined as reproductions made in any 
manner without the authority of the owner of the copyright.24 The various types of offending 
dealings with these books or artistic works were not dissimilar to the contemporary offences: selling; 
letting for hire; exposing, offering or keeping (possessing) for sale or hire; distributing; or exhibiting 
                                                            
16 See for example, the reaction of the Motion Picture Association of America to the video cassette recorder, 
discussed below at paragraph [7]. 
17 The Copyright Registration Act 1887 (Qld), 51 Vic. No.2  s 11 
18 Copyright Act 1895 (WA), 59 Vic No. 24  ss 15 and 16 
19 Copyright Act 1890 (Vic), 54 Vic No. 1076  s 15 
20 Copyright Act 1890 (Vic), 54 Vic No. 1076  s 4 
21 Copyright Act 1890 (Vic), 54 Vic No. 1076 s 37 
22 Copyright Act 1890 (Vic), 54 Vic No. 1076  s 11 
23 Copyright Act 1878 (SA), 41 & 42 Vic No.96 
24 Copyright Act 1905 (Cth), 5 Edw.VII c25  s 4 
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in public were all forbidden if the article was a pirated book or artistic work. 25 The term of the 
copyright under the Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) was far shorter than under subsequent Acts. The 
Australian Parliament adopted the copyright term of the Copyright Act 1842 (Imp):26 the life of the 
author and seven years, or forty-two years, whichever was the longer.27   
[5] The Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) 
After the passing of the Copyright Act 1911 (Imp)28 in the United Kingdom parliament, the Australian 
Parliament adopted the imperial law by enacting the Copyright Act 1912.29 Section 11(1) of the 
Copyright Act 1911 (Imp) contained several summary offences,30 most of which were already part 
the Copyright Act 1905 (Cth). Curiously, the making of an infringing copy for sale or hire did not 
constitute an offence until it was included the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth).31 The various types of 
prohibited conduct under these offence provisions have remained virtually unchanged in the 
                                                            
25 Copyright Act 1905 (Cth), 5 Edw.VII c25 s 50 (“If any person – sells, or lets for hire, or exposes offers or keeps 
for sale or hire, any pirated book or any pirated artistic work; or distributes, or exhibits in public, any pirated 
book or any pirated artistic work; or imports into Australia any pirated book or any pirated artistic work, he 
shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding Five pounds for each 
copy of such pirated book or pirated artistic work dealt with in contravention of this section, and also forfeit to 
the owner of the copyright every such copy so dealt with, and also to forfeit the plates, blocks, stone, matrix, 
negative, or thing, if any, from which the pirated book or pirated artistic work was printed or made”) 
26 Copyright Act 1842 (Imp), 5 & 6 Vict. c45 
27 See Atkinson, B., The True History of Copyright: the Australian Experience 1905-2005 (2007) 37 – 41 for a 
detailed discussion of the events and debate about the length of the copyright term.  
28 Copyright Act 1911 (Imp), 1 & 2 Geo.V c46 
29 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20 s 8 
30 Copyright Act 1911 (Imp), 1 & 2 Geo.V c46 s 11 (“(1) If any person knowingly – (a) makes for sale or hire any 
infringing copy of a work in which copyright subsists; or (b) sells or lets for hire, or by way of trade exposes or 
offers for sale or hire any infringing copy of any such work; or (c) distributes infringing copies of any such work 
either for the purposes of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright; or (d) 
by way of trade exhibits in public any infringing copy of any such work; or (e) imports for sale or hire into the 
United Kingdom any infringing copy of any such work, he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act, and be 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding forty shillings for every copy dealt with in contravention 
of this section, but not exceeding fifty pounds in respect of the same transaction; or in the case of a second or 
subsequent offence, either to such a fine or to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not 
exceeding two months. (2) If any person knowingly makes or has in his possession any plate for the purpose of 
making infringing copies of any work in which copyright subsists, or knowingly, and for his private profit causes 
any such work to be performed in public without the consent of the owner of the copyright, he shall be guilty 
of an offence under this Act, and be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or in 
the case of a second or subsequent offence, either to such a fine or to imprisonment with or without hard 
labour for a term not exceeding two months. (3) The court before which any such proceedings are taken may, 
whether the alleged offender is convicted or not, order that all copies of the work or all plates in the 
possession of the alleged offender, which appear to it to be infringing copies, be destroyed or delivered up to 
the owner of the copyright or otherwise dealt with as the court may think fit. (4) Nothing in this section shall, 
as respects musical works affect the provisions of The Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act, 1902, or 
the Musical Copyright Act, 1906.” 
31 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20 The Schedule, s 11(1)(a) 
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copyright law of several former members of the British Empire. A new offence was added under s 
11(2) for making or possessing of a plate for the purposes of making infringing copies, or for causing 
a public performance of a work knowingly and for personal profit.32 
The Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) incorporated section 11 verbatim, except for subsection (4), which was 
of no application in Australia since neither the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act 1902 
(England and Wales)33 nor the Musical Copyright Act 1906 (England and Wales)34 were adopted into 
Australian law. One of the major changes the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) brought about was the 
extension of the copyright term to the life of the author and fifty years, extending the scope of the 
criminal provisions. Another major change that dramatically altered the scope of the offence 
provisions was the granting of mechanical rights,35 which meant that recordings of literary, dramatic 
or musical works were both protected by copyright and subject to the offence provisions. 
However, a minor change ran against the general rule and contracted the scope of the offences to a 
in one aspect. Under the Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) it was an offence to distribute a pirated work or 
book. The distribution under that Act was not qualified, but under the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) the 
distribution had to be either for the purposes of trade or to such an extent as to prejudicially affect 
the owner of the copyright.36 A great many of the countries which adopted the Copyright Act 1911 
(Imp) still retain an offence for distributing an infringing copy to such an extent as to affect 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright37, with the notable exception of New Zealand which limits 
criminal distribution offences to commercial infringement38. The non-commercial distribution of 
infringing copies has really only in recent times come to the fore, due to the ease with which digital 
material can be disseminated over the internet.39 
The penalty for summary conviction under either s 11(1) or (2) was a fine of 40 shillings for each 
copy dealt with, not exceeding fifty pounds for the same transaction. A second or subsequent 
offence was punishable by the same fine or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding two months 
with or without hard labour. This was the first time that a person was capable of being imprisoned 
                                                            
32 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20 The Schedule, s 11(2) 
33 Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act 1902 (England and Wales), 2 Edw.VII c15 
34 Musical Copyright Act 1906 (England and Wales), 6 Edw.VII c36 
35 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20 The Schedule, s 2(d) 
36 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20 The Schedule, s 11(1)(c) 
37 Examples include countries such as Canada (s 42(1)(c) Copyright Act 1985) and Saint Lucia (s 52(1)(d) 
Copyright Act 1995) 
38 Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand), s 198(1)(d)(iii) 
39 For example, the case of Hong Kong v Chan Nai Ming [2005] HKLRD 142, where the defendant was convicted 
under the equivalent offence in the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance.  
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for a copyright offence in Australia and represented a significant enhancement to the penalty 
provision. 
The development of technological innovations such as cinema, radio and television in the years 
between the enactment of the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) and the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) also 
caused great difficulties for copyright law. However the disputes that they caused between 
broadcasters and copyright owners were settled through licensing and royalty collection rather than 
through changes to the criminal law.40 However, the cases of radio and television first illustrate the 
concept of new technology broadening the range of possible conduct that could constitute an 
offence, since the playing copyrighted work on a radio or television set in public, knowingly and for 
private profit, would have constituted an offence under the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), The Schedule, 
s 11(2). Rather than the law moving to capture the new conduct, the new conduct strayed into the 
realm of the offence.   
[6] The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
The criminal provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), as passed, were not substantially different 
from those of the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), except the offences became housed in s 13241 and the 
penalty provisions for those offences were contained in s 133.42 By this time it had been firmly 
established that sound recordings and cinematographic films were subject matters capable of 
                                                            
40 For a full discussion of these events see Atkinson, B. The True History of Copyright: the Australian Experience 
1905-2005 (2007)  112 - 136 
41 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132 (circa 1968) (“(1) A person shall not, at a time when copyright subsists in a 
work- (a) make an article for sale or hire; (b)  sell or let for hire, or by way of trade offer or expose for sale or 
hire, an article; (c)  by way of trade exhibit an article in public; or (d)  import an article into Australia for the 
purpose of- (i)  selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale or hire, the article; (ii)  
distributing the article for the purpose of trade, or for any other purpose to an extent that will affect 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright in the work; or (iii)  by way of trade exhibiting the article in public, if he 
knows the article to be an infringing copy of the work. (2) A person shall not, at a time when copyright subsists 
in a work, distribute - (a) for the purpose of trade; or (b)  for any other purpose to an extent that affects 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright, an article that he knows to be an infringing copy of the work. (3) A 
person shall not, at a time when copyright subsists in a work, make or have in his possession a plate knowing 
that it is to be used for making infringing copies of the work. (4) The last three preceding sub-sections apply in 
relation to copyright subsisting in any subject-matter by virtue of Part IV in like manner as they apply in 
relation to copyright subsisting in a work by virtue of Part III. (5) A person shall not cause a literary, dramatical 
or musical work to be performed in public, knowing that copyright subsists in the work and that the 
performance constitutes an infringement of the copyright. (6) This section applies only in respect of acts done 
in Australia.”) 
42 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133 (circa 1968) 
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copyright protection and the new Act dedicated a new Part IV to the rights in these subject matters. 
The offence section made it expressly clear that they were to apply to Part IV subject matter.43 
The scope of the offences was broadened slightly by altering what the purpose for importing an 
infringing copy had to be before an offence was committed. Under the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) it 
had been an offence to import an infringing copy for the purpose of selling or letting it for hire.44 
Under the new Act, this was extended to importations for the purpose of:45 (1) by way of trade, 
offering or exposing the copy for sale or hire; (2) distributing the article for the purpose of trade or 
any other purpose to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright; or (3) by way 
of trade, exhibiting the article in public. A person was required to know that the imported article was 
an infringing copy before criminal liability was attracted.46 
The penalty for a first conviction was extended to ten pounds for each infringing article,47 not 
exceeding two hundred pounds for the same transaction.48 Second or subsequent offences could 
alternatively be punished by a term of imprisonment of not exceeding two months, 49 as they could 
under the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth). 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) is the same Act that we have today in Australia. However, there have 
been a substantial number of amendments to the Act, but only some have amended the offence 
provisions. These amendments have largely been in reaction to a perceived problem caused by the 
use of a new technological innovation or an unfavourable court judgment. Other amendments which 
have changed the offence provisions have been made to fulfil international treaty obligations. 
[7] The Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) 
The invention and marketing of the video cassette recorder (“VCR”) 50 in the late 1970s caused 
considerable concern to the motion picture industry, which saw it as a serious threat to its business. 
VCRs were capable of recording motion pictures from television broadcasts, which could be copied 
and distributed, or kept privately as an archive. The motion picture industry approved of neither of 
these activities, but was particularly concerned about the implications on television aftermarkets. In 
                                                            
43 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132(4) (circa 1968) 
44 Copyright Act 1912 (Cth), 3 Geo.V c20  The Schedule, s (11)(1)(e) 
45 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132(1)(d) (circa 1968) 
46 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132(1)(d)(iii) (circa 1968) 
47 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133(1)(a) (circa 1968) 
48 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133(2) (circa 1968) 
49 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133(1)(b) (circa 1968) 
50 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Videocassette_recorder (Accessed 11 July 2008) 
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the United States, the long-time president of the Motion Picture Association of America Jack Valenti 
gave testimony before the House of Representatives Home Recording of Copyrighted Works hearings 
in 1982. His apocalyptic testimony represented the concerns of the industry at the time. He stated: 
“…now we are facing a very new and a very troubling assault on our fiscal security, on our 
very economic life and we are facing it from a thing called the video cassette recorder and its 
necessary companion called the blank tape. And it is like a great tidal wave just off the 
shore. This video cassette recorder and the blank tape threaten profoundly the life-
sustaining protection, I guess you would call it, on which copyright owners depend, on which 
film people depend, on which television people depend and it is called copyright [...] these 
machines are advertised for one purpose in life. Their only single mission, their primary 
mission is to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people. I don't have to go into 
it. The ads are here. Here is Sony that tells you that you can record one channel while 
watching another. You can program to record a variety of shows on four different channels 
for up to 14 days in advance if you like [...]I say to you that the VCR is to the American film 
producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”51 
The impact of Valenti’s testimony was somewhat deflated by the following exchange with 
Congressman Robert Kastenmeier: 
“Mr. Kastenmeier: Jack, let me ask you. Do you consider yourself and your family infringers 
when you engage in that practice?  
Mr. Valenti: I consider myself and my family believing what the plaintiffs in this lawsuit said 
and they said publicly, they have said it to the press, they have said it to the lawyers, they 
have said it to the courts. They do not intend to file any actions against homeowners now or 
in the future. I mean, that is obvious and they have said that publicly, Mr. Chairman, so I 
believe them. As far as I am concerned, I am going to continue taping because the plaintiffs 
have said they aren't going to do anything to me. I am not committing any crime. They know 
that.  
Mr. Kastenmeier: That wasn't my question.  
Mr. Valenti: Do I consider myself an infringer?  
                                                            
51 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. 1983. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works. 97th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 12 April 1982. Available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (Accessed 11 July 2008) 
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Mr. Kastenmeier: When you engage in such practice.  
Mr. Valenti: Yes, sir, I do. I am taking somebody else's copyrighted material without their 
consent and I know damn well I am infringing. But as far as court action or anything else, I 
am safe. First, it is not a criminal act. Again, the opposition would tell you video, police, and 
criminals. They show an astonishing lack of the copyright law. They know good and well that 
that is not a criminal infringement unless you do it for profit. But on the other hand the 
plaintiffs have said they are moving against anybody in the homes. There is no problem, but 
I know and everybody else knows they are infringing.” 52  
While this hearing had no direct effect on the Australian legislature, it provides a vivid illustration of 
the level of concern that the VCR initially caused the motion picture industry and the lobbying 
process that occurs when new copying technologies emerge. The VCR did not have the destructive 
consequence on the motion picture industry that Valenti portended, instead becoming a lucrative 
aftermarket for motion pictures.  
The Australian response in 1980 to the “problem” of the VCR was to increase the penalty for an 
offence under ss 132(1) or (2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to $150 per infringing article,53 and to 
increase the penalty to $1500 if the article was a cinematograph film.54 Second or subsequent 
offences under either subsection could alternatively be punishable by up to six months 
imprisonment,55 increasing the maximum term of imprisonment threefold.  
[8] The Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) 
In 1984, further amendments were made to include provisions related to the transmission of 
computer programs and the advertisement for supply of infringing copies of computer programs. 
These provisions were a direct response to the judgment of Beaumont J in Apple Computer Inc v 
Computer Edge Pty Ltd56. Beaumont J had held in the case that none of the computer programs in 
the case were literary works under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)57 and that the omission by 
Parliament to make any reference to computers or computer equipment meant computer programs 
                                                            
52 U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. 1983. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works. 97th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 12 April 1982. Available at http://cryptome.org/hrcw-hear.htm (Accessed 11 July 2008) 
53 Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) s 18, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 133 
54 Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) s 18, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133  
55 Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) s 18, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 133 
56 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 353 
57 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 353, 354 
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were not afforded copyright protection58. Although the decision was overturned in the Full Federal 
Court59, the Australian Parliament was sufficiently concerned about the implications for the 
Australian software industry that the Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) was passed the week 
after the Full Federal Court handed down its decision. The Australian Parliament had correctly 
assessed the fragility of the Full Federal Court decision because it was subsequently overturned by 
the High Court of Australia.60 In addition to expressly extending the definition of literary work to 
include computer programs, the amendment added another subsection to the offence provisions 
contained in s 132: 
“(5A) For the purposes of this section, a transmission by a person of a computer program 
that is received and recorded so as to result in the creation of an infringing copy of the 
computer program shall be deemed to be a distribution by the person of that infringing 
copy.”61 
This amendment meant that the distribution offence in s 132(2) could be applied to cases of 
software transmitted by telephone modems, an activity that would eventually progress to the 
transmission of other digital works through the Internet. The addition of a new s 133A also made it a 
criminal offence to advertise for the supply of infringing computer programs, which was penalised by 
a fine of $1500 for a first offence and the same fine or imprisonment for six months for a second or 
subsequent offence. 62 
[9] The Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) 
A significant change to the scope of all offences under s 132 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) was 
made by the passing of the Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth). Prior to the amendment, part of 
the mens rea of subsections (1) and (2) was the requirement of actual knowledge that the article in 
question was an infringing copy. The amendment broadened the mens rea of the offence by 
substituting the words “he knows” to “the person knows, or ought reasonably to know”. 63 In 
addition to broadening the mens rea of the offences, the Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) also 
broadened the range of conduct that could constitute an offence by criminalising the possession of 
                                                            
58 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 353, 354 
59 Apple Computer Inc v Computer Edge Pty Ltd (1984) 2 IPR 1 
60 Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1986) 6 IPR 1 
61 Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth)  s 5, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132 
62 Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth)  s 6, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132 
63 Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth)  s 15, amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132 
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infringing copies for the purposes of either: 64 (1)  selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering 
or exposing for sale or hire (2)  distributing the article for the purpose of trade, or for any other 
purpose to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright in the work; or (3) by 
way of trade exhibiting the article in public. This offence section was housed in s 132(2A). 
The effect of these changes is illustrated by the case of Pontello v Giannotis,65 which was the first 
reported prosecution under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) after the passing of the Copyright 
Amendment Act 1986 (Cth). The principle issue in the case was the question of the knowledge of the 
defendant66. Giannotis was a partner in a video hire business who was found to be in possession of a 
number of infringing copies of copyrighted work for the purpose of letting them for hire, contrary to 
the new s 132(2A).  
Giannotis had acquired infringing copies of some films that had been stolen from his shop67 from a 
contact called “Mimo”68. In his police interview, Giannotis reported the conversation during the 
transaction between himself and Mimo as being: 
“[I said] What did you do, he said don’t ask me questions you’re happy, I say of course I’m 
happy, how much cost, he said nothing only if you like to swap some of your movies for 
some of my movies, and after that we started to swap some movies”69 
It was held that the prosecution had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Giannotis ought to 
have known that each of the articles were infringing copies for a number of reasons: his history in 
the video industry; his knowledge of copyright and pirate copies; his knowledge that videos could be 
copied and the unlikelyhood of not appreciating the danger of dealing with a vendor of secondhand 
tapes70. Sheppard J stated: 
“I must confess that the case for holding that there is here demonstrated actual knowledge 
is a strong one, but I must bear in mind, as I have indicated, that the tapes which were 
purchased from Mr Mimo, who said to the defendant to ask him no questions, were not 
necessarily all the tapes which are the subject of the charge. The evidence does not enable 
one to tell. In the result I have reached the conclusion that I ought not to find actual 
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knowledge but I do, as I say, find that the defendant ought reasonably to have known that 
each of the articles was an infringing copy of the films in question”71 
The prosecution had relied on the authority72 of Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v Roper73, in 
which Devlin J (later Lord Devlin) had discussed the various legal classes of “knowledge”. Devlin J 
stated in that case that the words “ought reasonably to know” encompass constructive knowledge, 
which is merely neglecting to make such enquiries as a reasonable and prudent person would make, 
and that generally constructive knowledge has no place in the criminal law.74 Giannotis was 
sentenced to be bound over for three years and ordered to pay costs of $6500. In the conclusion of 
his judgment Sheppard J commented upon the evidentiary difficulties of proving that a defendant 
possessed the required degree of knowledge of the status of the infringing copy. He stated that 
there the lack of familiarity with copyright was a problem in the video hire industry and it would be 
desirable for the Australian Film and Video Security Office to prepare a short explanation document 
for video hire shop owners. He suggested the video hire industry would be helped by this 
knowledge, and additionally it would be easier to prove a shop owner or employee had constructive 
knowledge that an article was an infringing copy in the event of a prosecution.75 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) allowed prosecutions to be brought against shop owners 
such as Giannotis without the need for trap purchases or witnessing transactions. An investigator 
could gather sufficient evidence from an inspection of the premises, and if the owner or employee of 
the shop was still in possession of the infringing copies when the police visited, they could usually be 
successfully prosecuted without the need to prove that the copies had been sold, hired, distributed 
or exhibited. 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) implemented a number of other changes to the offence 
provisions.  It was thought that the scope of the offence of causing a performance in public would be 
inappropriately wide if the standard mens rea element of “ought to know” was applied to the 
offence.76 To counter-balance the effect of the change to the mens rea element, the circumstances 
in which the conduct had to occur were altered from “in public” to “in public at a place of public 
entertainment”.77 A place of public entertainment was defined as including any premises that are 
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occupied principally for purposes other than public entertainment but are from time to time made 
available for hire for purposes of public entertainment.78 A new subsection 132(5AA) also made it an 
offence to cause the performance of a sound recording or a film at a place of public entertainment.79 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1986 (Cth) also made substantial changes to the penalties for the 
offences.80 The penalty for a first offence was raised to a $500 fine per article for an offence 
committed by a natural person and a $2500 fine for an offence committed by a body corporate. If 
the article was a cinematographic film, the penalty for an offence committed by a natural person 
could also be punished by not more than two years imprisonment, in addition to the existing $1500 
fine for each infringing article. The fine for a body corporate was raised to a $7500 fine per infringing 
copy of a cinematographic film. For second or subsequent offences, the penalty for natural persons 
was raised to $500 per infringing article, or $1500 per article and/or five years imprisonment if the 
infringing article was a cinematographic film. The fine for second or subsequent offences committed 
by a body corporate was also enhanced for cinematographic films: $15000 per infringing article as 
opposed to $5000 in any other case. 
[10] The Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) created a number of offences which were designed to 
strengthen the protection for performers.81 The penalties for contravening these offences were 
prescribed in s 248R and varied in severity according to factors such as the status of the defendant, 
whether the offence was a first or subsequent offence, whether the infringing article was a sound 
recording or a cinematograph film and in which court the person or corporation was prosecuted.82 
The amendment as a whole (inclusive of the civil penalties) was ostensibly implemented to allow 
Australia to ratify83 the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations84. However under the convention Australia is only 
obligated to implement civil laws to protect performance; there is no obligation to provide criminal 
laws. 
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One of the more interesting aspects to this amendment is that the offences in s 248P were intended 
to be strict liability offences. Section 277 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright 
Amendment Bill stated: 
“The offences contained in [ss 248P(1) to (4)] are intended to be of a strict liability nature 
and not to be subject to proof of the defendant’s actual or imputed knowledge. As 
unauthorised recording, broadcasting and transmission are practices which are not only 
direct breaches of the rights conferred on performers but are obviously fundamental to 
enabling the profit-oriented offences to occur, it was considered appropriate to impose 
strict liability in order to deter potential offenders”85 
However, the legislation as enacted did not explicitly state that the offences were offences of strict 
liability, and it is unlikely that a court would have held that the construction of the relevant sections 
required the assistance of extrinsic material.86 In the absence of an express mens rea element, the 
courts have consistently held that the mens rea should be implied, unless it can be shown that 
Parliament had intended otherwise. In Sweet v Parsley87, the defendant had been charged with 
being concerned in the management of premises which were used for the purpose of smoking 
cannabis under s 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 (England and Wales). Section 5(b) did not 
specify a mens rea element. Reid LJ said: 
“[...] it is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential ingredient of 
every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that that is not necessary. It is 
also firmly established that the fact that other sections of the Act expressly require mens 
rea, for example because they contain the word "knowingly", is not in itself sufficient to 
justify a decision that a section which is silent as to mens rea creates an absolute offence. In 
the absence of a clear indication in the Act that an offence is intended to be an absolute 
offence, it is necessary to go outside the Act and examine all relevant circumstances in order 
to establish that this must have been the intention of Parliament. I say "must have been", 
because it is a universal principle that if a penal provision is reasonably capable of two 
interpretations, that interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be 
adopted.”88 
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Lord Morris agreed with Reid LJ: 
“[...] it has frequently been affirmed and should unhesitatingly be recognised that it is a 
cardinal principle of our law that mens rea, an evil intention or a knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of the act, is in all ordinary cases an essential ingredient of guilt of a criminal 
offence. If follows from this that there will not be guilt of an offence created by statute 
unless there is mens rea or unless Parliament has by the statute enacted that guilt may be 
established in cases where there is no mens rea.”89 
The Australian case of He Kaw Teh v R90 also held that there is a presumption that mens rea is an 
essential ingredient in every offence, including offences created by statute.91 As is the case with 
many of the criminal provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the matter was never judicially 
considered and subsequent amendments have made the possibility of strict liability under the 
provisions a moot point. However, it is clear that the scope of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) was once again expanded, this time by creating an entirely new scheme of offences. 
[11] The Copyright Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) 
The Copyright Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) made major alterations to the existing penalties for both 
the new offence provisions created by Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) and the established 
offence provisions under ss 132 and 133A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The Explanatory 
Memorandum explains that this was done in response to industry concerns about piracy and for a 
consistent approach to penalties.92 
The penalties for offences under ss 132,248P, 248Q and 248QA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were 
raised to a fine of not more than $55,000 which was expressed in penalty units in accordance with 
Commonwealth criminal law policy. 93 Penalty units were introduced in 1992 by the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) with a penalty unit valued at $100.94 This was raised to $110 
by the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Cth).95 The fines were therefore 
expressed as 550 penalty units. The distinction between first and subsequent offences, and between 
                                                            
89 Sweet v Parsley [1969] 1 All ER 347, 352 
90 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 60 ALR 449 
91 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 60 ALR 449, 449 
92 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (No 2) (Cth)  15 
93 Copyright Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) ss 1,4,5 and 6 amending Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 132, 248P, 248Q 
and 248QA 
94 Crimes Legislation Act 1992 (Cth) s 19 amending Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
95 Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997 (Cth), sch 1(9), amending Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)  s 4AA 
Are the Offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) Legitimate and Effective? An Analysis in Harm and 
Social Norms Theory 
 
26 
cinematographic films and other subject matter or works, was removed. In addition to the increased 
fine, individuals could also be imprisoned for up to five years for any of the offences except s 133A. 
In the context of the criminal law this was quite extraordinary, since the offences remained 
summary offences. Under s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914, all offences against the Commonwealth that 
are punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve months are indictable offences, unless the 
contrary intention appears. 96 The difference between a conviction on indictment and a summary 
conviction is important, since the Australian Constitution on guarantees a jury trial for offences 
against the Commonwealth tried on indictment.97 The amended Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) did 
indicate that the offences could be tried summarily, so the right to a jury trial was effectively 
negated despite the severity of the penalty. 
Due to the operation s 4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the maximum fine for a corporation could 
be five times the pecuniary penalty imposed on an individual, but only if a court saw fit.98 The 
penalty for an offence under s 133A was also raised to 15 penalty units and/or six months 
imprisonment for an individual and 150 penalty units for a corporation.99 
After these amendments, the penalties for offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were at their 
peak in relation to the culpability required by the offences. It was not until the Copyright 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) created tiered offences that the penalty for summary offences was 
reduced to two years imprisonment. 
[12] The Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) 
The rapid developments in communications technologies and digital technology prompted the 
Australian Parliament to pass the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth).100 During 
the mid to late 1990s the VCR was being replaced by the DVD, vinyl records and magnetic tapes had 
largely been replaced by CDs, personal computers had greatly improved computing power and as 
such were capable of playing CDs and DVD, and Internet connections were made available to 
domestic users. These technological developments meant that there was little or no cost associated 
with the transmission of multiple infringing copies of copyright material,101 and protection systems 
for digital products such as DVDs could be circumvented by computers. The greatest strength of 
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digital products is also its greatest weakness: digital reproduction enables lossless reproduction.102 
This is advantageous to manufacturers in that the quality of the product can be maintained, since 
each copy of a digitally processed work is the same as another. However, this also means that illicit 
copies of digital media are of the same high quality, to the extent that they can substitute for the 
genuine article. 
The use of technological protection measures to prevent and deter copying has not been successful. 
For example, the motion picture industry instituted a technological protection measure called the 
Content Scramble System which was designed to prevent the playback of DVDs that lacked an 
encrypted key which could be any one of 1,099,511,627,776 different keys. In October 1999 a 
computer program called DeCSS103 was released via an Internet mailing list called LiViD. The program 
enabled a personal computer to decrypt the Content Scramble System on a commercial DVD. Once 
the Content Scramble System is decrypted it is possible to make a perfect reproduction of the DVD. 
One of the programmers responsible for the DeCSS program was a Norwegian teenager called Jon 
Lech Johansen 104, who was unsuccessfully prosecuted by the Norwegian authorities for his 
involvement. The compromise of the CSS system is but one example of what has been characterised 
as a technological arms race105 between the publishing industries and computer hackers to prevent 
the infringement of copyright. One security expert has been quoted as saying a solution to the 
problem is impossible, akin to “making water not wet”.106 
To address these problems, the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act created a number of 
new offences concerning: (1) circumvention services and devices;107 (2) the removal or alteration of 
electronic rights management information;108 (3) dealings in copies after the removal or alteration of 
electronic rights management information;109  and (4) dealing in and using broadcast decoding 
devices.110 No offence was created by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 for the 
private use of broadcast decoding devices, but under the new s 135ANA of the Copyright Act 1968 it 
was offence to use such a device for commercial purposes. 
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The penalties for offences committed under ss 132(1), (2) and (2A) were enhanced by the new 
s 133(6AA), if the article was an infringing copy because it was made by converting a work or other 
subject-matter from a hardcopy or an analogue form into a digital or other electronic machine-
readable form.111 The new penalty did not change the maximum term of imprisonment available, 
but raised the fine from 550 penalty points to 850 penalty points.112 
[13] The Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Cth) 
In addition to changing evidentiary presumptions to the ownership of copyright in works or other 
subject matter,113 the Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Cth) amended s 133A 
of the Copyright Act (1968) (Cth).114 Until this point s 133A only applied to the advertisement of 
computer software, but after the Act was passed the section applied to all infringing copies of works 
and other subject matter. 
[14] The US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) and 
the Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) 
The next amendment to the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) occurred as a result of the 
Australia – US Free Trade Agreement,115 which was ratified by the US Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act 2004 (Cth). To implement Australia’s treaty obligations, the Act expanded the 
criminal provisions related to encoded broadcasts, making it an offence to receive or distribute 
encoded broadcasts.116 The offences in relation to electronic rights management information were 
also expanded by making it an offence not only to deal in infringing copies that had information 
removed or altered, but by dealing in the information itself.117  
The offences under s 132 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were also amended to include the words 
“with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit” were the offence had a trade 
element.118 This particular amendment had the unintended consequence that the scope of the 
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offences was temporarily narrowed, since instead of amending the offences to read “or with the 
intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit”, they instead read “and with the intention 
of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit”. This embarrassing oversight was remedied by the 
passing of the Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) which amended “and” to “or” in all 
instances where this occurred.119 
A new offence was created which made it an offence to engage in any conduct that resulted in an 
infringement of copyright, which had a substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner and 
occurred on a commercial scale.120 Quite obviously this broadened the scope of the offence 
provisions massively. The section was drafted to satisfy Article 17.11.26(a) which requires criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied for “wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale”121 which 
includes “significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no direct or indirect motivation of 
financial gain”.122 Rather than examine the scope of the existing provisions and fill any gaps, this 
offence was simply overlaid to satisfy the treaty obligation. It is arguable that it went further than 
was necessary. The copyright legislation of the United States was not amended to mirror the same 
scope as this new offence. 
Perhaps the greatest change in the scope of the criminal offences was the extension of the term of 
copyright to the lifetime of the author and seventy years123 or seventy years from the date of first 
publication or performance.124 
[15] The Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
The most recent changes to the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) were made by the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). The Act restructured most of the existing offences to a tiered 
system of culpability consisting of indictable offences, summary offences and strict liability offences. 
The explanations given for these amendments were: (1) they would provide police and prosecutors 
with a wider range of penalty options to pursue against suspected offenders depending on the 
seriousness of the conduct;125 (2) they would draw a clear line between indictable and summary 
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offences, as they were previously inconsistent with the standard Commonwealth criminal law policy 
in s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth);126 and (3) the tiering of the offences would ensure that 
penalties were reflective of the moral culpability of a particular offence.127 While the culpability 
required for the offences carrying the penalty of five years imprisonment were slightly stricter after 
the Act, therefore narrowing the scope of the higher tier offences, the inclusion of the strict liability 
offences meant that the overall scope of the offences is exponentially broader. Since the passing of 
the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), a person who does not even know of the existence of 
copyright law can be held criminally liable for a variety of dealings in infringing articles. Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 of this thesis will examine the scope of the contemporary offences in detail, including the 
scope of the strict liability offences. 
[16] Conclusion   
This chapter demonstrated that the relentless increase in the role criminal law has played in the 
Australian law of copyright has been prompted by technological advancements and trade 
agreements. The most telling aspect of this widening in scope is the frequency in changes that have 
occurred over the past thirty years.  
Between 1905 and 1980 there were only three amendments to the law, and the changes were 
relatively insignificant. Beginning with the Copyright Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) there were nine 
amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Each amendment has broadened the scope of the 
offences or increased the severity of the penalties, culminating in the overhaul of the offence 
provisions in the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).  
The increase in frequency correlates to increases in two other factors: the power and availability of 
copying and distributive technology, and the volume of copyright infringement that this has enabled 
to occur. If increasing the scope of the offences and the severity of the penalties were genuinely 
intended to curtail copyright infringement and the availability of infringing copies, it would be fair to 
say this objective has not been achieved.  
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Background 
[1] Introduction 
There has been a steady increase in the scope of conduct that attracts criminal liability under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Often there is no clear delineation between infringing conduct that can 
either be prosecuted as a criminal offence128 or pursued civilly by the copyright owner or licensee.129 
In many cases there is either significant or complete overlap between civil and criminal infringement 
provisions. The broadening of the scope of copyright offences has the effect of transferring the 
responsibility for both deterring and remedying infringement from copyright owners to the 
Australian government. During the same time period that there has been an increase in the scope of 
criminal liability, the actual physical ability to reproduce and distribute copies of digitised works by 
domestic actors has increased exponentially. Together, this means that many more people have the 
capability130 to engage in conduct, in their own homes, that can constitute serious criminal 
offences.131  
In order to assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of the offence provisions, two theories stand out 
as the most suitable to apply. The first theoretical concept is the ‘harm principle’ from the work of 
the late Professor Joel Feinberg, who set out the principles by which the extent of legitimate criminal 
liability can be measured. The application of this theory in this thesis is used to measure the 
legitimate limits of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). If each offence cannot be 
legitimately justified, it will mean that the Australian Parliament has curtailed the liberty of its 
citizens unreasonably.   
The second theoretical concept is social norms theory. Social norms theory explains that the 
regulatory mechanism of the law is not the sole governing force in the behaviour of individuals. 
More often their behaviour is regulated by the standards and sanctions applied to their conduct by 
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their social groups: the social norms of a group. While there is no clear consensus about how 
originate, it is common ground that they evolve to maximise the welfare of the group.  This theory 
can be used to predict how effective the copyright offences will be in deterring infringement. 
The Commonwealth Constitution grants the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make laws 
with respect to copyright for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth. 132 
Although the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia have consistently refused to restrict the 
power of Parliament through the interpretation of these words,133 the enactment of criminal 
offences that are unjustified would not advance the purposes for which the power has been granted. 
If there is a fundamental theoretical flaw in the offences, this will prevent them from being effective 
in controlling behaviour that infringes copyright and other related rights.  
[2] The Harm Principle 
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill sought to find a principle which governed the legitimate limit in 
exercising the power of the state over an individual.134 Mill was the first to propose that this 
limitation should be informed by whether or not the conduct of an individual caused harm to 
another person or the state. Mill’s theory was equally applicable to both criminal law and civil law. 
Building on Mill’s work, Professor Joel Feinberg provided an extensive theoretical consideration of 
this concept of harm in his four volume work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, published 
between 1984 and 1988.135 As the title suggests, Feinberg follows the work of Mill in seeking to find 
a legitimate limitation on the exercise of state power, but confines his enquiry to the application of 
criminal offences. In the first volume of Feinberg’s thesis, his basic contention is that criminalisation 
of a given conduct can only be justified if it wrongfully causes substantial harm to others.136 Feinberg 
developed this basic premise in various situations such as harm as setback to interests,137 failure to 
prevent harm138 and harm as wronging.139 Feinberg’s thesis is primarily confined to what he termed 
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“natural” crimes. He proposed that crimes created to enforce regulatory schemes and legal 
remedies, such as contempt of court, tax evasion, and licence violations, are “artificial” and 
derivative of the underlying scheme or substantive law that the criminal law supplements. In order 
to establish moral legitimacy for these types of crime, there must be adequate justification for the 
scheme or program that the criminalisation seeks to support.140 
Feinberg’s thesis has been criticised by a number of commentators since its publication as being 
incomplete,141 most notably by Bernard Harcourt, who goes as far as contending that the harm 
principle has been collapsed by the cacophony of competing harms.142 While this criticism is 
justified, the theory is still useful in highlighting conduct that cannot meet the necessary, but not 
sufficient, requirement of non-trivial harm, rather than using it as a guide for criminalisation alone. 
The application of harm principles to the criminalisation of copyright infringement has received little 
academic consideration. However, two articles143 written by Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr of the 
University of Houston stand out as beacons in this field of inquiry. In these articles Professor Moohr 
identifies the difficulties faced in measuring the harm caused to both individual copyright owners 
and to the “national copyright policy”. This second aspect of harm measurement most keenly 
equates to the artificial or derivative criminal laws described by Feinberg. Moohr contends that this 
consists of two aspects: (1) providing an incentive to create; and (2) maintaining public access. This is 
essentially the same rationale identified by Landes and Posner,144 and is highlighted as one of the 
four rationales for intellectual property by Fisher.145 This particular rationale for a system of 
copyright protection is one of the stronger arguments for its public enforcement, and its position in 
American jurisprudence is given considerable weight by judicial interpretation146 of the copyright 
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clause in the United States Constitution.147 While there is no similar expression or purported 
limitation148 contained within the Australian Constitution, Australian Courts have recognised that 
these competing policy considerations underpin Australian copyright law.149 Other rationales for the 
existence of a system of copyright identified by Fisher150 have a more tenuous link to public welfare 
and may be better advanced through private law remedies. The personality theory of intellectual 
property underpins the protection of an author’s moral rights in a work, but there is no proposal for 
an infringement of moral rights to be criminalised and at present it can only be remedied through 
the civil law.151 
[2.1] Measuring Harm 
Formulating legislation that anticipates the harm caused by copyright infringement is highly 
problematic. At least in part, the root of the difficulty stems from copyright law attempting to 
simultaneously advance both of the two economic policy objectives identified above. Advancing 
both policy objectives requires compromise and balance. Copyright owners are not granted a full 
spectrum of rights in the work, nor are those rights generally granted for an unlimited period of 
time.152  
The effect of infringement on these policies differs. Infringement can cause harm to a copyright 
owner, and undermine the policy of incentivising production, but at the same may advance the 
parallel or competing policy of maintaining access to the work. Conversely, increasing copyright 
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protection will harm the policy objective of providing access to the work,153 because it will mean that 
the premium paid to copyright owners will increase, and fewer members of the public will be able to 
meet the price of access. In determining the overall harm caused to the public welfare, both of these 
policy objectives need to be taken into account.  
Wider policy considerations also need to be taken into account. Finite resources are required to 
enforce copyright through the criminal law which could otherwise be deployed countering behaviour 
that has a more direct affect on the public welfare.154 The stigma of a criminal conviction can harm 
the employment prospects of offenders,155 and it will be detrimental to the economy if otherwise 
law-abiding individuals are prevented from fulfilling their full economic potential by being denied 
appropriate employment opportunities. While it may be theoretically possible to eradicate copyright 
infringement entirely through draconian enforcement, the cost of doing so would probably outweigh 
the benefits accrued by having a system of copyright in the first place.156 
Causing substantial harm to the public welfare is not the only legitimate justification for the 
application of criminal sanctions. If substantial harm is caused to the interests of copyright holders, 
this would also be a legitimate justification for criminal penalties according to Feinberg’s theory, but 
this does not mean that all acts of infringement are harmful enough to copyright owners that they 
justify criminal sanctions.  
The interests of copyright holders differ significantly from those of the public welfare, coinciding 
only in the fact that both copyright owners and the public have an interest in incentivising authors 
and artists to produce work. However, even here the coinciding interests are only broadly similar. 
The public welfare is served by keeping the level of this incentive to the minimum required to ensure 
that authors and artists will produce work. Authors and artists, and perhaps more pertinently those 
who invest in the production of their work, obviously have an interest in ensuring that the incentives 
for production are maximised. This is achieved by maintaining control over their work, and thereby 
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ensuring that their economic monopoly maximises the financial return on their labour and 
investment. Causing harm to this interest through infringement does not necessarily mean that the 
copyright owner has suffered a net detriment to all of their interests in the work. The harm caused 
by the infringement may be offset by advancing other interests, such as promoting an awareness of, 
and an interest in, the work.157 The range of civil remedies for infringement can also be used by 
copyright owners to mitigate harm caused to their interests, which is a mechanism that is not 
available for mitigating harm to the public welfare. 
If substantial harm can be shown to be caused by a violation of any of the offences in the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth), it is clear that they can be legitimately justified according to the harm principle. If this 
cannot be shown it is an indication that they should not be allowed to remain part of the law of 
copyright and should be repealed. Chapter 8 looks at the general application of the harm principle to 
copyright infringement in order to make recommendations about the legitimacy of the offence 
provisions discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
[3] Social Norms Theory  
As shown in Chapter 2 one of the key purposes of enacting copyright offences has been the 
perception that they will deter the infringement of copyright and related rights. A basic model of 
deterrence can be expressed in a cost and benefit equation. According to Professor Raymond 
Paternoster158 a person will commit an offence if: 
𝑈(Crime) = 𝑝1(Benefits of Crime) + 𝑝2(Costs of Crime) + 𝑝3(Benefits of Non Crime)+  𝑝4(Costs of Non Crime) 
The equation states the utility value (U) of the crime is the sum of the probability (p) of the benefits 
accruing and costs being extracted. Costs are expressed as negative values and benefits as positive 
values. If U is a positive value, it would be a rational choice to commit the crime.  
Assigning a real value to the costs and benefits in this equation can be difficult, since the perception 
of the value of these costs and benefits will vary from individual to individual, as will the perception 
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of the probability of the events occurring.159 Many crimes are committed on the spur of the moment 
by people with poor impulse control,160 which would be characterised as a misjudgement of the 
relative costs and benefits of committing the offence. If an individual is serving a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole, the perceived cost of an additional term of imprisonment would be 
zero, whereas the withdrawal of meagre privileges would be perceived as a substantial cost.161 There 
can be no deterrent value attributed to a cost if the person does not know that the cost will be 
incurred, i.e. they do not know the conduct is prohibited.162 Conversely, a person may think that a 
certain conduct is illegal when it is not,163 or may think that the penalty is higher than it actually is. 
Despite these differences, it can be concluded that if the economically rational decision is to engage 
in that conduct, people who can correctly gauge the costs and benefits will be likely to do so.164 
Yet even where the probability of detection is small and there are substantial benefits to committing 
a crime, many people still obey the law. It is clear that the law is not the sole regulator of behaviour. 
Professor Lawrence Lessig contends that there are four regulatory constraints that control the 
behaviour of an individual: the law, architecture, the market and social norms.165 The law and the 
market are standard terms, but the terms architecture and social norms need further explanation. 
The architecture to which Lessig refers is the properties of the environment in which the behaviour 
occurs. The physical properties of a building for instance, can constrain behaviour to prevent it from 
being taken away, and the software and hardware of cyberspace determine how a person can 
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behave online.166 Social norms are the informal rules of social groups, which like law regulate by 
threatening sanctions ex post.167 Unlike law, these sanctions are not centralised and formalised,168 
but are enforced by the social groups to which a person belongs.169 
The social costs or benefits of committing an offence has previously been identified in the 
criminology literature,170 and even posited as possessing higher values than legal sanctions.171 Nagin 
and Polarsky172 for example, integrate these extra-legal sanctions as part of cost of committing a 
criminal offence in a similar cost – benefit model. The probability of the social cost of the offence 
being extracted varies from the probability of the legal cost being extracted, since the mechanisms 
for extracting these two costs differ. In order for a legal cost to be extracted the offence has to be 
proven according to the formalities of law and evidence, but a social cost could be extracted merely 
through the dissemination of a rumour. 
There has been an increase of academic interest in the importance of social norms in the regulation 
of behaviour over the past twenty years, with much of the literature originating from law and 
economics scholars.173 This work has considerable application to copyright law and offers an 
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explanation for the ineffectiveness of the formal law in curbing infringement, particularly where it 
occurs on the internet.174 A great deal of the literature concerns the dynamics within small, close 
knit groups,175 since the opportunities for detecting norm violations and the effect of norm 
sanctions, such as gossip176 or shunning,177 are at their keenest in such communities. However the 
conditions for the origin and development of a norm178 are of wider application than rural towns.179 
[4.1] How Social Norms Originate and Operate 
There are three main explanations in the norm literature that explain why social norms arise within 
groups. Richard McAdams contends that norms originate through competition for increased esteem 
within a social group,180 while Eric Posner argues that abiding by norms signals a willingness to be 
cooperative in iterated exchanges following game theory.181 In a similar vein, Robert Ellickson asserts 
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that social norms develop to maximise the aggregate welfare of members of close knit groups,182 
basing this theory on observations of property norms in rural California which corresponded to the 
principles of iterated games of Prisoner’s Dilemma. 183 Ellickson found in his study that an 
overarching social norm was “being a good neighbour”, which meant behaving in a cooperative 
manner. 184 Other scholars have identified additional specific social norms that occur almost 
universally within societies. Professor Dan Kahan writes about a norm of reciprocity that he believes 
underlies cooperative behaviour,185  which is closely related to Posner’s signalling theory. 186 
Obedience to the law has also been offered as a fundamental social norm,187 but this is contingent 
on the authority making the law being perceived as legitimate, fair and trustworthy.188 
[4.2] The Influence of Norms on Behaviour 
Regardless of varying accounts of the origin of social norms, the manner in which they inform 
behaviour is well documented. There are incentives to adhere to norms which can either be 
internally189 or externally applied. These may be negative, in the form of costs for norm violators, or 
positive, as benefits for exceeding normative requirements190 or for obeying a norm. 
If a norm has been internalised by an individual, they will adjust their behaviour to avoid the 
disutility of feelings of guilt, or to promote the utility of feeling proud of their conduct.191 External 
normative incentives only operate if an individual cares about their reputation within a social 
group.192 McAdams and Rasmusen contend that these incentives are the external equivalents of 
guilt and pride: esteem and disapproval. The strength of these external sanctions differs from the 
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internal sanctions however, because they are dependent upon the individual’s perception of other 
people’s beliefs.193  
While these incentives operate on the individual’s emotions to control behaviour, violations of 
norms can lead to sanctions that go beyond withholding esteem or expressing disapproval. In 
addition to gossip and shunning, the norm literature includes examples such as economic 
boycotts,194 insults,195 property vandalism,196 and violence.197 
All manner of behaviour can be the subject of social norms within a social group. In many instances 
lawmakers will be unconcerned with the behaviour, so a norm will be the only rule that regulates 
the conduct.198 However, there is also a substantial amount of conduct which is the subject of both 
social norms and the law, but it is not always the case that the law and the social norm will concur in 
either the rule or the type and severity of the sanction. 
In Order Without Laws, Professor Robert Ellickson described a study of the social norms of the cattle 
ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California.199 He found that the norm that assigned fault for 
trespassing cattle was at odds with the actual legal liability. In this situation it was the social norm 
that was obeyed rather than the law, even by members of the legal community in the area.200 
Ellickson went on in the book to provide a taxonomy of rules, applying equally to social norms and 
law. In addition to the substantive norm, Ellickson proposes four additional ancillary norms: remedial 
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norms; procedural norms; constitutive norms; and controller selecting-norms. These norms 
prescribe the appropriate sanction for a violation; establish how information is to be collected and 
used; create rules about how norms are created; and determine who should and can enforce the 
norm. In the Ellickson study there was single social group whose controller-selecting norm 
determined that the law could be ignored. This did not cause any problems for the community since 
the law granted a private right of action which the ranchers could opt not to pursue.201 More 
problematic is the dynamics between conflicting norms and public laws, and between social groups 
where norms differ.202 
If the law and social norms are aligned, norms and law may reinforce each other. A malum in se 
crime, such as murder or theft, will almost always also violate the norms of social groups, the 
possible exception being criminal groups. The controller-selecting norm for murder will most likely 
determine that it is for the state to enforce the norm, 203 rather than members of the social group.  
Malum prohibitum crimes can also expect a certain degree of obedience simply through the 
operation of an obedience-to-law norm, 204 but crucially this is dependent upon the legitimacy of the 
law or lawmaker, as perceived by a social group.205 If the law is viewed as illegitimate, misguided or 
unjustified, an obedience-to-law norm will not support it, and in such situations it is likely that 
another substantive norm will exist that is disparate with the law prohibiting the conduct: a norm 
that tolerates or even rewards the prohibited conduct. This is the point at which the harm principle 
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intersects with social norms. If a law creates criminal liability for conduct that does not cause 
substantial harm, it is unlikely to be viewed as legitimate by most social groups. 
Laws are capable of influencing and changing social norms under certain conditions by conveying 
information,206 but the process must be carefully managed otherwise the norm can cause decision 
makers to become reluctant to enforce the law: a problem Kahan calls the “sticky norms 
problem”.207 Kahan says a norm will inhibit the operation of a law where the law condemns the 
behaviour much more than decision makers like police officers, juries, prosecutors and judges. If 
such conditions exist, a reluctance to enforce will strengthen the resistance of other decision makers 
and result in a “self-reinforcing wave of resistance”.208  
This does not mean that norms are fixed and cannot be changed through legislation, since there are 
many examples where norms have been led and supported by legislative change. The change in 
social norms about smoking209 and drink driving210 in the United States provide clear examples 
where this has been successful. Kahan advocates using the civil law rather than the criminal law to 
bring about these changes, suggesting the civil law will be more successful because decision maker 
will be less likely to experiencing aversion in applying them.211 Change in social norms can also be led 
by “norms entrepreneurs”,212 individuals who promote changes to the social norms of a group 
through persuasion and leadership. 
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Other social norms have been more resistant to change brought about by legislation. The 
temperance movement in the United States, which led to the passing of the Volstead Act in 1919,213 
gives a spectacular example of legislative failure.214 The Volstead Act forbade any person to 
“manufacture, sell, barter, transport import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating 
liquor”215 under the penalty of one year imprisonment and a $1000 fine.216 Lobbying for the Act had 
been conducted by the Anti-Saloon League, a group led by a lawyer-turned minister, Rev. Howard 
Hyde Russell,217 which had close ties to various church denominations.218 The Act did little to stem 
the demand for alcoholic beverages from the public, the majority of whom either drank alcohol 
themselves or treated drinking indifferently. The obedience-to-law norm failed because the Act was 
viewed as illegitimate219 and the existing of norm of tolerance for alcohol was extended to the 
criminal gangs that supplied alcohol.  
Although the norms literature shows that social norms can have a greater influence on behaviour 
than the law,220 it does not mean that they will always be effective. Returning to the cost – benefit 
model of general deterrence, if the benefit accrued by engaging in the conduct outweighs the 
perception of the risk of the social norm sanction being extracted, the social norm will not deter that 
behaviour. The severity of the sanction will also be determinative in making a rational choice, but 
the state’s monopoly of violence means that most social groups will not be able to provide sufficient 
sanctions to prevent behaviour which would allow an individual to accrue a substantial benefit. In 
such situations the law is the most efficient mechanism. For example, if one businessman owes a 
large debt to another businessman, he might decide that it would be more rational not to pay the 
debt if he perceived the value of the debt as greater than a sanction such as damage to his 
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reputation. The other businessman could not simply take what is owed by force without breaching 
other laws and social norms, so the legal system would provide the only mechanism to recover the 
debt. The enforcement of both norms and law both require detection, prosecution and effective 
sanction. 
The offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) provide ideal conditions for the application of social 
norms theory. The advancement of copying and dissemination technology has meant that many 
offences can be committed privately with little oversight from law enforcement. If it can be shown 
that social norms have emerged that inform the behaviour of individuals interacting with copyright 
works, and that these norms are not aligned with the substantive law, norm theory indicates that 
individuals will conduct themselves according to their norms rather than the law. This would have a 
substantial impact on the effectiveness of the offences in the Act.  
[5] Conclusion 
The key elements of the harm principle and social norms theory will be applied to the offences in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in Chapter 8. The harm caused by the behaviour prohibited by the offences 
needs to be examined to determine if it is substantial. The social norms and practices in relation to 
copyright material will also need to be examined in order to assess the extent to which they are 
harmonised with the law. 
If offences cannot be legitimately justified because they do not cause substantial harm, this will also 
inform social norms that operated in conjunction with the law to regulate behaviour. If a law or law-
maker is perceived as illegitimate, then the social norm that supports an obedience of the law will be 
weakened to the point it is ineffective. 
It is clear that social norms will play a far greater role in regulating behaviour where there is an 
absence of law enforcement or an understanding of the law. Both of these conditions are present in 
online file sharing. There is a very low risk of detection and the complexities of copyright law are not 
widely understood in the general population. 
The scope of criminal liability for each offence needs to be examined. This will enable a detailed 
application of the harm principle and social norms theory to show if the prohibited conduct causes 
substantial harm, to which interest it causes harm, and if there is a divergence between social norm 
practice and the law. 
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PART II Legislation 
This part examines the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in detail, and provides a 
critique of the offences. It also contains a brief overview of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which 
operates in conjunction with the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This will enable a clear understanding of 
the offences, which can be compared to the theoretical modelling and inform the analysis of the 
provisions. 
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Chapter 4 Application of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
[1] Introduction 
In order to accurately gauge the scope of criminal liability for offences under the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) it is necessary to understand the function of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The offences in 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) do not exist as a sui generis and comprehensive regulatory scheme. In 
common with all criminal offence against the Commonwealth, the offences in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) must be read against the general principles of criminal liability the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth). This chapter will examine the sections of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) that are 
supplementary to the sections in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and contribute to the formulation of 
the offences.   
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) has the practical effect of extinguishing all common law offences 
against the Commonwealth of Australia and codifying all existing and future offences.221 All offences 
against the Commonwealth are created either by, or under the authority, of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) or other Acts,222 including the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).223 In addition to creating offences 
as diverse as the dishonest use of previously used stamps224 and pillaging in wartime,225 the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides a framework of general principles within which Commonwealth 
offences operate. There are various sections that deal with the elements of offences,226 criminal 
responsibility,227 proof228 and geographical jurisdiction.229 The sections that constitute the general 
                                                            
221 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 1.1  
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223 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 9A 
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framework of criminal liability are the most important of these to the offence sections in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). These sections categorise the physical elements of offences against the 
Commonwealth, and determine the relevant mental element, or fault element as it is referred to in 
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The general framework also supplies the definitions and standards 
of these fault elements. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) also provides general defences to 
Commonwealth offences, and allows prosecutions where the physical elements of offences are 
committed by innocent agents of the offender. 
[2] Elements of an Offence 
Mirroring the common law principles of mens rea and actus reus, offences against the 
Commonwealth consist of both physical elements and fault elements,230 although offences can 
provide that a physical element does not require a fault element.231 The prosecution must prove 
both the physical and fault elements of the offence.232 
[2.1] Physical Elements 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) specifies233 that a physical element must consist of either: 
(1) conduct;234  
(2) the result of conduct;235 or  
(3) a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, occurs.236  
Distinguishing between these three finite forms of physical element is important since under certain 
conditions the corresponding fault element is determined by the type of physical element. 
In the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) there are several offences related to dealings with infringing 
copies.237 Most of these offence sections consist of an element which specifies an act particular to 
the offence, and two elements common to this group of offences which specify: “the article is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
228 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 pt 2.6 
229 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1  pt 2.7 
230 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1  s 3.1(1) 
231 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1  s 3.1(2) 
232 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1  s 3.2 
233 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.1 
234 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.1(1)(a) 
235 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.1(1)(b) 
236 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.1(1)(c) 
237 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt V div 5 sub-div C 
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infringing copy of a work or other subject‑matter”238  and “copyright subsists in the work or other 
subject-matter when [another element of the offence occurs]”.239  These common elements are 
clearly situations in which the conduct of the offence occurs and so would meet the statutory 
definition of a circumstance.240 
A result element requires some sort of outcome as a product of conduct. If an offence contains a 
result element, then the offence will not be complete unless the result has occurred, though of 
course this does not preclude the possibility of an attempt at the offence being committed where 
the result does not actually occur.241 For example, s 132AI of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) makes 
several offences concerning the distribution of infringing copies of works or other subject-matter. 
One of the two indictable offences requires an intention to trade or obtain a commercial advantage 
or profit when the distribution occurs. 242 The other indictable offence does not have this 
requirement, but instead contains a result element.243 As a result of the distribution the owner of 
the copyright must be affected prejudicially.244 
There is a far greater variety of conduct elements in the offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
than circumstance or result elements. Conduct may either be an act, an omission to perform an act 
or a state of affairs.245 In the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and probably by extension all offences 
against the Commonwealth, to “engage in conduct” excludes conduct by creating a state of 
affairs.246 This means that the offences247 under s 132AC of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), in which 
the conduct element is very wide in scope (“engages in conduct”), require either an act or an 
omission to do an act. The existence of a state of affairs is insufficient for the offence to occur. The 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) requirement for conduct to be voluntary248 further complicates the law 
for conduct elements. All of these different forms of conduct can be found in the offence in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).  
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[2.1.1] Voluntariness 
It is an established principle at common law that if the actus reus of an offence includes an act, then 
the act must be a product of the defendant’s will.249 This principle has been incorporated into the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth),250 albeit with the usual terminology translated into that of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth). Thus, conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary,251 and is only 
voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is.252  Conduct that consists of 
an omission or a state of affairs has additional requirements under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one which the person is capable 
of performing253 and a state of affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable of 
exercising control, but only if the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs.254 
This may lead to some rather unusual legal positions when we consider copyright offences that are 
committed using computers. For example the offences for distributing infringing copies255 requires 
that a “person distributes an article”.256 This includes distribution of an infringing copy by way of 
communication257, and case law258 has rejected arguments that a distribution can only occur when a 
work is distributed in a fixed medium.259 It is clear that the offences for distributing an infringing 
copy can be committed using a computer over a network where a person deliberately acts to bring 
about the physical acts to cause the distribution, e.g. connecting to a peer-to-peer file sharing 
protocol or uploading a file to YouTube. This would meet the requirements of s 4.2 of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) and that the conduct would be a voluntary act.  
However, there would also be a strong argument to suggest that using a computer program to 
perform the distribution on the demand of a third party would amount to a voluntary act, even if the 
defendant was unaware of the specific distribution. If we use the analogy of the setting of a trap, we 
can reason that where inanimate objects are left to perform the physical element of an offence by 
an individual, it can be said that the physical act is the product of the individual’s will.260 The 
                                                            
249 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963) AC 386, 409; Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 
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individual does not have to apply the physical force required to perform the physical element within 
a specific time frame relative to the physical element being complete. The counter argument to this 
is that the physical act of triggering the distribution is either the product of the will of the third 
party261 or both parties as either joint principles or as a principle and accessory.  
In the English case of DPP v K,262 a 15 year old schoolboy was convicted of assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm. He had been carrying out an experiment using sulphuric acid when he splashed some 
on his hand. He left the classroom to wash his hand and took some of the acid to the toilet to test its 
reaction on toilet paper. While there he heard footsteps in the corridor and, panicking, poured the 
sulphuric acid into a hand dryer with the intention of returning later to remove it. Before he could do 
so, another boy used the hand dryer and was squirted in the face by the sulphuric acid. It was held 
that K was guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Even though K had not physically 
triggered the dryer to squirt the acid, Parker LJ nonetheless concluded that “a defendant who pours 
a dangerous substance into a machine just as truly assaults the next user of the machine as if he had 
himself switched the machine on.”263  
[2.2] Fault Elements 
Fault elements in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) are not exhaustively stated and offences against 
the Commonwealth are not limited264 to the standard fault elements stated in s 5.1: intention, 
knowledge, recklessness or negligence. These standard fault elements may also be modified or 
supplemented, for example s 132AF(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) requires an “intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit”.265 Many, if not most of the elements to offences in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) do not specify fault and this is where an understanding of the interaction 
between the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is crucial. Where 
offences against the Commonwealth do not specify fault, standard fault elements are incorporated 
by s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).266 The proper characterisation of the physical 
elements267 and the prescriptions of the various fault elements in the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth)268 combine to give the required culpability to these offences. 
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If a physical element consists only of conduct, and does not specify a fault element, then the fault 
element for that physical element is intention.269 A person has intention with respect to a conduct if 
the person means to engage in that conduct. 270 If a physical element consists of either a 
circumstance or result, and does not specify a fault element, then recklessness is the fault element 
for that physical element,271 although proof of knowledge or intention will also satisfy the fault 
element.272  
[2.2.1] Law or Fact 
The offences related to dealings in infringing copies almost universally contain a circumstance 
element requiring that “the article is an infringing copy”.273 It would be disingenuous to expect a lay-
person to possess sufficient knowledge of copyright law to be able to accurately determine the legal 
status of a copy of a work in all circumstances. Certainly, there will be many circumstances where 
this is obvious, but more complicated aspects of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) can be opaque even to 
legal professionals. This somewhat conflicts with the common law maxim that ignorance of the law 
is no defence, which is a principle has been incorporated into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
Section 9.3 states: 
“Mistake or ignorance of statute law  
(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct 
constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or 
content of an Act that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly or indirectly 
affects the scope or operation of the offence.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the 
offence in those circumstances, if the Act is expressly to the contrary effect.”274 
 Section 9.4 states: 
 “Mistake or ignorance of subordinate legislation 
(1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the conduct 
constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the existence or 
                                                            
269 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
270 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.2(1) 
271 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
272 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(4) 
273 See for example Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1)(b)  
274 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 9.3 
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content of the subordinate legislation that directly or indirectly creates the offence or 
directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the 
offence in those circumstances, if: (a) the subordinate legislation is expressly to the contrary 
effect; or (c) at the time of the conduct, the subordinate legislation: (i) has not been made 
available to the public (by means of the Register under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 
or otherwise); and (ii) has not otherwise been made available to persons likely to be affected 
by it in such a way that the person would have become aware of its contents by exercising 
due diligence.” 
The use of the permissive word “can” appears to create a discretionary application of this section, 
but without any direction in when the discretion may be used or by whom. Had it been the intention 
of Parliament for this section to apply without discretion it would have been clearer if it had been 
phrased “a person is criminally responsible”. 
The question of whether a physical element is a law or a fact is vital, since ignorance or mistake of a 
fact may mean the fault element of the offence is not present. Characterising an element as law or 
fact is not always a straightforward matter, and differing interpretations have divided the High Court 
on occasion.275 The difficulty comes from having to separate statutory directions from facts that rely 
on statute to exist. An often used example is the offence of theft276 where the fault elements of 
dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive cannot be proved if the defendant believed that 
they were legally entitled to the property through ignorance or mistake.277 The standard of 
culpability can and does vary, so the belief may be gauged against the standards of recklessness or 
negligence. This does not mean that ignorance of a relevant statute can be negated by ignorance or 
mistake. An element that makes reference to another statute does not require the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant was aware of the content of that statute.278 
Since copyright is entirely statutory, it could be reasoned that references to “infringing copies” 
should be treated as law rather than facts. However, since all property rights are creatures of the 
law, this line of reasoning is not firmly grounded. While ignorance of the contents of a schedule 
cannot negate a fault element, mistake or ignorance about particular items on that schedule would 
                                                            
275 Iannella v French (1968) 119 CLR 84 
276 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 131.1 
277 Ogders, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (1st ed, 2007) 91  
278 Commonwealth Attorney – General’s Department, The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for 
Practitioners (2002), 199 
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negate a fault element. References to “infringing copies” in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) have been 
treated as facts by the courts in civil matters,279 and in the summary offences the wording of the 
“infringing copy” elements specifies “...and the person is negligent as to that fact”.  
[2.2.2] Recklessness 
Recklessness is defined in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as an awareness of a substantial risk that 
the circumstance exists or will exist280 or result will occur281, and having regard to the circumstances 
known the person, it is unjustifiable to take that risk.282 Whether the risk is unjustifiable is a question 
of fact.283 
Typically, the indictable offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) do not specify fault elements, and 
these attract the operation of s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Since these offences are 
punishable on conviction up to five years imprisonment and/or 550 penalty points, they require a 
high standard of culpability. However, it may well be that this standard might be so high as to make 
its useful operation prohibitive, and instead prosecutors may find a more practical route to secure a 
conviction in the summary offences. Proof of awareness can only be ascertained by inference, and 
this places a large weight on the credibility of defendants. 
To obtain a conviction for infringing copy offences on indictment, a prosecutor would have to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that:  
(1) there was a substantial risk that the article was an infringing copy;  
(2) the defendant was aware of this risk; and  
(3) it was unjustifiable to take that risk in all the circumstances. 
The key phrases “substantial risk” and “unjustifiable” are not defined by the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth), but the General Principles of Criminal Responsibility Report284 by the Model Criminal Code 
Committee states that the “definition substantially follows the US Model Penal Code”. 285  
                                                            
279 Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Polygram Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 638; Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 130 
ALR 659; Nintendo Co Ltd v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 134; Computer Edge Proprietary Ltd v 
Apple Computer, Inc (1986) 161 CLR 171 
280 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(1)(a) 
281 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(2)(a) 
282 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(1)(b) and (2)(b) 
283 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.4(3) 
284 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code: Chapters 1 and 2 General Principles of 
Criminal Responsibility Report (1992) 27 
285 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code: Chapters 1 and 2 General Principles of 
Criminal Responsibility Report (1992) 27 
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“Substantial risk” is not to be thought of in terms of a mathematical probability.286 One view is that 
refers to a risk that is “real and apparent on the evidence presented...not a risk that is without 
substance or which is fanciful or speculative”,287 though it has been observed that it would be 
difficult to say a one percent probability would be a substantial risk.288 Stephen Odgers holds the 
opinion that the level of risk will vary according to the justifiability in taking that risk. Using the 
example of playing Russian roulette illustrates a situation where even where the risk is low, the risk 
will still be “substantial” due to the possible result.289 While this is a practical analysis, it would tend 
to make the “unjustifiable” limb somewhat redundant. Greater precision in formulating a test for 
“substantial risk” may not be possible, and it will be tempting for courts to leave the entire fault 
element as a compound phrase to be interpreted by juries. Certainly the “unjustifiable” limb of the 
element is actually directed to be determined in this manner, since it is plainly stated in s 5.4(3) that 
the question is one of fact.290 However, this must be considered with regard to the circumstances 
known to the defendant,291 which further fortifies the subjective character of recklessness and puts 
more ground between it and negligence. The difference between the two is not great and it is likely 
that decisions to prosecute or convict under the indictable offences will be determined on the 
awareness of defendants as evidenced by their credibility.  
 In Pontello v Giannostis292 the defendant’s knowledge of the legal status of various titles in his video 
rental shop, while not a deciding factor, was discussed in the case. The relevant section of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) had been amended in 1986293 and the standard of culpability had been 
altered from “knows” to “knows, or ought reasonably to know”.294 This meant that the prosecution 
did not need to prove that Giannostis actually knew the articles were infringing copies. The word 
“ought reasonably to know” did not import an objective standard into the offence: 
                                                            
286 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code: Chapters 1 and 2 General Principles of 
Criminal Responsibility Report (1992) 27 
287 Hann v Commonwealth DPP [2004] SASC 86,[25] per Gray J, quoting Carswell’s Works and Phrases (US) 
Vol. 7 (1993) 1206  
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“[...] the true position is that the court is not concerned with the knowledge of a reasonable 
man but is concerned with reasonable inferences to be drawn from a concrete situation as 
disclosed in the evidence as it affects the particular person whose knowledge is in issue.”295 
If we assume he was being truthful, an assumption that Sheppard J was not prepared to make,296 
transcripts of a police interview submitted as evidence show that Giannostis had at best a vague 
idea of what constituted an infringing copy. Although Sheppard J thought that the case for actual 
knowledge was strong297 he nevertheless held that: 
“[He] ought reasonably to have known that each article was an infringing copy having regard 
in particular to the important factors of the defendant's history in the video industry; his 
knowledge of copyright and pirate copies; his knowledge that videos could be copied and 
the unlikelihood of not appreciating the danger of dealing with a vendor of secondhand 
tapes.”298 
It is questionable if Giannostis would have been found guilty if the standard of culpability in his case 
was recklessness. Devlin J gave the following advice in Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v 
Roper299, which Sheppard J quoted:300 
“…justices may find [actual knowledge] because they infer it from the nature of the act that 
was done, for no man can prove the state of another man’s mind; and they may find it, of 
course, even if the defendant gives evidence to the contrary. They may disbelieve him, and 
think that was his state of mind. They may feel that the evidence falls short of that, and, if 
they do, they have then to consider what might be described as knowledge of the second 
degree: they have to consider then whether what the defendant was doing was, as it has 
been called, shutting his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge.”301 
A finding of actual knowledge could not be constructed from the circumstances of the case in the 
manner suggested by Devlin J. Sheppard J said: 
“I must confess that the case for holding that there is here demonstrated actual knowledge 
is a strong one, but I must bear in mind, as I have indicated, that the tapes which were 
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296 Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174, 180 
297 Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174, 185 
298 Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174, 174 
299 Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v Roper[1951] WN 383 
300 Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174, 175 
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purchased from Mr Mimo, who said to the defendant to ask him no questions, were not 
necessarily all the tapes which are the subject of the charge. The evidence does not enable 
one to tell. In the result I have reached the conclusion that I ought not to find actual 
knowledge but I do, as I say, find that the defendant ought reasonably to have known that 
each of the articles was an infringing copy of the films in question.” 
Actual knowledge that the works were infringing copies, including “shutting his eyes to an obvious 
means of knowledge”,302 is quite different from knowing there is a substantial risk that the works 
were infringing copies, and different again from “ought to know”. Actual awareness of a substantial 
risk is similar to actual knowledge only insofar as it is a subjective assessment of the state of the 
defendant’s mind. It differs because awareness of a substantive risk is not positive knowledge of a 
result or circumstance. Even though the assessment is a subjective one, there is a very considerable 
threat that an objective assessment will influence the subjective assessment, since a determination 
about the defendant’s credibility is likely to be assessed against an objective standard.303 The further 
the defendant’s explanation of his state of mind is from the objective standard, the less likely it is 
that a tribunal of fact will find the explanation credible. In the case of copyright infringement, the 
concerted efforts of the various publishing industries to raise public awareness of the illegality of 
copyright infringement304 will have certainly impacted on the credibility of defendants who claim 
they were ignorant of a substantial risk of dealing with an infringing copy.   
Giannostis was at least vaguely aware that there was such a thing as infringing copies of works, and 
so must have known there was at least some level of risk that the tapes he had were infringing 
copies. The crux of the question would be therefore, Giannostis’ assessment of that level of risk.  
As wilful blindness can be construed as actual knowledge, it would have been prudent of Giannostis 
to make enquiries, however might have perversely had the effect of actually providing evidence that 
he knew there was a substantial risk. Only if it had been justifiable to take the risk after making such 
enquiries would Giannostis have escaped culpability. It is clear from the case that the defendant had 
not made such enquiries, so once again, credibility would have been the key to determining 
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303 Cf Hann v Commonwealth DPP [2004] SASC 86. 
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Giannostis’ state of mind and the onus would have been on the prosecution to lead evidence 
proving he knew there was a substantial risk. 
It is not clear if Giannostis would have been convicted under the indictable offence if it had existed 
at the time. In such cases with similar circumstances, prosecutors might not want to risk losing a 
conviction when an offence with a lower evidentiary burden is available. 
[2.2.3] Negligence 
The lower tier of offences for dealing with infringing copies, the summary offences, usually contain 
identical physical elements, but specify that the fault element for circumstance and result physical 
elements is negligence. Negligence is defined in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) as follows: 
“A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her conduct 
involves: (a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise in the circumstances; and (b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will 
exist; that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence.”305 
The definition of negligence in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is based closely306 on the judgment 
in Nydam v R 307 where the court stated: 
“In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the prosecution 
shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused consciously and 
voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm but in 
circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the standard of care which a 
reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or 
grievous bodily harm would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal 
punishment.”308 
Under s 5.5 the necessary culpability of a defendant is an objective standard, in contrast to the 
subjective standard for recklessness. The language employed by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
differs between recklessness and negligence and the Model Criminal Code Committee were of the 
opinion that distinguishing the two only on the basis of subjective and objective tests is an incorrect 
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view.309 Ian Leader-Elliott however, has stated the only substantive difference between the two is 
the subjective and objective assessments of a defendant’s state of mind.310  
The addition of the words “for the offence” in s 5.5 implies that the standard of culpability required 
to satisfy negligence is not a fixed standard for all offences, a view that has had judicial support.311 A 
charge as serious as manslaughter312 would therefore require a much higher departure from the 
standard of care expected of a reasonable person and a higher risk that the physical element exists 
than a lesser offence. While this is eminently sensible and creates an expectation that conduct with 
serious consequences should be undertaken with equally serious care, it does raise the problem of 
determining the relative seriousness of differing offences. While it is easy to place manslaughter as 
among the most serious of offences, attempts to determine the seriousness of offences such as 
fishing within a protected area313 or hiring out an infringing copy of a work314 will vary according to 
individual judicial conclusions.  
There are actually relatively few offences against the Commonwealth that contain elements where 
the fault element is negligence. Examples include: negligently destroying, fouling or damaging 
marine navigational aids;315 dealing in the proceeds of crime;316 discharging substances into the 
sea;317 failure to notify of actual or potential tampering of therapeutic goods;318 negligently allowing 
a person to leave or remove goods from a vessel or installation that is subject to quarantine; 319and 
carrying dangerous goods on board an aircraft.320 Without a body of case law as reference, 
determinations of this kind are likely to be made on an ad hoc basis. 
If the relative seriousness of offences is to be guided by the maximum sentence, most summary 
offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that contain a negligence fault element incur a penalty of 
two years imprisonment and/or a 120 penalty points. Offences with comparable penalties are: 
dealing in the proceeds of crime;321 negligently allowing a person to leave or remove goods from a 
                                                            
309 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code: Chapters 1 and 2 General Principles of 
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vessel or installation that is subject to quarantine; 322 and carrying dangerous goods on board an 
aircraft.323 Offences with lower penalties include negligently destroying, fouling or damaging marine 
navigational aids (200 penalty points); 324 discharging substances into the sea (2000 penalty 
points);325 and failure to notify of actual or potential tampering of therapeutic goods (12 months and 
1000 penalty points).326 If it is the case that the seriousness of negligently dealing with infringing 
copies is to be gauged against these other offences, it would seem that the intention of Parliament is 
that the offences are to be treated as quite serious offences. It would therefore follow that the 
departure from the standard of care required would have to be equally serious to reach the 
threshold of negligence. 
[2.2.4] Strict Liability 
There are a large number of strict liability offences contained in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). All of 
these offences are explicitly stated as being offences of strict liability which enables the application 
of s 3.1(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Strict liability offences are defined by the absence of 
a fault element. For the offence to be committed, only the physical element needs to be complete. 
This does not mean that criminal responsibility is immediately attached upon completion of the 
physical elements of the offence however, since a variety of defences and circumstances will excuse 
responsibility. Children under the age of 10 cannot be held criminally responsible at all;327 children 
between 10 and 14 must know their conduct is wrong;328 and the mentally impaired may be excused 
according to their condition.329 The defences of mistake of fact,330 claim of right,331 intervening 
conduct or event,332 duress,333 sudden and extraordinary emergency,334 self defence335 and lawful 
authority336 all remain available to persons charged with strict liability offences.  
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[3] Defences 
This section outlines the most likely defences to be used against strict liability offences under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). While other defences are available for strict liability offences, these are the 
more likely to be utilised. 
[3.1] Section 9.2: Mistake of Fact (Strict Liability) 
In offences where fault element is required, a mistake of fact will mean that the fault element will be 
absent and therefore the offence is incomplete. The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) restates this 
position clearly in s 91,337 but this is not a true defence since no offence is actually committed. Since 
strict liability offences do not contain fault elements, a mistake of fact will not prevent the 
completion of an offence. Section 9.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is therefore a true 
defence. It is narrower in its application because ignorance of a fact cannot be used as a defence338 
as it is in s 9.1, and the defendant bears the evidential burden of proof of the mistake of fact.339 The 
significant qualification for the availability of the defence is the requirement that the defendant 
considered whether or not facts existed, which is essentially the requirement that excludes 
ignorance from the defence. This was excluded from the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by the Model 
Criminal Code Committee because “this would make strict liability more like negligence, thus 
eroding the higher standard of compliance set by strict liability”.340  
The proposition that including ignorance in the defence would erode the distinction between strict 
liability and negligence does not sit comfortably. The clearer dividing line between the two is 
reasonableness and the evidential burden. A reasonable mistake of facts would negate a negligent 
fault element, as it would for a knowledge or recklessness fault element, even though s 9.1 purports 
to exclude negligence in the section title. If a reasonable mistake is capable of excusing criminal 
responsibility for strict liability offences there should really be no reason why reasonable ignorance 
should not do the same. It would perhaps been more difficult for the defence to prove that a 
defendant did not know something than to prove a mistaken belief, but this would have little impact 
on the distinction between negligence and strict liability. 
The availability of this defence might seem to undermine the core principle of strict liability, since 
although no fault element is required, mistake of fact requires the court to examine the state of the 
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defendant’s mind when the offence was committed. However, because the prosecution does not 
need to prove any fault, it simply means the burden to prove a mistake of fact rests with the 
defence. 
The defendant must prove that:  
(1) they considered whether or not facts existed;341  
(2) they were under a mistaken belief about those facts;342  
(3) that mistake was reasonable;343 and  
(4) if those facts existed, the conduct would not have constituted an offence.344  
Consideration of the same facts on a previous occasion345 will satisfy the first element of the defence 
if the person honestly and reasonably believed the circumstances were substantially the same as the 
previous occasion.346 
[3.2] Section 10.1: Intervening conduct or event 
The defence of intervening conduct or event is only available as a defence to strict liability and 
absolute liability offences, 347 and can supplement a denial that the offence was committed 
voluntarily.348 The section codifies the common law position expressed in the case of Mayer v 
Marchant, 349 where the overloading of a road tanker was caused by the use of a different density of 
distillate that was supplied by a third party. 
The defence requires the defence to prove  
(1) that a physical element is brought about by another person over whom the person has no 
control or a non-human act or event which the person has no control;350and  
(2) the person could not reasonably be expected to guard against the bringing about of that 
physical element.351 
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There are few strict liability offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) where this defence will have 
application. One example could be if an intermediary was charged with distributing an infringing 
copy in the course of obtaining a profit under s 132AI(7).352 The defence may argue that the 
distribution was brought about by another person, although it would be difficult to argue that they 
had no control over the that person if they had allowed them use the facilities or that they could not 
reasonably be expected to guard against bringing about the distribution. Since no cases have been 
brought against intermediaries under this section, the point presently remains academic.353 
[4] Section 11.3: Commission by proxy 
Commission by proxy allows a person to be prosecuted where they themselves have not committed 
all of the physical elements of the offence. This concept was initiated by the implementation of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and has a long history of application in the United Kingdom.354 A 
number of offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) lend themselves to the application of this section 
of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), since it is very often the case in the online environment that the 
offences are committed by using services provided by intermediaries.355 While commission by proxy 
is not a defence, it would often be more desirable for prosecutors to charge the directing mind 
behind an offence on indictment, rather than charge an innocent agent for a strict liability offence. 
A person is taken to have committed an offence if they:  
(1) have in relation to each physical element of an offence, a fault element applicable to that 
physical element;356 and  
(2) procure conduct of another person that (whether or not together with conduct of the 
procurer) would have constituted an offence on the part of the procurer if the procurer had 
engaged in it.357  
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In the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), the word “procure” is not defined except in reference to procuring a 
person to engage in sexual activity.358 In that context it includes: to encourage, entice, recruit or 
induce (whether by threats, promises or otherwise) a person to engage in that activity. Other 
proffered definitions include: “to obtain or get by care, effort or the use of special means; to effect, 
cause, bring about, especially by unscrupulous or indirect means.”359 Perhaps the most succinct and 
useful definition was provided by Lord Widgery CJ in Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975)360 
when he wrote: 
“To procure means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by setting out to see that 
it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening.” 
This does not necessarily mean that a strict causational relationship needs to be established,361 and 
one view is that it is possible for a person to procure conduct that would have otherwise have been 
undertaken by the person procured,362 i.e. if A pays B to commit a crime that B was going to commit 
by his own volition. The other view holds that this is not the case, and merely obscures the 
distinction between procuring and counselling.363 The first view would seem to be the more sensible 
approach, but the second view is supported by Australian case law. 
[5] Conclusion 
All the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are subject to the framework of general principles 
that the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides.  Any physical elements of the offences in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that do not contain specified fault elements are supplemented by the 
provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).  It is therefore necessary to understand the operation 
of both the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to make sense of the 
offences and to gauge their scope. The discussion in this chapter has been limited to the pertinent 
sections of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which operate with completed offences in the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) which have been committed by principal offenders. However, the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) also contains sections that apply to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that deal with 
accessorial liability, attempts and conspiracy. It is important to recognise that these sections greatly 
                                                            
358 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 Dictionary 
359 Ogders, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2007)  51 
360 Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 All ER 684, 686 
361 Ogders, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2007)  51 
362 Ogders, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2007)  51 
363 See Commonwealth Attorney – General’s Department, The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for 
Practitioners (2002)  267 citing: Ridgeway (1995) 184 CLR 19; O’Sullivan v Bastian(No2) [1948] SASR 17, 26; and 
Rice v Tricouris (2000) 110 A Crim R 86 
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broaden the scope of the offences. While this additional scope has not generally been the subject of 
discussion in this thesis, criminal liability may attach to conduct that in ancillary to the offences. 
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Chapter 5 Substantial Infringement on a Commercial Scale and Infringing Copies 
[1] Introduction 
This chapter examines the of criminal liability for the offences concerned with commercial scale 
infringement and dealing with infringing copies which are contained in Part V Division V of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). These offences are closely related to the exclusive rights vested in the 
copyright owner and form the core of the regime of copyright offences.  The great majority of 
people who have been charged with these offences have pleaded guilty. Consequently there has 
been little in the way of argument about the interpretation of phrases used in the offences, and 
virtually no judicial consideration of them. It has been necessary, therefore, to construe the meaning 
of these phrases by drawing on other areas of law. 
Section 132AC is an offence that can be applied to any form of copyright infringement, provided it is 
substantial enough to cause significant harm to the copyright owner.364 The majority of the other 
offences are for indirect infringement of copyright through dealings in infringing copies. This is 
another area of copyright law where there have been very few reported cases, either civil or criminal. 
There are three offences in Part V which do not amount to infringements of copyright, but are 
directed at conduct which facilitates the trade in infringing copies: possessing an infringing copy,365 
possessing a device to make an infringing copy366 and advertising the supply of an infringing copy.367 
In addition to s 132AC, one other offence section criminalises direct infringement of copyright for 
commercial purposes: the making of an infringing copy in s 132AD.368 
                                                            
364 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC 
365 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AJ 
366 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AM 
367 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AL 
368 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD 
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[2] Part V – Remedies and Offences, Division V – Offences, Subdivision 
A: Preliminaries 
There are two sections In Part V Division V that specify definitions and the geographical application 
of the offences in Division V.  
[2.1] Section 132AA: Definitions  
Section 132AA [see Appendix at page 327] contains definitions applicable to the offences in Division 
V. It states that it deals exclusively with “this Division”, so the legislative intent is to afford special 
meanings to words that might otherwise have meanings defined elsewhere in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) or given meaning by case law. Notably, the word “distribute”, except in Subdivision E, 
“includes distribute by way of communication”, which goes some way to clarify issues raised by the 
dissemination of copies via electronic means. 
The word “profit” is defined as not including any advantage, benefit, or gain that is received by a 
person and results from, or is associated with, the person’s private or domestic use of any copyright 
material. The meaning of “private or domestic use” is defined in s 10 as “private and domestic use 
on or off domestic premises”, so it is not entirely clear if the use of copyrighted material in virtual 
spaces, e.g. non-commercial distribution over the Internet, would be included as a private or 
domestic use for the purposes of defining profit. The unsuccessful prosecution of David LaMacchia in 
the United States369 led to the words “financial gain” being defined in the NET Act370 as including 
“receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted 
works”371. 
[2.2] Section 132AB: Geographical application 
Section 132AB [see Appendix at page 327] modifies the standard geographical jurisdiction372 of 
offences against the Commonwealth stating Subdivisions B, C, D, E and F apply only to acts done in 
Australia.373 Standard geographic jurisdiction is attracted if a person engages in conduct or the result 
of that conduct occurs wholly or partly in Australia or an Australian aircraft or ship.374  Section 4.1 (2) 
of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) defines conduct as an act, an omission to perform an act or a 
                                                            
369 United States v LaMacchia 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) 
370 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub L No 105-147, 111 Stat 2678 (1997) 
371 17 USC § 101 
372 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 14.1 
373 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AB(1) 
374 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s  14.1 
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state of affairs.375 Standard geographical jurisdiction therefore applies to acts, omissions or states of 
affairs occurring partly or wholly in Australia. Here, the geographic jurisdiction is limited only to acts. 
The word “acts” in s 132AB(1) is not defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). A literal interpretation 
might suggest this section has the effect of excluding omissions or states of affairs in Australia, but 
this would obviously lead to an absurd result when applied to the offences for possessing an 
infringing copy,376 since the conduct in possession offences is the bringing about of a state of affairs: 
the state of possession.377  
An alternative interpretation would be to give the phrase the meaning that would be explicit if the 
words “when they are” were inserted between “acts” and “done”. This would cure the absurdity, 
but it would also mean that offences where the conduct elements consist of either omissions or 
states of affairs attract standard geographic jurisdiction. This would mean these offences could be 
prosecuted if the conduct occurs outside of Australia and the result of that conduct occurs within 
Australia. Although this is a convoluted interpretation, all of the offences in the listed subdivisions 
that contain an element of bringing about of a state of affairs, do not contain a result of conduct 
element, with the exception of s 132AM.  
References to “Australia”, without modification, are ordinarily interpreted as including the territories 
of Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, but exclude other external territories.378 The 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) modifies this to include the external territories,379 which means that the 
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, the Australian Antarctic Territory, the Coral Sea Islands Territory, Heard 
Island and the McDonald Islands, and Norfolk Island are subject to the offences in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth). 
[3] Subdivision B: Substantial infringement on a commercial scale 
Subdivision B consists of only two offences. Both offences create criminal liability of any 
infringement of copyright that occurs on a commercial scale infringement and substantially 
prejudices the interests of the copyright owner. 
                                                            
375 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s  4.1 (2). See also He Kaw Te v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 
376 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AJ(1), 132AJ(3), 132AJ(5), 132AL(2), and 132AL(5)  
377 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 
378 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 17 
379 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 
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[3.1] Section 132AC: Commercial-scale infringement prejudicing copyright 
owner 
The offences under s 132AC [see Appendix at page 328] can be applied to any conduct that infringes 
copyright, has a substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner and occurs on a commercial 
scale. This can be a direct infringement of any of the rights granted to copyright owners, an indirect 
infringement by dealing in an infringing copy or authorising an infringement. The offences consist of 
an indictable offence and a summary offence. Specific defences to these offences are included under 
s 132AC.  
[3.1.1] Enactment 
Section 132AC has its genesis in the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.380 The treaty obliges 
signatories to implement criminal procedures and penalties at least in cases of wilful copyright 
piracy on a commercial scale.381 The wording of the treaty obligation is not unique to the Australia-
US Free Trade Agreement and identical wording appears in other free trade agreements that the 
United States has entered into since 1994.382 The US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
2004 (Cth) amended383 the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to include a new s 132(5DB)384: 
“A person commits an offence if: (a) the person engages in conduct; and (b) the conduct 
results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or other subject-matter; and 
(c) the infringement or infringements have a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of 
the copyright; and (d) the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale.” 
Guidance for determining whether or not the infringement occurred on a commercial scale was 
provided by s 132(5DC):385 
“In determining whether one or more infringements occur on a commercial scale for the 
purposes of paragraph (5DB)(d), the following matters are to be taken into account: (a) the 
volume of any articles that are infringing copies that constitute the infringement or 
infringements; (b) the value of any articles that are infringing copies that constitute the 
infringement or infringements; (c) any other relevant matter.” 
                                                            
380 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 
381 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.11 s 26(a) 
382 Cf US-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art 17.11 s(22)(a); Dominican Republic-Central America-US Free Trade 
Agreement, art 15.11 s 26(a); US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art 15.11 s 26(a); North American Free Trade 
Agreement, art 1717 s1 
383 US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) s 154 
384 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), amended by Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
385 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), amended by Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
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The offence was punishable on summary conviction by a fine of 650 penalty points and/or 
imprisonment for 5 years.386 Although never it was never put to the test, the interplay between the 
penalty section, s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s 80 of the Commonwealth Constitution may 
have invalidated any convictions entered under s 132(5DB) that were not tried by jury. The Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) specifies that unless the contrary intention appears, offences against the 
Commonwealth punishable by more than 12 months imprisonment are indictable offences. 
Consequently, indictable offences must be tried by jury in accordance with s 80 of the 
Commonwealth constitution. The linchpin would have been the judicial interpretation of the penalty 
provision in s 132(6A). Since there was no express intention to the contrary as required by s 4G,387 
the question for a court would have been whether the words of the section were sufficient to show 
a contrary intention, or if they impliedly repealed s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Subsequent 
legislative amendments have rendered further judicial consideration of this point unnecessary, but it 
remains an interesting historical footnote, particularly in light of the case of Ly v Jenkins388 where the 
defendants unsuccessfully argued that s 80 guaranteed a right to trial by jury in a copyright offence 
case. 
The Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), Schedule 1, s 6 repealed s 132(DB) and enacted 
s 132AC(1) as its replacement. The wording of the offence remained identical, but the offence 
became an indictable offence and a separate summary offence was created by the enactment of 
s 132AC(3). The physical elements of the summary offence are identical to the indictable offence, 
but the culpability for the fault elements of the offence is higher for the indictable offence. There is 
an express intention389 that s 132AC is a summary offence despite s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914. 
[3.1.2] Elements of the offences 
The physical elements for both s 132AC (1) and (3) consist of the following:  
(1) a person engages in conduct;  
(2) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or other subject-
matter;  
(3) the infringement or infringements have a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the 
copyright; and  
                                                            
386 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s132(6A), amended by Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) 
387 The summary offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) since the 2006 amendments now expressly state 
this intention. 
388 Ly v Jenkins (2001) 53 IPR 317 
389 Copyright Act 1968, s 132AC(4) 
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(4) the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale. 
The fault elements for physical elements (a) and (b) are identical for both offences and consist of 
intention and recklessness respectively. In the indictable offence, the fault element for physical 
elements (c) and (d) is also recklessness. The summary offence is differentiated from the indictable 
offence by making the fault element for these physical elements negligence. 
[3.1.3] “engages in conduct” 
“Engages in conduct” appears at first to be a very broad element, and is undefined by the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth). There are however, a number of factors which narrow its application. Section 4.1 (2) 
of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) however, states that “In this Code […] engage in conduct means 
(a) do an act; or (b) omit to perform an act”. If s 132 is interpreted in line with the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth), this would mean that “engages in conduct” excludes conduct that consists of a state of 
affairs such as possession. 
Further, s 4.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) states that: “An omission to perform an act can 
only be a physical element if: (a) the law creating the offence a makes it so; or (b) the law creating 
the offence impliedly provides that the offence is committed by an omission to perform an act that 
by law there is a duty to perform”. The meaning of “law” is restricted in the dictionary section of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) to “a law of the Commonwealth, and includes this Code”. There are a 
number of offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) where “engages in conduct” is an element of 
the offence390 and while it is clear under s 4.1 (2) that an omission to perform an act may be classed 
as engaging in conduct, an omission can only be a physical element in the circumstances stated in 
s 4.3.  
Neither of the offences under s 132AC expressly state that an omission to perform an act forms part 
of “engaging in conduct” and neither is it implied. It can therefore be stated with a reasonable 
amount of certainty that this element must consist of a positive act. 
[3.1.4] “the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright”  
This element can consist of any infringement under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The scope of this 
offence is very large, since any act that infringes copyright can become an offence, subject to the 
qualifying elements discussed below. The width of the scope precludes detailed discussion of the 
possible offences that may occur, but the element provides prosecuting authorities with a powerful 
                                                            
390 See ss 80.1 (1) (e), 104.22 (3) (a), 105.45 (a), 115.1 (1) (a), 115.2 (1) (a), 115.3 (1) (a), 115.4 (1) (a), 135.2 (1) 
(a), 135.2 (2) (a), 147.1 (1) (a), 147.1 (2) (a), 271.3 (1) (c) (i), 271.6 (1) (c) (i), 271.8 (1) (a), 310.2 (1) (a), 310.3 (1) 
(a), 360.2 (1) (a) and 471.6 (1) (a).  
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legislative tool to wield against commercial scale infringement which does not fall into another 
category of offence. Any act resulting in a direct infringement of the rights granted by ss 31 and 85 – 
88 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) would satisfy this element, as would any form of indirect 
infringement prohibited by ss 37 – 39 and 102 – 103. Most of these indirect infringements also 
constitute separate offences which are contained in Subdivisions C and D. Copyright is also infringed 
if a person authorises the doing of any act comprised in the copyright, and this is also capable of 
satisfying this element of the offence. 
[3.1.5] “substantial prejudicial impact” 
The phrase “substantial prejudicial impact” is not defined by the Act nor has there been any 
reported case law to refine or determine its ordinary meaning. “Prejudicial impact” is often used in 
the context of the probative value of uncorroborated confessions391, but this does not assist any 
interpretation of the phrase here, since in that context the word retains its etymological meaning. In 
the context of this section, the word should be considered in its alternate ordinary meaning of 
“detriment” or “injury”.392  
The qualifying word “substantial” has also received some judicial consideration in other contexts.393 
This has given rise to two distinct meanings. In some contexts, the word has held to be something 
more than ephemeral or nominal,394 thus rendering the meaning “real”. It has also been held to 
mean greater rather than less, 395  relatively considerable, 396  and large. 397  The explanatory 
memorandum for the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 states that an example “would include the 
situation where a film was placed on a website without the copyright owner’s authorisation was 
subsequently downloaded by a large number of people”,398 which tends to indicate the preferred 
interpretation of “substantial” is “large”. If the intention of Parliament had been to include conduct 
which only had a minor prejudicial impact on the owner of the copyright, there really would have 
been no need to include the word “substantial” at all. Quite where the dividing line falls is difficult to 
                                                            
391 Cf Harriman v R  (1989) 88 ALR 161; R v Swaffield  (1998) 151 ALR 98; Tofilau v R (2007) 238 ALR 650; R v 
Christie [1914] AC 545 
392 See Re Neath and Brecon Railway Company [1892] 1 Ch 349 
393 Cf. Tillmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australian Meat Industry Employee’s Union (1979) ALR 367; Palser v 
Grinling [1948] 1 All ER 1; Re Queensland Co Operative Milling Association Ltd  8 ALR 481; Hann v 
Commonwealth DPP [2004] SASC 86; Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 
173; Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo FM Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 557  
394 Tillmans Butcheries Pty Ltd v Australian Meat Industry Employee’s Union (1979) ALR 367; Hann v 
Commonwealth DPP [2004] SASC 86 
395 Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd  (1982) 44 ALR 173 
396 Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Stereo FM Pty Ltd  (1982) 44 ALR 557 
397 Palser v Grinling [1948] 1 All ER 1; Re Queensland Co Operative Milling Association Ltd  8 ALR 481 
398 Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) 
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say, but many courts have taken a conservative approach to interference with the proprietary rights 
of copyright holders. It was held in HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming,399 for example, that 30 or more 
downloads of a Hollywood film in a public forum would have a prejudicial effect on the copyright 
owner.400 The context of the infringement will be crucial to decide if this “substantial” benchmark 
has been met, and it will not be a simple case of reaching a target number of infringements since the 
prejudicial impact of copying a hundred commercially available musical works may be far less than 
the copying of one valuable or even bespoke article of software. If a court holds the prejudicial 
impact of the conduct is not substantial, then the offence cannot be complete. 
These offences go some way to incorporate the harm principle theory discussed in Chapter 3 by 
including a result element that requires proof of harm.  
[3.1.6] “the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale” 
The test for determining if the infringement is on a commercial scale is given in s 132AC(5). Courts 
are directed to take into account the volume and value of any articles that are infringing copies that 
constitute the infringement or infringements and any other relevant matter. While it is often the 
case that copyright infringement will involve infringing copies, this is obviously not the case with an 
infringement of the right to perform a work. It is not clear in these cases how courts will interpret 
the commercial scale requirement, but it would be prudent to expect that an infringement for 
commercial purposes will come closer to meeting this standard.  
[3.1.7] Defences 
Two defences are included in s 132AC for either of the offences. The first relates to law enforcement 
and national security;401 the second relates to the actions of certain public institutions.402 These 
defences are identical to those found in ss 132APC(7), (8) and (8A) which are defences for 
circumventing access control technological protection measures. These defences are discussed fully 
in Chapter 6 at paragraphs [3.1.9] and [3.1.10].  
[4] Subdivision C: Infringing Copies 
There are a number of offences that involve dealing with infringing copies. Although each offence 
differs in the conduct of the offence, there are considerable commonalities in definitions and terms. 
                                                            
399 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142 
400 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142 
401 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC(6) 
402 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC(7) 
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[4.1] Common Elements 
In Subdivision C, almost all403 of the offences involving infringing copies include two common 
elements:  
(1) “the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter”; and  
(2) “copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter when [another element of the 
offence occurs]”  
Superficially, one of these two elements (“the common elements”) would appear extraneous. For 
example, in the indictable offence of making an infringing copy commercially404, the act of making an 
article when copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter is impossible to do without the 
article being an infringing copy. The same is true of the distribution offences 405 where the 
distribution occurs by communication, since the infringing copy is created by the communication, 
and would have to occur within the period of time when copyright subsists. However, it is quite 
possible that an infringing copy could be produced before the expiry of the copyright and stored. In 
the absence of the subsistence elements, the offences could be committed when copyright no 
longer subsists in the work.  
In order to determine if the offences in Division C have been committed, it is first necessary to 
examine: 
(1) if the making of a copy was unauthorised; and  
(2) if the copy was unauthorised, if any of the exceptions apply.406  
This drastically understates the task of such an exercise since the volume and complexity of law on 
the subject is vast.407 In some circumstances this can be further complicated as the status of the 
copy may be changed by events that occur after a copy is made.  
                                                            
403 The exceptions are the two offences in s 132AL and s 132AM, though both of these offences still have a 
connection to infringing copies. 
404 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) 
405 Copyright Act 1968(Cth) s 132AE 
406 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) div 3 and div 6. For discussion see generally: Handler, M. and Rolph, D., ‘A Real 
Pea Souper: The Panel Case and the Development of the Fair Dealing Defences to Copyright Infringement in 
Australia’ (2003) 27(2) Melbourne University Law Review 381; Austin, G. W., ‘Four Questions About the 
Australian Approach to Fair Dealing Defenses to Copyright Infringement’ (2009) 57 Journal, Copyright Society 
of the U.S.A. 611; Brudenall, P., ‘Fair Dealing in Australian Copyright Law: Rights of Access under the 
Microscope’ (1997) 20(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 443; Mee, B., ‘Laughing Matters: Parody 
and Satire in Australian Copyright Law’ (2009) 20 Journal of Law, Information and Science 55  
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For example, s 110(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) states that a copy of a videotape is not an 
infringing copy if the owner of the videotape makes the copy for private or domestic use, subject to 
the additional qualifying sections in s 110(1) (b) and (c). If the owner subsequently disposes of the 
original videotape to another person, s 110(2) is taken to have never applied and so the non-
infringing copy becomes an infringing copy ab initio. Copyright owners would likely be precluded 
from seeking an award of damages virtue of s 115(3), since it is impossible for a defendant to have 
known that the infringement had occurred at the time of the infringement because at the time of 
the infringement no infringement had actually occurred. Such subtleties make an analysis of an 
offence difficult. 
For the purposes of the Division 5 offences, once it is established that the copy made was an 
infringing copy, the status of an infringing copy is fixed at its creation and so it remains an infringing 
copy even after the expiry of the copyright period. This is the case even if this determination occurs 
after the event as in the example of s 110(1) (b) above. This is indicated through the combination of 
the use of the past tense in s 10 (“[...] being an article the making of which constituted an 
infringement”) and the necessity of the infringing copy element being accompanied by the 
subsistence element.  
In most cases the subsistence element and the infringing copy element will overlap and both the 
making of the infringing copy and dealing with it will occur within the time period when copyright 
subsists. If an infringing copy is stored until copyright no longer subsists in the work or subject 
matter, most of the offences in Division 5 cannot be committed because the subsistence element 
will no longer be present.  
The offences for making an infringing copy under s 132AD are exceptional, since by the very nature 
of the offences the infringement and subsistence elements must logically occur simultaneously. The 
s 132AL offences also differ from the remaining offences in Subdivision C, since the existence of an 
infringing copy is not a require element of the offence. 
[4.2] Section 132AD: Making infringing copy commercially 
Section 132AD [see Appendix at page 329] contains offences for making an infringing copy for 
commerce. There are three offences for making an infringing copy commercially, which are tiered 
according to culpability. All of the offences contain the infringing copy and subsistence elements 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
407 See generally: Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 
984; Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [1999] FCA 1864; TCN Channel Nine v 
Network Ten (2001) 108 FCR 235 
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common to this Subdivision. In most of the other Subdivision 5 offences, the infringing copy element 
is a circumstance element, but here it a result element. The offence is not concerned with dealings 
with infringing copies, but rather bringing them into existence. At present, this difference has no 
effect on the indictable offence since the fault elements for both results of conduct and 
circumstances in which conduct occurs is recklessness.408  
[4.2.1] Indictable Offence 
The indictable offence is housed in s 132AD(1) and consists of three physical elements:  
(1) making an article;409  
(2) the article is an infringing copy;410 and  
(3) copyright subsists when the article is made.411  
The fault element for the first physical element is specified as being an intention to do one of three 
things:  
(1) sell the article;412  
(2) let the article for hire;413 or  
(3) obtain a commercial advantage or profit.414 
 The fault element for the other physical elements (“the common physical elements”) is 
recklessness, since the absence of a specified fault element means s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) applies. 
[4.2.2] Summary Offence 
The summary offence in s 132AD(3) differs from the indictable offence only by lowering the 
culpability of the fault elements of the two common physical elements from recklessness to 
negligence. Both the physical and fault elements of the first element of the offence remains identical 
to the indictable offence. 
                                                            
408 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6 (2) 
409 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (a) 
410 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (b) 
411 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (c) 
412 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (a) (i) 
413 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (a) (ii) 
414 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD(1) (a) (iii) 
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[4.2.3] Strict Liability Offence 
By definition the strict liability offence in s 132AD(5) removes the requirement of corresponding 
fault elements for both of the standard physical elements. The first physical element differs slightly 
from both the indictable offence and the summary offence. In those offences, the physical element 
is written simply – “a person makes an article”. The fault element in those offences is more 
elaborate, requiring the intention of one of three things: selling it, letting it for hire, or obtaining a 
commercial advantage or profit. These are discussed below at paragraphs [4.2.4.], [4.2.5] and 
[4.2.6]. Here the strict liability offence prohibits the making of an article “in preparation for, or in the 
course of” any of the same three things.  
It is difficult to imagine how evidence could differ between proving that an article was made “in 
preparation for” and not “with the intention of” doing any of the three proscribed acts. The offence 
is not one of preparing to make the copy. The preparation is for the doing of one of the other three 
things, and implies they have not commenced. When someone has explicitly made preparations  to 
sell, hire or obtain commercial advantage or profit by copying an article, an intention to do any of 
these three acts would surely exist in the mind of the person. In regard to offences where selling, 
hiring out or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit have not yet occurred, and exist only in the 
mind of the defendant, it is likely that 132AD(5) will be only used where evidence cannot support 
the corresponding fault elements of either the common elements for the indictable or summary 
offence. 
However s 132AD(5) also contemplates making a copy “in the course of” selling, hiring or obtaining a 
commercial advantage or profit. This phrase is not a term of art, and it simply means “during” or “in 
the process of”. Making a copy during or in the process of selling or hiring the same article would 
appear to be difficult to achieve, unless either transaction is taken to have started by taking a 
customer’s order. Obtaining a commercial advantage might be easier to make out due to the 
potential scope of the element, for example making an infringing copy for free in order to attract 
other business custom. 
[4.2.4] “selling” 
In the absence of express statutory extension or necessary implication,415 the meaning of the word 
“sell” is confined to an exchange of commodities for money.416 French J in Sun World Inc v Registrar, 
Plant Variety Rights417 stated that: 
                                                            
415 Sun World Inc v Registrar, Plant Variety Rights (1997) 148 ALR 447, 458 per French J 
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“There is considerable authority for the proposition that the ordinary meaning of the word 
“sale” in a variety of statutory and common law settings is an exchange of commodities for 
money”418 
No such express extension appears in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) nor would it appear that it is 
necessary to extend its meaning to facilitate the operation of the section. It is fairly clear that the 
word “selling” in s 132AD, and its related grammatical forms,419 should be restricted to transactions 
that use money. Transactions involving any other medium of exchange or barter, such as exchanging 
other infringing articles,420 would not meet this definition. The other intended acts in ss 132AD(1)(a), 
(3)(a) and (5)(a) are not restricted by this strict interpretation, so it may be possible that an exchange 
for something other than for money could constitute an offence under one of those subsections. 
Having restricted the meaning of “selling” to exchanges in consideration for money, no guidance is 
given from the case law previously referenced about the limits of the definition of “money”. In Moss 
v Hancock421 Darling J adopted the following definition: 
“that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of 
debts and full payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the 
character or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person who 
receives it to consume it or apply it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in 
discharge of debts or payment for commodities.”422 
Within the Commonwealth of Australia, the Australian dollar would certainly meet this definition. 
However, it would be stretching the definition to suggest that the US dollar “passes freely [...] 
throughout the community” in Australia, though it might be accepted as payment. However, it 
would be absurd if the meaning of “money” was restricted to the Australian dollar, since all that 
would be necessary to escape conviction would be to agree to carry out the transaction in another 
currency. Also, given the global nature of infringement in the digital age, it would be unremarkable if 
an online transaction took place using currencies other than the Australian dollar.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
416 See: J & P Coates v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1897] 1 QB 778; Simpson v Connolly [1953] 1 WLR 
911; Robshaw Brothers Ltd v Mayer [1957] Ch 125. 
417 Sun World Inc v Registrar, Plant Variety Rights (1997) 148 ALR 447 
418 Sun World Inc v Registrar, Plant Variety Rights (1997) 148 ALR 447, 458 
419 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 18A 
420 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295 
421 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111 
422 Moss v Hancock [1899] 2 QB 111, 116 
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Since it is not an actual exchange for money that is required by s 132(1)(a)(i), rather an intention to 
sell, questions over the currency of exchange are unlikely to be raised unless there is evidence of 
pre-existing arrangement for a transaction in an usual medium of exchange. Evidence of an intention 
to sell is far more likely to be drawn through inference, such as a large scale production of the same 
article. 
[4.2.5] “letting for hire” 
The phrase “letting for hire” has been judicially considered in the context of transportation 
licensing.423 In the English case of Corner v Clayton424 a private pilot had agreed to fly a third party 
from Durkeswell Flying Club in Exeter to Jersey airport. The third party had agreed to cover the cost 
of the hire of the aircraft from the flying club. The pilot was subsequently charged with flying an 
aircraft for the purposes of public transport without holding the appropriate licence. It was 
contended that the pilot had flown the aircraft for hire and therefore engaged in public 
transportation. The court held that “hire” meant “engaging the services of a person or the use of a 
chattel for payment” and that it was immaterial whether or not there is a profit element in the hiring 
charge. In Murphy v Forsythe; ex parte Murphy,425 this definition was approved and adopted. 
There is no authority which would either support or oppose a contention that a payment for hire 
would have to take the form of money as it would for a sale. This may mean that an arrangement 
between two or more parties to temporarily exchange infringing articles could possibly meet the 
definition of a let for hire. Given the ease with which digital copies can now be exchanged and 
copied over the internet, it would seem more likely that infringing articles will be let for hire by 
businesses to customers for monetary payment.426 
[4.2.6] “obtain a commercial advantage”  
The precise meaning of the words “commercial advantage” has received little judicial consideration 
in Australia. The use of these words in relation to the law of copyright originates in the 1976 revision 
of US copyright law.427 They were subsequently incorporated into Australian copyright law in the 
Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) 428 implementing Articles 17-26 of the Australia-US 
Free Trade Agreement.429 At no stage in this journey are the words given meaning in an explanatory 
                                                            
423 See: Murphy v Forsythe; ex parte Murphy [1980] Qd R 65; Corner v Clayton [1976] 3 All ER 212 
424 Corner v Clayton [1976] 3 All ER 212 
425 Murphy v Forsythe; ex parte Murphy [1980] Qd R 65 
426 See: Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174 
427 An Act for the General Revision of Copyright Law 1976, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, §506 
428 Copyright Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) s 17 
429 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17-26 
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memorandum. This is troubling because “commercial advantage” could be easily construed by its 
ordinary meaning to include many incidental infringements with a very low impact on the 
commercial interests of rights holders.  
For example, if D owns a barber shop, obtains a background music licence from the Australasian 
Performing Right Association and buys a CD to play in his shop, this would almost certainly be 
characterised as a “commercial advantage” in the ordinary sense. The background music is being 
played to create a pleasant atmosphere which he hopes is attractive to potential customers. Since 
the “commercial advantage” is not qualified, it would be reasonable to assume that it is not limited 
to advantages over competitors, but would include improvements to D’s chances of attracting and 
retaining custom. If D were to copy the CD for the purposes of playing in his shop so he can use the 
original as a backup, he will have enlivened the “making a copy” element of any of the three 
offences in s 132AD, despite having paid for the original CD and a performance license.  
[4.2.7] “profit” 
The meaning of the word “profit” is not defined for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), but 
as discussed above at paragraph [2.1], in Division 5 it does not include any advantage, benefit, or 
gain received by a person that results from, or is associated with, the person’s private or domestic 
use of any copyright material. 
The most obvious way to make a profit would be to sell an infringing copy for more money than it 
cost to produce. However, this conduct would of course fall under the definition of “selling”, so it 
should be assumed that “obtaining a profit” addresses a broader range of conduct that results in a 
benefit or gain by the person making the copy. An example would be making a copy for a reward or 
gain where both the original copy and the materials used to make the copy, such as a blank CD or 
DVD, are provided by a third person. If such a transaction occurs between members of a domestic 
circle, it is unlikely that this would enliven the offence, but this would depend on extending “private 
and domestic use” to private and domestic acts of infringement.  
[4.3] Section 132AE: Selling or Hiring Out Infringing Copy 
Section 132AE [see Appendix at page 330] contains offences for selling an infringing copy or letting 
an infringing copy for hire. It consists of three offences tiered in the usual manner. The meanings of 
selling and letting for hire discussed above in relation to the offences in s 132AD also apply to the 
offences in s 132AE. However, here the selling or hiring out forms a physical element of the offences, 
so it necessary to prove both that a sale or hire actually took place, and that the defendant intended 
to either sell the article or let it for hire.  
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[4.3.1] Investigation and charging 
Most of the reported Australian cases for copyright offences 430 have been concerned with 
commercial dealings with infringing copies. However, most of these have been for offences that 
might be considered peripheral to the core activity of the business, i.e. the offering431, possession432 
or making433 of infringing copies for the purposes of sale or hire, rather than the actual sale or hiring 
out of infringing copies. The main reason for this apparent discrepancy can be demonstrated by the 
facts in the case of Hamm v Middleton.434 
Middleton operated a business in South Australia which traded as “The Laser Disc Shop”, which was 
involved with the importation and sale of legitimate copies of DVDs from America which were 
licensed for sale in Australia, a practice commonly known as parallel importing. He had been 
formally warned in March 1992 by representatives of the Australian Film and Video Security Office 
(“AFVSO”) that the activities of his business were illegal and that even though the articles were 
authorised copies, the act of importation rendered them infringing copies. Middleton told AFVSO 
that he had received advice that what he was doing was legal and he intended to continue to import 
the DVDs. In October 1995 an officer from AFVSO purchased two DVDs from Middleton, and three 
days later a search warrant was executed and a considerable amount of DVDs were located and 
seized. The following day another warrant was executed at the office of a courier service Middleton 
had been using to import the DVDs and another batch was seized. Middleton was charged with 
three different offences:  
(1) selling an infringing copy;  
(2) possessing an infringing copy for the purposes of trade; and  
(3) importing an infringing copy for the purposes of trade. 
The investigation of the case suggests that the offence of selling an infringing copy was ultimately 
used as evidence to obtain a search warrant so other offences could be investigated and greater 
number of infringing copies could be confiscated. Where a search warrant can be obtained,435 
                                                            
430 See Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174; Pontello v Ceselli (1989) 16 IPR 645; Irvine v Carson (1991) 22 
IPR 107; Holder v Searle (No 1) (1997) 39 IPR 337; Hamm v Middleton (1999) 44 IPR 656; Donnelly v Hughes 
(1999) 47 IPR 614; Kam Lai-Ha v McCusker (2000) 49 IPR 47; Chen v NSW Police Service (2003) 59 IPR 431; Bell 
v Queensland (2006) 71 IPR 139; Vu v NSW Police Service (2007) 73 IPR 531; Le v R (2007) 74 IPR 1 
431 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AF 
432 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AJ 
433 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD 
434 Hamm v Middleton (1999) 44 IPR 656 
435 See Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174, 177; Irvine v Carson (1991) 22 IPR 107, 109; Kam Lai-Ha v 
McCusker (2000) 49 IPR 47, 53 
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prosecutions for the sale or hiring out of infringing copies will usually not occur. The charge is far 
more likely to be the making or possession of infringing copies for the purposes of trade, since this 
would not require a “trap purchase” to be made.  
The offence of selling or hiring out an infringing copy, from an investigative and evidentiary point of 
view, requires the defendant to be caught “red-handed” and this is only likely to occur if the sale or 
hire involves an investigator as in Hamm v Middleton,436 or in the unlikely event a sale or hire is 
witnessed by a police officer.  
[4.4] Section 132AF: Offering infringing copy for sale or hire 
Section 132AF [see Appendix at page 331] contains offences for offering or exposing an infringing 
copy for sale or hire. There are actually six different offences in s 132AF consisting of two sets of 
three tiered offences. The tiering of offences occurs in the usual manner with the summary and 
indictable offences being distinguished by differing levels of culpability of the infringing copy and 
subsistence elements.  
The two sets are distinguished by the circumstances of the offer or exposure for sale or hire and the 
corresponding fault element. In one set the offer or exposure is “by way of trade” with a default 
fault element of intention. The other set requires the offer or exposure to be with the intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit, or in the case of the strict liability offence, in 
preparation for, or in the course of, obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. 
[4.4.1] “offers or exposes for sale or hire” 
The meaning of the phrases “offers for sale” and “exposes for sale”, has been the subject of judicial 
consideration in the context of criminal law. Many prohibitions on the types of goods that may be 
sold437, and where438 and when439 they are sold have been enacted and breached which have 
provided a substantial body of case law. 
A leading case in this area is the English case of Fisher v Bell,440 where the defendant was charged 
with offering to sell a flick knife, contrary to s 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 
(England and Wales). A policeman had seen a flick knife on display in a shop window with a ticket 
displaying the price and Bell was charged. It was contended by the prosecution that by placing the 
                                                            
436 Hamm v Middleton (1999) 44 IPR 656 
437 Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731; R v Peirce [1996] 2 VR 215 
438 Godwin’s of Newton Pty Ltd v Gurry [1959] SASR 295; City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Tuting (1964) Tas SR 194; 
Badman v Allchurch [1927] SASR 174 
439 Turnbull v Cocking [1899] 25 VLR 83; Pelka v Sunquist [2005] WASC 52 
440 Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731 
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knife in the shop window Bell had offered the knife for sale within the meaning of the Act. The 
defence was that the knife was at no time offered for sale, that the words “offer for sale” were to be 
interpreted as they were for the law of contract and consequently the display was merely an 
invitation to treat.441 The question for the court was whether the meaning of the words “offer for 
sale” was to be construed in line with the law of contract or whether the Act had intended another 
construction. Parker CJ said: 
“I think that most lay people would be inclined to the view (as, indeed, I was myself 
when I first read these papers), that if a knife were displayed in a window like that 
with a price attached to it, it was nonsense to say that it was not offering it for sale. 
The knife is there inviting people to buy it, and in ordinary language it is for sale; but 
any statute must be looked at in light of the general law of the country, for 
Parliament must be taken to know the general law. It is clear that, according to the 
ordinary law of contract, the display of an article with a price on it in a shop window 
is merely an invitation to treat. It is in no sense an offer for sale the acceptance of 
which constitutes a contract. That is clearly the general law of the country. Not only 
is that so, but it is to be observed that, in many statutes and orders which prohibit 
selling and offering for sale of goods, it is very common, when it is so desired, to 
insert the words “offering or exposing for sale”, “exposing for sale” being clearly 
words which would cover the display of goods in a shop window.”442 
This analysis was followed in Partridge v Crittenden443 where an advert for the sale of a protected 
species of bird was held to be merely an invitation to treat. Where negotiations have been 
conducted outside the context of a shop and an agreement for sale has been reached, it is unclear 
whether a question of exactly who makes an offer and who accepts an offer is relevant in these 
cases if it is raised. It may be that the “last shot” principle444 in contract law could allow defendant to 
escape a charge of under s 132AF in circumstances where the article has not also been exposed for 
sale. In such circumstances, the best option for prosecutors would perhaps be to charge the 
defendant with an attempt at selling an infringing copy, contrary to s 132AE. 
If Parliament had intended to make an offence of agreeing to sell an infringing copy of a copyright 
work it could have quite easily done so by expanding the definition of sell. In R v Peirce the 
                                                            
441 Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421 
442 Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731, 732 per Parker CJ 
443 Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421 
444 Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 965 
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defendant was appealing a conviction for trafficking in heroin, where to “traffick” was defined as 
“...(c) sell, exchange, agree to sell, offer for sale or have in possession for sale...”445 In that case there 
was a question about the judge’s direction to the jury about the meaning of “offer for sale” and 
whether or not the offer has to be genuine, but the appeal was ultimately rejected. 
The strict analysis taken in Bell v Fisher was rejected by McKechnie J in Pelka v Sunquist446 and by the 
Full Federal Court in Sun World International Inc v Registrar, Plant Breeders Rights447 in favour of 
giving the word “sell” its ordinary meaning and not a restricted legal meaning. In both of those cases 
however, the relevant statute had broadened the definition of the word “sell”, and so the courts 
inferred that the intention of Parliament was to broaden the meaning beyond the legal meaning. 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not broaden the definition of “sell”, “offer for sale” or “expose for 
sale”. It does not define these words at all. Both cases should therefore be distinguished in any 
attempt to broaden the meaning of “offer for sale” or “expose for sale”. 
In Badman v Allchurch448 the court was required to consider the meaning of “exposes” for sale in a 
case concerning the sale of liquor. Murray CJ stated: 
“To expose for sale implies something more than merely allowing the things exposed 
to be seen. Pictures are exposed in an art gallery, but they are not exposed for sale. 
They may even be exposed in a shop window, and yet not be for sale. On the other 
hand, if they are hung in an auction mart, or in a private gallery, to which purchasers 
are invited, they may fairly be regarded as exposed for sale. Exposure alone, then, is 
not enough. There must be exposure coupled with an intention to sell to anyone who 
wishes to buy. The difficulty in each case is to prove the intention. But the methods 
of proving the intention are well settled. Acts and declarations may be used as 
evidence. Declarations of intentions speak for themselves, as, for example, where 
the person exposing the goods states that they are for sale, or attaches a card to 
them with the price or the words 'for sale' upon it. Acts are evidence if they justify or 
tend to justify the inference that the goods are exposed for sale. Thus, if one goes up 
to a fruit barrow in the street, and asks for a dozen of apples, tendering a 10 shilling 
note, and the person in charge takes a dozen of apples from the front of the barrow, 
                                                            
445 Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) s 70 
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and hands them to the customer with eight shillings change but without saying a 
word, it may be inferred that the fruit was exposed for sale.”449 
In City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Tuting450 it was held that cars parked on a fenced off piece of 
land with prices on them were exposed for sale, because an office on the premises was 
staffed by a man calling himself the used car manager. Similarly, in Turnbull v Cocking451 it 
was held that a shop which was open after the prescribed hours of trade had exposed goods 
for sale even though no actual sales took place and signs were displayed stating the shop was 
only open for show purposes. Again, sales employees were in attendance. 
It would appear fairly clear from these cases that an that is not difficult to draw inference 
that a defendant had intended to sell even where confronted with palpable attempts to 
circumvent the definition by notices as in Turnbull v Cocking. If a court is satisfied that a 
defendant had an intention to sell at some future point or at the same time the goods were 
exposed, then they can find that they were exposed for sale. 
Section 132AF does cover a substantial amount of the field and the difficulties exposed in 
Fisher v Bell are largely removed due to using the phrase “offer or expose for sale”. However, 
there are still gaps which may be exposed non-retail sales where goods are not exposed for 
sale and legalistic analysis of offer and acceptance prevails. This will also be of significant 
importance for e-commerce sales, though conversely automated transactions may be easier 
to prosecute under this section due to the reversal of offer and acceptance452 from standard 
transactions conducted in a shop.453 A person purchasing an infringing copy of a copyrighted 
work online will usually be deemed to have accepted an offer454, rather than made an offer in 
response to an invitation to treat.455 In these circumstances, the problem for prosecutors in 
Fisher v Bell would simply not arise as the offer would have been made. 
[4.4.2] “by way of trade” 
The definition of the phrase “by way of” is given in the Macquarie Dictionary as follows: 
                                                            
449 Badman v Allchurch [1927] SASR 174, 177 per Murray CJ 
450 City Motors (1933) Pty Ltd v Tuting (1964) Tas SR 194 
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452 Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 163 
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455 See Tay, C., ‘Contracts, Technology and Electronic Commerce: the Evolution Continues’ (1998) 9 Journal of 
Law, Information and Science 177; Allen, T. and Widdison, R., ‘Can Computers Make Contracts?’ (1996) 9 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 25; Fitzgerald B. et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law: Technology, Law 
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“a. by the route of; via; through. b. as a method or means of: *`See you round, then,' he said, 
by way of farewell. –HELEN GARNER, 1977. c. having a reputation for; ostensibly (being, doing, 
etc.): he is by way of being an authority on the subject.”456 
In Nash v Hollinshead457 it was held that the phase “by way of trade” involves the idea of selling or 
manufacturing an article for the purpose of sale.458 The offences that contain an element which 
requires the act or omission to occur “by way of trade” are only enlivened if the activity occurs 
through trade, or as a method of trade. The essential constitution of the word “trade” has a long 
history of judicial consideration in two main areas of Australian law: constitutional law and trade 
practices law. 
Constitutional law has had to deal with the concept of trade due to the conferral of powers on the 
Parliament of Australia to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth with respect to:  
(1) trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States;459 and  
(2) foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth.460  
Section 92 of the Constitution also provides for free trade among the States. Some of the most 
useful cases to emerge from the significant body of law on the subject, for the purposes of defining 
“trade”, are Bank of NSW v Commonwealth,461 the R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George 
County Council 462 and R v Judges of FCA & Adamson; Ex parte WA National Football League.463 In 
Bank of NSW v Commonwealth Dixon J stated: 
“It has been said that "trade" strictly means the buying and selling of goods. That, 
however, is a specialized meaning of the word. The present primary meaning is much 
wider, covering as it does the pursuit of a calling or handicraft, and its history 
emphasizes rather use, regularity and course of conduct, than concern with 
commodities [...] it covers intangibles as well as the movement of goods and persons. 
                                                            
456 Yallop, C. et al (eds) Macquarie Dictionary (4th ed, 2005) 1596 
457 Nash v Hollinshead [1901] 1 QB 700 
458 Nash v Hollinshead [1901] 1 QB 700, 702 
459 Australian Constitution s 51(i) 
460 Australian Constitution s 51(xx) 
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The supply of gas and the transmission of electric current may be considered only an 
obvious extension of the movement of physical goods. But it covers communication. 
The telegraph, the telephone, the wireless may be the means employed. It includes 
broadcasting and, no doubt, it will take in television. In principle there is no reason to 
exclude visual signals. The conception covers, in the United States, the business of 
press agencies and the transmission of all intelligence, whether for gain or not. 
Transportation, traffic, movement, transfer, interchange, communication, are words 
which perhaps together embrace an idea which is dominant in the conception of 
what the commerce clause requires. But to confine the subject matter to physical 
things and persons would be quite out of keeping with all modern developments. 
The essential attributes which belong to the conception should determine the field of 
human activities to which it applies. To place among the essential attributes the 
requirement that there should be goods for sale or delivery or a man upon a journey, 
is to mistake the particular for the general, the concrete example for the abstract 
definition, and to yield to habits of thought inherited from a more primitive 
organization of society.”464 
 Stephen J in R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council stated that: 
“It is the acts of buying and selling that are at the very heart of trade; as Lush J said in 
Higgins v Beauchamp [1914] 3 KB 1192 at 1195 ; [1914-15] All ER Rep 937 at 939, “a 
trading business is one which depends on the buying and selling of goods”. The word 
“trade” was said by their Lordships in Commissioners of Taxation v Kirk [1900] AC 588 
at 592, to mean primarily “traffic by way of sale or exchange or commercial 
dealing”.”465 
In R v Judges of FCA & Adamson; Ex parte WA National Football League Mason J, referring to 
Western Australia National Football League, said: 
“The financial revenue of the leagues is so great and the commercial means by which 
it is achieved is so varied I have no hesitation in concluding that trading constitutes 
their principle activity. In saying this I treat all their activities which I have listed and 
which produce revenue as trading activities. I do not limit the concept of trading to 
                                                            
464 Bank of NSW v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 182 per Dixon J 
465 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St George County Council 2 ALR 371, 399 
Chapter 5 
 
91 
buying and selling at a profit; it extends to business activities carried on with a view 
to earning revenue.”466 
It is fairly clear from these views of the High Court that the concept of “trading” has been construed 
widely and that activities peripheral to buying and selling for a profit would be characterised as “by 
way of trade”. Certainly the operation of a business that buys, sells, or manufactures infringing 
copies would be considered as trading for the purposes of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth), but even though “trade” has been given its widest import in other areas of the law, there are 
limits.  
Strictly private transactions will not be considered as being “by way of trade”. In O’Brien v 
Smolonogov467 it was held that misleading statements made by the appellants in the course of a sale 
of land were not actionable under s 53A(1)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 because the court was 
not satisfied that the transaction was made in trade or commerce. The Full Federal Court, consisting 
of Fox, Sheppard and Beaumont JJ, relied on the guidance of a number of American cases in reaching 
their judgment. In Lanter v Carson468 it was held that relief was not available where the transaction 
is strictly private and not undertaken in the ordinary course of a trade or business.469 Similarly in 
Rosenthal v Perkins,470 an action was brought against the vendors of a house and their agent. Clark J 
held that the defendants were not engaged in trade or commerce and said: 
“[The defendants] did not by the sale of their residence on this one occasion become 
realtors. [...] alleged violators must be engaged in a business, a commercial or 
industrial establishment or enterprise [...]”471 
One-off transactions by individuals involving the sale, hire or exposure for sale of infringing copies 
would therefore not enliven the offences which contain a “by way of trade” element. Most reported 
criminal cases for copyright offences have been against individual retailers,472 market traders473 or 
illicit manufacturers,474 and activities of this kind have been successfully prosecuted under sections 
of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) requiring that infringement be done “by way of trade”.  The ground 
                                                            
466 R v Judges of FCA & Adamson; Ex parte WA National Football League (1979) 23 ALR 439, 474 
467 O’Brien v Smolonogov (1983) 53 ALR 107 
468 Lanter v Carson 373 NE(2d) 973 (1978) 
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470 Rosenthal v Perkins 257 SE(2d) 63 (1979) 
471 Rosenthal v Perkins 257 SE(2d) 63 (1979), 67 
472 See: Pontello v Giannostis (1989) 16 IPR 174; Kam Lai-Ha v McCusker (2000) 49 IPR 47; Vu v NSW Police 
Service (2007) 73 IPR 531 
473 See: Chen v NSW Police Service (2003) 59 IPR 431 
474 See: Pontello v Ceselli (1989) 16 IPR 645; Bell v Queensland (2006) 71 IPR 139; Le v R (2007) 74 IPR 1 
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between these ends of the spectrum will likely be decided on a case-by-case basis. In the related 
cases of Irvine v Carson475 and Irvine v Hanna-Rivero476 the defendants in both cases were 
prosecuted for possession of infringing articles for distribution in the way of trade. Both defendants 
had been involved with the operation of a “swap network” of computer enthusiasts. Each member 
of the network maintained their own library of computer programs and would swap them for a 
program in another member’s library.477 In the Hanna-Rivero case the defendant occasionally 
supplied a copy to non-members for $3. Von Doussa J stated: 
“I accept that the infringing copies were held by the defendant primarily as part of 
his hobby of collecting programs, but, as his plea admits, they were also held for the 
purpose of distribution for the purpose of trade. However the “trade” carried on by 
the defendant was not trade in the ordinary commercial sense.”478 
Since both defendants plead guilty to the charges, the meaning of “by way of trade” was 
never actually contested, but the cases are the clearest authority in Australia for the 
proposition that “by way of trade” will be given a wide ambit by the courts in copyright cases. 
If bartering is accepted as trade, this would have a profound effect on the criminal liability of 
those who engage in the contemporary version of disk swapping: internet file sharing. Many 
internet file sharing systems, particularly during the last decade, have relied on the active 
participation of users in a barter system.479 In most cases an opt-out is provided,480 and a 
study in 2000 by Etyan Adar and Bernardo Huberman481 found that sixty-six percent of users 
were passive users. A reasonable argument could be made that the remaining thirty-four 
percent, by supplying infringing copies in exchange for other infringing copies, are engaging 
in a form of trade. Subsequently, offences that contain a “by way of trade” element could be 
enlivened. While the offences under s 132AF also require that the person offers or exposes 
the article for sale or hire, which would obviously not apply in the case of file sharing, other 
                                                            
475 Irvine v Carson (1991) 22 IPR 107 
476 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295 
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479 See generally: Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the 
File-Swapping Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505; Yu, P.K., ‘P2P and the Future of Private Copying’ 
(2005) 76 University of Colorado Law Review 653; Choi, B.H., ‘The Grokster Dead End’ (2006) 19 Harvard 
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offences such as possession482 or distribution483 of an infringing copy might be triggered if 
this analysis is correct. 
[4.5] Section 132AG: Exhibiting infringing copy in public commercially 
Section 132AG [see Appendix at page 333] contains offences for exhibiting an infringing copy in 
public for commercial purposes. This section is ordered in an identical manner to s 132AF. It 
comprises of six offences in two sets of three offences which are tiered according to differing levels 
of culpability. Again, the two sets are distinguished between offences occurring “by way of trade” 
and offences committed with the intention of “obtaining a commercial advantage or profit”. The 
offence has a long statutory pedigree, reaching back to s 11 of the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) and has 
been retained throughout the history of Australian copyright law. Unfortunately, this long legislative 
history is not matched by an equally long history of case law or judicial examination. 
[4.5.1] “exhibiting an infringing copy” 
The physical element of the act of “exhibiting” is not given a definition by the statute nor does 
Australian copyright law grant an exclusive right of exhibition in public. Infringing copies of artworks 
which are exposed for viewing in an art gallery or museum would almost certainly be characterised 
as being exhibited, since the material in which copyright subsists cannot be separated from the 
physical object. Physical objects which contain films, music or software require a device to display 
the copyrighted work, and as such can only be exhibited indirectly. It can be said with some certainty 
that the showing of a cinematographic film which contains an infringing copy of a musical 
composition does constitute the act of “exhibiting”, since this was held to be the case in the Hawkes 
& Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service Ltd. 484  
It is not clear if the exhibition of an infringing copy of film, music or software would extend to 
displaying the physical object embodying the copyrighted work. Some guidance on the point can be 
found in the United States jurisprudence. The copyright law of the United States grants copyright 
holders the exclusive right to display the work publicly,485 which encompasses “literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audio-visual work”.486 The right of 
display is subject to the limitation of §109(5) which provides: “the owner of a particular copy lawfully 
                                                            
482 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AJ(1)(v) 
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made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of 
the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more 
than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”487 According to 
Professor R. Anthony Reece, were it not for this limitation anyone reading a copyrighted newspaper 
in public would technically infringe the owner’s right of display in the United States.488 The display of 
an unlawfully made copy of the newspaper therefore, which would not benefit from the limitation of 
§109(5), would also infringe the display right in addition to the right infringed when the copy was 
made.489 If Reece is correct, and simply reading a copyright work in public can amount to display, 
this would give the offence enormous reach if the word “exhibit” was equated with the right of 
display in the United States. It would mean that merely carrying an infringing article in public would 
amount to an offence. 
However, this should be treated with caution since in the absence of a definition in an Act, words are 
to be given their ordinary meaning consistent with the purposes of that Act.490 Attempts to import 
meaning from other jurisdictions have fallen foul of this rule of interpretation in at least one case 
involving copyright offences.491 It would seem unjust if the offence could be triggered by the 
exhibition of an infringing article without actually exhibiting the protected work, but literal 
interpretation of the statute would allow this to occur without producing an absurdity. However, it is 
highly unlikely that a prosecutor would bring a charge under s 132AG when the same conduct would 
amount to an offence for possessing an infringing copy under s 132AJ. The word “exhibit” is more 
likely to be interpreted as inviting the inspection of the work rather than merely allowing it to be 
seen. 
[4.5.2] “in public” 
The other limb of the distinguishing physical element in the offences under s 132AG, the “in public” 
limb, is perhaps not such an unknown quality as the “exhibit” limb. There have been a number of 
cases in copyright law that have sought to distinguish whether or not an infringing act has been done 
                                                            
487 US Code Title 17 §109(5) 
488 See Reese, R.A., ‘The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to the Controversy over 
RAM “Copies”’ [2001] University of Illinois Law Review 83, 90 
489 Cohen, J. et al, Copyright in a Global Information Economy (2002)  417 
490 Acts Interpretation Act 1901(Cth) s 15AA 
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“in public”.492 The majority of these cases deal with the public performance right, which although is 
not directly comparable with the offence in hand, nonetheless may provide keener guidance for the 
interpretation of the phrase than would other offences that contain a similar elements such as 
indecent exposure493 or public drunkenness.494 Moreover, “in public” in the context of copyright law 
is not restricted to a public place as is common with other offences; a performance is equally 
capable of being “in public” in a private home.495 
Reaching the correct interpretation of this element of the offences under s 132AG involves 
considering the audience who are invited to view the infringing copy. In Duck v Bates496 it was held 
that the presence of visitors at a private performance did not render the defendant liable for 
copyright infringement, since the visitors became part of the domestic circle of the defendant. The 
case is unusual since the domestic circle in question consisted of staff of Guy’s Hospital in London, 
but who were also resident at the hospital. Other cases where such performances have occurred in 
non-residential workplaces have been generally considered to have been in public.497  
In Harms Incorporated and Chappell & Co v St Martin’s Club498 however, it was held that a 
performance in a private club where the audience was restricted to members of the club amounted 
to a performance in public. This was because the members of the club represented a portion of the 
copyright owner’s public and was therefore not a domestic or quasi domestic audience. This 
principle has been applied consistently in cases involving hotels499 and restaurants500 playing music 
audible to guests. 
The case of Jennings v Stephens501 concerned a performance of a short play called “The Rest Cure” 
by Gertrude E. Jennings. The performance was held at a meeting of Duston Women’s Institute which 
was performed by a visiting amateur dramatic society. It was given free of charge and for members 
                                                            
492 Duck v Bates (1884) 13 QBD 843; Ernest Turner Electrical Instruments Ltd v Performing Right Society [1943] 
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of the Institute only. Jennings sued the President of the Overstone and Sywell Dramatic Society for 
copyright infringement. The court gave a thorough analysis of the issue and held that the true 
criterion was the character of the audience and that the following factors are immaterial:  
(1) the numbers present;  
(2) the presence or absence of visitors;  
(3) the payment or non-payment of performers;  
(4) whether the performers are members of the domestic circle or strangers; and  
(5) whether or not a charge is made for admission. 
Greene LJ stated: 
“The question may therefore be usefully approached by inquiring whether or not the act 
complained of as an infringement would, if done by the owner of the copyright himself, have 
been an exercise by him of the statutory right conferred upon him. In other words, the 
expression “in public” must be considered in relation to the owner of the copyright. If the 
audience considered in relation to the owner of the copyright may properly be described as 
the owner's “public” or part of his “public,” then in performing the work before that 
audience he would, in my opinion, be exercising the statutory right conferred upon him; and 
anyone who without his consent performed the work before that audience would be 
infringing his copyright.”502 
This concept of the copyright holder’s public was adopted in the Australian cases of APRA v 
Canterbury-Bankstown League Club Ltd503 and Rank Film Production Ltd v Dodds.504 In Rank Film 
Production Ltd v Dodds the proprietor of a motel had transmitted various films to his guests by 
means of a video cassette recorder which was linked to the television sets in the motel rooms. 
The most likely conduct that will attract the operation of s 132AG will be the public exhibition of 
works of art. The exhibition of infringing copies of cinematographic films and sound recordings could 
also be bring charges under this section, but this will depend on the nature of the infringement. 
There are separate offences for causing a cinematographic film or sound recording to be seen or 
heard in a place of public entertainment in s 132AO, discussed in Chapter 6 at paragraph [2.2]. 
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[4.6] Section 132AH: Importing infringing copy commercially 
Section 132AH [see Appendix at page 334] contains offences for importing an infringing copy for a 
variety of purposes, most of which are commercial purpose. It consists of three offences, once again 
tiered according the culpability of the infringing copy element and the subsistence element. The 
distinguishing element of these offences is the physical element of importing an article. For the 
offence to be complete, this importation must be accompanied by the intention to do any of the 
following with the article:  
(1) selling it;  
(2) letting it for hire;  
(3) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire;  
(4) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or profit;  
(5) distributing it for trade;  
(6) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit;  
(7) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright in the 
work or other subject-matter of which the article is an infringing copy;  
(8) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; or  
(9) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit.  
The strict liability offence, in common with s 132AD discussed above, replaces the words “with the 
intention of” with “in preparation for, or in the course of” ostensibly to remove the requirement for 
a mental element and make the offence a true strict liability offence. All of these intention elements 
are to be found in other offences and will not be discussed in this section. The most crucial and 
distinguishing element of these offences is the act of importation, which requires consideration. 
[4.6.1] “imports an article into Australia” 
As discussed above at paragraph [2.2], the external Territories of Australia are included in the 
definition of Australia for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). “Imports” is not defined in 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), nor is it defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Contrary to 
what one might assume, the term is not defined in either the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), the Customs 
Regulations 1926 (Cth) or the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth) despite 
numerous references to the word. For serious drug offences under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), 
the word import “includes bring into Australia”.505 Unsurprisingly, this has meant that customs 
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offences where different permutations of the word are used have been the subject of considerable 
judicial scrutiny.506 In Lyons v Smart,507Griffith CJ stated: 
“In my opinion the word “import” [...] means, “bring into the Commonwealth” and refers to 
some contravention of the Statute committed in the act of bringing in, and not to a 
contravention committed after the goods have been reported to the Customs.”508 
The statutory language used to create offences of this nature has varied. In some instances the word 
“imports” is employed,509 in other cases “importation”.510 In R v Bull511 the High Court was asked to 
consider if cannabis had been imported into Australia. A vessel had sailed from Darwin to Bali and 
back. As it neared Darwin, Customs officers observed the crew dumping suitcases overboard. The 
suitcases were recovered and were discovered to have contained cannabis resin. The court held that 
“import into Australia” required the drugs to be landed in Australia and did not refer to the area 
between the low water mark and a line three nautical miles out to sea. Barwick CJ stated: 
“The question is not what constitutes importation in an abstract or universal sense; the 
question is when, according to the provisions of the Act, are goods imported into Australia. 
However, in general, importation of goods, in my opinion, according to the natural meaning 
of the word, involves landing them, or bringing them within a port for the purpose of landing 
them, or bringing them within a port for the purpose of landing them in the country or place 
in relation to which importation is regulated.”512 
This reasoning was adopted by Neaves J in McGurk Construction and Rigging Co Ltd v Comptroller-
General of Customs,513 an administrative law case where the applicants had sought to challenge a 
decision not to grant a licence to import a second hand crane on the basis that the importation 
process had not been completed.514 
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In some cases, particularly where a consignment is sent unaccompanied, it is not a straightforward 
matter to identify the importer. In Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Grantite Arms Pty Ltd,515 a 
shipment of 2000 pistols was sent from China to an arms dealer in Victoria. The arms dealer, Granite 
Arms, had agreed to take the shipment as a favour for a trusted business friend, Omeo Way, whose 
import permit had been rescinded due to an inability to satisfy a “Police authorisation test”. Omeo 
Way had bought the pistols in China and had title to them. The High Court held that the importer of 
the pistols was Omeo Way, and not Granite Arms. Granite Arms could not be held to be the importer 
merely because they were the consignee. Omeo Way was held to be the importer because the 
pistols would have been at their disposal, and they had caused the goods to be consigned to 
Australia by the particular means adopted.516 It would be reasonable to contend that where the 
physical act of importing is required by an offence, then the person who causes the import to occur 
should be held responsible. This approach is consistent with the general principle of innocent 
agency.517 If D instructs A to send a package containing a prohibited substance from overseas, it 
would be unreasonable to allow D to escape responsibility for the offence because he procures B to 
actually land the package or bring it into port. 
Where a fault element is required by an offence, the fault element must coincide with the physical 
element of importing in the offence.518 In R v Campbell,519 the appellant had been convicted with 
importing a border controlled precursor substance on a commercial scale, with the intention of 
using the substance to manufacture a controlled drug, under s 307.11 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth). The appellant Mrs. Campbell was a pharmacist by profession, but was in the business of selling 
imported furniture from Indonesia. Over a period of years she had received a number of shipments 
of furniture which had been arranged by her Indonesian business associate, Mr. Rantesalu. She was 
aware that on several occasions Mr. Rantesalu had included undeclared packages within her 
furniture shipments that he had arranged to be collected by third parties. Mr Rantesalu had visited 
Australia each time the undeclared packages had been sent. She had asked Mr. Rantesalu to stop 
this practice. The final shipment of furniture contained 96 boxes of medicine containing 
pseudoephedrine, a precursor substance used to manufacture methlyamphetamine hydrochloride, a 
controlled drug also known as “ice”.  
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The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (“AQIS”) advised Mrs. Campbell the shipment was 
to be the subject of a random search. Customs officials discovered the packages placed the shipment 
under surveillance. AQIS advised Mrs. Campbell that the search had been cancelled and Mrs. 
Campbell’s telephone services were intercepted for a period of two days. She was heard to have 
expressed elation that the inspection had been cancelled and was heard urging Mr. Rantesalu to 
“sort something else to do”.520 Mrs. Campbell had learnt that Mr. Rantesalu was intending to visit 
Australia prior to the shipment arriving, and the implication relied on by the Crown was she knew 
the shipment contained additional packages.521 She claimed that she only learnt of the existence of 
the packages after they had been delivered to her business premises with the furniture shipment. 
Mrs Campbell and Mr. Rantesalu arranged for the packages to be picked up from Mrs. Campbell’s 
premises by two associates of Mr. Rantesalu. The two men were arrested when they left with the 
packages and Mrs. Campbell was arrested shortly afterward. In his directions to the jury, the trial 
judge had said that the physical element of importation had continued up until the time the two 
associates were arrested and therefore Mrs. Campbell knew there were additional packages and 
persisted in the importation.522 
The NSW Criminal Court of Appeal held the judge erred in this instruction and that there is a 
distinction between “importation” and “imports”. Relying on several authorities,523 the court held 
that the physical element of imports in s 307.11 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) occurs when 
border controlled drugs and precursors arrive in Australia from abroad and are delivered to a point 
which results in the goods remaining in Australia. In this case it was the point at which they arrived 
at Mrs. Campbell’s premises, before they were unpacked. And, if the fault element occurs after the 
arrival in Australia, no criminal liability exists. The appeal was allowed. 
In R v Toe524 the appellant had been convicted of two counts of importing a marketable quantity of 
controlled narcotics. The principle question on appeal was whether the jury had been properly 
instructed on the matter of importing at law. Customs officials had intercepted the drugs in two 
packages addressed to a fictitious consignee, “Mr. Dan”. One contained a canvas print sent from 
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India with heroin concealed in the wooden frame; the other contained a photo album from Brazil 
concealing a quantity of cocaine. The police attempted to deliver the packages, but were 
unsuccessful. With the cooperation of the courier service TNT, the police then delivered failed 
“delivery advices” to the consignee’s address. The appellant arranged for another courier service to 
pick up the packages from the TNT warehouse and deliver them to a block of flats. The courier 
service duly delivered the packages to the appellant who identified himself as “Mr. Dan”. Although 
surveillance was undertaken by the police, the appellant and an accomplice evaded arrest at the 
scene, but were later arrested at his home. The police found the photo album and canvas print at 
the address with clothing which was consistent with what the appellant was wearing earlier in the 
day. 
At trial, the judge had directed the jury that they could find the appellant guilty of importing if they 
found that he had no knowledge of the drugs after they arrived in Australia, but had continued to 
obtain delivery of them while the process of importation was still in progress. The question of 
whether or not the importation was still in progress until the time the parcels had been removed 
from the custody of TNT or beyond was left open to the jury. The appellant court held, on a majority 
of two to one, that these instructions were in error and that the conviction should be set aside and 
the case retried. Bleby J stated: 
“The principle issue in this case was whether the physical elements of importing had been 
proved. Proof that the appellant was “concerned in the importation” was not enough. It had 
to be shown that he “import[ed]” the packages and their contents. By definition that could 
include bringing into Australia. There is no suggestion that the appellant did that. The 
bringing in was effected by the crew of an airline on its behalf. But to import has a wider 
meaning, as the inclusory definition implies. It would include the conduct of the person who 
arranges or causes the goods to be imported. That person may be in Australia or may be in a 
foreign country.”525 
He continued: 
“It does not matter if or when, after the physical importation, the process is interrupted. I 
am still the importer, having caused the goods to be imported. Mere proof of my 
involvement in collection of the goods, if that be the case, does not prove that I am the 
importer, although my activity in that regard may be circumstantial evidence tending to 
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prove that I was the importer. Therefore, attempts to define when importation ceases are 
somewhat artificial and irrelevant.”526 
It can be clearly seen from the case law that the physical element of the offences in s 132AH does 
not require the person to bring an infringing copy into Australia personally. All that is required is the 
person causes the infringing copy to brought into Australia. The point at which the process ceases is 
dependent upon the circumstance of the case, but importing cannot continue after the point at 
which the infringing copy remains in Australia permanently. The formation of the mental element 
after the import has ceased will not support a charge under the offences in this section. The 
opportunity to withdraw from the offence presents greater difficulty. If D has formed the mental 
element of the offence and causes the infringing copy to begin its journey to Australia, but changes 
his mind before the infringing copy arrives in Australia, it is unclear if he would be guilty of the 
offence. Public policy should allow a defendant to withdraw from an attempt, but this may or may 
not be enough to allow them to escape liability, since he will already have set the cause of the 
importation event in motion. 
A further uncertainty is the potential liability for “importing” by electronic means. Prior to the use of 
the internet, it would have been inconceivable that an infringing copy could be sent to Australia in 
anything other than a tangible form. Now, it is of course possible to transmit all manner of digital 
goods electronically. In many circumstances, it makes very little difference to the ultimate outcome 
whether the article that is moved across the national boundaries is in electronic or physical form. 
There has been recognition of this in Division 400 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).527 Division 400 
creates a number of offences concerning dealings in the proceeds of crime. Under these offences a 
person deals with money or other property if they import money or other property.528 To “Import 
money or other property” into Australia is defined for the purposes of the division as “includ[ing] 
transfer money or other property to Australia by an electronic communication.”529  
It is unclear when given its ordinary meaning, if “import” necessarily excludes the movement of 
digital files across borders. However, while it is easy to imagine that a digital file can sent from point 
A to point B, it is information that is sent from point A to point B, which can be used to reproduce a 
                                                            
526 R v Toe [2010] SASC 39, [75] and [76] per Bleby J 
527 Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) sch 1 div 400 
528 Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) sch 1 s  400.2(a)(ii) 
529 Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) sch 1 s  400.1 
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perfect copy. This point was made in HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming, but it failed to convince the magistrate 
that the defendant had not “distributed” an infringing copy.530 
[4.7] Section 132AI: Distributing infringing copy 
Section 132AI [see Appendix at page 336] contains offences for distributing infringing copies. They 
are also split into two “sets” of offences, one set comprising of indictable, summary and strict 
liability offences, and the other an indictable offence and a summary offence only. These sets are 
distinguished from each other by the differing mental elements of the common conduct element in 
both sets, and the addition of a result element in the second set (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Distribution Offences under s 132AI 
 Offence Mental Element for “distributes an article” Result Element 
“Set 1” 132AI(1) “with the intention of trading” or “with the intention of obtaining 
a commercial advantage or profit” 
None 
132AI(4) “with the intention of trading” or “with the intention of obtaining 
a commercial advantage or profit” 
None 
132AI(7) None, but physical element includes “in preparation for, or in the 
course of” “trading” or “obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit” 
None 
“Set 2” 132AI(2) Intention or recklessness “the extent of the distribution affects 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright” 
132AI(5) Intention or recklessness “the extent of the distribution affects 
prejudicially the owner of the copyright” 
 
Offences in Australia for the distribution of infringing copies have a long statutory history. The 
Copyright Act 1911 (Imp) contained offences both for commercial distribution and distribution which 
had a prejudicial effect. These offences were incorporated into Australian law by the Copyright Act 
1912 (Cth). They also remain part of the copyright law of a number of countries in the former British 
Empire.531  
The global distribution and length of history of the offence has not, however, been converted into a 
substantial body of case law. Prior to the widespread use of the internet and its ability to distribute 
                                                            
530 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 151 
531 Copyright Act of Canada, s 42(1)(d); Copyright Ordinance (Cap 528) (Hong Kong)  s 118(1)(g);  Copyright Act 
1994 (NZ)  s 131(1)(iii)(d) 
Offences in the Copyright Act 1968(Cth): Will They Be Effective? 
 
104 
digital goods, the ability of anyone other than a commercial venture, legal or otherwise, to distribute 
infringing copies of copyright works would be negligible. This economic restraint has meant that 
reported cases for non-commercial distribution offences have been negligible, if not non-existent. It 
is only now, nearly one hundred years later, that the gratis distribution of infringing copies to the 
extent that it affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright has become possible. Defendants who 
might have been charged with the distribution of infringing copies with a commercial intent have 
more often than not found themselves facing charges of selling or possessing infringing copies. 
Other jurisdictions with similar provisions have provided limited case law, the most notable being 
the case of HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming532 from Hong Kong, which was unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Court of First Instance533 and the Court of Final Appeal.534 
[4.7.1] “distributes an article” 
The physical conduct for these offences is that the person “distributes an article”.535 “Distribute” is 
defined by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as “includ[ing] distribute by way of communication”.536 
“Communicate” means “make available online or electronically transmit (whether over a path, or a 
combination of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work or other subject-
matter, including a performance or live performance within the meaning of [the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth)].537 These definitions clearly show that the offence is capable of being directed at distribution 
that occurs over the internet, and it is clear that making an infringing copy available online would 
amount to distribution. 538  
The inclusion of “making available online” in the definition of communicate means that it is 
unnecessary for Australian prosecutors to seek to broaden the ordinary meaning of distribute. In 
other jurisdictions this has lead to prosecutions for attempting to distribute an infringing copy, 
where evidence of making a file available online could be construed that a defendant’s conduct was 
                                                            
532 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142 
533 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1 
534 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255 
535 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AI 
536 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA 
537 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) 
538 Cf The civil case of Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) where a retrial was 
ordered sua sponte on the issue of whether “making available” was sufficient for the jury to find distribution 
had occurred.  
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more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence539 and that they had intended to 
commit the offence.540  
The ordinary meaning of distribute was discussed in Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR.541 The facts of the case 
were not particularly remarkable. The prosecution’s case was that Chan was responsible for 
distributing three movies (“Daredevil”, “Red Planet” and “Miss Congeniality”) using the Bit Torrent 
file sharing protocol. On 10 January 2005 a customs officer browsed a movie newsgroup in Hong 
Kong and found a “.torrent” file for the movie “Daredevil” which had been posted by someone using 
the pseudonym “Big Crook”. The customs officer downloaded and activated the file which revealed 
the internet (IP) address of the source of the file. The customs officer downloaded a complete 
version of the film. The following day, the procedure was repeated with two other “.torrent” files, 
and complete versions of the movies “Red Planet” and “Miss Congeniality” were obtained. On 12 
January 2005, having located the physical address of Chan’s home from the IP address, customs 
officers raided the premises and found Chan in his living room at his computer. Items found close to 
the computer included genuine DVD copies of the three movies Chan was accused of distributing 
and a camera allegedly used to make copies of the DVD inlay cards. 
The Bit Torrent protocol functions by distributing files in a decentralised manner allowing users to 
share parts of files. This means the original source of a file can distribute different parts of a file to 
different downloader, and they in turn can exchange the parts of the file they do not have with 
other downloaders in what is called a “swarm”. The consequence of this system is that the original 
source does not have to distribute all the parts of the file to all of the members of the swarm and 
generally improves the speed of the distribution. In order to coordinate this exchange mechanism, a 
central computer tells each other computer in the swarm where to locate the different parts of the 
file that are required to make a complete copy. This is achieved through the information found in 
the “.torrent” file. 
The argument presented at the Magistrates Court on behalf of the defendant was that Chan had 
only made the movies available for download and that this did not amount to distribution, since the 
acts that precipitated the transfer of the files from Chan’s computer to the other members of the 
swarm were caused by people other than Chan. This argument was rejected by Magistrate Colin 
Mackintosh who stated that because Chan had published and activated the “.torrent” files and kept 
his computer connected to the Bit Torrent software, he had performed “an integral part of the 
                                                            
539 Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) sch 1 s 11.1(2) 
540 Criminal Code Act 1995(Cth) sch 1 s 11.1(3) 
541 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142 
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enterprise of downloading the infringing copies to other computers”,542 and that “it would be 
straining the language to breaking point to conclude that the defendant’s acts did not constitute, or 
might not have constituted, a distribution of the films which are the subject of the charges.”543 
At the Court of First Instance, two grounds of appeal were argued on behalf of Chan with regard to 
the distribution aspect of the case:  
(1) the Magistrate erred in law by failing to recognise that the offence concerned infringing 
copies and not the distribution of data or information, which therefore meant a copy was 
required to be in a physical form;544 and  
(2) the Magistrate erred in law by finding Chan’s acts amounted to distribution and that he 
should have found that the downloaders of the movies initiated and caused the 
distribution.545  
Beeson J rejected these grounds of appeal. She held that an infringing copy of a copyrighted work 
was not required to take a physical form, citing the civil case of Shetland Times v Wills546 as an 
example where distribution had involved digital, intangible copies. Chan’s counsel had contended 
that the creation of a right of “making available copies of works to the public” “by wire or wireless 
means” or “through the Internet” demonstrated that there was an intention by the legislature to 
distinguish between “distribution” and “making available”. Therefore, it was reasoned, “distribute” 
should be confined to physical copies. Counsel for the respondents argued that copying a work was 
defined in the Copyright Ordinance as including storing the work in any medium by electronic means 
and that the Hong Kong legislature had intended to surpass the minimum legislative standards 
required by the WIPO treaty obligations. Beeson J concluded that the appellant had not established 
that copies must involve physical copies. 
On the second ground for appeal, Beeson J referred to the United States case of Donna R Hotaling v 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 547 where a church library had made copies of 
genealogical research material and had given the copies to its branch libraries. The plaintiffs had 
contended that this was an infringement of their exclusive right to distribute copies to the public. 
                                                            
542 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142, 151 
543 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142, 151 
544 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 9 
545 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 9 
546 Shetland Times Ltd v Wills [1997] SC 316 
547 Donna R Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (1997) 118 F 3d 199  
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The key passage from the case relied on by Beeson J in her reasoning was from the judgment of 
Butzner J: 
“When a public library adds a work to their collection, lists the work in its index or catalogue 
system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public, it has completed 
all the steps necessary for distribution to the public. At that point, members of the public can 
use the work.”548 
While it was conceded by Beeson J that the factual scenario of the cases were not identical, she held 
that they were sufficiently similar to show that Chan had “done all that was necessary to fulfil the 
criteria for distribution.” 549 This determination, coupled with the absence of a definition of 
“distribution” in the Copyright Ordinance550 and the overall ambit and structure of the Ordinance,551 
led her to conclude that “the Magistrate was correct in adopting the ordinary meaning of 
distribution”.552 
The case went to the Court of Final Appeal on similar grounds:  
(1) that an infringing copy must take a physical form and it is the physical storage device that 
must be transferred to the recipient of the distribution;553 and  
(2) for a distribution to occur, the distributer must be in possession of the infringing copy which 
is transferred to the recipient.  
Chan’s conduct did not amount to distribution since the infringing copy only came into existence 
after the downloaders had decided to initiate the download process.554 
The court was unanimous and agreed with the judgment of Ribeiro PJ. Addressing the first of these 
grounds of appeal he congratulated Chan’s counsel for his argument, but ultimately rejected it 
entirely: 
“This is an ingenious argument which was advanced with ability and enterprise by Mr Pun. It 
must however be rejected. I agree of course that an electronic copy must exist in some 
physical medium or environment and not in a vacuum. But as the evidence established and 
                                                            
548 Donna R Hotaling v Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (1997) 118 F 3d 199, 203 
549 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 15 
550 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 15 
551 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 16 
552 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 2 HKC 1, 15 
553 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 258 
554 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 259 
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as everyday experience indicates, electronic data constituting a digital copy of a work can 
plainly be transmitted via the medium of the network of computers and cables making up 
the Internet. Electronic copies can plainly be transmitted without first being stored in a 
tangible article such as a CD or DVD to be physically handed over to a recipient.”555 
Turning to the second point of appeal, Ribeiro PJ dismissed the argument that Chan had not initiated 
the distribution and that it was the decision of the operator of the downloading computer. He used 
the analogy of a coin operated vending machine to illustrate that Chan had taken all the required 
steps to make the item available and that the recipient took the necessary step to obtain the file. 
This was encompassed in the ordinary meaning of the word “distribute”.556 This approach is 
consistent with the approach taken in DPP v K,557 where a hand dryer was recklessly left as a trap. 
Although the “trigger” was operated by a third party, the defendant in that case was still held to 
have both committed the actus reus of the offence and to have been in the necessary state of mind 
to form the mens rea. Ribeiro PJ did not regard Chan’s conduct as passive, and said it would be a 
mistake to confuse the use of automated means to achieve the distribution with passivity.558 
This approach does create uncertainty in determining when the physical act of distribution begins 
and ends which, as demonstrated above in relation to the importing offence in s 132AH, can be vital 
where there is a question over the coincidence of the physical element and the mental element. For 
example, one might begin the process of transferring a file, without one of the required specific 
states of mind in the commercial distribution offences, and form the mental element just before the 
distribution is complete. The scope and purpose of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) would also allow a 
wider view of “distribution” than was suggested by the defence counsel in Chan Nai Ming, and it is 
unlikely that the technicalities of determining when the distribution occurred will be a major factor, 
particularly with the reasoning of Ribeiro PJ standing as an authority. 
[4.7.2] “with the intention of trading” 
One interesting and potentially far reaching point concerns the mental element for the offences in 
ss 132AI(1)(i), 132AI(4) and to some degree the physical element in 132AI(7). Both the indictable and 
summary offences require the distribution to be committed with the intention of trading. “Trading” 
is not defined by the Copright Act 1968 (Cth) and, once again, would require an examination of its 
ordinary meaning. In 1994, Federal prosecutors in the United States found they were unable to bring 
                                                            
555 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 265 
556 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 270 
557 Director of Public Prosecutions v K (a minor) [1990] 1 All ER 331 
558 Chan Nai Ming v HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255, 270 
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a criminal case against David LaMacchia for copyright infringement and instead attempted to 
prosecute under a wire fraud statute.559 LaMacchia had hacked into the computer network of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he was enrolled as a student. He set up an electronic 
bulletin board and encouraged members of the board to upload popular software applications and 
computer games. He transferred these programs to another bulletin board from where they were 
made available to be downloaded by members of the group. Prior to the enactment of the No 
Electronic Theft (“NET”) Act560 in 1997 the relevant US statute required that infringement was done 
“willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”,561 neither of which 
applied to LaMacchia since he had committed the infringement without any financial motivation. 
The wire fraud case against LaMacchia failed. In response to the case, the definition of “private 
financial gain” was amended to include the “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, 
including the receipt of other copyrighted works”562 
In the 1991 Australian case of Irvine v Hanna-Rivero,563 a more technologically primitive, although 
similar, set of circumstances led to the defendant being charged with four counts of possessing 
infringing copies of computer programs for the purpose of distributing the articles for the purpose of 
trade.564 The defendant had set up a “swap network” where infringing copies of computer programs 
were exchanged by physically exchanging disks containing the copies. Occasionally non-members of 
the swap network were supplied with copies of the programs by the defendant for a fee of $3, but 
the usual arrangement was to swap one infringing copy for another. Since the defendant plead guilty 
to the charges it was unnecessary for Von Doussa J to adjudicate on the question of whether or not 
bartering could constitute “trading” for the purposes of the offence. He stated: 
“[...] the "trade" carried on by the defendant was not trade in the ordinary commercial sense. 
The trade involved copying and supplying infringing copies of programs, sometimes to 
members of the "swap network", and sometimes to others.”565 
If the exchange of infringing copies of copyright works could be held to be “trading” for the purposes 
of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), it would mean that persons using a contemporary 
version of the “swap network” in Irvine v Hanna-Rivero, such as Limewire or Napster could be liable 
                                                            
559 See United States v LaMacchia (1994) 871 F.Supp 535  
560 Pub L No 105-147, 111 Stat 2678 (1997) 
561 17 U.S.C. § 506 (Circa 1994) 
562 Pub L No 105-147, 111 Stat 2678 (1997)  s 2 
563 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295 
564 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295, 296 
565 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295, 297 
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for distributing infringing copies with the intention of trading. This is important, since the offence 
could be committed with the exchange of a single infringing copy, without the additional 
requirement that the distribution results in the copyright owner being prejudicially affected. 
It is difficult to imagine that bartering in its ordinary sense could not be regarded as trading. Many 
large commercial dealings still involve the exchange of goods, services and company shares in barter. 
Barter transactions are assessable and deductable as income tax.566 An Australian currency dealer 
who exchanges Japanese yen for US dollars barters the two commodities,567 and sophisticated 
barter exchange mechanisms exist to facilitate the exchange of goods.568 To suggest that barter is 
not “trading” with reference to any of these situations would be preposterous. In the context of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) however, the question remains unanswered and given the infrequency of 
prosecutions for distribution offences it is likely to remain as such. Given the widespread use of file 
sharing protocols of various types in Australia,569 the lack of prosecutions does not reflect the 
probable high levels of distribution offences committed,570 particularly if trading does indeed 
encompass peer-to-peer file sharing. 
[4.7.3] “the extent of the distribution affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright” 
The offences in ss 132AI(2) and 132AI(5) are only complete if the distribution results in the owner of 
the copyright being affected prejudicially. Although this phrase has a significant legislative history, 
the only reported judicial consideration it seems to have received is in HSAR v Chan Nai-Ming,571 and 
in that case, only in the initial hearing in the Magistrates Court. The use of the words “to the extent” 
in the phrase might tend to suggest that there is some sort of minimal requirement for the element 
to be satisfied. In HSAR v Chan Nai-Ming572 the defendant was charged with attempt, which meant 
that an actual result was not required to be proven in evidence, only an intention to bring about that 
result. Nonetheless, Magistrate Colin Mackintosh gave consideration to the meaning of the phrase. 
He said that prejudice should not be confined to economic prejudice since “the widespread 
                                                            
566 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 21; Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 21A; Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 15.2(2) 
567 See Stern S., ‘Establishment of Interests in Money’ (2000) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 45, 51 
568 Provident Capital Ltd v Gould [2009] NSWSC 1458; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 
Fuelbanc Australia Limited [2007] FCA 960; A and D Douglas Pty Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd 
[2006] FCA 520 
569 See http://torrentfreak.com/p2p-statistics-080426/ (Accessed 25 August 2010) 
570 It has been estimated that almost all the files transferred through the BitTorrent protocol are infringing 
copies. See: Layton R. and Watters P., Investigation into the Extent of Infringing Content on BitTorrent 
Networks (2010) available at http://www.afact.org.au/research/bt_report_final.pdf  
571 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142 
572 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142 
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existence of [counterfeit DVDs] tends to degrade the genuine article and undermine the business of 
copyright owners”.573 Addressing the minimal requirement he stated: 
“[...] the distribution of one copy to a customs officer, who would never otherwise have 
bought it, in the context of local sales since release in 2001 of over 50,000 copies, barely 
amounted to significant prejudice [...] It is inevitable that distribution to 30 or 40 
downloaders would involve prejudice to the copyright owners through unauthorised 
distribution of their intellectual property and lost sales. And though lost sales, in the context 
of the evidence in this case, might be small, nevertheless, such losses would amount to a 
prejudicial effect.” 
One of the problems with this analysis is the perception of prejudicial effect. Because there was no 
need to lead evidence of the prejudicial effect Chan’s conduct had on the copyright owners, it was 
left to the intuition of the Magistrate. While no aspersion should be made against his reasoning, it 
does raise the question of where the root of this intuition originates. If one were to ask a large 
corporate copyright owner if they had been prejudicially affected by even a de minimus infringement 
of their copyright, the answer would invariably be “yes”. Yet, this may or may not be the case. The 
influence of copyright owners on the discourse of copyright infringement is well documented.574 
Lobby groups for copyright owners habitually liken copyright infringement to stealing575 and have 
produced statistics and claims for restitution which count each download as a lost sale.576 The 
counter argument is that the free availability of infringing copies has little or no effect on the 
decision to purchase a legitimate copy, and may indeed contribute to sales through the “sampling 
effect”.577 While some studies have demonstrated that people who share music are equally likely to 
                                                            
573 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2004] 4 HKLRD 142, 152 
574 There have been numerous information campaigns produced by the various industry bodies for many years. 
One of the more notable examples was the “You Wouldn’t Steal a Car” campaign by the Motion Picture 
Association of America launched in 2004. The advertisement was included in many DVDs produced in the last 
decade and appeared before the content. It was not possible to skip the advertisement with many commercial 
DVD players. 
575 Loughlan P., ‘“You Wouldn’t Steal a Car”: Intellectual Property and the Language of Theft’ [2007] 10 
European Intellectual Property Review  401; Reyman J., The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law 
and the Regulation of Digital Culture (2010); Sterk, S. E., ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94(5) 
Michigan Law Review 1197; Yu, P., ‘Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric’ (2011) 13(4) Vanderbilt Journal 
of Entertainment and Technology Law 881 
576 Although this assertion is pervasive, it has been rejected in several cases for restitution claims in the US: 
United States v. Hudson, 483 F.3d 707 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2008); 
and United States v. Dove 585 F. Supp. 2d 865 (Dist. Court, WD Virginia, Big Stone, Gap Div. 2008) 
577 Leibowitz, S.J., ‘File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?’ (2006) 47 Journal of Law and 
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purchase music as those who do not,578 the net effect of file sharing on copyright owners is unclear 
at this stage.579  
[4.7.4] Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Ng, Tran and Lee 
One of the rare instances of prosecution for a non-trade distribution offence in Australia occurred in 
2003.580 Three Sydney students had set up a website which hosted music files which could be 
downloaded.581 During the time the website operated in had internet traffic of over 7 million hits, 
and the defendants had adopted an attitude of defiance, which “evinced disdain for the capacity of 
Australian authorities to successfully prosecute them”.582 Unfortunately for the defendants, their 
perception was misjudged. All three defendants entered a guilty plea. Henson J was at pains to point 
out that he regarded their conduct as serious offences that had caused great harm to the Australian 
music industry. He was of the view that imprisonment was warranted, and sentenced two of the 
defendants to 18 months imprisonment and the other defendant to 3 years. However, due to the 
absence of commercial gain, Henson J was persuaded that the sentences should be suspended and 
imposed community service orders on two of the defendants. 
[4.8] Section 132AJ: Possessing infringing copy for commerce 
Section 132AJ [see Appendix at page 337] contains offences for possessing an infringing copy for a 
variety of purposes, which are mostly commercial purposes. These offences are identical to the 
offences in s 132AH except for the physical element consisting of the conduct. The mental element 
remains the same for both the indictable offence and summary offence, as does the “in preparation 
for, or in the course of” supplement to the physical element of the conduct. The indictable and 
summary offences can only be completed if a person possesses an article with the intention of doing 
any of the nine acts specified. The offences also contain the standard infringing copy and subsistence 
circumstance elements. It should be noted that the conduct of possession consists only of a state of 
affairs, which means it is only voluntary if the person is capable of exercising control.583 Merely 
                                                            
578 Cf Van Eijk, N. et al, ‘Legal, Economic and Cultural Aspects of File Sharing’ (2010) 77(1) Communications and 
Strategies 35 
579 Among copyright owners and their various lobby groups however, there is an unwavering belief that file-
sharing is the cause of the decline in sales. See: Heindl, S. ‘Facing the Piracy Challenges in the Digital 
Environment – the Australian Music Industry’ (2007) 25(2) Copyright Reporter 55, 57 (“It goes without saying 
that the availability of illegitimate music files on the internet has a serious impact on legitimate music sales 
both in digital and physical form.”) 
580 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Ng, Tran and Lee [2003] NSWLC 17 
581 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Ng, Tran and Lee [2003] NSWLC 17 
582 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Ng, Tran and Lee [2003] NSWLC 17 
583 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.2(5) 
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possessing an infringing copy does not amount to an infringement that can be pursued in the civil 
law, and it is only through the criminal law that the possession of an infringing copy can be deterred.  
[4.8.1] “possesses an article” 
There has been substantial judicial consideration over the concept of possession. However “the 
English law has never worked out a completely logical and exhaustive definition”584 because of the 
various contexts in which possession can occur. There is certainly clear ground between what 
constitutes possession in civil law and criminal law. Civil law has generally considered the meaning of 
possession in the context of possessory and proprietary rights, while criminal law has invariably 
concerned the possession of forbidden articles of one type or another. 
The difference between the two is well illustrated by the Privy Council decision in DPP v Brooks.585 In 
that case a man was charged with possession of a substantial amount of marijuana in Jamaica. 
According to the defence he had simply been hired to drive a van by other man, Reid, and did not 
know that there was 1000lbs of marijuana in the body of the van, which was neither accessible nor 
visible from the cab. When police officers approached the van while it was parked the occupants ran 
off. The case had been heard before the Court of Appeal in Jamaica, which had quashed a conviction 
for possession of a dangerous drug on the ground that he was a servant of Reid and had merely had 
custody of the van and its contents, and that did not constitute possession. Their Lordships rejected 
this view and stated: 
“In the ordinary use of the word ‘possession’, one has in one’s possession whatever is, to 
one’s own knowledge, physically in one’s custody or under one’s physical control [...] 
technical doctrines of the civil law about possession are irrelevant to this field of criminal law. 
The only actus reus required to constitute an offence under s 7(c) [of the Dangerous Drugs 
Law] is that the dangerous drug should be physically in the custody or under the control of 
the accused. The mens rea by which the actus reus must be accompanied is [...] 
knowledge”586 
The High Court case of Haw Ke Te v R587 addressed similar circumstances. The applicant was charged 
with importing heroin into Australia and being in possession of heroin without lawful excuse under 
the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ss 233B(1)(b) and (c). The principle question for the Court was whether a 
                                                            
584 United States of America and Republic of France v Dollfus Mieg et Cie SA and Bank of England [1952] All ER 
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585 Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840 
586 Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840 
587 He Kaw Te v R (1985) 60 ALR 449 
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direction by the trial judge that the Crown did not need to prove a specific state of mind on the part 
of the accused was incorrect. In obiter however, Brennan J discussed the actus reus of possession588 
and supported the view of Nagle J in R v Bush589 who said that all that is required is that the specified 
object “should be physically in the custody or under the control of the accused”.590 Also in Haw Ke Te 
v R, Dawson J strongly supported the view of Diplock LJ in DPP v Brooks, stating: 
“For the purposes of the criminal law, and for directness and simplicity, it is not possible, to 
my mind, to think of a better working definition of possession than that given by Lord 
Diplock in DPP v Brooks”591 
Dawson J also discussed the concepts of “actual possession” raised in Moors v Burke592 and “de facto” 
possession from the case of Williams v Douglas,593 where a hotel guest was held to have been in 
possession of gold bars which he had hidden in a communal bathroom. Dawson J was of the view 
that the two terms were interchangeable and merely extended the concept of possession “beyond 
the notion of having something presently in one’s hands”.594 This point is of particular importance 
when we consider that the word “article” in the offences under s 132AJ can include a reproduction 
or copy in an electronic form.595 If the authority of Williams v Douglas holds, it is arguable that it 
would be possible to be in possession of an article if one were to upload the article onto a storage 
device using the internet. This is precisely the technique employed by users of sites such as YouTube 
when they upload digital content. If we discount the obvious difference in physical distance and 
instead consider the level of control of the object, there appears to be no way to logically distinguish 
between secreting gold in a bathroom adjoining one’s hotel room and secreting an infringing article 
on YouTube’s computer server. In both cases the person still has control over the hidden article. 
Haw Ke Te v R stands as good authority that the principle in Sherras v De Rutzen596 still holds true in 
Australia. Sherras v De Rutzen held that there is a presumption that mens rea is an essential 
ingredient in every offence. In Haw Ke Te v R it was held that the mens rea element for possession is 
                                                            
588 He Kaw Te v R (1985) 60 ALR 449, 494 
589 R v Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298 
590 R v Bush [1975] 1 NSWLR 298, 316 per Nagle J 
591 He Kaw Te v R (1985) 60 ALR 449, 505 per Dawson J 
592 Moors v Burke (1919) 26 CLR 265 
593 Williams v Douglas (1949) 78 CLR 521 
594 He Kaw Te v R (1985) 60 ALR 449, 505 per Dawson J 
595 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA 
596 Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 
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knowledge in the absence of a contrary intention.597 The mental element of possession is explicitly 
stated in the offences in s 132AK, so knowledge is not the applicable fault element. However there 
can be no doubt that knowledge of the possession must be present if a person intends to do any of 
the nine acts listed in the offences. This does not hold true for the strict liability offence, and there is 
a real danger that individuals or corporations that host computer files may be held criminally liable 
for possession of infringing articles without ever knowing the content of those files.598 
[4.9] Section 132AK: Aggravated offence 
Section 132AK [see Appendix at page 339] contains a provision which can enhance the penalty for 
any of the offences discussed so far. All of the indictable offences in Subdivision C, with the 
exceptions of s 132AL and s 132AM,599 can be aggravated offences, punishable by an enhanced 
penalty,600 if the infringing copy was made by converting a work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analogue form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form.601 An aggravated 
offence essentially inserts an additional circumstance element into the eligible offences. Both the 
physical and fault elements of this circumstance element must be proved for the aggravated offence 
to be complete. The fault element is specified in s 132AK(3) as recklessness. If the prosecution 
intends to prove an aggravated offence, then the charge must allege that the infringing copy was 
made by converting a work or other subject-matter from a hard copy or analogue form into a digital 
or other electronic machine-readable form.602 
Some forms of publication are somewhat immunised against digital reproduction and distribution by 
the technological and labour difficulties involved in their conversion into digital form. While it is 
relatively easy to copy a CD or even a vinyl record, the effort required to copy an entire book 
without access to very sophisticated technology is substantial. Even if someone is prepared to invest 
the time it would take to make a digital copy of an entire book with a scanner, the quality of the 
copy will be marginal at best. This would tend to discourage casual infringement and safeguard 
certain publishing industries from the levels of infringement that have been seen in the recorded 
music and motion picture industries over the past 12 years. However, once a digital copy of an 
                                                            
597 He Kaw Te v R (1985) 60 ALR 449, 452. See also Tabe v R (2005) 221 ALR 503 where the High Court held that 
the construction of ss 57(c) and (d) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) had entirely displaced the mens rea 
element of the possession offence under that Act. 
598 See Gething S, and Fitzgerald, B ‘The Criminalisation of Copyright Law:  Where Do Intermediaries Stand?’ 
2009 22(2) Australian Intellectual Property Bulletin 22 
599 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AK(1) 
600 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AK(2) 
601 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AK(1) 
602 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AK(4) 
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analogue work has been made, the regulating technological and labour barriers are removed and the 
work becomes as vulnerable as any other digitised work to casual reproduction and distribution. The 
enhanced penalty recognises the damage caused by this initial conversion. 
It is notable that this section could have applied to the conduct of Google in their Google Books 
project had it occurred in Australia. Such a large scale project could have attracted a substantial fine 
for the company.    
[4.10] Section 132AL: Making or possessing device for making infringing 
copy 
Section 132AL [see Appendix at page 339] contains offences for making or possessing a device for 
making an infringing copy. The offences under s 132AL differ slightly in structure from the remainder 
of the offences under Division 5 because there is no requirement for an infringing copy to either 
exist or be brought into existence. Therefore both the standard infringing copy is unnecessary and 
does not form part of the offences. However the subsistence element remains. The offences are 
tiered according to culpability and consist of either making or possessing a device for making 
infringing copies.  
The physical conduct in both versions of the indictable offences, either making or possessing a 
device, must be accompanied by an intention that the device is to be used to make an infringing 
copy of a work or other subject matter, in the circumstances that copyright subsists in the intended 
work at the time of possession. 
The summary offences are structured slightly differently. The conduct is again the physical element 
of making or possessing a device, but no fault is specified so the default mental element of intention 
is imported courtesy of s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). There is no requirement to prove 
that there was an intention to use the device to make an infringing copy, only an intention to make 
or possess the device itself. The second element is that the device is to be used for copying a work or 
other subject matter. Again, no fault element is specified, so recklessness is the default element. 
Section 132AL(6) explicitly states that this is the case to avoid doubt. The third element is that the 
copy will be an infringing copy with the fault element of negligence. The final element is that 
copyright subsists in the work or subject matter at the time of making or possessing the device with 
the fault element of negligence. 
The strict liability offence is structured in an identical manner to the summary offence, but the 
requirements for fault are absent. 
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Finally, s 132AL(11) states that it is not necessary to prove which particular work or other subject-
matter is intended to be, or will be, copied. This does not necessarily mean, however that a 
prosecutor only needs to prove that a device has the potential to create an infringing copy of any 
work. The explanatory memorandum to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) states: 
“[...] if evidence is provided that there were a number of DVDs in a room where a device is 
located, it is not intended that the prosecution would have to specify which of those DVDs 
were, in fact, to be copied”603 
These provisions create a somewhat unusual type of offence, insofar as it is anticipated that some 
other act will occur or is intended to occur in the future using the equipment made or possessed, 
rather than an act that has already occurred. Although unusual, offences of this type are not unique. 
Offences such as going equipped to steal604 or possessing devices to facilitate forgery605 have long 
been a part of the criminal law in common law jurisdictions. However, what we might refer to as the 
“underlying conduct”, the conduct for which the equipment possessed or made is either designed or 
intended to do, is usually a crime per se. Further, those offences are very often structured in such a 
way as to narrow the application and scope of the offence to give a high level of certainty to the 
anticipated conduct. 
The underlying conduct anticipated by the offences in s 132AL is the making of an infringing copy of 
a work or other subject matter while copyright subsists in the work. This conduct is not a criminal 
offence unless the making is either:  
(1) with the intention, in the course of, or in preparation for selling, letting for hire or obtaining 
a commercial or profit;606 or  
(2) the infringement has a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the copyright, and 
occurs on a commercial scale.607  
                                                            
603 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  1.111 
604 Cf Theft Act 1968 (England & Wales)  s 25; Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)  s 315; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)  s 114; 
Criminal Code (NT)  ss 231C and 231D; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld)  s 425; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
(SA)  s 270C; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas)  s 248; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)  s 91; The Criminal Code (WA)  s 407. 
See also Model Criminal Code s 3.2.14. 
605 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)  s 349; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)  s 256; Criminal Code (NT)  s 270; Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld)  s 510; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)  s 270C; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas)  s 285; 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)  ss 83A(5A), (5B) and (5C); The Criminal Code (WA) s 474. See also Model Criminal Code 
s 3.5.6. 
606 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD 
607 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC 
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Absent these conditions, making an infringing copy does not attract criminal liability, yet s 132AL 
creates criminal liability for the possession or making of a device for making an infringing copy, 
which might only attract minor civil liability. Whether by mistake or design, this is a serious flaw in 
the offence and it has a real danger of causing injustice. 
In comparison, under s 25 of the Theft Act 1968 (England and Wales), a person is guilty of an offence 
if “he has with him any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft”. 
However this can only apply when the person is not at his usual abode,608 and must be accompanied 
by a basic intention to commit a burglary, theft or cheat at a future time.609 An article that has been 
made or adapted for burglary or theft is evidence that it was intended for such use.610  
Similar offences exist throughout the various jurisdictions of Australia, and almost all have 
circumstantial limitations or requirements for criminal culpability. Section 91 of the Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic) is virtually identical to the Theft Act. The Australian Capital Territory also requires that the 
person in possession of an article is in a place other than the person’s home and there is an intention 
to use it in the course of or in relation to a theft or related offence.611 Both Western Australia and 
Queensland distinguish between possession during the day and at night: during the day in must be 
proved that the possession of “an instrument” is accompanied by an intention to commit an 
indictable offence;612 at night the person bears the onus of proving a lawful excuse for possessing 
the instrument, but the instrument must be “an instrument of housebreaking”.613 In New South 
Wales possession is limited to “any implement of housebreaking or safebreaking”614 or “any 
implement capable of being used to enter or drive or enter and drive a conveyance”,615 but once 
again the defendant must provide a lawful excuse.616 South Australian law provides that a person 
commits an offence if the are in possession of an article, with intention to commit specified offences, 
in “suspicious circumstances”.617 This is defined as proceeding to the scene of a proposed offence, 
keeping the scene of a proposed offence under surveillance or being in, or in the vicinity of, the 
scene of a proposed offence awaiting an opportunity to commit the offence. Section 231C of the 
Criminal Code (NT) creates an offence of dealing with money or other property that is, or is intended 
                                                            
608 Theft Act 1968 (England & Wales) s 25(1) 
609 R v Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130 
610 Theft Act 1968 (England & Wales) s 25(3) 
611 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 315 
612 Cf Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 425(d); The Criminal Code (WA) s 407(d) 
613 Cf Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 425(c); The Criminal Code (WA) s 407(c) 
614 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 114(b) 
615 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 114(b) 
616 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 114(b) 
617 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 270C 
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to be used in an offence.618 Tasmanian law is somewhat stricter. It is an offence under s 248 of the 
Criminal Code (Tas) to have in one’s possession an instrument for making an entry into a place 
without lawful excuse.619  
All of these offences either:  
(1) narrow the article, instrument or device to one that is specifically or substantially designed 
to accomplish a particular offence; or  
(2) require an intention to commit an offence; or  
(3) both 
While the indictable offences under s 132AL require an intention to create an infringing copy of a 
work, the summary offence and the strict liability offences do not. The summary offences merely 
require that the person is reckless as to the possibility that the device will be used to create an 
infringing copy. The strict liability offence for making a device does not require any proof of a state 
of mind. This seems particular repugnant since part of the physical element of the offence have yet 
to be performed and so can only logically exist as a plan in someone’s mind. To draft a law that 
creates a physical element that may or may not occur in the future and does not require the 
prosecution to either prove a state of mind or which particular infringement may occur seems odd.  
The Australian legislation can be contrasted with the UK legislation that deals with identical mischief. 
It is an offence under s 107(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (England and Wales) to 
make, or be in possession of, “an article specifically designed or adapted for making copies of a 
particular copyright work”620, “knowing or having reason to believe that it is to be used to make 
infringing copies for sale or hire or for use in the course of a business”.621 It is immediately apparent 
that the UK legislation limits the type of article that can be used to constitute an offence, limits the 
type of intended infringement to that of a commercial nature and requires a mens rea. This 
legislation is perfectly capable of addressing the sort of behaviour that would be of most cause for 
concern, and yet would bar overzealous prosecutions for possessing the means to commit small 
scale domestic infringements, most of which is not even an offence in Australian law. 
                                                            
618 Criminal Code (NT) s 231C(1) 
619 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 248 
620 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (England and Wales) s 107(2) 
621 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (England and Wales) s 107(2) 
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[4.10.1] “a device” 
A device is defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as “includes a plate”622 which in turn is defined as 
“includes a stereotype, stone, block, mould, matrix, transfer, negative or other similar appliance”.623 
This wide definition leaves it possible for the offences to be committed by the possession or making 
of virtually anything. As discussed above, the construction of the offences does not provide an 
adequate limit on the scope of conduct that could trigger a prosecution, and this is compounded by 
the definition, or rather lack thereof, of the word device.  
This is of particular concern given the ease with which a standard computer, running a standard 
operating system, is able to create infringing copies. Windows Media Player, which comes bundled 
as standard with the various versions of Windows XP, allows CDs to be copied to the hard drive of a 
computer. This is a common domestic occurrence and Microsoft even provides instructions on their 
website about how to do it.624 This does not create an infringing copy under the Copyright Act 1968, 
provided the sole purpose of making the copy is for the owner’s private and domestic use,625 on a 
device he or she owns.626 However, this exemption is taken never to applied if either the original 
recording or the copy is sold or otherwise disposed of in the circumstances provided in s 109A(3), 
and therefore the copy becomes an infringing copy at the point when of these conditions is met. If D 
buys a CD and rips it to his computer he has not infringed copyright and the copy on his computer is 
not an infringing copy. If he sells the original CD to a second hand dealer, but keeps the copy on his 
computer, the copy is an infringing copy and is taken to always have been an infringing copy. This in 
itself would not constitute a criminal offence, since the making of copy requires at least that the 
copy is made in preparation for, or in the course of selling it, letting it for hire or obtaining a 
commercial advantage or profit.627 It would of course be an infringement of the copyright owner’s 
right to make a copy of the sound recording,628 for which they would be entitled to seek an order for 
account of profits,629 damages630 or even the conversion of the computer used to make the 
infringing copy.631 Even though there would be no offence committed for the act of making the copy, 
making the computer and the software used to make the copy would be an strict liability offence 
                                                            
622 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 
623 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 
624 See http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/knowledgecenter/easystart/mp11guide.aspx 
(accessed 6 September 2010) 
625 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 109A(2) 
626 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 109A(1)(b)(ii) 
627 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD 
628 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 85(1)(a) 
629 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115(2) and (3) 
630 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115(2) 
631 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(1)(b) 
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under s 132AL(8). It would seem inconceivable that Microsoft could be criminally liable for making 
the software used to commit a minor act of copyright infringement, but this seems to be the case. 
Courts have not been at all reluctant in the past to confiscate computers used to commit copyright 
offences, and have even taken the computer accessories used to communicate with the computer. 
In Irvine v Hanna-Rivero,632 for example, von Doussa J ordered that the following items should be 
forfeited to the Commonwealth of Australia: “(1) An Atari computer and attached keyboard. (2) Atari 
video monitor. (3) Modems. (4) External disk drives. (5) Two mice.”633 
[4.11] Section 132AM: Advertising supply of infringing copy 
Section 132AM [see Appendix at page 340] contains a single offence for advertising the supply of an 
infringing copy. It is unique within the Subdivision C offences, since it only consists of a summary 
offence and shares none of the characteristics of the other offences. The offence is interesting in 
that it contemplates offences that can be largely committed overseas, but nonetheless is bound by 
the geographic limitations in s 132AB. The conduct that must be committed within the geographic 
jurisdiction of Australia is the publication, or the causing of the publication, of an advertisement. It is 
unclear whether or not causing a publication through an omission or by bringing about a state of 
affairs outside of Australia can attract jurisdiction. The offence specifically deals with 
communications of works in s 132AM(2). A communication that results in the creation of a work or 
other subject matter when it is received and recorded is taken to be a supply.634 
 [4.11.1] “publishes, or causes to be published” 
In Australian copyright law, the word “publish” obviously has a specific meaning relating to the 
exclusive right of publication granted by s 31(1)(a)(ii). It is highly questionable, however, if it is this 
construction that will be applicable to the offence in s 132AM, even though the offence occurs 
within the same Act. There are many offences in Australian law that prohibit or regulate the 
publication of advertisements for different underlying reasons. The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
prohibits the publication of advertisements that indicate an intention to do an act prohibited by Pt II 
of the Act.635 Under certain conditions in the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth), it is an offence to 
publish, or cause to be published, an unapproved advertisement.636 In the context of the offence in 
                                                            
632 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295 
633 Irvine v Hanna-Rivero (1991) 23 IPR 295, 302 
634 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AM(2) 
635 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 86 
636 Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 42C 
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s 132AM, it would be reasonable to assume that the correct judicial construction of the verb will be 
its ordinary meaning rather than the specific meaning related to the right of publication. 
The ordinary meaning of the word was discussed by Starke J in Sullivan v Hamel-Green. 637 
Considering the meaning of the word in the context of the now repealed s 7A(b) of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) which made it an offence to “publishes any writing which incites to, urges, aids or 
encourages, the commission of offences against the law of the Commonwealth”.638  
Starke J was of the opinion that the ordinary meaning of the word was the preferred construction 
and this would include the distribution of leaflets inciting the commission of offences against the 
National Service Act 1951 (Cth). He stated that “publishes” could mean:639  
(1) to make publicly or generally known;  
(2) to declare openly or publicly;  
(3) to tell or noise abroad;  
(4) to propagate;  
(5) to announce in a formal or official manner;  
(6) to pronounce a judicial sentence;  
(7) to promulgate a law or edict;  
(8) to proclaim a person publicly as something or in some capacity or connexion;  
(9) to issue or cause to be issued for sale to the public (copies of a book, engraving etc.), said of 
an author, editor or specifically or a professional publisher; or  
(10) to make generally accessible or available.  
A wide construction of the offence, following the judgment of Starke J, would mean that any public 
dissemination of an offer to supply an infringing copy will complete the offence. 
The elements of the offence will vary according to whether the person: 
(1) publishes an advertisement; or  
(2) causes an advertisement to be published.  
In the first instance, the physical act of publishing an advertisement for supply is self-contained and 
is an act. As no fault element is stated the fault element is intention. In the second instance, it is only 
the result that is expressly stated in the offence, i.e. an implied act causes the result that an 
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638 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 7A(b) 
639 Sullivan v Hamel-Green [1970] VR 156, 157 
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advertisement is published. The fault elements in this case would be intention for the implied 
conduct and recklessness for the result. This is discussed further in Chapter 6 at paragraph [2.1]. 
There is a strong possibility that either search engine operators themselves or persons using search 
engine service could trigger this offence. If a request is made to a search engine, result will invariably 
be displayed that lead to web pages that supply infringing copies or the means to obtain infringing 
copies such as Bit Torrent files. It is highly likely, given the wide import of “publish” that these search 
results could be construed as advertisements that have been published. 
[5] Conclusion 
While many of the offences in Subdivisions B and C are principally directed at large scale commercial 
infringement, most are drafted in such broad terms that they create criminal liability for activities 
that fall outside of the targeted behaviour. The addition of strict liability offences means that 
individuals and corporations who did not know that their conduct constituted an infringement, much 
less a criminal offence, can be subject to prosecution. This has the potential to create a large pool of 
offenders who can be prosecuted selectively, which may undermine the perception of the legitimacy 
of the offences.      
On a more positive note, the offences contained in s 132AC contain elements that are close to 
satisfying Feinberg’s harm principle. This offence creates criminal liability for any type of 
infringement provided it results in substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner and occurs 
on a commercial scale. This would include direct infringement of rights in works or other subject-
matter, indirect infringement and the infringement by authorisation. Indirect infringement is also 
criminalised through ss 132AE – 132AI, but the level of harm required by these offences is either 
assumed to have been caused by a nexus to commercial activity, or it is far lower than that of 
s132AC. Sections 132AJ, 132AL and 132AM create criminal liability for conduct which does not 
actually infringe the rights of copyright owners. 
Conduct that falls within the definition of these offences may not amount to substantial harm in all 
cases. While there can be little doubt that harmful conduct will be capable of being addressed by 
these offences, it is unclear if conduct that is not harmful will necessarily be excluded from their 
operation. Nor is it clear if the social norms and practices of the general public are consistent with all 
of the offences, particularly those offences such as ss 132AC, 132AI and 132AL that do not specify a 
commercial nexus.  
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While it not possible to draw a distinct line between civil infringement and criminal offences for 
infringement, the criminal law should be targeted only at the most harmful and malicious conduct. 
One consequence of overcriminalisation is an undermining of the principle that criminal law reflects 
the condemnation by the community of the criminal act. One of the consequences of the law being 
perceived as illegitimate is that the social norms of the general public will permit breaches without 
social sanction.  
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Chapter 6 Airing of Works, TPM, ERM, and Encoded Broadcasts  
[1] Introduction 
There are five Subdivisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) containing offences that are directed at 
conduct other than dealings in infringing copies. This chapter will examine the offences in four of 
those Subdivisions. Subdivisions D, E, and F are located in Part V Division 5 along with the offences 
for substantial infringement and dealing with infringing copies. These have been grouped together in 
this chapter due to their size, rather than a common theme.  
Subdivision D contains offences for the airing of works, sound recordings and films and designed to 
deter unlicensed performances at places of public entertainment. The conduct that these offences 
address is also covered by s 132AC, since the conduct would also amount to an infringement of 
copyright. However, the offences in Subdivision D not require substantial harm to be caused, or for 
the infringement to occur on a commercial scale. 
There are a number of offences in Subdivision E which are directed at preventing the circumvention 
of technological protection measures put in place by copyright owners to curtail copyright 
infringement. The offences create criminal liability for dealings in devices that will enable 
technological protection measures to be removed or circumvented, in addition to the act of 
circumvention itself. 
Subdivision F contains offences for removing and altering the electronic rights management 
information, for dealing in copies that have had electronic rights management information removed, 
and for distributing that actual information itself. Electronic rights management information is 
attached to copyright material in order for copyright owners to track its use and detect 
infringements. 
The final Subdivision under examination in this chapter is contained within Part VAA of the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth). This Part houses Division 3 Subdivision A in which house various offences related to 
the unauthorised interception of encoded broadcasts. In addition to creating criminal liability for 
accessing encoded broadcasts without the authority of the broadcaster, Subdivision A contains 
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offences for dealing in the devices which enable unauthorised access to encoded broadcasts and for 
using an authorised decoder to make the broadcast available to non-subscribers. These offences 
address conduct that causes harm to subscription broadcasters in addition to copyright owners. 
With the exception of the offences in Part V Division 5 Subdivision D, the offences in this chapter are 
concerned with the subversion of the management and control of copyright in the marketplace, 
rather than the infringement of copyright itself. 
 [2] Subdivision D: Airing of works, sound recordings and films 
Subdivision D contains two offence sections related to the airing of works, sound recordings and 
films. It divides the offences by the type of copyright material. One section contains offence for 
causing a work to be performed, the other section for causing a sound recording or film to be aired. 
[2.1] Section 132AN: Causing work to be performed publicly 
Section 132AN [see Appendix at page 341] There are two offences under this section, an indictable 
offence and a summary offence, which are both concerned with infringing performances of literary, 
dramatic and musical works. Both offences contain three identical physical elements and two 
identical mental elements. The only point of difference between the two offences is the level of 
culpability in the physical element that “the performance infringes copyright in the work”.640 The 
remaining mental elements are not specified by the section, so once again s 5.6 of The Criminal Code 
1995 (Cth)641 provides the fault elements. 
[2.1.1] “the performance infringes copyright in the work” 
A performance will infringe copyright642 in a literary, dramatic and musical work if it is performed 
without the licence of the owner of the copyright.643 In Australia the licensing of musical works is 
managed by a collecting society, the Australasian Performing Right Association Limited (“APRA”).644 
APRA issues licences to venues for live performances of musical works, and collects royalties on 
behalf of its own members and on behalf of members of affiliated foreign collecting societies. To 
become a member of APRA, the owner of the copyright in a work must assign the right to publicly 
                                                            
640 Cf Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AN(1)(c) and (3)(c) 
641 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
642 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(1)(iii) establishes the right to perform the work. 
643 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 36(1) 
644 See http://www.apra-amcos.com.au/default.aspx (Accessed 29 September 2010) 
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perform the work to APRA.645 APRA does not provide licences for grand right performances646 or for 
literary or dramatic performances. In these cases, individual licences must be sought from individual 
copyright owners. This is not such an arduous task as it may sound, since there are a limited number 
of publishers who control a large number of musical, literary and dramatic works.647 
The person responsible for acquiring the licence to perform will vary according to the particular type 
of licence required. In the case of musical works licensed by APRA, it is only the venue provider who 
is capable of applying for, and being granted, a licence for the performance of musical works.648 No 
licence exists for performers. This puts the performer and their agents in the difficult position of 
potentially being liable for infringing the right of performance, without the ability to obtain a licence. 
For artists who have assigned their performance rights to APRA, this would include performances of 
their own compositions.  
In terms of criminal liability, if a performer gives a performance that infringes copyright, then they 
will have undoubtedly have completed the physical element of both offences. The fault element for 
this element is either recklessness649 for the indictable offence or negligence650 for the summary 
offence. Whether either of these standards of culpability would be applicable would be determined 
by the facts of any case brought, but it seems likely that performers will be in an inferior position to 
venue holders to correctly assess the risk that the performance is unlicensed. The same would be 
true of actors who perform dramatic or literary works, since the performance licence is likely to be 
arranged by a third party such as a producer or director. The defence of mistake of fact651 would be 
open for the indictable offence if the performer was under the mistaken belief that the venue holder 
or another third party had obtained a licence for the performance. Additionally, it is possible that 
the chain of causation could be broken between the conduct (performing) and the result (it is an 
infringing performance) by an omission by a third party to obtain the licence.  
                                                            
645 See http://www.apra-amcos.com.au/musiccreators/managingyourrights.aspx (Accessed 29 September 
2010) 
646 See http://www.apra-amcos.com.au/APRA/MusicConsumers/MusicinBusiness/MusicinTheatre.aspx 
(Accessed 29 September 2010) 
647 See for example: Dominie Pty Ltd, Hal Leonard Australia, Tams-Whitmark Music Library Inc, Origin 
Theatrical, David Spicer Productions and Warner/Chappell Music. 
648 See http://www.apra-
amcos.com.au/MusicConsumers/Findalicencetosuityourneeds/Performplaymusicinabusinessorganization.aspx 
(Accessed 29 September 2010) 
649 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
650 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AN(3)(c) 
651 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 9.1 
Offences in the Copyright Act 1968(Cth): Will They Be Effective? 
 
128 
[2.1.2] “causes a literary, dramatic or musical work to be performed” 
Both offences require that the person “causes a literary, dramatic or musical work to be performed”. 
Since no fault element is unspecified, and does not state the offence is a strict liability offence, the 
fault element must be supplied by s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The question that this 
raises, in relation to this particular element of the offence, is one of the characterisation of the 
element, which will affect the level of culpability the element will attract according to s 5.6, as 
illustrated in the tables below.652  
Table 2 Incorrect Interpretation of the Fault Elements in s 132AN 
Characterisation of Physical Elements Criminal Code 
Application 
Fault Element 
Result Cause a performance of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work 
to be performed 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the result a literary, 
dramatic or musical work will be performed 
by doing an act or creating a state of affairs 
Circumstance In public at a place of public 
entertainment 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the nature and location of 
the performance 
Result Performance infringes copyright 
in the work 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the result that the 
performance will infringe copyright 
 
Table 2 above illustrates the culpability for the indictable offence if the phrase “causes a literary, 
dramatic or musical work to be performed” was taken to consist only of a result. However, the 
analysis this illustrates is problematic because a result can only occur through some sort of conduct. 
Since some sort of causal link must be shown to have caused the result, a physical element of 
conduct must be implied in the offence.653 Section 5.6(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) states 
that where a physical element which consists only of conduct does not specify a fault element, then 
intention is the fault element for that physical element. The section does not limit this to express 
physical elements, so the fault element for the implied conduct must be intention. The correct 
analysis of culpability of the indictable offence is illustrated by Table 3 below.  
                                                            
652 The design of these tables is the work of Ian Leader-Elliott, who used it to illustrate the displacement of the 
implied fault elements by offence sections: Leader-Elliott, I. “Elements of Liability in the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code” (2002) 26 Criminal Law Journal 28 
653 See Odgers, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2010)  27 
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Table 3 Correct Interpretation of the Fault Elements in s 132AN 
Characterisation of Physical Elements Criminal Code 
Application 
Fault Element 
Implied Conduct Do an act or create a state 
of affairs  
s 5.6(1) applies Intention to do the act or create the 
state of affairs 
Result A literary, dramatic or 
musical work is performed 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the result a literary, 
dramatic or musical work will be 
performed 
Circumstance In public at a place of public 
entertainment 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the nature and 
location of the performance 
Result Performance infringes 
copyright in the work 
s 5.6(2) applies Recklessness as to the result that the 
performance will infringe copyright 
 
Section 4.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) places a limitation on the applicability of omissions as 
physical elements. An omission may only be a physical element if the law creating the offence makes 
it so,654 or if the offence impliedly provides that the offence is committed by an omission to perform 
an act that by law655 there is a duty to perform.656 Since neither of these conditions are met by 
s 132AN(1) or (3), an omission cannot constitute the implied conduct element under this analysis. 
The implied conduct must be an act or the creation of a state of affairs. There would be no criminal 
liability under s 132AN if a person omits to check that hirer of their venue will be performing a 
literary, dramatic or musical work, since there is no legal duty to do so. 
A causal link between the conduct and the resulting performance of a literary, dramatic or musical 
work would also need to be established. Since “to cause” is not defined by the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth), the common law principles of causation apply.657 In Royall v R,658 McHugh J stated that 
“judicial and academic efforts to achieve a coherent theory of common law causation have not met 
with significant success.”659 Much of the criminal case law on causation has been distilled from 
                                                            
654 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.3(a) 
655 This is further restricted to a law of the Commonwealth by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4:  “law 
means a law of the Commonwealth and includes this Code” 
656 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.3(b). See also Commonwealth Attorney – General’s Department, The 
Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for Practitioners (2002)  45 
657 See generally: Hart, H.L.A and Honore, T. Causation in the Law (2nd ed, 1985) 
658 Royall v R (1991) 100 ALR 669 
659 Royall v R (1991) 100 ALR 669, 719 
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murder cases in which an intervening act has occurred, including intervening acts by the victims 
themselves. While this is far removed from the present area of discussion in terms of its factual 
basis, the legal principles are capable of being applied to this offence. 
The most obvious candidate for a person who causes a performance would be that of the performer 
actually performing the work.  However, in most cases the performer will not be the same person 
who makes the arrangements for licensing the performance of the work. It is more likely that this 
will be the responsibility of the venue management. In these circumstances, it would be unlikely that 
the performer would be held to be negligent or reckless that the performance infringes copyright in 
the work if they are not responsible for obtaining the licence to perform the work. This is required 
by the third element of the offences under s 132AN and is discussed below at paragraph [2.1.5]. 
It would therefore be necessary to prove that the person responsible for obtaining the performance 
licence had caused the performance if anyone was to be held criminally liable for an infringing 
performance. 
[2.1.3] Commission by proxy 
The simplest approach for attaching liability for the implied conduct to someone other than the 
performer is through the operation of s 11.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The operation of 
s 11.3 is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 at paragraph [4]. This approach would allow the prosecution 
to target the person most at fault if an infringing performance takes place. It would have to be 
shown that the person responsible for obtaining the appropriate licence to perform the work 
procured the person who caused a literary, dramatic or musical work to be performed and intended 
that work to be performed. In some instances, the person responsible for obtaining the licence and 
the person who procures a performance will be the same person, e.g. the owner of a bar. In other 
situations where the responsibilities are more diffuse, the offence would need to be charged as a 
joint commission.660  
[2.1.4] “in public at a place of public entertainment” 
The meaning of “in public” has been discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.5.2]. A “place of public 
entertainment” is defined for the purposes of Div 5 in s 132AA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which 
states it “includes premises that are occupied principally for purposes other than public 
entertainment but are from time to time made available for hire for purposes of public 
entertainment”. This definition leaves the remaining scope open to interpretation. In many States 
                                                            
660 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.2A 
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and Territories it is necessary for a place of public entertainment to obtain a licence from the 
appropriate licensing authority,661 but other States have removed this requirement.662 These 
licensed places are very likely to fall within the definition for the purposes of these offences. 
Whether a place amounts to somewhere that is from time to time made available for the purposes 
of public entertainment will ultimately be a question of fact for the courts. However, useful guidance 
for the type of entertainment that is likely to be considered in the assessment can be found in the 
Places of Public Entertainment Ordinance 1949 (NT): 
“entertainment (including, though without limiting the meaning of that term, concert, 
recital, lecture, reading, entertainment of the stage, cinematograph or other picture show, 
dancing, boxing or other amusement or contest and the provision of more than 3 
amusement machines) which is open to, or are available for use by, the public whether 
admission thereto or use thereof is or is not procured by the payment of money or on any 
other condition.”663 
Any premises that have been hired out for any of these activities may be included. However, the 
more contentious issues will be whether a one-off hire would constitute “from time to time” and 
how frequently the premises would have to be hired in order to be correctly characterised as a place 
of public entertainment. How courts will approach these issues is unclear, and the infrequency of 
prosecutions means this will probably remain the case. 
[2.1.5] “the performance infringes copyright in the work” 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) grants the owner of copyright in a work the exclusive right to perform 
the work in public,664 so a performance which is unlicensed by the copyright owner will be an 
infringing performance. It is also an infringement of the performance right to permit a place of 
public entertainment to be used for a performance in public,665 unless:  
(1) the person had no reasonable grounds for suspecting the performance would constitute an 
infringement;666 or  
(2) if the permission was given gratuitously, for a nominal consideration, or did not exceed 
reasonable expenses incurred.667  
                                                            
661 Places of Public Entertainment Ordinance 1949 (NT) 
662 See http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/StrategicPlanning/Entertainment/tabid/243/language/en-
AU/Default.aspx (Accessed 15 March 2011) 
663 Places of Public Entertainment Ordinance 1949 (NT)  s 4 
664 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(1)(iii) 
665 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 39(1) 
666 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 39(2)(a) 
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It is unlikely that a person could be held to have caused a performance of a work in a place of public 
entertainment merely by granting permission to use the place, so these exceptions will not apply to 
the offences under s 132AN. 
 [2.2] Section 132AO: Causing recording or film to be heard or seen in 
public 
Section 132AO [see Appendix at page 341] is the counterpart offence to s 132AN for other subject 
matter: cinematographic films and sound recordings. The person must cause either: 
(1) a sound recording to be heard; or 
(2) images from a cinematographic film to be seen; or  
(3) sound from a cinematographic film to be heard.  
Other than this difference in the type of copyright material, s 132AO is also distinguished from 
s 132AN by the inclusion of a strict liability offence. There is no clear reason why a strict liability 
offence should be required for film and sound recordings, but not for artistic, literary and dramatic 
works. In all other aspects the offences are identical to those under s 132AN. 
[2.2.1] “the hearing or seeing occurs in public at a place of public entertainment” 
This subsection precludes the possibility of the offence being committed if a sound recording is 
being played at a volume which can be heard outside of a place of public entertainment or if 
someone looks through the window of an establishment and sees a film being shown.  
However, no account is made however for the possibility that the offence could be committed by 
sounds being heard between two neighbouring places of public entertainment. The element does 
not expressly state that the hearing must occur at the same place of public entertainment from 
which the sounds are emanating. There is a possibility therefore, that a person who holds a licence 
to play sound recordings could be responsible for those sounds being heard in a neighbouring place 
of public entertainment where no licence is in place. 
[2.2.2] “causing the seeing or hearing infringes copyright in the recording or film” 
The exclusive rights in subject matter other than works are granted by four sections in Part IV 
Division 2 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). One of the exclusive rights in the copyright of sound 
recordings and cinematographic films is the right to cause the recording to be heard668  or seen in 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
667 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 39(2)(b) 
668 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 85(1)(b) and 86(b) 
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public.669 Subject to exceptions, causing a film to be seen or heard or causing a sound recording to 
be heard in public without the authorisation of the copyright owner will infringe copyright in the 
subject matter670 and fulfil the physical element of the offence. While a number of exceptions exist, 
most will not be applicable to charges brought under this offence. The fair dealing exception for the 
purpose of research or study,671 for example, is unlikely to occur in a place of public entertainment 
unless an event such as an academic conference is held there. The more likely candidate for an 
exception that could be used in these circumstances is the exception for causing a sound recording 
to be heard at a guest house or club in s 106 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).672 As discussed in 
Chapter 5 at [4.5.2], an audience in a private club is usually taken to be “in public” since it forms part 
of the person’s public life. The exception in s 106 only applies to certain clubs, societies or other 
organisations which are not established or conducted for profit and the principal objects of which 
are charitable or are otherwise concerned with the advancement of religion, education or social 
welfare. Even where the organisation is of the qualifying class, any charges made for admission must 
not be used otherwise than for the purposes of the organisation. 
The corresponding fault element for this physical element in the indictable offence673 is recklessness 
and negligence in the summary offence.674 
 [3] Subdivision E: Technological protection measures 
This subdivision contains three offences prohibiting certain dealings with technological protection 
measures (“TPMs”). All of the prohibited acts are required to have been committed with the 
intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit, and no strict liability offences are contained 
within the subdivision. Legal protection for TPMs was incorporated into Australian law by the 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth), but this protection has not always proved 
wholly effective for copyright owners. The case of Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony675 demonstrated 
a problem with the initial definition of a TPM.  
                                                            
669 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 86(b) 
670 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) 
671 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 103C 
672 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 106 
673 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AO(1)(c) 
674 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AO(3)(c) 
675 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony (2005) 221 ALR 448. See also: Kabushiki Kaisha Sony v Stevens (2002) 200 
ALR 55 and Kabushiki Kaisha Sony v Stevens (2003) 200 ALR 96; Brennan, D.J., ‘What Can it Mean ‘To Prevent 
or Inhibit the Infringement of Copyright’? - A Critique on Stevens v. Sony’ (2006) 17(2) Australian Intellectual 
Property Journal 81; Chalk, P. and Forss A., ‘Stevens v Sony: The High Court's Views on Films and Computer 
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Sony’s combined use of an access code on a game CD and the boot ROM on a PlayStation console 
was held not to be a TPM for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). It was held that deterring 
copyright infringement by making infringing copies unplayable did not amount to a TPM under the 
definition used at the time. Video game console producers have been particularly active in 
attempting to prevent the manufacture of devices that have the effect of allowing infringing copies 
of their games to be played, and have been vigorous in initiating action against such the 
manufacturers and importers of such devices.676 
The Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) altered the definitions of “technological protection 
measure”, “circumvention device” and “circumvention service”. The same Act created a definition of 
“access control technological protection measure” and “controls access”. None of these new 
definitions have been the subject of reported judicial consideration in either a civil law or a criminal 
law context, and their variation from the pre-existing definition considered in Stevens v Kabushiki 
Kaisha Sony makes it very difficult to ascertain the scope of the criminal offences with precision. One 
notable passage from Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony makes it clear that the construction of such 
definitions must take into account the possibility of criminal proceedings. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ said: 
“There are three other considerations which support Sackville J’s construction of the 
definition. The first is that, in choosing between a relatively broad and a relatively narrow 
construction of legislation, it is desirable to take into account its penal character. The 
present litigation does not arise from the institution of criminal proceedings under the 
offence provisions now contained particularly in s 132 of the Act. However, a person who 
makes or sells a circumvention device (s 132(5B)) is liable to imprisonment for not more 
than 5 years (s 132(6A)). An appreciation of the heavy hand that may be brought down by 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Games’ (2006) 18(8) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 127; Ng, G., ‘Technological Protection 
Measures – The Problem of Access to a Work’ (2006) 17(2) Australian Intellectual Property Journal  114 
676 Two recent examples include the legal action undertaken by Nintendo against suppliers of the R4 Card 
device, which allows owners of the Nintendo DS console to play music, homemade games and infringing copies 
of games. In the UK a judgment was entered though not contested, see: Nintendo Co Ltd v Playables Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 1932 (Ch). In February 2010 Nintendo extracted $620,000 from an Australian supplier of R4 Cards in an 
out of court settlement, see: http://ap.nintendo.com/_pdf/news/223460700.pdf (Accessed 27 July 2012). Sony 
were recently granted an injunction by the Federal Court against several respondents prohibiting them from 
importing, distributing or otherwise dealing in a USB device called “PSJailbreak” which performs a similar 
function on PlayStation 3 consoles, see: https://www.comcourts.gov.au/file/Federal/P/VID727/2010/actions 
(Accessed 27 July 2012) 
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the criminal law suggests the need for caution in accepting any loose, albeit “practical”, 
construction [...]”677 
The available civil actions in relation to TPMs678 are very similar to the criminal offences and use the 
same definitions of access control TPMs, TPMs, and circumvention devices. This close relationship is 
likely to once again hinder any attempt by copyright owners to persuade courts to take an expansive 
view of the construction of the civil provisions.  
[3.1] Section 132APC: Circumventing an access control technological 
protection measure 
Section 132APC [see Appendix at page 342] contains an offence for circumventing an access control 
technological protection measure. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contains a subcategory of TPMs 
called “access control technological protection measures”.679 The definition of a TPM includes an 
access control TPM.680 The offence in s 132APC only applies to access control TPMs and contains 
four elements:  
(1) engaging in conduct;681  
(2) which results in the circumvention of a TPM; 682 
(3) the TPM is an access control TPM;683 and  
(4) the person engages in conduct with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit.684 
It is a summary offence with a maximum penalty of 60 penalty units,685 but in contrast to the 
summary offences discussed in Chapter 5, the fault elements require a higher culpability than 
negligence. There are a substantial number of specific defences to the offence, in addition to the 
standard defences applicable to any Commonwealth offence. 
                                                            
677 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony (2005) 221 ALR 448, 459 
678 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) div 2A sub-div A 
679 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) 
680 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) 
681 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(1)(a) 
682 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(1)(b) 
683 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(1)(c) 
684 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(1)(d) 
685 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4H 
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[3.1.1] “engages in conduct” and “with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage 
or profit” 
In contrast to the implied conduct discussed above at paragraph [2.1.2], the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) explicitly states that a reference to “engages in conduct” includes an omission.686 A person 
does not engage in conduct simply because a state of affairs exists, but if the state of affairs was 
created by an act or omission by that person, this would mean they have engaged in conduct.687 An 
omission can only attract liability subject to the conditions specified in s 4.3 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth), as discussed above at paragraph [2.1.1]. In practice it is unlikely that an omission would 
trigger the offence, but it remains a theoretical possibility. 
The physical conduct must be accompanied by the mental element of intention to obtain a 
commercial advantage or profit, which is discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.2.6] and [4.2.7]. 
[3.1.2] “the technological protection measure is an access control technological 
protection measure” 
An access control TPM is given an extensive definition in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).688 It can be 
distinguished from a non-access control TPM by the fact that “in connection with the exercise of the 
copyright” it “controls access to the work or other subject matter”.689 A non-access control TPM, on 
the other hand, “prevents, inhibits or restricts the doing of an act comprised in the copyright”.690 
Before the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) amended the definition of a TPM, an access control 
device was required to prevent an infringement of copyright from taking place by controlling access 
for the device to qualify as a TPM. It meant that a device which simply prevented the access to a 
work after an infringement had taken place, i.e. the playback of an infringing copy, could not qualify 
as a TPM.691 The contemporary definition does not require the access control TPM to prevent or 
inhibit an infringement, but there must be a nexus with the exercise of copyright. The explanatory 
memorandum to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) makes it clear that the mere fact that 
copyright subsists in a work or other subject matter would not be sufficient to establish this 
connection and that the TPM must be related to the exercise of an exclusive right.692  
                                                            
686 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.1(2) 
687 Odgers, S. Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2010)  24 
688 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) access control technological protection measure 
689 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) access control technological protection measure 
690 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) access control technological protection measure 
691 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony (2005) 221 ALR 448, 459 
692 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch  9 cl 12.7 
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These rights vary according to the type of copyright work, but the exceptions that normally apply to 
copyright works, such as fair dealing for the purposes of research,693 cannot be utilised if a valid 
access control TPM is in place. If a TPM is applied to a copyrighted work, a legal “shell” is effectively 
placed over the work. Although the exceptions remain in place, they are inaccessible unless either 
the device is excluded as a TPM due to its purpose694 or an exception to circumventing the TPM695 
can be invoked. This creates a de facto “right of access” to copyright works, the balance of which is 
heavily weighted in the favour of copyright owners when compared to other rights granted by the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
A good example of this would be the back-up of computer programs. If a person wished to make a 
back-up copy of a Sony PlayStation game to use in lieu of the original, they would not infringe 
copyright due to the exception in s 47C(1)(c)(i) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). However, as shown 
in the Stevens v Sony case, Sony have a TPM embedded in the PlayStation console and the game CD 
which limits access to the copyright work. Only those in possession of original copies manufactured 
by Sony or their licensees can access the copyrighted work without circumventing the TPM.  Sony 
would have a strong argument that the TPM on the PlayStation is used in connection with the 
exercise of their exclusive right to copy the work, which was an argument that convinced the Federal 
Court.696 Prohibitions on circumventing the access control TPM through the use of a “mod chip”, 
similar to the one described in Kabushiki Kaisha Sony v Stevens,697 prevent a person from using a 
legally made back up copy.  
Two exceptions which exclude certain devices, products, technologies and components from being 
classified as either access control TPMs or non-access control TPMs are:  
(1) geographic market segmentation for films and computer programs;698 and  
(2) computer programs embodied in machines or devices that restrict the use of goods or 
services in relation to the machine or device.699 
The second of these exceptions means that certain devices such as the universal garage door 
openers in The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,700 or microprocessors that 
                                                            
693 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  40 
694 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) access control technological protection measure, (c) and (d) 
695 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 116AN(2),(3),(4),(5),(6),(7),(8) and (9) 
696 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony v Stevens (2003) 200 ALR 96  
697 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony v Stevens (2003) 200 ALR 96 
698 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) access control technological protection measure (c) 
699 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) access control technological protection measure (d) 
700 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 
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controlled the source of ink cartridges in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc.,701 would not TPMs under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).  
The geographic market exception would allow the use of “firmware hacks”702 to alter the regional 
coding of DVD players. However, if a device or computer program which, to this end, also 
circumvents another type of protection measure, such as the CSS protection on DVD systems703 that 
controls access for a different purpose, then it is likely that this type of circumvention would be 
constitute a circumvention of a TPM as defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
While civil liability for circumventing an access control TPM applies under any circumstances except 
the listed exceptions in s 116AN, there is only criminal liability if the person engages in the conduct 
resulting in the circumvention with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. A 
person who wishes to use a backup copy of a protected computer program can do so without 
incurring criminal liability, but a commercial user of the same program could be liable under 
s 132APC. Making and using a back up copy of a computer program does not infringe copyright 
under s 47C, even for commercial purposes. 
For a person to be found guilty of the offence, it must be proved that they either knew or were 
reckless to the fact that the TPM was an access control TPM. 
[3.1.3] Defences 
A number of specific defences to s 132APC(1) are provided. These are complete defences and negate 
any liability for the offence. While there is some cross-over between the scope of these defences 
and the various exceptions to copyright infringement, the defences cover a narrower range of 
conduct than is permissible under those exceptions. 
[3.1.4] Permission 
The first defence covers virtually the same ground as the general exception to copyright 
infringement in ss 36704 and 101:705 that the person has the permission of the copyright owner or 
                                                            
701 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 
702 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DVD_region_code (Accessed 19 October 2010) 
703 See generally, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decss (Accessed 20 October 2010); Lessig, L., The Future of 
Ideas (2001) 187 – 190; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
704 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 36(1) (“Subject to this Act, the copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner 
of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.”)  
705 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) (“Subject to this Act, a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part is 
infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the 
copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.”) 
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exclusive licensee. The notable difference, of course, is that an exclusive licensee may grant 
permission to circumvent an access control TPM, not only the copyright owner which is the case 
with ss 36 and 101.706 Permission may be express or implied, but the mere fact that a statutory 
exception to copyright infringement allows an act to be done in relation to the copyright work, does 
not mean that it can be implied that permission to circumvent a TPM has been given.707 
[3.1.5] Interoperability 
The second defence allows access control TPMs to be circumvented to enable a person to achieve 
interoperability between an independently created computer program and an original copy of a 
computer program or other program.708 This is subject to the following conditions:  
(1) the original program is not an infringing copy and was lawfully obtained;  
(2) the circumvention will not infringe copyright in the original program; and  
(3) the act of circumvention relates to elements of the original program that are not readily 
available at the time of the circumvention.  
The first of these conditions would include copies of computer programs that are non-infringing 
copies courtesy of the exceptions contained within Div 4A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), such as 
the exception that permits the reproduction of a back-up copy,709 or the exception that allows a 
reproduction for the purpose of making the program interoperable with other products.710  
The second condition would disallow devices that create an infringing copy of the work while 
circumventing the access control TPM. This condition is probably unnecessary because if the 
remaining conditions are satisfied, it is highly likely that a copy of a computer program would not be 
an infringing copy due to the operation of s 47D.711 A slight difference is that ss 47D(1)(b) and (e) 
refer only to the obtaining of information, which is not readily available from another source, 
necessary to make another interoperable program. The defence under s 132APC(3)(b)(iia) is wider, 
referring to “elements”,712 not limited only to information, of the original program that are not 
readily available.  
                                                            
706 This does not preclude contractual arrangements which enable licensees to issue licenses on behalf of 
copyright owners. 
707 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) sch 9 cl 12.46  
708 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(3)(b)(iii) 
709 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47C 
710 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D 
711 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47D. Cf Davidson & Associates v Jung 422 F.3d 630, where the copyright in the 
original program was found to have been infringed 
712 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(3)(iia) 
Offences in the Copyright Act 1968(Cth): Will They Be Effective? 
 
140 
The third condition limits the purpose of the circumvention to achieving interoperability of 
independently created computer programs. Therefore any computer programs that are merely 
derivatives of the original program, as in the US case of Davidson & Associates v Jung,713 will not be 
eligible for the defence. 
[3.1.6] Encryption Research 
The third defence relates to encryption research, but it is not limited to computer programs. It 
allows a person or an employee of a body corporate to circumvent an access control TPM if:  
(1) the act of circumvention relates to a legally obtained non-infringing copy;714 which  
(2) will not infringe copyright in the work or other subject matter;715 and  
(3) is done for the sole purpose of indentifying and analysing flaw and vulnerabilities of 
encryption technology.716  
The defence is further limited to a particular class of person. They must either:  
(1) be engaged in a course of study at an educational institution in the field of encryption 
technology;717 or  
(2) be employed, trained or experienced in the field of encryption technology.718  
In addition the person or employee must have either:  
(1) obtained permission from the copyright owner or their exclusive licensee to do the act;719 or  
(2) have made or will make a good faith effort to obtain such permission.720  
Once again there is some limited crossover between this defence and the exceptions in Div 4A. 
While the act of circumvention does not permit an infringing copy to be made, so long as an original 
copy of a computer program remains stored by the owner or licensee, a copy of that program will 
not infringe copyright due to s 47C.721 The same would apply to the general exceptions granted for 
research or study in ss 40 and 103C,722 and since the defence is squarely directed at research or 
                                                            
713 Davidson & Associates v Jung 422 F.3d 630 
714 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(b)(i) 
715 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(b)(ii) 
716 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(b)(iii) 
717 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(c)(i) 
718 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(c)(ii) 
719 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(d)(i) 
720 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(4)(d)(ii) 
721 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 47C 
722 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss  40 and 103C 
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study, as evidenced by the class of persons permitted to use the defence, again the condition that an 
infringing copy will not be made would be redundant. It is a fairly straightforward matter to provide 
evidence that a person was enrolled as a student of encryption technology or employed in the field 
of encryption technology, but problems might occur where the student’s course of study or a 
person’s employment is merely incidental to encryption technology research.  
More contentious would be establishing that the person was trained or experienced in encryption 
technology, as this could potentially include people who engage in the study of encryption 
technology informally, although it is unlikely that such people would require the defence since the 
offence requires the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. Regardless of these 
difficulties, the burden of proving that the person falls within the permitted class of people lies with 
the defendant.723  
The most intriguing aspect of this defence is the requirement for permission. There appears to be no 
provision made for situations where permission has been sought in good faith, but refused. While 
s 132APC(4)(d)(i) requires permission to have been obtained, s 132APC(4)(d)(ii) permits the defence 
to be used if the person has made, or will make a good faith effort to obtain such permission. This 
would suggest that if a person has made such as effort to obtain permission, the defence would be 
capable of being invoked, regardless of the reply sent by the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright. Further, a person might apply to both the copyright owner and exclusive licensee 
independently and receive different answers. Again, this does not appear to be anticipated. 
[3.1.7] Computer Security 
Section 132APC(5) allows an access control TPM to be circumvented for the purpose of testing, 
investigating or correcting the security of a computer. One of the major beneficiaries of this defence 
are corporations that supply security software who would otherwise be unable to provide services to 
remove potentially damaging TPMs, such as the MediaMax and Extended Copyright Protection (XPC) 
systems that Sony BMG used to prevent CDs being accessed on personal computers in the early to 
mid 2000s.724  
These protection systems installed a “rootkit”725 onto computers when a protected CD was inserted 
into a personal computer, and made these computers vulnerable to security breaches.726 After 
                                                            
723 The Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 13.3(3) 
724 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_CD_copy_protection_scandal (Accessed 25 October 2010) 
725 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit (Accessed 25 October 2010); Bill Thompson, The Rootkit of all 
Evil?, BBC News, Nov. 4, 2005 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4406178.stm. 
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several parties began legal action against them, Sony agreed to an out of court class settlement. One 
of the reasons cited by computer security professionals for not exposing the vulnerability at earlier 
stage was the fear of being liable for a breach of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).727 
This fear was probably unfounded however, since exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions 
for security testing were integral to the Act.728  
The defence does not limit the class of person who may make use of the defence, nor does it require 
the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright. 
[3.1.8] Privacy 
The fifth defence allows circumvention for the sole purpose of identifying and disabling an 
undisclosed capability to collect or disseminate personally identifying information about a person’s 
online activities,729 provided it does not affect the ability of the person or a third party to gain access 
to the copyright material.730  
It is uncertain what is meant by an “undisclosed capability”. It is arguable that if an end user is made 
aware of such a capability through the use of a “click-wrap” end-user licence agreement would make 
the defence unavailable. It is not clear how knowledge of the existence of this capability can be 
brought to the attention of a person who relies on this defence if it is undisclosed, or if “identifying” 
means that the defence would be applicable to a person who circumvents an access control TPM in 
search of such a capability that ultimately does not exist.  
If this capability is disclosed by a third party that has taken advantage of another defence to 
circumvention, such as the computer security defence, the ability to provide tools to assist in the 
disabling of the capability may be hampered by the absence of equivalent defences in ss 132APD 
and 132APE. The condition that the circumvention will not affect the person’s ability to access the 
copyrighted work may further obstruct the effectiveness of the defence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
726 See Lyon, M.H., ‘Technical Protection Measures for Digital Audio and Video: Learning from the Failure of 
Audio Compact Disc Protection’ (2007) 23 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 643; 
http://sonysuit.com/ (Accessed 25 October 2010) 
727 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 US Code §1201 (1998); Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
728 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 US Code §1201(j)(4) (1998) 
729 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch 9 cl 12.55 
730 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(6)(b)(iv) 
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[3.1.9] Law Enforcement and National Security 
The sixth defence available is for law enforcement and national security.731 It is broadly drawn and 
allows for circumvention for the purposes of law enforcement,732 national security733 or performing 
a statutory function, power or duty.734 None of these terms are defined by the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth). The class of defendant is limited to the Commonwealth, a State or Territory, an authority of 
one of those bodies, and persons acting on behalf of any of these.735  
This defence would initially seem redundant, since it is unlikely that any of the purposes listed could 
conceivably coexist with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit as required by 
the offence. However, the defence would be useful to agents of the Commonwealth, State or 
Territory who are required to commit these offences while serving in a covert capacity. The defence 
is drawn broadly enough to include persons not employed directly by a government body. 
[3.1.10] Libraries, etc. 
Under ss 132APC(8) and (8A) a number of bodies are exempt from the operation of s 132APC(1) in 
respect of anything lawfully done in the performance of their duties. These bodies are restricted to: 
(1) libraries736;  
(2) the National Archives of Australia, the Archives Office of New South Wales, the Public 
Record Office of Victoria and the Archives Office of Tasmania;737  
(3) a non-profit body that has custody of material of historical significance or public interest 
maintained for the purpose of conservation and preservation;738  
(4) an educational institution;739  
(5) a public non-commercial broadcaster;740 and  
(6) a person who has custody of a work under s 64 of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth),741 but only in 
relation to that work and only if the act lawfully done would also be lawful for the National 
Archive to do that thing under s 132APC(8).742  
                                                            
731 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(7) 
732 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(7)(a) 
733 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(7)(b) 
734 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(7)(c) 
735 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(7) 
736 Other than libraries that are conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of an individual or individuals. See 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(8)(a) 
737 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132APC(8)(b) and s10(1) “archives” subsection (a) 
738 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132APC(8)(b) and s10(4) 
739 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(8)(c) 
740 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(8)(d) 
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The circumstances in which these bodies would trigger the offence are again difficult to conceive, 
due to the requirement for an intention to obtain a commercial advantage or profit. It is possible 
that such bodies do have a commercial aspect to their operations that Commonwealth, State or 
Territory governments performing statutory functions, duties or powers do not.   
[3.1.11] Governor-General Regulations 
The final defence to s 132APC allows the circumvention of an access control TPM to enable a person 
to do an act that is prescribed by regulations. The regulatory power is vested in the Governor-
General who may make regulations, not inconsistent with the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), prescribing 
all matters required or permitted by the Act.743  
In regard to regulations prescribing the doing of acts under s 132APC(9)744 the Governor-General 
must not make a regulation unless “the Minister” makes a recommendation to do so.745 The relevant 
“Minister” is not stated in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), presumably to avoid amending the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) should there be a change in ministerial responsibilities. At the time of 
writing the Minister with this responsibility is the Attorney-General.746  
The Minister may only make a recommendation in the circumstances described in s 249(4):  
(1) a submission has been made to prescribe the doing of the act by the person;747  
(2) the doing of the act will not infringe copyright in a work or other subject matter;748  
(3) the doing of the act is in relation to a particular class of works or other subject matter;749  
(4) an actual or likely adverse impact on the doing of the act has been credibly demonstrated;750 
and  
(5) the adequacy of the protection and effectiveness of the relevant remedies would not be 
impaired.751  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
741 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(8A)(a) 
742 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APC(8A)(b) 
743 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(1) 
744 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(2) 
745 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(3) 
746 Under an Administrative Arrangements Order made by the Governor-General on 14 October 2010. See 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/parliamentary/docs/aao_20101014.pdf (Accessed 15 February 2011) 
747 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(4)(a) 
748 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(4)(b) 
749 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(4)(c) 
750 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(4)(d) 
751 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(4)(e) 
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A decision must be made by the Minister as soon as practicable after receiving a submission, but 
must be made within four years of receiving it.752 The Governor-General may make regulations 
varying or revoking a regulation made under the power,753 but must not make such a regulation 
unless the Minister makes a recommendation to vary or revoke the regulation.754 Again, the Minister 
may only make such a recommendation in prescribed circumstances:  
(1) a submission has been made to vary or revoke the regulation;755  
(2) an actual or likely impact on the doing of an act that is the subject of a regulation can no 
longer be credibly demonstrated;756 and  
(3) the adequacy of the protection and effectiveness of the relevant remedies would be 
impaired if the regulation was not varied or revoked.757  
The Minster must make a decision to revoke or vary the regulation as soon as practicable after 
receiving a submission, but within a four year time limit.758 
These procedural limitations will mean that there is an avenue for regulations to be open to 
challenge by persons with the appropriate standing.759 The current prescribed acts may be found in 
Schedule 10A of the Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) and include gaining access to copyright 
material when a TPM is not operating normally760 and the reproduction or communication by an 
institution assisting persons with a print disability.761  
It is anticipated that in addition to the role of the Attorney-General in enforcing public rights 
standing would be recognised for organisations that will experience an interference with a private 
right or suffer “special damage peculiar to themselves”, consistent with the principle developed 
from Boyce v Paddington Borough Council.762 Other special interest bodies may also be recognised as 
                                                            
752 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(5) 
753 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(6) 
754 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(7) 
755 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(8)(a) 
756 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(8)(b) 
757 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(8)(c) 
758 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 249(9) 
759 See generally Pearce, D. and Arguement, S., Delegated Legislation in Australia (3rd ed, 2005); South Australia 
v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 
760 Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) Schedule 10A, Item 6.1 
761 Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) Schedule 10A, Item 3.1 
762 Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109. See also Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The 
Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493; Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27; Batemans Bay Local 
Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247 
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having standing, provided they are sufficiently related to the subject matter763 “both in terms of 
weight and, in particular, proximity”.764 It is likely that large organisations representing copyright 
owners would be recognised by courts, by reference to their special interest. However simply having 
a commercial interest in blocking competitors will not be enough for standing to be recognised.765  
Also certain to be recognised would be organisations representing other special interests such as the 
Royal Society for the Blind. An attempt to vary the current provision concerning institutions assisting 
persons with a print disability766 would almost certainly be sufficiently proximate to the aims of the 
Royal Society for them to have sufficient standing for a judicial review. The grounds on which 
challenges to delegated legislation are more limited than those developed for administrative 
decisions at common law or the grounds provided in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act 1977 (Cth). They are confined to the general doctrine of ultra vires and its sub-classifications.767 
[3.2] Section 132APD: Manufacturing etc. a circumvention device for a 
technological protection measure 
Section 132APD [see Appendix at page 345] contains an indictable offence for a variety of dealings in 
circumvention devices for technological protection measures. This section applies to all 
circumvention devices for TPMs that come within the definition in s 10(1):768  
(1) a device which is promoted, advertised or marketed as having the purpose or use of 
circumventing the technological protection measure; or  
(2) has only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other 
than the circumvention of the technological protection measure; or  
(3) is primarily or solely designed or produced to enable or facilitate the circumvention of the 
technological protection measure.  
The person must either know that it is such a device, or be reckless as to that fact.769 The definition 
of “circumvention device” is narrower than for a “device” which, as discussed at paragraph [4.10.1], 
has the potential to incriminate manufacturers of personal computers or software under s 132AL(8). 
Manufactures of such generic equipment would not attract liability under s 132APD.  
                                                            
763 North Coast Environmental Council Inc v Minister for Resources (1995) 127 ALR 617 
764 Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27, 42 per Stephens J 
765 See Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Smithkline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 121 ALR 373 
766 Copyright Regulations 1969 (Cth) sch 10A Item 3.1 
767 See Pearce, D. and Argument, S., Delegated Legislation in Australia (2005, 3rd ed.)  114; Young v Tockassie 
(1905) 2 CLR 470; James Peterson & Co Pty Ltd v Melbourne Harbor Trust Commissioners [1961] VR 343; 
Downey v Pryor (1960) 103 CLR 353; The Gramophone Co Ltd v Leo Feist Inc (1928) 41 CLR 1 
768 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) “circumvention device” 
769 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth)  ss 5.6 and 5.4(4) 
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The offence is an indictable offence, which is apparent from by the penalty imposed and the 
application of s 4G of the Crimes Act 1914.770 It consists of the doing of a number of acts with a 
device771 which must be accompanied by an intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit.772 This requirement means that individuals who provide devices gratuitously would not be 
liable for the offence.  
Software for circumventing TPMs is commonly distributed through non-commercial websites and 
internet forums that do not require payment to download the software.773 In Spain, a case was 
brought against an individual who operated a website which offered links to video games, movies 
and music.774 The files were stored on servers operated by third parties who had no relationship to 
the individual. In this respect the facts of the case were essentially the same as those in Cooper v 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd.775 Under Spanish law, criminal liability could only be attracted to 
such activities if there was a commercial motivation for the infringement. The website carried 
advertising banners which generated revenue, although ostensibly only for the purpose of 
supporting the costs of running the website and not to make a profit 
The court held that this met the Spanish requirement for a commercial motivation.776 It is unclear if 
Australian courts would take a similar approach, but there is a strong possibility that any revenue 
raising activities connected with a website which distributes,777 provides778 or communicates779 a 
circumvention device to another person would amount to obtaining a commercial advantage.780 
[3.2.1] “the person does any of the following acts with a device” 
As previously stated any of the acts listed in s 132APD(1)(a) must be accompanied by an intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit.781 However, two of the acts specified, manufacturing a 
                                                            
770 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4G (“Offences against a law of the Commonwealth punishable by imprisonment for 
a period exceeding 12 months are indictable offences, unless the contrary intention appears.”) 
771 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a) 
772 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(b) 
773 http://www.doom9.org/index.html?/dvddec.htm (Accessed 16 February 2011) 
774 See http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharing-site-admin-sentenced-to-6-months-jail-090411/ (Accessed 16 
February 2011) 
775 Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 
776 See http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharing-site-admin-sentenced-to-6-months-jail-090411/ (Accessed 16 
February 2011) 
777 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(iii) 
778 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(v) 
779 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(vi) 
780 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(b) 
781 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(b) 
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circumvention device782 or importing a circumvention device into Australia,783 require the additional 
intention of providing the device to another person. Under these subsections, both an intention of 
providing the device to another person, and an intention to obtain a commercial advantage or profit, 
must be held by a defendant at the point at which the article is either landed in Australia, or the 
manufacturing process is completed.784  
The remaining acts consist of doing any of the following with a device:  
(1) distributing it to another person;785  
(2) offering it to the public;786  
(3) providing it to another person;787 or  
(4) communicating it to another person.788  
It was noted in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [2.1] and [4.7.1] that references to the word “distribute” in 
Division 5 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) “includes distribute by way of communication” except for 
Subdivision E, in which s 132APD is housed.  
It is clear that the legislative intent was to distinguish between “distribute” and “communicate” for 
the purpose of this subdivision. The reason for this distinction is unclear. Since both Subdivision E 
and Subdivision C were created at the same time, it is unlikely to be an accident caused by the 
legislative development of the Act. For the purposes of s 132APD(1)(a)(iii), the word “distributes” 
therefore excludes making available online or electronically transmitting a work or other subject-
matter789 and refers only to other means of distribution such as the physical transfer of tangible 
copies. Further, the meaning of “distributes” is narrowed by the presence of s 132APD(1)(a)(v) which 
prohibits “providing” a circumvention device to another person. The difference between the two is 
not immediately apparent, but the Explanatory Memorandum for the Copyright Amendment Bill 
2006 (Cth) states that the two terms cover two distinct activities:790 
                                                            
782 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(i) 
783 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(ii) 
784 See McNicol v Pinch  [1906] 2 KB 352 ; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jack Zinader Pty Ltd [1949] ALR 
912 ; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Jax Tyres Pty Ltd  (1984) 58 ALR 138 
785 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(iii) 
786 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(iv) 
787 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(v) 
788 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(1)(a)(vi) 
789 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “communicate” 
790 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch 9 cl 12.143 
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“[Providing to another person] is to cover an active or deliberate transfer of a thing from one 
person to another while ‘distributes’ suggests that the person is acting as a conduit or 
intermediary. Eg a transport company may not be providing devices by merely transporting 
them. However, it may be distributing the devices.”791 
This raises some unfortunate possibilities for intermediaries, since there is no element in the offence 
requiring knowledge of the status of the device, only that the device was distributed with the 
intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. An innocent company shipping a device 
would almost certainly be doing so with this intention. This means that they would have to rely on 
an argument that the conduct was not voluntary. As discussed in Chapter 4 at paragraph [2.2.1], 
simply being unaware of the nature or quality of the thing distributed may not be enough to support 
this contention. 
The phrase “offering it to the public” is quite different from “offer for sale”, so the analysis of “offer” 
in the cases of Fisher v Bell,792 Partridge v Crittenden793, Pelka v Sunquist794 and Sun World 
International Inc v Registrar, Plant Breeders Rights795 is unlikely to have any consequence. In those 
cases it was relevant to examine the distinction between offer and acceptance in the law of contract. 
Here, there is no requirement for the offer to be for a sale. Offering to give a device gratuitously to 
the public would amount to the proscribed conduct, however there would still have to be an 
intention to obtain a commercial advantage. 
[3.2.2] Defences 
There are a number of specific defences available to s 132APD. These defences are virtually identical 
to the defences to s 132APC discussed above at paragraphs [3.1.5] – [3.1.7] and [3.1.9] – [3.1.10]. 
They vary from the defences in s 132APC by referring to the circumvention device, rather than the 
act of circumventing the TPM. Due to the obligations under Article 17.4.7(f)(ii) and (iii) of the 
                                                            
791 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch 9 cl 12.143 
792 Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731 
793 Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 2 All ER 421 
794 Pelka v Sunquist [2005] WASC 52 
795 Sun World International Inc v Registrar, Plant Breeders Rights (1998) 87 FCR 405 
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Australia – US Free Trade Agreement796 the encryption research797 and computer security798 
defences in s 132APD can only apply to access control TPMs.799  
Three of the defences under s 132APC are not available under s 132APD. Being granted permission 
by the copyright owner or exclusive licensee is not a defence to s 132AD (as it is under s 132APC(2)). 
This means that even the copyright owners who applied the TPM to the copyright materials are 
unable to manufacture or supply a circumvention device without committing an offence.  There are 
no equivalent defences in s132APD for online privacy or prescribed acts as there are under 
ss 132APC(6) and 132APC(9). 
Section 132APD(2) provides a defence that is not available under s 132APC. The defence can only be 
relied upon if the device is a circumvention device only because it has been promoted, advertised or 
marketed as having the purpose of circumventing a TPM.800 This is a far narrower category of 
devices than the definition of circumvention devices in s 10(1),801 and excludes devices that:  
(1) have only a limited commercially significant purpose, or no such purpose or use, other than 
the circumvention of a TPM; and 
(2) are primarily or solely designed or produced to enable or facilitate the circumvention of the 
technological protection measure.  
The defence only applies where the person:  
(1) did not do such promoting, advertising or marketing;802 and  
(2) did not direct or request (expressly or impliedly) another person to do such promoting, 
advertising or marketing.803  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006, this defence 
was incorporated to: 
                                                            
796 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature 30 March 2004, [2005] ATS 1, Art 17.4. 
797 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(4) 
798 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(5) 
799 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132APD(4)(a) and 5(a); Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment 
Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch 9 cl 12.157 
800 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(2)(a) 
801 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 (1) circumvention device 
802 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(2)(b)(i) 
803 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132APD(2)(b)(ii) 
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“[...] address the situation where X and Y are competitors and person Y places an 
advertisement for vexatious purposes, with the effect that the device manufactured by X 
becomes a circumvention device despite the device not having that function”804 
There are two problems with this defence. The first stems from the definition of circumvention 
device itself. The fact that any device, component or product is defined as a circumvention device 
for a TPM simply because it is promoted, advertised or marketed for that purpose or use805 can lead 
to absurd results. An empty cardboard box would meet the definition of a product. So, if a person 
manufactures cardboard boxes and places an advertisement in a newspaper which states “my 
cardboard boxes are made for the purpose of circumventing the Playstation 3 copy protection”, the 
cardboard boxes he manufactures are now categorised as a circumvention device for a TPM despite 
having no possibility of circumventing the TPM. 
Secondly, the defence is available if the device is promoted by a vexatious competitor for the 
purpose of circumventing a TPM, but not if device is promoted for the use of circumventing a TPM. 
Therefore if Y placed an advertisement which stated, “X’s cardboard boxes can be used for 
circumventing the Playstation 3 TPM”, X’s cardboard boxes will have become circumvention devices 
because they have been advertised as such. X cannot rely on the defence under s 132APD(2) since 
the circumvention devices were not advertised as having the purpose of circumventing a TPM, only 
the use. Consequently, X could be charged with an indictable offence if he does any of the acts in 
s 132APD(1) with his boxes, if he has the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. 
 [3.3] Section 132APE: Providing etc. a circumvention service for a 
technological protection measure 
Section 132APE [see Appendix at page 348] is the equivalent offence to s 132APD for circumvention 
services. The type of conduct which can constitute the offence is far narrower since it would be 
impossible to manufacture, import, distribute or communicate a service. The conduct element is 
therefore limited to providing a service to another person806 or offering a service to the public.807 In 
common with s 132APD, the offence is an indictable offence. This is ascertained by the penalty:808 
550 penalty points or imprisonment for 5 years or both. 
                                                            
804 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  sch 9 cl 12.147 
805 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 (1) circumvention device (a) 
806 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132APE(1)(a)(i) 
807 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132APE(1)(a)(ii) 
808 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4G 
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The defences to this offence in ss 132APE(2) –  (8), are identical to the defences to s 132APD except 
that any reference to a circumvention device is replaced by “circumvention service”.  
The fault element for either conduct is the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit.809 To be sure of avoiding liability for the fault element, a circumvention service would have to 
be completely gratuitous. This would include circumvention services from the copyright owners who 
have applied the TPM to their works.  
[4] Subdivision F: Electronic Rights Management Information 
Subdivision F contains a number of offences related to electronic rights management information 
(“ERM information”). There are three offence sections:  
(1) removing or altering ERM information;810  
(2) distributing, importing or communicating copies after removal or alteration of ERM 
information;811 and  
(3) distributing or importing ERM information.812  
Each of these sections contain three offences tiered according to culpability. These offences are 
included in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to implement obligations under Article 12 the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (the “WCT”),813 to which Australia acceded on 26 April 2007.814 These offences are 
powerful and wide reaching tools for prosecutors, since much of the illicit distribution, 
communication and copying of copyright material will involve the removal or alteration of ERM 
information of some sort.  
Although the ERM information offences are applicable across all forms of media, the more 
prominent types of copyright material to be affected by Subdivision F is photography. It is very 
common for digital cameras to include ERM information in .jpg files automatically and many 
professional photographers add ERM information to their digital works. Compared to other media 
such as film or music, there is a highly dispersed population of producers of photographic works, and 
                                                            
809 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132APE(1)(b) 
810 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s 132AQ 
811 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AR 
812 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AS 
813 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 20 December 1996, [2007] 
ATS 26, art 12, (entered into force 26 April 2007) 
814 See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/wct/treaty_wct_67.html (Accessed 21 February 2011) 
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this has led to an increase of “orphan-works”.815 Technological constraints that prevent the removal 
of ERM information from .jpg files are virtually non-existent, so there is a high probability that the 
majority of offences committed will be undetected. 
[4.1] Definition of ERM Information 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) defines ERM information as: 816 
“[...] in relation to a work or other subject-matter, means information that:  
(a) is electronic; and  
(b) either:  
(i) is or was attached to, or is or was embodied in, a copy of the 
work or subject-matter; or  
(ii) appears or appeared in connection with a communication, or 
the making available, of the work or subject-matter; and  
(c) either:  
(i) identifies the work or subject-matter, and its author or 
copyright owner (including such information represented as 
numbers or codes); or 
(ii) identifies or indicates some or all of the terms and conditions 
on which the work or subject-matter may be used, or indicates 
that the use of the work or subject-matter is subject to terms 
or conditions (including such information represented as 
numbers or codes).” 
[4.1.1] “is electronic” 
The requirement for the information to be electronic is open to interpretation. It is not clear if the 
meaning of the word “electronic” is limited to information stored using electronic circuitry, or if it 
extends to information that can only be read by electronic means. The hard disk drive of a normal 
personal computer stores information by directionally magnetizing the ferromagnetic material of the 
disk. The information stored is not electronic, it is magnetic. This narrow interpretation would 
exclude the information contained in MP3 files, CDs and DVDs, but it this would be inconsistent with 
the purpose of the offences.  
                                                            
815 United States Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works (2006) 24 
816 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10  “electronic rights management information” 
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To include this type of information, “electronic” must be expanded to include information that is 
stored magnetically which requires an electronic device to read the information encoded in the 
material of the disk. If this wider definition of “electronic” is correct then magnetic tape such as VHS 
or audio cassette tapes would also have to be included, since they are only distinguished by the 
utilisation of analogue encoding rather than digital encoding on the magnetic material.  
There are other methods of storing information that can only be read using electronic means, but do 
not use magnetic material. The barcodes attached to products use ink to store information. It is 
arguable that information stored in this manner would be included if the definition is expanded to 
take account of information stored magnetically. In summary, there is wide spectrum of information 
that could be considered “electronic” by the courts:  
(1) information stored in electronic circuitry; 
(2) information stored by writing and reading electronically on magnetic medium; and 
(3) information that can only be read electronically 
How the definition will be interpreted is still open, since there have been no reported cases in 
Australia for prosecutions under Subdivision F, nor are there any reported civil cases under ss 116B, 
116C or 116CA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).817 
[4.1.2] “is or was attached to, or is or was embodied in, a copy of the work” 
ERM information may be attached to a copy of the work or embodied in a copy of the work. It is 
common for CDs, DVDs, and various computer files to contain metadata. 818 This information is not 
ordinarily accessible to ordinary playback devices, but specialist devices and computers are able to 
access and alter this information. Information that would also be embodied in a copy would be the 
credits shown at the end of cinematographic films.  
The tangible objects that contain copyright material, such as CDs and DVDs, are not works or other 
subject matter protected by copyright law. Any information that is in these objects, but does not 
form part of the copyright work would be better described as being attached to the work. The 
definition is silent regarding the level of adhesion required for the information to be considered 
“attached”. It is unclear if permanent attachment to the copyright material is required, or if 
temporary attachment would be sufficient. A DVD may contain ERM information printed on its 
surface in the form of a barcode for instance. The case containing the DVD is almost certain to 
                                                            
817 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 116B, 116C, 116CA 
818 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata (Accessed 27 July 2012) 
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contain a barcode with information.  Again it is unclear if this would be sufficiently attached to the 
work to fall under the definition. 
[4.1.3] “appears or appeared in connection with a communication, or the 
making available” 
For copyright material that has been communicated or made available it is only necessary that the 
information appears or appeared in connection with the communication or making available. 819  It is 
not required to be attached or embodied. This would include information contained in emails sent 
with the copyright material or notices that appear on websites.  
[4.1.4] “identifies the work or subject-matter, and its author or copyright 
owner” or “terms and conditions” 
The ERM information itself must either:  
(1) identify the work or subject-matter, and its author or copyright owner (including such 
information represented as numbers or codes);820 or 
(2) identify or indicate some or all of the terms and conditions on which the work or subject-
matter may be used, or indicate that the use of the work or subject-matter is subject to 
terms or conditions (including such information represented as numbers or codes).821  
ERM information may not always be apparent to the end user if it is expressed in a coded form. The 
definition is unclear if combined encoded information about the work, and the author or copyright 
owner needs to appear separately or if it can be a compound code which identifies both in one code. 
If the information is encoded, it may be impossible for a third party to even know that the 
information is used for the purpose of ERM. Many websites providing audio or visual files use a 
naming convention or code which allows the owners to easily identify and organise their works for 
the purposes of managing the operation of their servers. Even a file name that contains the required 
information could be characterised as ERM information. This would mean that an offence could be 
committed under s 132AQ if an end user removes or alters the filename given by the provider, even 
if they have acquired the file legitimately. 
Information that identifies some or all of terms and conditions, or indicates that the copyright 
material is subject to terms and conditions is also capable of being interpreted broadly.  One 
                                                            
819 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “electronic rights management information” (b)(ii) 
820 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “electronic rights management information” (c)(i) 
821 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “electronic rights management information” (c)(ii) 
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example of this type of information is the indicator buttons used by the various Creative Commons 
licences.822 The minimum information that would indicate that the use of the copyright material is 
subject to terms or conditions would be contained the archetypal indicator “© All rights reserved”. 
[4.2] Section 132AQ: Removing or altering ERM information 
Section 132AQ [see Appendix at page 351] contains offences for removing or altering electronic 
rights management information. There are three offences under s 132AQ, which are tiered 
according to culpability. All consist of four physical elements:  
(1) copyright subsists in a work or other subject matter;  
(2) the removal or alteration of ERM information that relates to that work or other subject 
matter;  
(3) the person does so without the permission or exclusive licensee of the copyright;823 and 
(4) the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of the 
copyright.  
In the case of the indictable824 and summary offences,825 there are also corresponding mental 
elements. The meaning of “copyright subsists” in the first element of the offences is discussed in 
Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.1]. 
[4.2.1] “removes [or] alters any electronic rights management information” 
This element of the offences is contained in separate subsections across the three offences. One 
subsection in each offence prohibits the removal of ERM information; the other prohibits the 
alteration of ERM information. As both of these physical elements consist of conduct and no fault 
element is specified, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides that intention is the fault element 826 
for the indictable and summary offences. 
The removal of ERM information from a copy is intended to cover situations where copies are made 
of copyright material, but the ERM information attached or embedded in the original is not attached 
or embodied in the copy. When a digital copy is made by a computer, the computer reads the data 
in the original file and then creates a new copy of the file on the hard drive of the computer. If the 
                                                            
822 See http://creativecommons.org.au/learn-more/licences (Accessed 27 July 2012) 
823 As discussed at [4.2.2.], it is unclear if this is actually an element to the offence, or if it is a qualification or a 
defense to the conduct element of the offence. 
824 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AQ(1) 
825 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AQ(2) 
826 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
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ERM information is not copied, it is not actually removed from the original copy. It is simply never 
transferred to the new copy. The analogue equivalent would be to not copy the end credits of a film. 
The manner in which the subsection is phrased does not accurately reflect this process. It suggests 
that the ERM information must actually be removed from a copy of the work. This problem is equally 
applicable to the second subsection, where the conduct consists of altering ERM information.827  
It may be difficult to successfully argue this interpretation in court. It does not correspond with the 
purpose828 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and the courts may give a wider construction of the word 
“removes”, without regard to the technicalities of the copying process.  
ERM information can be removed or altered without creating an additional copy. Audio, video or 
picture files that are stored on a computer hard disk drive can be renamed. If the filename contains 
ERM information then changing the filename could constitute altering ERM information. Many of 
these files also contain metadata consisting of ERM information, all of which can be removed or 
altered with specialist computer programs829 without making a new copy. It has been alleged that 
the website Facebook routinely strips the metadata from photographs that are uploaded to its 
website.830 
[4.2.2] “the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee” 
This subsection of the offences requires legislative clarification. It is unclear if it is intended to be a 
distinct element to the offence, or a qualification to the conduct element. The distinction is 
important. If the subsection is characterised as a qualification to the conduct element, the evidential 
burden is borne by the defence to prove that permission has been given.831 If the subsection is 
characterised as an element of the offence, the prosecution would have to prove that no permission 
was granted, and in the case of the indictable and summary offence to prove that the fault element.  
                                                            
827 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AQ(1)(b)(ii) and (3)(b)(ii) 
828 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA (“In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that 
would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in 
the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.) 
829 See generally - http://lifehacker.com/#!5149327/jpeg--png-stripper-removes-the-metadata-from-your-
images (Accessed 22 February 2011); http://www.becyhome.de/becypdfmetaedit/description_eng.htm 
(Accessed 22 February 2011); http://www.sobolsoft.com/removemetadata/ (Accessed 22 February 2011) 
830 See http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2008/11/05/facebook-flickr-strip-copyright-data-from-images/ 
(Accessed 22 February 2011) 
831 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 13.3(3)( “A defendant who wishes to rely on any exception, exemption, 
excuse, qualification or justification provided by the law creating an offence bears an evidential burden in 
relation to that matter.”) 
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The task of characterising the subsection is further complicated by the absence of a definition of 
“permission” in the Act. This would suggest that the permission could be express, implied or 
conditional. Other sections in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) where permission is intended as a 
defence are clearly and expressly stated. Section 132APC(2) is clearly stated as a defence for 
circumventing an access control TPM. This suggests that the subsection would be drafted in the 
same manner if the legislative intent was for it to be a defence or qualification.  
If the subsection is interpreted as an element of the offence, it would be a physical element 
consisting of a circumstance which does not state a fault element. The fault element given by the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) for both the indictable and summary offences would therefore be 
recklessness.832 In order to discharge the legal burden of proof, the prosecution would have to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant:  
(1) did either of the acts in s 132AQ(1)(b) or (3)(b); 
(2) they intended to do either of the acts in s 132AQ(1)(b) or (3)(b); 
(3) without the express, implied or conditional permission of either the owner or exclusive 
licensee;  
(4) the person was aware that there was a substantial risk that they did not have the express, 
implied or conditional permission of either the owner or exclusive licensee; and  
(5) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it was unjustifiable to take the risk.  
Additionally, a person accused of the offence could invoke the defences of mistake or ignorance of 
fact833 and claim of right,834 and would have the evidential burden of adducing or pointing to 
evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility835 that they were mistaken or ignorant that there 
was a substantial risk that they did not have the express or implied permission of the copyright 
owner or exclusive licensee. 
If the competing interpretation is accepted, it would mean that the prosecution would have to 
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person  
(1) did either of the acts in s 132AQ(1)(b) or (3)(b); and  
(2) they intended to do either of the acts in s 132AQ(1)(b) or (3)(b) 
                                                            
832 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
833 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 9.1 
834 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 9.5 
835 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 13.3(6) 
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The defendant would have the evidential burden of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a 
reasonable possibility that they had actually had express, implied or conditional permission. If the 
defendant was unaware that there was a substantial risk that they did not have the express or 
implied permission of either the owner or exclusive licensee or they were mistaken or ignorant of 
that fact, they could still be guilty of the offence if the other elements of the offence are made out 
since the mistaken belief would not negate the fault element. 
It is clear that the second interpretation produces a more onerous environment for a defendant 
accused of the offence. This is not sufficient to decide which interpretation is correct, as the practice 
of resolving the meaning of ambiguous words in favour of defendants has fallen out of favour with 
the Australian courts.836 There is no real ambiguity in the meaning of the words in the subsection, it 
is the characterisation of the subsection within the framework of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
which produces the ambiguity.   
No definitive answer can be ascertained in relation to this interpretation problem. The first 
interpretation would appear to be the better view, since the competing interpretation would mean 
that the defence or qualification has been drafted entirely differently from other defences in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). There is also a specific section in s 132AT that provides defences available 
for any offence in Subdivision F. If the legislative intent was that the burden of proof of permission is 
to borne by the defendant, it is likely that a permission defence would be housed with the other 
defences. If the matter is ever contended, the courts may be prepared to resurrect the rule for the 
construction of penal sections. The High Court has suggested this approach on occasion,837 and an 
application of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation does not resolve the ambiguity. 
[4.2.3] “the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright” 
This element of the offence mirrors the wording of Article 12 of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation Copyright Treaty.838 While this ensures Australia meets the treaty obligation, the treaty 
text does not translate easily into the framework of the Australian federal criminal law.  
                                                            
836 See generally: Beckwith v R (1976) 135 CLR 569; Deming No 456 Pty Ltd v Brisbane Unit Development Corp 
Pty Ltd (1983) 155 CLR 129; Waugh v Kippen (1986) 160 CLR 156; Chew v R (1992) 173 CLR 626; R v Lavender 
(2005) 218 ALR 521; MacAdam, A.I. and Smith, T.M., Statutes: Rules and Examples (3rd ed, 1993)  298; Pearce, 
D.C. and Geddes, R.S., Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th ed, 2006)  284 
837 One of the more pertinent occasions indirectly concerned a copyright offence. See the quote at 
paragraph [3] above from Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony (2005) 221 ALR 448  
838 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 20 December 1996, [2007] 
ATS 26, art 12 
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This element requires the prosecution to prove that the removal or alteration of ERM information 
impacts an unspecified infringement of copyright that has yet to occur. Some analogy can be drawn 
to attempts at offences where the result does not occur. However, in Commonwealth offences a 
person can only be guilty of an attempt at an offence if it is proved that they had intention or 
knowledge for each physical element of the offence839 and that their conduct was more than 
preparatory to the commission of the offence.840 This provides a safeguard against a conviction of 
attempting an offence where people have only recklessly engaged in conduct, and where no result 
has occurred. A person could not be convicted of attempted murder if they recklessly fire a gun at a 
chair, simply because someone else might have been sitting in it. 
One interpretation of this element is that it assumes a result at some open ended point in time. It 
does not require a measurement of the likelihood of the other outcome occurring. If this were the 
intention it would state “the removal or alteration makes it easier to induce, enable, facilitate or 
conceal an infringement of the copyright”. If the element used these words, it would be capable of 
being proved by expert opinion.  
The time period within which the ultimate infringement of copyright occurs is unstated, so this 
means that the induced, enabled, facilitated or concealed infringement may occur at any time until 
copyright no longer subsists in the work or other subject matter. For a photograph taken by a 
healthy twenty year old Australian this would be 130 years.841 This provides a large window of 
opportunity for an infringement to take place, and presumably the greater the window of 
opportunity the greater the chance of an infringement taking place. This is an impossible task for the 
courts and that this could not be intent of parliament or the purpose of the subsection. 
An alternate interpretation is that the result is hypothetical: if an infringement were to take place or 
was contemplated by a third party, if the result of the conduct of the defendant would have 
enabled, induced, facilitated or concealed the infringement. This interpretation allows a more 
objectively certain outcome than the first interpretation. 
Any of the listed acts will complete the offence and any type of infringement will suffice, but if the 
defence could eliminate enabling, facilitating and concealing an infringement, it is unclear what 
qualities the hypothetical person induced into infringing copyright would possess. If the induced 
                                                            
839 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.1(3) 
840 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.1(2) 
841 This is based on a life expectancy of 80 years. The actual life expectancy of an person born in Australia is 81 
years according to the World Bank – see http://data.worldbank.org/country/australia (Accessed 2 March 2011) 
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person is a reasonable person, the act of removing or altering ERM information would have to be 
deceptive. It would be unusual for a court to find that a reasonable person infringes copyright simply 
because they did not know that copyright exists in the work.  
The fault element for this physical element varies between the indictable and summary offences. 
Recklessness842 is the fault element for the indictable offence and negligence843 is the fault element 
for the summary offence. The strict liability offence has no fault element. 
In common with the various offences of making or possessing a device for making an infringing 
copy, 844 this offence penalises conduct that is preparatory. No infringement of copyright is 
necessary, and there is no property right in ERM information. Once again, a person could find 
themselves convicted of a crime for taking preparatory steps to commit a minor tort.  
For example, A takes a photograph of B at a party using a digital camera and calls the picture file 
“[A’s name]_B at a party” and emails it to B. B likes the photograph and uploads it to a social 
network site without asking A, but changes the filename to “Me at a party”.  
B would be criminally liable under one of the offences in s 132AQ. Copyright subsists in the work and 
A is the owner of the copyright. B has altered the ERM information which identifies A as the owner 
and identifies “B at a party” as the title of the work. B has done so without A’s permission. The 
absence of the ERM information could conceal B’s infringement by copying and communicating A’s 
work. If A were to sue B for infringing his or her copyright by communicating the work, the damages 
recovered by A are likely to be quite minor, unless A is a professional photographer. B, in contrast, 
could be imprisoned for five years if charged under the indictable offence. While a prosecution 
might be an unlikely outcome, the facts of this hypothetical scenario are common place. 
[4.3] Section 132AR: Distributing, importing or communicating copies after 
removal or alteration of ERM information 
Section 132AR [see Appendix at page 352] contains offences for distributing, importing or 
communicating copies after the electronic rights management information has been removed or 
altered. There is some overlap between s 132AR and the offences in ss 132AH845 and 132AI,846 which 
                                                            
842 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
843 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AQ(3)(d) 
844 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AL 
845 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AH 
846 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AI 
Offences in the Copyright Act 1968(Cth): Will They Be Effective? 
 
162 
are discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.6] and [4.7]. However, there are however some 
important differences between these offences.  
First, the work or other subject matter does not need to be an infringing copy as it does for the 
offences in ss 132AH and 132AI. This means that licensee may still be liable for the offences. For 
example, a person who has been granted a licence to reproduce the copyright work, but does not 
copy the ERM information embodied in the work and then distributes the copy. 
Second, in all three of the offences under this section, communication is distinguished from 
distribution. For the indictable and summary offences that involve distribution847 there must be an 
intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit.848 The strict liability offence 
modifies this somewhat, but the nexus between commercial activity and the distribution remains.849  
As stated in the previous chapter, except for offences related to TPMs in Subdivision E, distribution 
includes by way of communication.850 Here in contrast, the three offences can also be committed by 
communication,851 but the act of communicating the copyright material does not require either an 
intention or nexus to trading or of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit.  
Nor does the communication need to be to the extent that it affects prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright.852 A single non-commercial communication is sufficient. This makes a communication of a 
work or other subject matter a far easier element to prove in s 132AR than in s 132AI. A 
communication does not require a second person to receive the communication. It merely requires 
that a work or other subject matter is transmitted electronically over a path. The definition in s 10(1) 
states: 
“communicate means make available online or electronically transmit (whether over a path, 
or a combination of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work or other 
subject-matter, including a performance or live performance within the meaning of this 
Act.”853 
A person could potentially be liable for communicating a copyright work even if they own and are 
operating both computers. The inclusion of a strict liability offence, which does not require any 
                                                            
847 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AR(1)(1)(b)(i) and (3)(b)(i)  
848 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AR(1)(1)(b)(i) and (3)(b)(i) 
849 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AR(5)(b)(i) 
850 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA “distribute” 
851 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AR(1)(1)(b)(iii), (3)(b)(iii) and (5)(b)(iii) 
852 Cf Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AI(2)(d) and (5)(d) 
853 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 
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knowledge of the removal or alteration of the ERM information, further increases the scope of the 
offence.  
This can be demonstrated by changing slightly the hypothetical situation between A, B and the party 
photograph discussed at paragraph [4.2.3] above. A emails the party photograph file to B and tells 
him he can print a copy for himself, thus granting B a limited licence to reproduce the work. B again 
changes the filename, altering the ERM information and concealing any future infringement. B does 
not have a printer at home and posts the photo to a publically accessible website to access from 
work. A did not grant B a licence to communicate the work, which is an exclusive right granted to the 
owner of the copyright under s 31 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), so B has communicated the work 
without A’s permission. Under these circumstances, B could be guilty of an indictable offence.  
If B had instead emailed the photograph file to C with the ERM information removed, and C uploads 
the file to a social network site, B could be guilty of either an indictable or summary offence and C 
could be found guilty of the strict liability offence. Again, while a prosecution for this conduct is 
unlikely, the factual scenario is not. 
This puts third parties, such as the hypothetical C, in an impossible legal position. Even if they are 
ignorant of the fact of the removal or alteration of ERM information, criminal liability would still be 
attracted even where the communication occurs between two devices that they own. As discussed 
in Chapter 4 at paragraph [4], the concept of commission by proxy854 cannot be used as a defence to 
strict liability offences. It can only be used to prosecute a person who procures another to commit a 
physical element of an offence. C could only defend against the offence if he considered whether or 
not he had permission from the copyright owner, was mistaken as to that fact and the mistake was 
reasonable.855 
[4.3.1] “imports, distributes or communicates without the permission of the copyright 
owner” 
Any of the three acts in the conduct element of s 132AR must be committed without the permission 
of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee. As previously mentioned above in paragraph [4.3], in 
the indictable and summary offences, if the act consists of either importing into Australia or 
distributing a copy, there must be an intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit for. The strict liability offence requires that these two acts are done in preparation for, or in 
the course of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit.  
                                                            
854 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.3 
855 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 9.2(1)(a) 
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The fact that the copy does not need to be an infringing copy means that an importation or 
distribution of copyright material with ERM information removed or altered can amount to an 
offence, but not an infringement of copyright. Under s 37 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) a person 
infringes copyright if the importation is for the purpose of: selling; letting for hire; by way of trade 
offering or exposing the article for sale or hire; distributing for the purpose of trade; distributing for 
any purpose that will prejudicially affect the owner of the copyright; or by way of trade exhibiting 
the article to the public.856  
Copyright would not be infringed if a copy is imported for the purposes of gifting it to another 
person for the purpose of gaining a commercial advantage. For example to show good will in the 
course of negotiating a business deal. Importing non-infringing copies of sound recordings857 and 
electronic literary or music items858 does not infringe copyright. 
This means a person licensed to reproduce a sound recording non-exclusively in New Zealand, who 
removes ERM information from his copies and exports these copies to Australia, could expose an 
unwitting importer to criminal liability. The importer would not have sought permission from the 
copyright owner or an exclusive licensee because they do not need a licence to import sound 
recordings.  
Australian copyright law does not grant an exclusive right to distribute copies of works859 or other 
subject matter,860  so distribution does not constitute an infringement unless the article was an 
infringing copy861 or was taken to be an infringing copy through unauthorised importation.862 It 
would therefore be unlikely that express permission would be sought from a copyright owner to 
distribute an article. If the person has obtained a licence from the copyright owner to import or 
reproduce copies, permission to distribute can be implied. Whether this implied permission survives 
through the supply chain to the retail customer is unclear, since the permission is only implied by the 
grant of licence that not necessary for dealings in the article subsequent to the first sale by an 
importer or reproducer. 
                                                            
856 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 37(1) 
857 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 112D 
858 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 112DA 
859 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 37(1) 
860 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 85-88 
861 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 38(2), 103(2) 
862 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 38(1), 103(1) 
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The offence is further complicated by the problem of correct application of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth) to the term “permission”, discussed above at paragraph [4.2.2]. The same problem is 
equally applicable here. 
[4.3.2] “any ERM information that relates to the work or other subject matter has been 
removed [or] altered” 
As discussed above the removal or alteration of the ERM information does not need to have been 
done by the same person who imports, distributes or communicates the article. The tiering of the 
offences means that a person must know ERM information has been removed or altered to be 
convicted of the indictable offence. For the summary offence, there must have been such a great 
falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances, 
and there was such a high risk that the ERM information had been that the conduct merits criminal 
punishment for the offence.863 The strict liability offence of course, requires no fault element at all. 
The indictable offence in s 132AR differs from the other indictable offences in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth), in that it requires actual knowledge 864 of a circumstance element rather than 
recklessness. The fault elements, coupled with the requirement for the importation and distribution 
offence to be committed for the purpose of trade or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit, will 
insulate most unwitting parties from prosecution.  
The strict liability offence is narrower in scope for the acts of importation and distribution than for 
an act of communication. Importation and distribution are required to be committed in preparation 
for, or in the course of, trading or to obtain a commercial advantage or profit. This has the effect of 
insulating most domestic individuals from unwittingly importing or distributing copies that have had 
ERM information removed or altered. Intermediaries such as couriers and carriage service providers 
could still be liable for the strict liability offence, since they will undoubtedly be seeking a 
commercial advantage or profit.  
The strict liability offence committed by an act of communication however, is an especially harsh 
imposition of criminal liability on individuals who may be entirely ignorant of the removal of any 
ERM information and are not in a position to make enquiries. It is inconsistent with the offences for 
distributing infringing copies for non-commercial purposes in s 132AI. There is no strict liability 
offence in s 132AI for non-commercial distribution, and in the indictable and summary offences the 
                                                            
863 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.5 
864 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.3 
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distribution is required to result in the copyright owner’s interests being affected prejudicially. There 
is no such requirement in s 132AR. 
The difference in scope between the two offences can be illustrated by the following scenario: A 
emails B a photograph file of B and C at a party, which contains embedded metadata which identifies 
the work or subject-matter and its author. Without A’s permission, B uploads the photograph to a 
social network site, creating an infringing copy. B does not think this will prejudicially affect A in any 
way since only a small number of mutual friends will see the photograph.  
Unknown to B, the social network site automatically strips photographs uploaded to the site of 
embedded metadata and it is available for anyone to see. A is unconcerned about this infringement 
but C objects to the photograph being uploaded and informs the police. It is highly unlikely that B 
could be convicted under s 132AI for distributing the infringing copy of the photograph. Even though 
B has distributed an infringing copy, through communicating865 the file by making it available 
online,866 he has not done so with the intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit. It is also doubtful that he has distributed the infringing copy to the extent that A is affected 
prejudicially, and since A is unconcerned by the infringement, he could testify that he has not been. 
Even if it was found that he has, B did not do so with the necessary recklessness or negligence 
required respectively by the indictable and summary offences, and there is no non-commercial strict 
liability offence.  
B would, however, be liable for the communicating the article to the public under at least the strict 
liability offence in s 132AR. He would be liable under the indictable offence if he knew there was a 
substantial risk that the social network site might automatically remove ERM information from 
photographs, and it could be shown B was unjustified in taking that risk. A would not be able to 
assist B by testifying that he, as the copyright owner, has not been prejudicially affected by B’s 
distribution because it is not an element of the offence. Nor could A grant permission to remove the 
ERM information retrospectively. If B had chosen a different social networking site on which to post 
the photograph, one which did not remove the embedded metadata, no offence would have been 
committed and C’s complaint to the police would be of no consequence. 
                                                            
865 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA (“In [Division 5] distribute, except Subdivision E, includes distribute by 
way of communication”)  
866 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 (“communicate means make available online or electronically transmit 
(whether over a path, or a combination of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work or 
other subject-matter, including a performance or live performance within the meaning of this Act.”) 
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[4.4] Section 132AS: Distributing or importing ERM information 
Section 132AS [see Appendix at page 354] contains offences for the distribution or importation of 
ERM information that has been removed from copies. This section contains are three offences once 
more tiered according culpability. The structure of the offences are very similar to s 132AR, however 
there are some important differences. Firstly, the subject matter of the conduct element of the 
offence is the ERM information itself,867 rather than a copy of a work or other subject matter.  
Secondly, the communication of ERM information is not treated separately in these three offences. 
The offence cannot be committed by an act of communication, as “distribution” in this subdivision 
can also include a distribution by way of communication.868 Under s 132AR it is possible to commit 
the offences by communicating a copy without a commercial motivation.869 In s 132AS the offences 
must be committed with an intention of trading, or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. In 
the strict liability offence this is modified to preparation for, or in the course of trading, or obtaining 
a commercial advantage or profit. Since distribution also applies to a communication, it was 
unnecessary to create an additional subsection prohibiting a communication with the intention of 
trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. Apart from this different treatment of 
communication, the conduct elements operate in an identical fashion to s 132AR with the same fault 
elements in respect of the different offence tiers. 
These offences can only be committed by the actual removal of ERM information from a copy of the 
work or other subject matter.870 All three offences also criminalise the distribution or importation of 
ERM information that has both been removed and altered,871 without the permission of the 
copyright owner or exclusive licensee. Since the distribution or importation of ERM information that 
has been removed is an offence in itself,872 the addition of this alternative element in the offence is 
unnecessary. 
[4.4.1] “the information has been removed from a copy of the work or other subject 
matter” 
As stated above, the ERM information must have been removed from a copy of the work or other 
subject matter,873 without the permission of the copyright owner.874 This is a physical element that 
                                                            
867 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AS(1)(b), (3)(b) and (5)(b) 
868 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA 
869 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(b)(iii), (3)(b)(iii) and (5)(b)(iii) 
870 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(d), (3)(d) and (5)(d) 
871 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(d)(ii), (3)(d)(ii) and (5)(d)(ii) 
872 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(d)(i), (3)(d)(i) and (5)(d)(i) 
873 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(d)(i), (3)(d)(i) and (5)(d)(i) 
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consists of a circumstance. It does not require that the person who distributes or imports the ERM 
information to be the same person who removed the ERM information from the article. The 
indictable offence requires that the person knows that this was done without that permission;875 the 
summary offence requires the person to be reckless to this fact.876 
This element of the offence does not seem to have any real application, except perhaps in the 
limited circumstances where the definition of ERM information is greatly expanded. It is therefore 
unclear precisely what mischief this section is intended to cure. The offence only applies to ERM 
information that:  
(1) is capable of being removed from a work or other subject matter; and  
(2) is capable of being distributed or imported  
It is also difficult to envisage what value there is in ERM information alone. A possible use would be 
to conceal the infringement of copyright by reattaching genuine ERM information to an infringing 
copy. For example, if an artist sold limited edition prints of a painting and attached a microchip 
containing ERM information to each copy sold, it might be tempting for a forger to conceal his 
infringement by removing the microchip and embedding it in his infringing copy. It might however, 
be simpler for a forger, having already gone to the trouble of creating an infringing copy, to also 
copy the ERM information. In the digital environment, it is doubtful if there any circumstances 
where the offences could have any real application.  
[4.5] Section 132AT: Defences 
Section 132AT [see Appendix at page 356] consists of defences applicable to ss 132AQ, 132AR and 
132AS. There are three subsections of defences to any of the offences related to ERM information in  
Subdivision F. They provide legal cover for law enforcement, certain public institutions and persons 
in the custody of a work or other subject matter under an arrangement referred to in s 64 of the 
National Archives Act 1983 (Cth). These defences are identical to the defences in relation to offences 
under Subdivision E877 and are discussed above at paragraphs [3.1.9] and [3.1.10]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
874 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AR(1)(d)(ii), (3)(d)(ii) and (5)(d)(ii) 
875 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AR(1)(e) 
876 The element does not state the fault element, so sch 1 s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides 
that recklessness is the fault element 
877 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132APC(7), 132APC(8) 132APC(8A), 132APD(6), 132APD(7), 132APD(8), 
132APE(6), 132APE(7) and 132APE(8)  
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[5] Part VAA – Unauthorised access to encoded broadcasts, Division 3 
– Offences , Subdivision A: Offences 
Part VAA of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contains a number provisions dealing with unauthorised 
access to encoded broadcasts, both creating civil actions available to channel providers and 
copyright owners, and creating a number of criminal offences. The expanded definition of distribute 
used in Division 5 has no application to the offences in Part VAA, so distribute is given its ordinary 
meaning. Section 132AB does not apply to Part VAA which means standard geographic application 
applies in accordance with s 14.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The offences relating to 
encoded broadcasts are housed in Division 3 of Part VAA contains. Many of the offences use same 
terms and phrase found in the offences in Part V Div 5. All of the offences in Subdivision 3 are 
indictable offences, except s 135ASI which is a summary offence.  
[5.1] Section 135AL: Definitions 
Section 135AL [see Appendix at page 356] consists of definitions applicable to Part VAA. None of the 
definitions in s 135AL are controversial. However, the definitions of “decoder” and “unauthorised 
decoder” include a computer program capable designed or adapted to decrypt, or to facilitate the 
decryption of, an encoded broadcast. There are problems associated with this definition will be 
made apparent in the discussion of the offences below. References to “broadcaster” means persons 
licensed under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). All of the offences contain an element (or 
qualification depending on the preferred view) which contain the words “without the authorisation 
of the broadcaster”, which means the offences in Division 3 only apply to Australian broadcasters or 
international broadcasters licensed to broadcast in Australia. 
[5.2] Section 135AN: Law enforcement exemption 
Section 135AN [see Appendix at page 357] provides an exemption to the offences for law 
enforcement activity. Anything lawfully done for the purposes of law enforcement or national 
security by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory,878 or an authority of any of those 
bodies, 879 is exempt from the offences in Division 3. This is not a defence to the offences, since it 
exempts law enforcement from the application of the offences. However a defendant relying on 
                                                            
878 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AN(a) 
879 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AN(b) 
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s 132AN bears the evidential burden of proof880 in any proceedings for an offence under Division 3 
as they would for a defence. 
[5.3] Section 135ASA: Making unauthorised decoder 
Section 135ASA [see Appendix at page 357] contains a single offence for making an unauthorised 
decoder. This offence consists of two physical elements:  
(1) the conduct of making an unauthorised decoder; and  
(2) with the result that the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access 
to an encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster.  
Neither element has a specified fault element, so through the application of s 5.6 of the Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Cth) the fault element for the conduct element is intention and recklessness for the 
result.881 The offence does not need to be committed for a commercial purpose, so criminal liability 
will be attached to a person who creates a computer program that enables unauthorised access to 
an encoded broadcast and makes it available online.  
[5.3.1] “makes an unauthorised decoder” 
There may be some argument regarding the characterisation of this element of the offence. One 
view is that words such as “makes an unauthorised decoder” should be interpreted as two elements: 
a conduct element, consisting of the physical act of assembling component parts, with the result 
that an unauthorised decoder has been made.  
The better view is that the phrase should be read as a single physical act. The distinction is important 
when the fault element or elements of the offence are imported by s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 
1995 (Cth). The fault element for a physical act consisting of conduct is intention882, and the fault 
element for a physical element consisting of a result is recklessness.883  
If the first interpretation is used, this would result in a lowering of the culpability for the offence, 
which is likely to disadvantage a person charged under the offence. The High Court has considered 
comparable legislation on numerous occasions884 without a settled view emerging which is broadly 
                                                            
880 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 13.3(3) 
881 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6 
882 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
883 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
884 Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56; Mamote-Kulang v R (1964) 111 CLR 62; Timbu Kolian v R (1968) 119 CLR 47; 
Kaporonovski v R (1973) 133 CLR 209; Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 
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applicable.885 In Falconer,886 the High Court concluded that the phrase “discharge a firearm” should 
be viewed as a single element since “a consequence which the bodily movement is apt to effect and 
is inevitable and which occurs contemporaneously with the bodily movement is more appropriately 
regarded as a circumstance that identifies the character of the “act” which is done by making the 
bodily movement.”887  
The unauthorised decoder itself can consist of any device, including a computer program. A 
computer program would consist of an algorithm that can decode the broadcast signal. Such 
algorithms can be converted into large prime numbers, and these have been called the “illegal 
primes”.888 
[5.3.2] “the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster” 
This element of the offence in occurs in a number of the offences in Division 3. It is clear that this is a 
result element. However the ultimate result of the gaining access to an encoded broadcast is not 
contemplated to have actually occurred. As discussed above at paragraph [4.2.3], it is not unique to 
include inchoate results as elements to offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The inchoate result 
element in the ERM information offences is capable of being interpreted in such a way as to make 
some sort of sensible reading of the element. This element of s 132ASA does not allow the same 
interpretation, since the result refers to an actual event rather than a change in the quality of an 
event. 
It is hypothetical that this element was originally intended to be the fault element to the various 
offences in which it occurs: 
“(1) A person commits an offence if: 
  (a)  the person makes an unauthorised decoder with the intention that; 
(b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster.”  
Changing this into a physical element was probably intended to:  
                                                            
885 Odgers, S., Principles of Federal Criminal Law (2010, 2nd ed)  18-24  
886 Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 
887 Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30, 38 
888 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_prime (Accessed 27 July 2012) 
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(1) remove the need for a prosecuting authority to prove which use of the device the defendant 
intended;  
(2) replace this with the easier requirement to prove the defendant had intended to engage in 
the physical conduct;  
(3) enable the prosecution to prove the physical result element by demonstrating that the 
device is capable of decrypting an encoded broadcast; and 
(4) lower the culpability of this element of an offence from intention to recklessness.  
This would have made the proving the offence an easier task for prosecutors. If this was the 
intention the offence should have been drafted like so: 
 “(1) A person commits an offence if: 
  (a)  the person makes an unauthorised decoder; and  
(b) the unauthorised decoder will enable a person to gain access to an encoded 
broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster”  
The inclusion of the words “be used to” between “will” and “enable” in sub-s 132ASA(1)(b) creates a 
problem for prosecutors. To demonstrate the problem with the greatest clarity, it is necessary to 
apply the offence to a set of hypothetical facts.  
A is an organised criminal. Through his activities he has accumulated enough money to invest in an 
enterprise producing decoders which enable people to gain access to encoded broadcasts without 
paying the broadcaster. A and his employee B make 500 decoders with the intention of selling them 
through his underworld contacts. Unknown to A, his “employee”, is actually an undercover 
policeman. B informs his police supervisor when the decoders are ready for shipment. The police 
raid A’s premises, arrest A under s 135ASA and seize the decoders as evidence. 
If A is charged under s 132ASA, it will be a relatively straightforward matter to prove that A made an 
unauthorised decoder intentionally. If the decoders work as they are designed, it could also be 
proved that the unauthorised decoders enable a person to gain access to an encoded broadcast 
without the authorisation of the broadcaster. However, it will be impossible to prove that the 
decoders will be used to that end, because they will never be used for anything other than evidence 
if they remain in a police evidence room.  
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This is the legal equivalent of the observer effect in physics. The interception of the decoders 
nullifies the offence. This seems to have been overlooked in the preceding case to Nahlous v R,889 
where the defendant pleaded guilty to a number of related offences. 
If there is evidence of the actual use of decoder, the element can be proved because the offence 
refers to a future use without expressly specifying when that period of time ends. The time period 
for the offence begins immediately after the conduct element of the offence is complete and does 
not expire.890 However it would have to be proved that the making of the decoder and its use 
formed a single transaction.891 
Leading proof that the decoder has been used would enable evidence to be led that at the moment 
the conduct element of the offence was committed, the decoder will be used. But if, as in the 
example, the decoder is seized before it has a chance to be used, prosecutors will have to charge 
offenders with an attempt at the offences to circumvent the problem. This means they will be 
required to prove that the defendant intended892 that the decoder was to be used to enable a 
person to gain access to an encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. If the 
hypothetical origins of this offence are accepted, the prosecution is in the same position that existed 
before the change. 
In respect to the authorisation of the broadcaster, once again it is unclear where the evidential 
burden lies, as discussed above at paragraph [4.2.2]. 
[5.4] 135ASB: Selling or hiring; 135ASC: Offering for sale or hire; 135ASD: 
Commercially exhibiting; 132ASE: Importing; 135ASF: Distributing 
Sections 135ASB – 135ASF [see Appendix at pages 358 - 359] consist of offences for a variety of 
dealings in unauthorised decoders. These offences have direct equivalents in the Part V Division 5 
offences for dealings in infringing copies. With two exceptions, the conduct elements of the offences 
are identical to both the conduct elements in those offences,893 and the fault elements in the 
importation offence. These elements are analysed at length in Chapter 5, so it is unnecessary to 
repeat the analysis here.  
                                                            
889 Nahlous v R [2010] NSWCCA 58 
890 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15B 
891 R v GMW [2005] NSWCCA 101; Dickens v The Queen [2004] WASCA 179; Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57 
892 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 11.1(3) 
893 Cf Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss 132AE(1)(a); 132AF(1)(a) and (2)(a);132AG(1)(a) and (2)(a); 132AH(1)(a); and 
132AI(1)(a) 
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All of these offences also contain the “will be used to enable” element discussed above at paragraph 
[5.3.2]. The problem with that element in s 132ASA is equally applicable to these offences. The 
practical issues that the problem raises are particularly acute in the importing offence in s 132ASE, 
since seizures of unauthorised decoders are likely to occur either at the point of entry or 
immediately after delivery as they are in drug importation offences.894 
The differences between the conduct elements in these offences and the offences in Part V Division 
5 are:  
(1) the distribution offence does not expressly include a communication; and  
(2) both the importation and distribution offences contain a modified and expanded fault 
element for non-commercial distribution that has a prejudicial affect.  
[5.4.1] “engaging in any other activity that will prejudicially affect a channel provider or 
anyone with an interest in the copyright in either an encoded broadcast or the content of 
an encoded broadcast” 
This fault element occurs in two forms in the importation offence in 135ASE(1)(a)(vii) and the 
distribution offence in s 132ASF(1)(a)(iii). The equivalent offences under s 132AH and s 132AI limit 
the class of people affected prejudicially only to the owners of the copyright subsisting in the 
infringing copy.895 Here there are a number of persons that are capable of falling within the class of 
affected parties. Expressly stated is the channel provider, who is defined in s 132AL896as a person 
who:  
(1) packages a channel; and  
(2) supplies a broadcaster with the channel; and  
(3) carries on a business that involves the supply of the channel; where apart from any breaks in 
the transmission of incidental matter, the channel is broadcast as part of an encoded 
broadcast service.  
Copyright owners and licensees of the encoded broadcast897  would also be included in the class of 
persons affected, as would copyright owners and their licensees of the copyright material in the 
broadcast. 
                                                            
894 See generally: R v Bull (1974) 131 CLR 203; R v Campbell (2008) 73 NSWLR 272; R v Toe [2010] SASC 39 
895 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  ss 132AH(1)(a)(vii), (3)(a)(vii), (5)(a)(vii), 132AI(2)(d) and (5)(d) 
896 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135AL  “channel provider” 
897 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 87 
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In s 135ASE(1)(a)(vii) the importation must occur with the intention of distributing the unauthorised 
decoder in preparation for, or in the course of, engaging in a prejudicial activity. In s 135ASF(1)(a)(iii) 
the distribution must be done with the intention of engaging in a prejudicial activity. In these 
subsections prejudicial distribution is a fault element, whereas its equivalent in s 132AI(2)(d) is a 
physical element consisting of a result. The distribution is not qualified by “to the extent” so a single 
act of distribution or the intention to commit a single act of distribution may be sufficient. 
[5.5] Section 135ASG: Making unauthorised decoder available online 
Section 135ASG [see Appendix at page 360] contains an offence for making an unauthorised decoder 
available online. As previously stated above, in the Part 3 offences distribution does not necessarily 
include distribution by a communication. Although the case of Chan-Nai Ming v HKSAR898 suggests 
that the ordinary meaning of distribution in the context of infringing copies may include distribute 
by communication, the case did not consider whether or not this included making available online. 
In the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) communicate includes making available online,899 but this refers to a 
work or other subject matter, including a performance or live performance, not a decoder device. A 
communication that was not a communication by making available online, may not be capable of 
being prosecuted under the offence in s 135ASF, and could not be prosecuted under s 135ASG. 
Section 132ASG consists of three physical elements:  
(1) the conduct of making the unauthorised decoder available online;  
(2) in the circumstance that it made available to the extent that it will prejudicially affect any of 
the interested parties listed;  
(3) with the result that it will be used to enable a person to gain access.  
The first physical element requires the fault element of intention; the second and third physical 
elements require a fault element of recklessness. The third element is identical to the element 
discussed above at paragraph [5.3.2], but although there is no physical object that can prevent the 
offence from functioning if it is seized, the problem remains if the decoder is removed from the 
hosting website. Also evidence would have to show that the decoder had been used by someone in 
or outside of Australia for the offence to be complete, which given the nature of the online 
environment, is likely to prove a difficult task. 
                                                            
898 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142; HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1; Chan Nai Ming v 
HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255 
899 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “communicate” 
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In contrast to the offences in ss 132ASE and 132ASF, s 132ASH(1)(e) requires that the decoder is 
made available online  to the extent it prejudicially affects an interested party. Again, there is little 
judicial authority900 to predict where this threshold will be set and it is likely to depend upon the 
facts of the case. There are a larger number of parties that are to be taken into consideration when 
assessing the prejudicial affect than in the distribution of infringing copies offences, so widening 
scope of potential victims. A de minimus level of making a decoder available online may therefore be 
not amount to an offence, in contrast to importation and distribution under ss 132ASE and 132ASF. 
[5.6] Section 135ASH: Making decoder available online for subscription 
broadcast 
Section 132ASH [see Appendix at page 360] contains an offence for making a decoder available 
online for a subscription broadcast. This offence differs from the offences discussed above in 
relation to unauthorised decoders. Here the decoder is required to have been supplied by, or with 
the authorisation of, the broadcaster of a subscription broadcast.901 This is a circumstance physical 
element so the corresponding fault element is recklessness.902  
The person must intentionally903 make the decoder available online,904 without the authorisation of 
the broadcaster.905 Again the correct application of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) is not clear, so 
this authorisation might either be:  
(1) a physical element of the offence, in which case the prosecution would have to prove that 
there was no authorisation and that the defendant was reckless as to that fact; or  
(2) it is a qualification to subsection (1)(b) in which case s 13.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) will apply and the defendant would have to discharge the evidential burden of proof if 
they claim the making online was authorised. 
The fourth element of the offence is the same as the element discussed above at paragraph [5.3.2]. 
There will be the same problems with the offence if the decoder is taken offline before it proved 
that the decoder has been used.  
                                                            
900 HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142; HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1; Chan Nai Ming v 
HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255 
901 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASH(1)(a) 
902 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
903 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
904 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASH(1)(b) 
905 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASH(1)(c) 
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The fifth element is essentially the same as the physical element in s 132ASG(1)(b), but the section is 
organised in a different manner and each group of interested parties is given its own subsection. 
This offence will be applicable where a person is using a decoder to stream programming across the 
internet with or without a commercial motive. It is not necessary for the person who gains access to 
the subscription broadcast to have control of the decoder, only that they have access. It is unlikely to 
apply where a single decoder is used by a single end user to gain access to programming, since the 
relevant interested parties will have been unaffected, at least financially, by the unauthorised 
making available of the decoder. There is no equivalent offence of making a decoder available online 
with the intention of trading or obtaining a profit or commercial advantage as there is in most other 
offences of this nature.906  
[5.7] Section 135ASI: Unauthorised access to subscription broadcast 
Section 135ASI [see Appendix at page 360] consists of an offence for accessing a subscription 
broadcast without authorisation. This offence is the only summary offence within the Division 3 
offences. The penalty for committing the offence is comparatively low for a summary offence in the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), as it consists only of a 60 penalty unit fine. The offence is also unusual in 
that the fault elements of the offence consist of intent, knowledge and recklessness, whereas the 
other summary offences discussed so far contain at least one fault element consisting of negligence. 
The first physical element of the offence is “a person does an act”. While this can cover a wide 
variety of conduct it will not include an omission, because the offence neither makes it so nor 
impliedly provides that the offence is committed by an omission to perform an act that by law there 
is a duty to perform.907 Since no fault element is stated, the act must be done intentionally.908  
The second element is a result element: that a person gains access in an intelligible form to a 
subscription broadcast or sounds or images from a subscription broadcast. The fault element for this 
physical element is recklessness.909 There are three express exceptions which negate liability under 
135ASI:  
(1) starting or playing of sounds or images in or from the broadcast on a device;910  
(2) listening to the sounds and/or seeing the images, in or from the broadcast;911 and  
                                                            
906 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AI, 132APE, 248PJ and 248QE 
907 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 4.3 
908 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
909 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
910 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(d)(i) 
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(3) distributing the sounds or images within a single dwelling that is occupied by a single 
household and is subject of an arrangement involving a member of the household and the 
broadcaster about authorisation of private access to the broadcast.912 
The act need not be the sole cause of the result. The offence allows the act to be done in 
conjunction with other unspecified acts which in concert cause the result.913 The exceptions 
however, are limited to acts which “consist merely of”914 one or more of the express exceptions. 
There can be no offence merely by switching on a decoder or if someone merely watches a 
broadcast were access has been gained by another person. The domestic exception allows people to 
arrange for broadcasts to be transmitted to more than one room of a dwelling through technological 
means. 
Recordings of encoded broadcasts in the form of a cinematographic film or sound recording915 are 
exempt from the offence, as are copies of those recordings.916 
The third physical element of the offence is that the access is not authorised by the broadcaster. In 
contrast to subsections, where it is unclear if the subsection is an element or a qualification, there is 
no doubt that this is an element to the offence because the fault element is specified as knowledge. 
The person must know that the access gained is not authorised by the broadcaster.  
Although the scope of this offence is quite wide due to the unspecified act, the high level of 
culpability required for the fault elements will ensure that a prosecution under this section will only 
succeed if people have taken deliberate acts to access broadcasts illegally. 
[5.8] Section 135ASJ: Causing unauthorised access to encoded broadcast 
Section 135ASJ [see Appendix at page 361] contains offences for causing unauthorised access to an 
encoded broadcast. These offences are the counterpart offences to s 132ASI, distinguished by the 
fact that the person who commits the act to gain access to an encoded broadcast can be a different 
actor to the person that does the act that causes that result. The act that causes the result must be 
the principle cause of the result, in contract to the offence in s 135ASI, where the act may cause the 
result in conjunction with other acts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
911 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(d)(ii) 
912 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(d)(iii) 
913 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(b) 
914 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(d) 
915 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(e)(i) 
916 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 135ASI(1)(e)(ii) 
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Subsection 135ASJ(1) requires the act to be done by way of trade. Subsection 135ASJ(2) requires the 
act to be done with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. Subsection 
135ASJ(3) is identical to the s 135ASI offence except that the result of the act requires that another 
person gains access to the encoded broadcast. All three are indictable offences. 
[6] Conclusion 
In common with the offences for dealing in infringing copies, most of the offences discussed above 
will be effective against commercial infringement, provided it can be detected and the risk of 
apprehension is perceived as significant enough. However, the threshold for criminal liability in some 
of the offences is set at a very low level and conduct that is not substantially harmful to copyright 
owners is nonetheless subject to the operation of the offences. 
The offences in Subdivision D for causing sound recordings or cinematographic films to be aired in 
public are most likely to be committed by licensees who have not obtained permission to air those 
works. The existence of a strict liability offence is of concern, since individuals who have 
inadvertently allowed their licence to lapse will need to rely on a defence of mistake of fact in order 
to escape criminal liability. The offences for causing a work to be performed are of greater concern, 
since there is a greater risk of performers attracting liability if the licensee has neglected to obtain or 
renew the appropriate licences for the performance.    
Efforts to curtail copyright infringement through the use of TPMs and ERMs, are likely to meet the 
same resistance by file sharers as the offences in Subdivisions B and C. The tools for unlocking TPMs 
and stripping ERMs can be shared illicitly as easily as infringing copies of works, and there is no 
documented social norm in the general population that sanctions the use of such tools. This is likely 
to be aggravated by the fact that many of the people who will use these tools will have paid for a 
legal copy of the work. The strict liability offences are yet again a cause for concern, particularly the 
ERM offences for distributing a work after the ERM information has been removed. While the 
equivalent non-commercial offence in s 132AI is qualified by a result element, this is absent in the 
ERM offence. This has the potential to criminalise quite innocent behaviour, and is therefore unlikely 
to be effective in all circumstances.  
The offences for unauthorised decoders and unauthorised access to broadcasts are unlikely to have 
very much application to domestic users. Possible exceptions would be making a decoder under 
s 132ASA and making an unauthorised decoder available online under s 132ASG. Software that can 
decode encrypted broadcasts may be made available online for non-commercial purposes, and it is 
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likely that the act of downloading such a decoder would constitute the making of a decoder under 
s 132ASA. 
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Chapter 7 Performers’ Protection 
[1] Introduction 
Part XIA of the Copyright Act 1968 contains a large number of offences for infringing the rights of 
performers to authorise the recording of their performances. These offences are primarily designed 
to prevent unauthorised recordings of concerts from being commercially exploited by “bootleggers”. 
Before the advent of digital technology and the internet, there was a significant trade in vinyl 
records consisting of unauthorised recording of live performances by popular musicians. Performers’ 
rights were implemented to prevent the exploitation of these performances by individuals 
unconnected to the performer.   
This chapter examines the various offences related to performers’ protection. While the performers’ 
protection offences contain many similarities to the offences to those previously discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, there are significant peculiarities to the regime of performers’ protection that 
requires detailed discussion.  
[2] Preliminaries 
There are a substantial number of preliminary sections that apply to the offences in Part XIA Division 
3. It is essential to understand the definitions of certain words and phrases that apply to Part XIA as 
reading the offences by simply interpreting them according to their ordinary meaning can result in 
considerable error. 
[2.1] Protection periods 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) makes reference to two protection periods: a 20-year protection 
period and a 50-year protection period.917 Both protection periods begin on the day when the 
performance was given and end at the end of either 20 or 50 years after the calendar year in which 
the performance was given. Thus, the protection periods for performance given on 1 January 2000 
would commence at 12am on 1 January 2000 and end at 12am on 2 January 2020 and 12am on 2 
January 2050. 
                                                            
917 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1) 
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The 20-year protection period applies to both sound recordings and cinematographic films, which 
includes the sound-track associated with the film. Under certain offence sections918 of Part XIA 
however, sound recordings alone are given the benefit of the 50-year protection period.919 
[2.2] Recordings and exempt recordings 
All of the offences in Division 3 make reference to “recordings”. A “recording” is defined as “a sound 
recording or cinematograph film, other than an exempt recording.”920 Exempt recordings are given 
an extensive definition in s 248(1) detailing circumstances which recordings are classified as exempt 
recordings. Some of the more broadly applicable exempt recordings include: indirect 
cinematographic film of performances made solely for the purpose of private and domestic use by 
the person who made it;921 indirect cinematographic films or sound recordings made in a domestic 
premises from a broadcast for the purpose of time shifting;922 various forms of fair dealing;923 
research,924 limited to scientific research in the case of indirect cinematographic films;925 and 
recordings made by a person who reasonably believe authority has been given, through fraud or 
innocent misrepresentation.926 
Under certain circumstances almost all exempt recordings may cease to be exempt recordings,927 so 
further dealing with them without authority may cause an offence to be committed. An exemption 
for judicial proceedings or giving professional legal advice928 does not lose its status through 
subsequent dealings. 
[2.3] Direct and indirect recordings 
A direct recording of a performance means a recording made directly from a live performance. An 
indirect recording means a recording made from a communication of a performance. 
Communication is not defined for the purposes of Part XIA, but would certainly include a broadcast 
                                                            
918 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248PA, 248PB, 248PE, 248PF, 248PG, 248PI, 248PJ, 248PK, 248PL and 248PM 
919 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248CA 
920 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1) 
921 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(a) 
922 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(aaa) 
923 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(fa) 
924 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248(1)(aa) and (b) 
925 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(b) 
926 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(j) 
927 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248C 
928 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(g) 
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which is defined in s 10(1) as “a communication to the public delivered by a broadcasting service 
within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992.”929 
[2.4] Part XIA performances and qualifying persons 
A performance is given a limited definition for the purposes of Part IXA. The performance must be a 
live performance given in Australia or one given overseas by one or more qualified persons, but the 
presence of an audience is not required.930 This would mean a live performance given in a television 
studio for broadcast would be included. “Live performance” is not defined and it will be a matter of 
judicial interpretation to render its ordinary meaning. Improvised performances are included as 
performance of dramatic and musical works. 
The performance must have been given by one or more qualified persons, which is defined as “an 
Australian citizen or a person resident in Australia”.931 “Resident” is not defined and its meaning can 
vary according to context.  
Participation in a performance as a member of the public is not taken to be a performance932 under 
Part XIA (“a Part XIA performance”). For example, a performance of a magic act by a non-resident 
foreign magician which is performed overseas will not be a Part XIA performance simply because the 
audience member he saws in half is an Australian citizen.  
Performances of sporting activities are not taken to be Part XIA performances. The line drawn 
between sport and dance can sometimes be blurred in the case of shows consisting of martial arts 
performances, ice skating, and synchronised swimming. Cases where these are held out as 
performances are likely to be contentious.  
Performances of literary, dramatic or musical works which are given as instruction by a teacher to 
students, or otherwise meeting the requirements of s 28(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth),933 are 
                                                            
929 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) 
930 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1) 
931 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1) 
932 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(2)(c) 
933 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 28(1) (“(1) Where a literary, dramatic or musical work: (a) is performed in class, 
or otherwise in the presence of an audience; and (b) is so performed by a teacher in the course of giving 
educational instruction, not being instruction given for profit, or by a student in the course of receiving such 
instruction; the performance shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed not to be a performance in public if 
the audience is limited to persons who are taking part in the instruction or are otherwise directly connected 
with the place where the instruction is given.”) 
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not Part XIA performances,934 nor is a reading, recital or delivery of any item of news and 
information.935 
[3] Part XIA Division 3 Subdivision A – General Offences 
The offences in this subdivision are applicable to all acts done in Australia on or after the 
commencement of the subdivision,936 without limitation on the date of the performance. The 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 received Royal Assent on 11 December 2006, so the oldest 
recordings to which Subdivision A could be applied would be indirect recordings of performances 
made on 11 December 1956, for an offence committed on the day of commencement. It is 
questionable however, whether or not the offences in Subdivision A are applicable to sound 
recordings made before 1 July 1995, since these recordings are the subject of a separate subdivision 
of offences. This is discussed below at paragraph [4]. 
The standard geographical jurisdiction is modified by s 248P(1) in the same manner as s 132AB, as 
discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [2.2],. 
[3.1] Section 248PA: Unauthorised direct recording during the protection 
period 
Section 248PA [see Appendix at page 367] contains offences for making an unauthorised direct 
recording. The offences under this section consist of an indictable offence and a summary offence, 
differentiated by the fault element for the circumstance “the recording is made without the 
authority of the performer”. In the indictable offence the fault element is recklessness, in the 
summary offence the fault element is negligence. 
[3.1.1] “the person makes a direct recording of a performance” 
This element is a conduct element without a stated fault element, so the fault element is intention 
for both the indictable and summary offences.937 Therefore recording a performance by accidently 
leaving a recording device switched on would not satisfy this element of the offence.  
As stated above at paragraph [2.2], only indirect cinematographic films are capable of being exempt 
recordings if they are used for private and domestic use,938 so the recording of a concert by an 
                                                            
934 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(2)(a) 
935 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(2)(b) 
936 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248P 
937 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
938 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)(a) 
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audience member using a mobile telephone would not be an exempt recording, even if the 
recording was made solely for the purpose of the private and domestic use of the person who made 
it. While this type of conduct is extremely common939 and is probably considered harmless by many 
people, this does create a risk of harm to the interests of professional performers. However, the 
offence is drafted so widely that many innocent and harmless activities can amount to an offence. 
One example is a street performance. There is no definition or limitation in Part XIA that would 
exclude such a performance. For example, if a person is performing a dance940 in a public place such 
as a pedestrianised street in a city, the dance would meet the definition of performance. No regard 
is taken of the fact that there has been no charge for admittance, or that the dance is not performed 
on a stage with no reasonable expectation of privacy. Even a person is simply an extrovert dancing in 
street oblivious to their “audience” would qualify as a performance under the definition. Directly 
recording such a “performance” intentionally would satisfy the physical and fault elements of the 
offence. 
Another example is a school nativity play.941 These are typically attended by parents watching their 
very young children perform just before Christmas. 942 Many parents wish to capture these 
performances for posterity, and this has become easier for them to do so through the availability of 
ever cheaper digital video cameras. Under this section of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) however, this 
conduct becomes an indictable offence.  
There is an exemption for the recording of a performance in schools due to the operation of 
s 248(2)(a). This states that a performance referred to in s 28(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) is 
not taken to be a performance for the purposes of Part XIA. Subsection 28(1) states: 
“Where a literary, dramatic or musical work: (a) is performed in class, or otherwise in the 
presence of an audience; and (b) is so performed by a teacher in the course of giving 
educational instruction, not being instruction given for profit, or by a student in the course 
of receiving such instruction; the performance shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed 
not to be a performance in public if the audience is limited to persons who are taking part in 
the instruction or are otherwise directly connected with the place where the instruction is 
given.” 
                                                            
939 One only needs to briefly search a site such as YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/ Accessed 18 March 
2011) to find examples.  
940 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248(1)  performance (d) 
941 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nativity_play (Accessed 18 March 2011) 
942 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nativity_play (Accessed 18 March 2011) 
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A nativity play might conceivably be held to be “in the course of giving educational instruction” and 
the parents “otherwise directly connected with the place [of instruction]”. While the first 
assumption may be true, s 28(3) states: 
“For the purposes of this section, a person shall not be taken to be directly connected with a 
place where instruction is given by reason only that he or she is a parent or guardian of a 
student who receives instruction at that place.” 
This serves as an example of the harm that can be caused to the community through the over 
extension of private rights. It is highly improbable that a member of law enforcement would arrest a 
parent at their children’s nativity play, due to the obscurity of the offence and the outrage that it 
would cause. However, the possibility of arrest is not the real harm that this offence would cause. 
The real harm is the chilling effect that this could cause in schools, where caution against allowing 
offences to be committed on school property would probably overwhelm the desire to allow parents 
to film their children’s performance. Since parents would be on the school property as licensees, 
schools would be within their rights to ask parents not to film as a condition of entry. Such 
conditions have been reported to have been implemented in the past,943 though not for the reasons 
currently under discussion. 
The distinction between indirect and direct recording produces strange outcomes where there is an 
intervening communication. A different offence section exists for communicating a performance in 
s 248PC, discussed below at paragraph [3.3]. If A connected a video camera to the internet and 
communicated the performance to B and B makes a recording of the communication, the recording 
is more likely to meet the definition of an indirect recording: 
“indirect, in relation to a sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance, means 
made from a communication of the performance.” 
                                                            
943 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1414637/Parents-barred-from-filming-nativity-play.html 
(Accessed 18 March 2011); http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fury+as+teachers+ban+play+filming.-a0110938359 
(Accessed 18 March 2011); http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/2588845.stm (Accessed 18 March 
2011); http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/2579137.stm (Accessed 18 March 2011); 
http://menmedia.co.uk/rochdaleobserver/news/s/345/345576_parents_banned_from_filming_nativity_show.
html (Accessed 18 March 2011); http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23378468-greedy-schools-ban-
nativity-play-pictures-then-charge-17-for-dvds.do (Accessed 18 March 2011); 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1336139/Father-Lee-Ingram-broke-photo-ban-school-play-
threatened-arrest.html (Accessed 18 March 2011) 
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There is no express or implied requirement that the communication is an authorised 
communication. All A and B have essentially done is separate the camera from the recording device. 
The recording itself would be identical if the recording device was attached to the camera.  
The implication of this is that an indirect cinematographic film is not a Part XIA recording if it is made 
solely for the purpose of private and domestic use. Therefore B would not be guilty of an offence, 
assuming he did not counsel, procure, aid or abet A in the communication. The court could not order 
the recording to be destroyed or delivered up under s 248T even if B had assisted A in the 
commission of the offence under s 248PC since it would not be a “recording” recognised by Part XIA. 
It is not clear how far the separation between camera or microphone and the recording device 
needs to be since “communicate” can mean “electronically transmit (whether over a path, or 
combination of paths, provided by a material substance)”.944 It has yet to be determined just how 
short the path needs to be before it is no longer considered a communication, and is considered to 
be attached to the camera or microphone. 
[3.1.2] “the recording is made during the protection period of the performance” 
This is a physical element that consists of a circumstance. Since an express fault element is absent, 
once again s 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) applies, and the fault element is recklessness.945 
A prosecutor must prove that the recording was made during the protection period. In the case of a 
cinematographic film of the performance including the sound-track, the protection period is the 20 
year protection period. For a sound recording it is the 50 year protection period.  
Quite obviously the making of a direct recording of a performance will by its nature occur during 
either of these protection periods. The protection period is taken to have begun on the day the 
performance is given, so it would be impossible to make a direct recording either before or after 
either protection period. 
The prosecution must prove that the person was aware there was a substantial risk that the 
recording would be made during the protection period of the performance and in all the 
circumstances it was unjustified to take that risk. It is not necessary to show that a defendant was 
aware that such a thing as a protection period exists, only that the recording was made during the 
20 or 50 year period of time. 
                                                            
944 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1)  “communicate” 
945 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
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[3.1.3] “the recording is made without the authority of the performer” 
Variations of this element are common throughout the offences in Part XIA. The type of authority 
required is not stated so it must be assumed that express, implied and conditional authority are all 
acceptable. Where there is more than one performer, authority is not taken to have been given if a 
single performer has not given authority.946 In the example of the nativity play given above at 
paragraph [3.1.1], this would mean the parents would require the authority of each of the children 
in the performance to escape this element of the offence. It is fairly clear that permission must be 
given prior to the performance, since retrospective permission would not be contemporary with the 
conduct element of the offence and the offence would have been complete before permission was 
given. 
In s 248PA(1)(c) the fault element for the indictable offence is recklessness, and in s 248PA(3) it is 
negligence. As previously discussed, these standards of culpability are higher than civil negligence. 
Therefore it would be unlikely that the reasonable belief of fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentations that a performer has authorised a recording of the performance, which makes 
the recording an exempt recording947 could be even reach the standard of criminal negligence, let 
alone reckless. 
[3.2] Section 248PB: Unauthorised indirect recording during protection 
period 
Section 248PB [see Appendix at page 368] contains offences for making unauthorised indirect 
recordings during the protection period. This offence section is identical to s 248PA apart from the 
conduct element of the offence where a direct recording is replaced by an indirect recording, and 
the fact that a strict liability offence is included. 
[3.2.1] “the person makes an indirect recording of a performance” 
While the difference in language in the conduct element subsection of this offence only differs 
slightly from the previous offence, the practical difference in application is far larger. There are many 
more exempt recordings which are indirect recording than direct recordings. Among these 
exemptions for indirect recordings are probably the most common exemptions that will be utilised: 
the private and domestic use exemptions.948 These insulate people who are using a video or sound 
                                                            
946 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(3)(c) 
947 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(1)(j) 
948 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248A(1)(a) and (aaa) 
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recorder to record broadcasts for their own use from committing the offence. The exempt indirect 
recordings are quite narrowly drawn.  
An indirect cinematographic film is exempt if it is made solely for the purpose of the private and 
domestic use of the person who made it. If the recording is made for any of the purposes listed in 
s 248D, it is not taken to be have been made for private or domestic use. 949 An exempt 
cinematographic film recording however, ceases to be an exempt recording if it is used for any other 
purpose without the authority of the performer.950 This does not mean that the recording is taken 
never to have been exempt as is the case in certain circumstances with infringing copies,951 so once 
the recording has been made it will not be possible for the offence to be committed retrospectively 
due to the fact that its exempt status has ceased. While there are a number of offences in Part XIA 
that cover a variety of conduct, they by no means cover all the other possible purposes for which a 
recording may be used and lose its exempt status. 
[3.2.2] Defence 
While a recording is an exempt recording for private and domestic use only for certain recording and 
in certain circumstances, a more expansive defence for private and domestic use is available in 
s 248PB(7). The type of recording is not specified, so it applies equally to cinematographic film and 
sound recordings. Any additional qualifying circumstances required for the recording to be exempt, 
such as those in s 248(1)(aaa), are not required for the defence. The defence bears the evidential 
burden of proof if it wishes to use the defence, as it would if it wanted the recording to be 
considered an exempt recording.952 
[3.3] Section 248PC: Unauthorised communication to public during 20-year 
protection period 
Section 248PC [see Appendix at page 369] contains offences for making unauthorised 
communications of performances to the public within the protection period. There are two offences 
under this section, an indictable offence and a summary offence, both of which contain four physical 
elements consisting of one conduct element and three circumstance elements. The summary 
offence is only distinguished from the indictable offence by the fault element for one of the 
circumstance elements being negligence rather than recklessness. 
                                                            
949 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248D 
950 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248C(2) 
951 See Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.1] 
952 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 13.3(3) 
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[3.3.1] “the person communicates a performance to the public” 
In both offences the fault element for this physical element is not given by the section, so the fault 
element is intention.953 The physical element requires a person to communicate a performance. The 
performance can be made directly from the live performance, or a recording of the performance. 954  
As noted in Chapter 6 at paragraph [4.3], the definition of communicate is expansive and can include 
most types of electronic transmission including making available online. In these offences the 
communication must be to the public, so any private communication is excluded. The distinction 
between a communication to the public and a communication and any other type of communication 
is unclear. However it is likely that courts will seek guidance from the cases concerning the public 
performance right discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.5.3]. 
[3.3.2] “during the 20-year protection period” 
These offences are excluded from the operation of s 248CA, so both cinematographic films and 
sound recording are only protected for a 20-year period. This means that recordings that were made 
20 years after the performance are able to be communicated without attracting criminal liability 
under this section. However, this does not mean that other offences do not apply. 
[3.3.3] “without the authority of the performer” 
The summary offence is distinguished from the indictable offence by the fault element for this 
physical element. It is a circumstance element and the indictable offence does not state a fault 
element,955 so the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) makes the fault element recklessness.956 The 
summary offence states that the fault element is negligence.957 
[3.3.4] “the communication is made either directly from the live performance or from an 
unauthorised recording of the live performance” 
This element contains two possibilities for the source of the communication. Where the 
communication consists of a recording of a performance, the recording must be an unauthorised 
recording.958 This means that broadcasters would not criminally liable where the performer has 
authorised the recording of the performance, but has not authorised the broadcasting of the 
performance. 
                                                            
953 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
954 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248PC(1)(d) and (3)(d) 
955 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PC(1)(c) 
956 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
957 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PC(3)(c) 
958 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248PC(1)(d), (3)(d), 248PC(7) 
Chapter 7 
 
191 
[3.4] Section 248PD: Playing unauthorised recording publicly during 20-
year protection period 
Section 248PD [see Appendix at page 370] contains offences for playing an unauthorised recording 
in public during the 20 year protection period. It consists of two offences: an indictable offence and 
a summary offence distinguished by the culpability of the person in relation to their assessment of 
the authorisation of the recording. 
[3.4.1] “causes a recording of a performance to be seen or heard in public” 
This element of the offences is virtually identical to the elements found in ss 132AN and 132AO, 
discussed in Chapter 6 at paragraphs [2.1.2] and [2.2.2]. There needs to be an underlying conduct 
that causes the recording to be seen or heard in public, but this cannot be an omission. The fault 
element in both offences for this element is intention. 
The performer cannot authorise the recording to be seen or heard in public, since the conduct does 
not need to be done without their authority. If a performer is made aware of an unauthorised 
recording and wants to make use of it, perhaps for a documentary, they cannot authorise the 
recording to be seen or heard in public. If performers themselves cause the recording to be seen or 
heard in public they too may be liable under one of the offences. 
[3.4.2] “the recording is seen or heard in public during the 20-year protection period” 
Once again, s 248CA does not apply to this section, so the protection period is always limited to 20-
years. 
[3.4.3] “the recording is unauthorised” 
The indictable and summary offences are differentiated by the fault element for this physical 
element. The fault element in the indictable offence is recklessness and negligence in the summary 
offence. “Unauthorised” is defined in s 248A(1) as “made without the authority of the performer”.959 
Once a recording is made it cannot become an authorised recording at through the subsequent 
permission of the performer. 
[3.5] Section 248PE: Possessing equipment to make or copy unauthorised 
recording 
Section 248PE [see Appendix at page 370] contains offence for the possession used to make or copy 
an unauthorised recording. The offences in this section are similar to the offence in s 132AL for 
                                                            
959 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(1)  “unauthorised” 
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possessing a device for making an infringing copy, and prosecutors might be faced with a choice of 
which section under which to prosecute. A recording does not have to be actually brought into 
existence for the offence to be committed, just as under s 132AL an infringing copy does not have to 
be brought into existence. This section however, does not contain a strict liability offence and both 
the indictable and summary offences require a fairly high standard of culpability for the offence to 
be committed. 
[3.5.1] “a person possesses a plate or recording equipment” 
As previously discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.8.1], being in possession of something under 
the criminal law does not rely on a technical interpretation of the civil law of property. In contrast to 
s 132AL, the thing possessed under s 248 is limited to a plate960 or recording device. “Recording 
device” is not defined in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), so it is unclear if this will be limited to 
specialised devices that are only capable of recording or more general devices with that capability, 
such as mobile telephones. The latter is more likely given the purposive approach to interpretation. 
In the indictable offence the possession must be accompanied by an intention that the plate or 
recording equipment is to be used for either making:  
(1) an unauthorised recording of a performance;961 or  
(2) a copy of an unauthorised recording of a performance.962  
The summary offence alters this somewhat, in order to lower the culpability of the offence. Under 
the summary offence the conduct physical element is the possession of a plate or recording 
equipment with the fault element of intention. This must be done in the circumstances that the 
plate or recording equipment will be used for:  
(1) making a recording of a performance; or  
(2) a copy of an unauthorised recording of a performance 
With the result that:  
(1) the recording made will be an unauthorised copy; or  
(2) the recording to be copied is an unauthorised copy.  
                                                            
960 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) (“plate includes a stereotype, stone, block, mould, matrix, transfer, 
negative or other similar appliance.”) 
961 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PE(1)(a)(i) 
962 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PE(1)(a)(ii) 
Chapter 7 
 
193 
The fault element for the physical element that consists of a circumstance is recklessness,963 and the 
fault element for the physical element that consists of a result is negligence. 
This quite convoluted series of circumstances and results is necessary to allow the culpability of the 
offence to be lowered within the framework of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Once again 
however, the circumstance and result elements rely on future events. Unless these events have 
actually occurred, these “physical” elements can only exist in the mind of the person in possession of 
the plate or recording equipment. 
It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove which particular recording or performance is 
intended, or will be, recorded or copied with the device.964 This could prove to be problematic if 
there is a difference in protection periods for multiple performances. 
[3.5.2] “the possession occurs during the protection period of the performance” 
Section 248CA applies to this section, so the protection period for sound recordings of performances 
is 50 years and the protection period for cinematographic films of performances is 20 years. 
[3.6] Section 248PF: Copying unauthorised recording 
Section 248PF [see Appendix at page 371] contains offences for copying unauthorised recordings. 
The section contains three offences which are tiered according to culpability. They consist of three 
physical elements:  
(1) making a copy of a recording of a performance;  
(2)  within the protection period; and  
(3)  the recording is an unauthorised recording.  
As previously discussed above, if a direct or indirect recording is made without the authority of the 
performer it is an unauthorised recording, unless one of the exemptions applies in which case the 
recording is not a recording for the purposes of Part XIA. The exempt status can survive copying, but 
only if the copy is made for certain specific purposes.965  
Under certain conditions original recordings or copies can lose their exempt status966 but s 248PF 
will only apply to those copies once the exempt status has been extinguished. Therefore if someone 
                                                            
963 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PE(7) 
964 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PE(8) 
965 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 248A(1)(ja),(k),(m),(n),(p) 
966 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248C 
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has an exempt recording and makes a copy for a non-exempt purpose, they will not be liable under 
this offence but be liabile under s 248PG discussed below at paragraph [3.7]. 
Section 248CA applies to this section, so the length of the protection period is determined by the 
type of recording. 
In the indictable and summary offences the fault element for the making of a copy of a recording is 
intent and the fault element for the circumstance that the copy is made within the protection period 
is recklessness. The fault element for the circumstance element, that the recording is unauthorised, 
is recklessness in the indictable offence and negligence in the summary offence. The strict liability 
offence obviously does not contain any fault elements. 
[3.7] Section 248PG: Unauthorised copying of exempt recording 
Section 248PG [see Appendix at page 372] contains offences for the unauthorised copying of exempt 
recordings. The offences in s 248PF discussed above, only apply to unauthorised recordings and will 
not apply to exempt recordings unless the purpose for which the exempt recording is made is 
altered before the copy is made. The offences under s 248PG cover these gaps. 
The offences are structured in a similar manner to s 248PF. However there is no requirement for the 
recording to be an unauthorised recording and the copy must be made without the authority of the 
performer. Additionally there is a result physical element that the copy is not an exempt copy, and a 
circumstance physical element that the “recording” is an exempt recording. This circumstance 
element twists the definitions somewhat, since a “recording” for the purposes of Part XIA is defined 
as a sound recording or cinematographic film except an exempt recording.967 For the purposes of 
clarity the conduct element would have been better drafted as: “the person makes a copy of an 
exempt recording of a performance”. However, this would have attracted a higher level of culpability 
in the fault element, intention rather than recklessness, and would appear to be the only logical 
reason why this solution was avoided. Nonetheless, it is clear that the intention of the legislature 
was that a reference to recording in this section can include an exempt recording and this 
interpretation is required for the section to function. 
The circumstance and fault elements of the indictable and summary offences are illustrated in 
Table 4 below. 
                                                            
967 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(1) 
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Table 4 Fault Elements in s 248PG 
Physical Elements (all offences) Indictable offence fault elements Summary offence fault elements 
“the person makes a copy of a 
recording of a performance” 
Intention Intention 
“the copy is made during the 
protection period of the 
performance” 
Recklessness Recklessness 
“the copy is made without the 
authority of the performer” 
Recklessness Negligence 
“the recording is an exempt 
recording” 
Recklessness Recklessness 
“the copy is not an exempt 
recording” 
Recklessness Negligence 
 
Section 248CA applies to this section, so the length of the protection period differs between sound 
recordings and cinematographic films. 
[3.8] Section 248PH: Unauthorised copying of authorised sound recording  
Section 248PH [see Appendix at page 373] contains offences for the unauthorised copying of 
authorised sound recordings for the use in sound-tracks. The word “sound-track” is linked to 
cinematographic films by the definitions given in ss 10(1) and 248A of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth): 
“sound-track, in relation to in relation to visual images forming part of a cinematograph film, 
means: (a) the part of any article or thing, being an article or thing in which those visual 
images are embodied, in which sounds are embodied; or (b) a disc, tape or other device in 
which sounds are embodied and which is made available by the maker of the film for use in 
conjunction with the article or thing in which those visual images are embodied.”968 
“cinematograph film includes an article in which visual images are embodied and which is 
capable of being used to show those images as a moving picture, and a sound-track 
associated with those images.” 
                                                            
968 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1) 
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If a sound recording is not embodied in part of an article or thing that embodies visual images or is 
embodied separately for use in conjunction with embodied visual images, the sound recording will 
simply be another sound recording. 
The offences consist of five physical and fault elements, except for the strict liability offence which 
obviously contains no fault elements. These elements are illustrated in Table 5 below: 
Table 5 Physical and Fault Elements in s 248PH 
Physical Elements (indictable and summary offences) Indictable offence fault 
elements 
Summary offence fault 
elements 
“the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a 
performance” 
Intention that the copy 
be used in a sound-
track 
Intention that the copy 
be used in a sound-track 
“the copy is made during the 20-year protection period 
of the performance” 
Recklessness Recklessness 
“the copy is made without the authority of the 
performer” 
Recklessness Negligence 
“the sound recording is an authorised recording” Recklessness Recklessness 
“the making of the sound recording was not authorised 
for the purpose of use in that or any other sound-track” 
Recklessness Negligence 
 
The strict liability offence alters the first element of the offence slightly, since it cannot contain a 
fault element: “intending that the copy be used in a sound-track” becomes “in preparation for use in 
a sound-track”. Once again, this physical element will be difficult to prove if the preparation only 
exists inside the mind of the person making the copy. 
[3.8.1] “the sound recording is an authorised sound recording”; “the making of the sound 
recording was not authorised for the purpose of use in that or any other soundtrack” 
The combination of these elements of the offence makes the scope of this offence considerably 
narrow. Only authorised recording are covered under the scope of this offence, so where a sound 
recording is an unauthorised recording, the correct section under which to prosecute would be 
s 248PF, discussed above at paragraph [3.6].  
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Exempt recordings do not fall under the scope of this offence, so only where the performer has 
given authority for the sound recording to be made will this offence apply. Further, if the authority 
was given for the sound recording of a performance to be used in a particular sound-track, the use of 
the sound recording for an alternative sound-track would not satisfy the fifth element of the 
offence. 
If it is accepted that conditional authorisation can exist for the purposes of the offences in Part XIA, 
it is difficult to imagine exactly when this offence will be capable of being prosecuted. It is highly 
unlikely that a performer will give carte blanche authorisation for sound recording of a performance 
to be made, and only in such unusual circumstances is it possible for these offences apply. 
[3.9] Section 248PI: Selling etc. unauthorised recording 
Section 248PI [see Appendix at page 374] contains offences for commercial dealings in an 
unauthorised recording. It contains three offences tiered by culpability. All of the offences consist of 
three physical elements, with corresponding fault elements for the indictable and summary 
offences. The first element is the doing of an act with a recording of a performance, either:  
(1) selling;  
(2) letting for hire; or  
(3) by way of trade offering or exposing for sale or hire.  
These concepts are discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.2.4], [4.2.5], [4.4.2] and [4.4.1]. The fault 
element for this element is intention in both the indictable and summary offences.969 The act must 
be done within the protection period of the performance and since s 248CA applies to this 
section, 970  this can either be 20 or 50 years depending on whether the recording is a 
cinematographic film or a sound recording. The fault element for this physical element is 
recklessness.971 The recording must be an unauthorised recording. The fault element for this 
circumstance element is recklessness972 in the indictable offence and negligence in the summary 
offence.973 
                                                            
969 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
970 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248CA 
971 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
972 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
973 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248PI(3)(c) 
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[3.9.1] “a recording of a performance”  
The offences only apply to recordings, and as discussed above at paragraph [2.2], a recording is not a 
record if it is an exempt recording. This might suggest that the offences in this section do not apply 
to recordings which are exempt recordings. However, an exempt recording may lose its status as an 
exempt recording if it is used for a purpose for which it is made under s 248C.974  
This presents two problems.  It is unclear whether a sale or other dealing will extinguish the exempt 
status at all, and if it does, ascertaining the exact point in time when the exempt status of the 
recording is extinguished. The solution is indicated by closely reading the definitions of exempt 
recordings.  
Under subsection (a) of exempt recording975 for instance, an indirect cinematographic film is exempt 
if it is made solely for the private and domestic use of the person who made it. One view might be 
that part of the private and domestic use of a person is the ability to sell the recording, especially 
through a private sale. The competing view would be that this is not a private and domestic use and 
selling the recording extinguishes its exempt status.  
Section 248D states that a cinematographic film is not taken as being made for the private and 
domestic use of the person who made it if it is made of the purposes of selling it, letting it for hire, or 
by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale.976 While this is not exactly on point, since a recording 
made for private and domestic use can subsequently be sold, it does indicate that the intention of 
the legislature was that a sale does not constitute part of private and domestic use. Even if this is 
accepted as the better view, the point at which the exempt status is extinguished will be crucial and 
it is unclear if this is before the sale, at the point of sale or after the sale. 
Under subsection (d) of exempt recordings,977 an indirect  cinematographic film made by, or on 
behalf of, the body administering an institute assisting persons with a print disability, solely for the 
purpose of the provision, whether by the institution or otherwise, of assistance to persons with a 
print disability is an exempt recording. It is quite possible that such a recording could survive a sale 
or one of the other acts with its exempt status intact. The exemption does not expressly or impliedly 
require the provision of the recording to be made without some sort of payment. It certainly 
                                                            
974 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248C 
975 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248CA(1)  exempt recording, (a) 
976 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248D 
977 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248A(1)  exempt recording, (d) 
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contemplates that the recording will be distributed, which is of considerable importance for s 248PJ 
discussed below at paragraph [3.10]. 
Whether an exempt recording can be sold, let for hire, etc. will depend on a judicial interpretation of 
s 248C in relation to particular exemptions and it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine every 
possible permutation.  
[3.10] Section 248PJ: Distributing unauthorised recording  
Section 248PJ [see Appendix at page 375] contains offences for the distribution of unauthorised 
recordings within the protection period. This section consists of five offences. There are two 
indictable offences, two summary offences and one strict liability offence. The section falls under the 
operation of s 248CA, so different protection periods apply to different types of performances. The 
structure of the section is very similar to s 132AI discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.7]. However, 
in the “commercial” offences under s 248PJ the fault element is limited to the intention of trading, 
and disregards an intention to obtain a commercial advantage or profit.  
In the “non-commercial” offences the result that the distribution prejudicially affects the interests of 
the performer is limited to financial interests rather than a general interest as it is in s 132AE. 
Additionally, the s 248PJ non-commercial offences do not contain the words “to the extent that”, 
which would suggest that the possible de minimis level of distribution in s 132AI is absent in these 
offences.  
The concepts of distribution and prejudicial affect are discussed at in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.7.1] 
and [4.7.3]. In common with the strict liability offence in s 132AI, the conduct element of this 
offence alters to “in preparation for, or in the course of trading”. Once again it is difficult to 
distinguish intention from “in preparation for”. 
Section 248CA applies to this section978 so the protection period will vary. The distribution must 
occur within the protection period for the offence to be committed. 
The recording must be an unauthorised recording and this will present the similar interpretation 
problems in relation to exempt recordings discussed above at paragraph [3.9.1]. 
                                                            
978 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248CA(4)(h) 
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[3.11] Section 248PK: Commercial possession or import of unauthorised 
recording 
Section 248PK [see Appendix at page 377] contains offences for the possession or import of 
unauthorised records. It consists of three tiered offences. Each offence comprises of three physical 
elements:  
(1) the conduct of possessing or importing into Australia a recording of a performance;  
(2) the circumstance that the possession or import occurs during the protection period; and  
(3) the circumstance that the recording is an unauthorised recording.  
The first physical element in the strict liability of offence is appended by the a requirement that the 
possession or import of the recording is done in preparation for, or in the course of either:  
(1) selling it;  
(2) letting it for hire;  
(3) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale; or  
(4) distributing it for the purpose of trade or to an extent it will affect prejudicially the financial 
interests of the performer.  
In the indictable and summary offences, these four acts form the fault element of intention for the 
first physical element, i.e. the possession or import must be accompanied by an intention to do any 
of those four acts with the recording.  
The concepts of importation and possession in relation to infringing copies are discussed in Chapter 
5 at paragraphs [4.6] and [4.8]. The meanings of selling, letting for hire, and by way of trade offering 
or exposing for sale are also discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.2.4], [4.2.5] and [4.4]. 
Distribution is discussed above at paragraph [3.10] and in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.7]. 
Section 248CA applies to this section,979 so the protection period will vary according to the type of 
recording imported or possessed. 
The fault element for the third physical element, that the recording is unauthorised, is different for 
the indictable offence and the summary offence and is in fact the only distinguishing point between 
the two. In the indictable offence the fault element is recklessness, through the application of s 5.6 
                                                            
979 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248CA(4)(i) 
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(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), and the fault element of the summary offence is stated in 
the offence as being negligence. 
[3.12] Section 248PL: Exhibiting unauthorised recording in public by way of 
trade 
Section 248PL [see Appendix at page 378] contains offences for publically exhibiting unauthorised 
recordings for the purposes of trade. This section is structured in a similar manner to s 248PK 
discussed above and also consists of three tiered offences. The third physical element, that the 
recording is unauthorised, is the same in all the offences and the corresponding fault elements in the 
indictable and summary offences are both recklessness.  
The second physical element is only altered by the requirement that the exhibition occurs within the 
protection period rather than the possession or import in s 248PK. Again the fault element is 
recklessness for both the indictable and summary offences. The protection period is determined by 
the type of recording exhibited through s 248CA(j). The major point of difference in these offences 
are the conduct elements contained in ss 248PL(1)(a), (3)(a) and 5(a). 
However, “conduct element” may be a misnomer since it is not entirely clear whether or not this 
“conduct element” actually consists of a single conduct element or a conduct element, “exhibiting a 
recording” and two circumstance elements, “by way of trade” and “in public”. 
This is obviously important since the fault element is unstated and would therefore be intention if it 
is taken as a single conduct element,980 but would be intention and recklessness981 if the relevant 
subsections are taken to be a conduct element and two circumstance elements.  
Although these are contained within single subsections, the better view is that this conduct element 
is in fact a conduct element and two circumstance elements. The concepts of “by way of trade”, 
“exhibit” and “in public” are discussed at length in Chapter 5 at paragraphs [4.4.2], [4.5.1] and [4.5.2] 
respectively. 
[3.13] Section 248PM: Importing unauthorised recording for exhibition by 
way of trade 
Section 248PM [see Appendix at page 379] consists of offences for importing unauthorised 
recordings for the purpose of public exhibition by way of trade. The offences contained in s 248PM 
                                                            
980 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(1) 
981 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
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are closely related to s 248PL. These offences penalise the importing of recordings prior to engaging 
in the conduct prohibited by s 248PL. As such the conduct element in these offences is clearly 
importing a recording into Australia. The concept of importation is discussed in Chapter 5 at 
paragraphs [4.6.2]. In the indictable and summary offences the fault element for the importation is 
the same as the conduct element and related circumstance elements in s 248PM, i.e. an intention to 
exhibit the recording in public by way of trade. The strict liability offence modifies the language to 
once again attempt to circumvent a requirement for a fault element and maintain the offence as one 
of complete strict liability. In common with many of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
“with the intention of” is therefore altered to “in preparation for”. In reality this alteration is largely 
cosmetic, since a prosecutor will still need to prove that the conduct was done as a preparatory act, 
and it is difficult to see how this can be done without drawing inference from the actions of an 
accused person, in precisely the same manner as one would need to do in order to prove intention. 
Nonetheless, in terms of the application of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), this constitutes part of 
the physical element. 
The importation must occur within the protection period which varies according to the type of 
recording under s 248CA(k). In the indictable and summary offences the accused must be reckless as 
to this circumstance.982 The recording must be an unauthorised recording and the fault element for 
this circumstance varies between the indictable and summary offences in exactly the same manner 
as the offences under 248PK discussed above at paragraph [3.11]. 
[4] Part XIA Division 3 Subdivision B – Acts relating to sound 
recordings of performances given before 1 July 1995 
Subdivision B [see Appendix at pages 380 – 386] contains eight offences which apply only to sound 
recordings of performances given before 1995. Each of these offences has an equivalent offence of 
more general application as illustrated in Table 3 below. However, the offences of general 
application in Subdivision A overlap precisely the same conduct, circumstances and results as the 
specialised offences in Subdivision B and are structured in exactly the same manner. The only slight 
differences are that since the Subdivision B offences only refer to sound recordings, the protection 
period is always 50 years but this is also the case in the overlapping Division A offences that are 
subjected to the application of s 248CA. One clear difference is under s 248QB it is only an offence to 
possess equipment for copying an unauthorised sound recording, whereas its equivalent offence in 
                                                            
982 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 s 5.6(2) 
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s 248PE includes equipment for making an unauthorised recording. The reason for this absence is 
the same reason why the offences in ss 248PA and 248PB could not have an equivalent offence in 
Subdivision B; it relates to the recording of an actual performance and it is impossible to record a 
performance given before 1 July 1995 after the commencement of the subdivision in 2006, it is only 
possible to make a copy of a performance given before 1 July 1995. 
Table 6 Comparison of Offences in Subdivisions A and B 
Subdivision A 
offence section 
Subdivision B 
offence section 
Type of offence 
248PE 248QB Possessing equipment for making an unauthorised recording 
248PF 248QC Copying unauthorised recording 
248PI 248QD Selling, etc. unauthorised recording 
248PJ 248QE Distributing unauthorised recording 
248PK 248QF Commercial possession or import of unauthorised recording 
248PL 248QG Exhibiting unauthorised recording in public by way of trade 
248PM 248QH Importing unauthorised recording for exhibition by way of trade 
 
This raises the question of whether or not these offences displace the offences in relation to such 
recordings in Subdivision A, and to what extent. The inclusion of s 248S might tend to indicate that 
the legislature intended that the two Subdivisions were to operate concurrently in relation to sound 
recordings made before 1 July 1995. Section 248S states: 
 “248S Protection against multiple proceedings for the same act 
If a single act done in relation to a performance is an offence against Subdivision 
A and an offence against Subdivision B, only one of the offences may be 
prosecuted”983 
If this is correct, it would be impossible to commit an offence against a Subdivision B offence without 
also committing the equivalent offence under Subdivision A, which would immediately render the 
purpose of the Subdivision B offences void which is an uncomfortable conclusion. 
                                                            
983 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248S 
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An alternative explanation for s 248S is that it simply prohibits prosecutors from charging a person 
with two offences if, for example, they import a variety of unauthorised sound recordings of 
different performances, within the protection period, some of which are predate 1 July 1995 and 
some of which postdate 1 July 1995. There is no real logical reason why the legislature would 
duplicate a series of offences if there was no intention to displace at least the overlapping 
Subdivision A offences. It is likely that this is the better interpretation. 
The remaining question to be answered is: if Subdivision B displaces the offences in Subdivision A, 
does the displacement apply only where there is an overlap or does it completely displace the 
Subdivision A offences. If Subdivision B does completely displace Subdivision A, there are a number 
of offences that would not apply to sound recordings made before 1 July 1995: ss 248PA, 248PB, 
248PC, 248PD, 248PG and 248PH. If the Subdivision B offences only displace their equivalent 
offences in Subdivision A, once again there would really be no purpose in including them, since the 
only thing achieved would be that the same conduct is prohibited under a different section. 
In No 20 Cannon Street Ltd v Singer & Friedlander Ltd,984 when faced with similar circumstances, 
Megarry J stated: 
“Put formally it seems to me that the proper principle to apply if an enactment contains two 
similar prohibitions, one wide and the other applying only to a limited class of case wholly 
within the wide prohibition, is to treat the wide prohibition as not applying to cases within 
the limited prohibition, especially if the limited prohibition is made subject to some 
exception and the wide prohibition is not.”985  
In Refrigerated Meat Lines (A/asia) Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestocks Corporation,986 Deane J held 
that: 
“Repugnancy can be present in cases where there is no direct contradiction between the 
relevant legislative provisions. It is present where it appears, as a matter of construction, 
that special provisions were intended exhaustively to govern their particular subject matter 
and where general provisions, if held to be applicable to the particular subject matter, would 
constitute a departure from that intention by encroaching on that subject matter.”987 
                                                            
984 No 20 Cannon Street Ltd v Singer & Friedlander Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 577 
985 No 20 Cannon Street Ltd v Singer & Friedlander Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 577, 583 
986 Refrigerated Meat Lines (A/asia) Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestocks Corporation (1980) 29 ALR 333 
987 Refrigerated Meat Lines (A/asia) Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestocks Corporation (1980) 29 ALR 333, 347 
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The only sensible conclusion that can be drawn from these authorities, and from the fact that 
alternative constructions would render Subdivision B a superficial addition to Part XIA, is that 
Subdivision B is intended to be an exhaustive regime of offences in relation to sound recordings 
made before 1 July 1995 and therefore Subdivision A does not apply to such recordings. It would be 
of great benefit if this was made clear in s 248P. 
[5] Conclusion 
Perhaps the greatest problem with the offences in Part XIA is their complexity. As Professor 
Geraldine Szott Moohr correctly observes, criminal laws are most effective when the prohibition is 
written in absolute terms: “Thou Shalt Not” rather than “Thou shalt Not Under Certain 
Circumstances and Certain Conditions.”988 The performers’ protection offences fall squarely within 
the latter category. Even with many years of legal training they are difficult to understand. It would 
be ludicrous to expect a lay person to be able to read these offences and abide by them. 
The offences are not complemented by any known social norm, and once again they are capable of 
being applied to quite innocent and harmless behaviour. Due to the broad definition of 
performance, conduct such as recording a children’s school performance will attract the operation of 
the offences. 
The conduct that these offences are designed to curtail is being overtaken by technology.  In 
previous technological eras the recording of concerts by well-known artists would have been capable 
of generating illicit income for the person responsible for the recording. The technological 
innovations in mobile telephones and the availability of websites such as YouTube means that 
virtually anyone can record a concert and distribute the recording with little effort or expense. Many 
new mobile telephones have the ability to record video and sound.  
Although the prohibited conduct is likely to occur in a public place and detection of these offences is 
far easier than an activity such as file sharing, this is unlikely to improve the efficacy of these 
offences as a deterrent. There can only be a deterrent value if there is an awareness of the sanction 
and the penalty that it imposes. The absence of a social norm prohibiting the recording of an event 
and its distribution online will mean that these offences will continue to be breached. 
                                                            
988 Moohr, G.S., ‘Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal 
Copyright Laws’ (2005) 54 American University Law Review 783, 797 
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PART III Analysis, Recommendations and Conclusions 
 This part will analyse the specific provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) against the theoretical 
conclusions drawn from Part I and make recommendations for the improvement of the regulatory 
environment for copyright works and other subject matter. 
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Chapter 8 Analysis and Recommendations 
[1] Introduction 
In the preceding Part II of this thesis, the analysis of the offences revealed that a number of sections 
in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contain substantial problems which require immediate 
consideration. The first part of this chapter details these flaws in the legislation, and makes remedial 
recommendations to cure the deficiencies that have been identified. 
The second part of this chapter applies the theoretical framework established in Chapter 3 to the 
offences analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The analysis consists of identifying the harm caused by 
copyright infringement, who or what is harmed, and measuring the magnitude of the harm. This will 
show whether the extent of the harm can legitimately justify the attachment of criminal liability in 
each offence section. Social norms theory will then be applied to the offences and the probability of 
the offence sections being obeyed in the absence of detection and prosecution by law enforcement 
authorities will be considered. 
The final part of this chapter assesses the extent to which the Australian Parliament can modify the 
offence sections while still meeting its treaty obligations. These findings will form the basis of more 
substantial recommendations for legislative changes in the offence sections so that they are better 
supported by the social norms of consumers of copyright works and are more consistent with the 
harm principle.  
[2] Remedial Recommendations for the Current Regime of Criminal 
Sanctions 
This part of the chapter examines the major flaws in the current offence provisions caused either by 
drafting errors or by ineffective or inappropriate attempts to accommodate the copyright offences 
within the framework provided by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). In doing so, a purely doctrinal 
approach is adopted, without reference to the theoretical framework in Chapter 3. 
Recommendations are made for changes to remedy the defects identified in the offence provisions 
as they presently stand. 
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[2.1] Strict Liability Offences 
There is a strong argument that the mass of strict liability offences which were included in the 
Copyright Amendment Act (2006) should be reconsidered on a case by case basis in accordance with 
the principles recommended by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills in the report 
Application of Absolute and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation.989 The report 
stated as a basic principle:  
“[...] fault liability is one of the most fundamental protections of criminal law; to exclude this 
protection is a serious matter [and] strict liability should be introduced only after careful 
consideration on a case-by-case basis of all available options; it would not be proper to base 
strict liability on mere administrative convenience or on a rigid formula”.990  
Further to this: 
“[...] strict liability should, wherever possible, be subject to program specific broad based 
defences in circumstances where the contravention appears reasonable, in order to 
ameliorate any harsh effect; these defences should be in addition to mistake of fact and 
other defences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Strict liability offences should, if 
possible, be applied only where there appears to be general public support and acceptance 
both for the measure and the penalty”991 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) justified the 
implementation of the strict liability offences simply by stating the following: 
“copyright piracy is becoming easier and the law needs to be constantly updated to tackle 
piracy”992 
And: 
“The strict liability offences will be underpinned by an infringement notice scheme in the 
Copyright Regulations 1969. This will give police and prosecutors a wider range of 
enforcement options depending on the seriousness of the relevant conduct.”993 
                                                            
989 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002) 
990 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  283 
991 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  283 
992 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  General Outline 
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While it is difficult to contradict the first quoted statement from the Explanatory Memorandum, and 
indeed the findings of this thesis agree that copyright infringement has become easier to 
accomplish, it is arguable that the second statement does not provide sufficient justification for the 
imposition of strict liability offences. The logical reasoning appears to be that as offences have 
become easier to commit, legislation should make offences easier to prosecute in order to provide a 
counterweight. This simply does not make sense. The only result of this policy is that more 
individuals are potentially criminally liable for their conduct. There is no evidence to suggest that 
prosecutions have failed, or have not been initiated, because of difficulties proving the fault 
elements of the repealed offences. Of the reported cases of prosecutions brought under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), only in Pontello v Giannotis994 was the fault element a contentious issue. 
In addition to the introduction of the strict liability offences, the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 
(Cth) introduced evidential presumptions for criminal prosecutions relating to the subsistence and 
ownership of copyright in Part V, Division 5, Subdivision G of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). These 
provisions allow a rebuttable presumption to be made about who owns copyright in a work or other 
subject matter and the year of first publication based upon the labelling applied by the 
manufacturer. No offence exists for misleading labelling. This directly contravenes another 
recommendation made by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills:  
“[...] strict liability should depend as far as possible on the actions or lack of action of those 
who are actually liable for an offence, rather than be imposed on parties who must by 
necessity rely on information from third parties in Australia or overseas; offences which do 
not apply this principle have the potential to operate unfairly”995 
Not only are the various strict liability offences for dealing with infringing copies dependent on third 
party information, courts are now expressly instructed to take this information at face value. 
Another recommendation of the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills was that: 
“[...] it is undesirable if a strict liability scheme includes a large number of offences creating a 
substantial pool of contravening behaviour, resulting in selective and possibly inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
993 Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)  General Outline 
994 Pontello v Giannotis (1989) 16 IPR 174 
995 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  286 
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enforcement; to avoid this, agencies should ensure that enforcement guidelines are detailed 
and unambiguous and accompanied by adequate training”996 
This highlights one of the worst aspects of the general scheme of copyright offences. The offences 
do indeed create a substantial pool of contravening behaviour which results in selective 
enforcement. Some of the largest examples of infringement are committed by corporations which 
have not been subjected to prosecution, as discussed below at paragraphs [2.1.1] and [2.1.2] and in 
Chapter 3 at paragraph [3.1]. 
The Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) was presented to the Senate Standing Committee for the 
Scrutiny of Bills who reported: 
“In each case [of strict liability provisions], the explanatory memorandum notes the fact that 
the imposition of strict liability means that no fault element is required to be proved, and 
that the offence has a maximum penalty of 60 penalty units and that it will be ‘underpinned 
by an infringement notice scheme to be inserted into the Copyright Regulations.’ The 
explanatory memorandum makes no explicit reference to the Committee’s Sixth Report of 
2002: Application of Absolute and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation or to 
the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers (the 
Guide), however, the Committee notes that the new offences appear to fall broadly within 
the principles stated in the Guide. While the Committee would generally prefer to see a 
more detailed justification for such offences, it makes no further comment in this case. In 
the circumstances, the Committee makes no further comment on this bill.”997 
The scarcity of information about the strict liability offences in the Bill and an absence any detailed 
justification for their inclusion, does not appear to have concerned the Committee to any significant 
degree. The Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers,998 
the guide to which the Committee refers, gives substantial weight to the findings of the Application 
of Absolute and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation report. The principles 
contained within both documents are identical. The only characteristics in the Copyright 
                                                            
996 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  288 
997 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, First Report of 2007 (2007)  
11 
998 Minister for Justice and Customs, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (2004)  23 
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Amendment Bill 2006 that could conceivably be described as falling broadly within the guide are that 
the strict liability offence are:  
(1) not punishable by more than 60 penalty points;999  
(2) are underpinned by an infringement notice scheme;1000 and  
(3) all elements of the strict liability offences subject to the infringement notice scheme are 
elements of strict liability.1001  
This third principle has produced additional difficulties in the drafting of certain offences which will 
be demonstrated below. 
The oversight of the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills was insufficient and this 
issue should be returned to the Committee for re-evaluation, with the additional information and 
justifications for the strict liability offences in the original Bill.  If there is no evidence to demonstrate 
that the strict liability offences and the Copyright Infringement Notification Scheme have been 
effective deterrents since their introduction five years ago, it is recommended that they should be 
repealed. 
[2.1.1] Publishing Industries and Strict Liability Offences 
In the recent case of EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Limited1002 it was 
held that the Men at Work song “Down Under” infringed the copyright in a work called “Kookaburra 
Sits in the Old Gum Tree”, the copyright of which was owned by Larrikin Music Publishing. The song 
“Down Under” was very successful and sold enough copies as a single to reach the top of the 
Australian, UK and US music charts in the early 1980s.1003 Millions of copies were sold and continue 
to be sold to this day. The remedy reached by the Federal Court was that EMI would pay Larrikin 5% 
of the APRA/AMCOS income received from 20 May 2002.1004  
At no point has there been any suggestion that EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd should face any criminal 
charges for dealing with infringing copies of a work or other subject matter, yet EMI may well have 
committed almost every strict liability offence in Subdivisions C and D of Part V, Division 5 of the 
                                                            
999 Minister for Justice and Customs, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (2004)  24 
1000 Minister for Justice and Customs, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (2004)  24 
1001 Minister for Justice and Customs, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (2004)  24 
1002 EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Limited [2011] FCAFC 47 
1003 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Down_Under_%28song%29#Chart_positions (Accessed 10 May 2011) 
1004 Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 698 
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Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in relation to the song. Prosecutions for the strict liability offences are 
required to commence within one year of the offence being committed,1005 but the summary 
offences which can be penalised by a two year term of imprisonment are not subject to such a 
limitation. The summary offences in Subdivisions C and D require that copyright subsists in the work 
and the defendant is negligent to that fact. EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd certainly knew that there was 
a risk that copies of the song “Down Under” may have contained infringing copies of the work 
“Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree” when the matter was first raised, but they continued to sell, 
distribute, copy, possess, etc. copies of that work in violation of the offence provisions. 
While it would probably not be in the public interest to prosecute EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd for 
these offences, the relative ease with which they may be applied to commercial publishers should be 
of concern to them. Additionally, and presuming no such prosecution materialises, the selective 
manner and inconsistency with which the offences are applied to large commercial infringers is 
inconsistent and contrary to the recommendations of the Senate Standing Committee for the 
Scrutiny of Bills.1006 
[2.2.2] Intermediaries and Strict Liability 
Another serious concern is the potential liability under the strict liability offences for intermediaries 
providing various internet services: internet service providers, internet search engines operators 
who cache web pages containing infringing copies, and operators of servers offering online storage 
facilities. As the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills also stated, it is a fundamental 
principle of criminal law that people should not be held criminally responsible for unintentional 
conduct.1007 This is undermined by strict liability offences and they should be implemented with 
great care, not for the sake of convenience. 
The technology utilised by internet intermediaries sometimes necessitates engaging in conduct that 
may infringe copyright in a work. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) recognises that infringements may 
arise through this and limits the civil actions that may be pursued against carriage service 
providers,1008 subject to certain criteria being met by those carriage service providers.1009 The 
                                                            
1005 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 14B(1)(b) 
1006 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  288 
1007 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002)  283 
1008 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AG 
1009 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AH 
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relevant activities are divided into four categories1010 each of which are subject to conditions that 
must be met before the orders that a court may grant are limited, the so-called safe harbour 
provisions. 
These limitations are fundamental to any legal operation of the internet, since almost all activities 
that are commonly performed in the provision of internet services could otherwise be liable under 
the civil law for a copyright infringement caused by a customer. The safe harbour provisions do not 
negate the infringement; they simply limit the remedies that a copyright owner may bring against a 
carriage service provider. 
However, those same activities where civil remedies are limited by the safe harbour provisions, may 
also amount to offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This would otherwise be of little 
concern since being unaware of an infringement would mean the fault elements required by the 
indictable and summary offences would be absent and therefore the offences would be incomplete. 
The strict liability offences do not require fault elements, so it is possible that internet intermediaries 
could be subject to overzealous prosecution.  
For example, if a carriage service provider engages in Category A activities,1011 they can limit the 
remedies available to the copyright owner by adhering to the conditions in s 116AH(1).1012 A 
copyright owner would only be granted one or more of the orders listed under s 116AG(4).1013 
However, it is quite possible that the carriage service provider would be criminally liable under 
s 132AI(7), i.e. distributing an infringing copy in the course of trading or obtaining a commercial 
                                                            
1010 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), ss116AC, 116AB, 116AC and 116AD 
1011 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AC (“A carriage service provider carries out a Category A activity by providing 
facilities or services for transmitting, routing or providing connections for copyright material, or the 
intermediate and transient storage of copyright material in the course of transmission, routing or provision of 
connections.”) 
1012 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AH(1) (“Item 1. All Categories. Condition 1. The carriage service provider 
must adopt and reasonably implement a policy that provides for termination, in appropriate circumstances, of 
the accounts of repeat infringers. Condition 2. If there is a relevant industry code in force—the carriage service 
provider must comply with the relevant provisions of that code relating to accommodating and not interfering 
with standard technical measures used to protect and identify copyright material. Item 2. Category A. 
Condition 1. Any transmission of copyright material in carrying out this activity must be initiated by or at the 
direction of a person other than the carriage service provider. Condition 2. The carriage service provider must 
not make substantive modifications to copyright material transmitted. This does not apply to modifications 
made as part of a technical process. 
1013 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AG(4) (“For an infringement of copyright that occurs in the course of the 
carrying out of a Category B, C or D activity, the relief that a court may grant against a carriage service provider 
is limited to one or more of the following orders: (a) an order requiring the carriage service provider to remove 
or disable access to infringing copyright material, or to a reference to infringing copyright material; (b) an 
order requiring the carriage service provider to terminate a specified account; (c) some other less burdensome 
but comparably effective non-monetary order if necessary.”) 
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advantage or profit. The offence is drafted widely enough to catch this activity, and the absence of a 
fault element or specific defence1014 may not protect a carriage service provider if they inadvertently 
distribute an infringing copy. An argument could be made by the defence that the distribution was a 
communication,1015 and since a communication other than a broadcast is taken to have been made 
by the person responsible for determining the content of the communication,1016 the carriage 
service provider would not have made the communication. However, although “distribute includes 
distribute by way of communication”, it does not mean that distribution via the internet must be 
considered a communication, and the court in the only authoritative case rejected a distinction 
between “distribution” and “communication” by the defence. 1017 An Australian court might 
construct the meaning of the offence to exclude liability for carriage service providers in such 
circumstances, but there is an element of risk that is unacceptable and can be easily cured. Specific 
defences to the strict liability offences should be included for carriage service providers and other 
intermediaries who are compliant with the safe harbour provisions. 
The position of couriers with regard to these offences is even worse. There is no question that a 
delivery of a tangible infringing copy of a work would be a distribution and there is no equivalent 
presumption for physical copies to that of s 22(6) for communications, so a courier delivering an 
infringing copy of a work would be entirely at the mercy of a prosecuting authority. This is an 
entirely unacceptable position and it is recommended that this should be rectified by either 
removing strict liability offences entirely or by providing a specific offence for persons unaware of 
the contents of a delivery.  
[2.2.3] Drafting Problems and Interpretation 
A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers 1018 contains 
the following passage on page 24: 
                                                            
1014 Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Commonwealth Parliament, Application of Absolute 
and Strict Liability Offences in Commonwealth Legislation (2002) 284 (“strict liability should, wherever possible, 
be subject to program specific broadbased defences in circumstances where the contravention appears 
reasonable, in order to ameliorate any harsh effect; these defences should be in addition to mistake of fact 
and other defences in the Criminal Code.”)  
1015 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AA 
1016 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 22(6) 
1017 See HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142; HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming [2007] 2 HKC 1; Chan Nai Ming v 
HKSAR [2007] 3 HKC 255; and Gething, S. ‘Criminal Infringement of Copyright: The Big Crook Case” in Fitzgerald 
B. et al (eds), Copyright Law, Digital Content and the Internet in the Asia-Pacific (2008) 367 
1018 Minister for Justice and Customs, A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and 
Enforcement Powers (2004) 
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“Different considerations apply to the use of strict and absolute liability depending on how it 
applies to an offence. Application of strict or absolute liability to all physical elements of an 
offence has generally only been considered appropriate where each of the following 
considerations is applicable: 
− The offence is not punishable by imprisonment and is punishable by a fine of up to 60 
penalty units for an individual (300 for a body corporate) in the case of strict liability or 10 
penalty units for an individual (50 for a body corporate) in the case of absolute liability. A 
higher maximum fine has been considered appropriate where the commission of the offence 
will pose a serious and immediate threat to public health, safety or the environment. 
− The punishment of offences not involving fault is likely to significantly enhance the 
effectiveness of the enforcement regime in deterring offences. 
− There are legitimate grounds for penalising persons lacking ‘fault’, for example because 
they will be placed on notice to guard against the possibility of any contravention. In the 
case of absolute liability, there should also be legitimate grounds for penalising a person 
who made an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. 
Strict liability should apply to all physical elements of an offence that is subject to an 
infringement notice scheme, and therefore an offence will only be appropriate for inclusion 
in such a scheme if it meets the criteria above”  
While the strict liability offences do undoubtedly comply with the first criteria listed above, it is 
highly contentious whether or not the second and third criteria have been met. However, the guide 
indicates that all offences subject to an infringement notice scheme should consist completely of 
strict liability elements. The aspiration to implement an infringement notice scheme for the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) has caused the drafting of some unusual terms in the strict liability offences 
to ensure that certain elements of these offences do not contain a fault element, and therefore 
comply with the drafting guidelines. 
As discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.2.4], where a strict liability offence has an equivalent 
indictable or summary offence which contains a proscribed conduct accompanied by an intention to 
do another act, the strict liability offence replace the words “with the intention to” with “in 
preparation for” or “in the course of”. Providing evidence that certain conduct was committed “in 
the course of” committing other conduct may be a straightforward matter, depending of course on 
the individual circumstances, since the secondary conduct would simply be a circumstance element. 
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However, it is very difficult to imagine what evidence could be led that would prove that a certain 
conduct was committed by a person “in preparation for” another conduct, without an examination 
of the person’s state of mind. It is arguable that this is essentially intention by another name, and 
that it is the form of these offences that has been altered and not the substance. The only sensible 
conclusion that can be drawn is that this is an attempt to comply with the drafting guidelines 
recommended for infringement notice schemes. 
The position of these offences is untenable. If a case is prosecuted under one of these offences it is a 
strong possibility that a judge will construe “in preparation for” as intention will require evidence to 
be led as such. It is recommended that if these offences are to remain on the statute book, any 
elements that contain the words “in preparation for” should be redrafted as elements that require 
intention to be proved, despite the general aims of the drafting guidelines to maintain only strict 
liability elements for offences under an infringement notification scheme. 
[2.2] Making or possessing a device for making an infringing copy 
As discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.10], criminal liability is attracted for making or possessing 
a device intending it to be used to make an infringing copy of a work of other subject matter. This is 
not consistent with the offence in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which deals with the making of 
infringing copies. Under that section, making an infringing copy is qualified by an intention to either 
sell, let for hire, obtain a commercial or obtain a profit. As it stands, the offence of making or 
possessing a device can be applied where the underlying conduct is not in itself a criminal offence. 
This could potentially lead to injustice, and it is recommended that the fault element of the 
indictable offences should be amended from “with the intention that the device will be used to 
make an infringing copy” to “with the intention that the device will be used to make an infringing 
copy which is intended to be (a) sold; (b) let for hire; or (c) used to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit.” In the summary offences, “the copy will be an infringing copy and the person is negligent as 
to that fact” should be amended to “the copy will be an infringing copy which will be (a) sold; (b) let 
for hire; or (c) used to obtain a commercial advantage or profit, and the person is negligent to that 
fact”. This would have the effect of punishing the making or possession of device that will be used to 
commit criminal acts, but will exclude the possibility of punishing the making or possession of 
devices that will only be used to merely commit civil torts. 
Chapter 8 
 
219 
[2.3] ERM Offences 
The broadness of the definition of electronic rights management information1019 means that the 
offences could potentially be applied to conduct that does not fit the purposes of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth). The definition of ERM information should be limited to information that cannot be 
removed by changing a computer file name and must be identifiable as ERM information. As the 
definition stands, information qualifying as ERM information can be represented as numbers or 
codes that may not be recognised as ERM information by a third party. While the fault elements of 
the indictable and summary offences may provide some legal cover where a person is ignorant 
about the existence of ERM information, the strict liability offences under this subdivision allow a 
person to be prosecuted for engaging in conduct that they cannot guard against. This is a completely 
unjustifiable position and it is recommended that either:  
(1) the strict liability offences are repealed;  
(2) the definition of ERM information is tightened to exclude such a possibility; or  
(3) a specific defence is included that will excuse the removal of ERM information when its 
existence is not apparent to reasonable person. 
 The offence in s 132AR(5) can be applied to a person who distributes, imports or communicates a 
copy of a work if they do not know, and have no means of discerning, that ERM information has 
been removed. This is completely unjust and it is recommended that this section should be repealed 
immediately. 
As discussed in Chapter 6 at paragraph [4.2.2], it is not clear in these offences whether the absence 
of the permission of the copyright owner is an element that must be proved by the prosecution or if 
it is a qualification that must be proved by the defence. It is arguable that since the balance of power 
is outweighed in favour of the Crown, then it should be a matter for the prosecution to prove. It is 
recommended that a note of clarification is added to all sections where this occurs. 
[2.4] Decoder Offences 
As highlighted in Chapter 6 at paragraph [5.3.2], there is a significant problem with the offences that 
require an inchoate result element. This needs to be remedied with immediate effect since these are 
indictable offences and should be treated seriously. The very real possibility that defendants may 
escape justice, or will need to be charged with an attempt instead of the complete offence purely 
because of a drafting error, is not acceptable. 
                                                            
1019 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 “electronic rights management information” 
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There are two realistic alternatives:  
(1) in the conduct element, the fault elements for the physical elements are altered to “with an 
intention that the device is to be used to enable a person to gain access to an encoded 
broadcast”; or  
(2) the inchoate result elements are changed from “will be used to enable a person to gain 
access to an encoded broadcast” to “will enable a person to gain access to an encoded 
broadcast”. 
There are advantages and disadvantages with either of these alternatives, but both are preferable to 
the current provisions. The first alternative would on paper be more difficult to prove, since a 
defendant could claim that they had intended for the device they had manufactured, imported, sold 
etc. not to be used to gain access to an encoded broadcast. Where guilt is established, however, 
there can be no doubt that there is anything other than a secure conviction of genuine criminal 
behaviour. 
The second alternative would overcome the problem that claims of alternative intentions may 
cause, but could expose manufacturers, importers and retailers to liability where they have 
marketed a device which subsequently been found to enable a person to gain access to an encoded 
broadcast. This would be highly unlikely, and even if it did occur the prosecution would still be 
required to prove recklessness and this would be the better option. 
[2.5] Performers’ protection 
It is often difficult to strike an appropriate balance between legislation that provides comprehensive 
protection for one party, and legislation that unduly prevents other parties from engaging in 
harmless conduct by drafting the legislation too broadly. As shown in Chapter 6 at paragraph [2.1.1], 
the broad definition of performance and the absence of an appropriate exemption have created a 
legal environment where the filming of a school performance by parents may constitute an offence 
under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This is not an appropriate balance and it is recommended that 
the exemption provided under s 248(2)(a) should be altered to specifically allow parents to make 
recordings of performances to which they have been invited for personal and domestic use. 
It is also recommended that the recording of performances that take place in public spaces, such as 
street performances should also be exempted from the operation of s 248PA. 
[2.6] Summary of remedial recommendations 
The recommendations for remedial action are summarised as follows: 
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1) If no evidence can demonstrate that the strict liability offences and the Copyright 
Infringement Notification Scheme have been effective deterrents since their introduction 
five years ago, then it is recommended that they should be repealed. 
2) Specific defences to the strict liability offences should be included for carriage service 
providers, and other intermediaries, who are compliant with the safe harbour provisions. 
3) A specific defence should be available to the strict liability distribution offence for 
intermediaries who are unaware that they are distributing an infringing copy. 
4) For the s 132AL offences of making or possessing a device for making an infringing copy, the 
fault element of the indictable offences should be amended from: “with the intention that 
the device will be used to make an infringing copy” to: “with the intention that the device 
will be used to make an infringing copy which is intended to be (a) sold; (b) let for hire; or (c) 
used to obtain a commercial advantage or profit.” In the summary offences, “the copy will 
be an infringing copy and the person is negligent as to that fact” should be amended to “the 
copy will be an infringing copy which will be (a) sold; (b) let for hire; or (c) used to obtain a 
commercial advantage or profit, and the person is negligent to that fact”.   
5) Either: (a) the strict liability offences concerning ERM information should be repealed 
entirely; (2) the definition of ERM information should be tightened to exclude the possibility 
that a person can be prosecuted for removing or altering ERM information that is not 
apparent to a reasonable person; or (3) a specific defence should be included to excuse the 
removal or alteration of ERM information when its existence is not apparent to reasonable 
person. 
6) Section s 132AR(5) should be repealed. 
7) A note of clarification should be added to all ERM information offences that explicitly states 
that the prosecution bears the burden of proof in establishing that a person did not have the 
permission of the copyright owner. 
8) In Part VAA Division 3 Subdivision A, the words “will be used to enable a person to gain 
access to an encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster” should be 
replaced by “will enable a person to gain access to an encoded broadcast without the 
authorisation of the broadcaster” in all instances where they occur. 
9) The exception for the recording of performances under subsection 28(1) should be extended 
to audience members attending performances given in the course of educational instruction, 
or a defence should be included for any of the offences in Part XIA Division 3 for recording 
such performances for personal and domestic use. The recording of performances given in 
public places for personal or domestic use should also be exempt or given a specific defence. 
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[3] Theoretical Application 
By applying the theoretical framework established in Chapter 3 to the offences, a clearer picture will 
emerge of their effectiveness. The harm principle can show which offences can be legitimately 
justified and if any conditions are required to meet the threshold of substantial harm to either an 
individual or the public welfare. Social norms theory will explain which offences are likely to be 
supported, tolerated or violated by social groups.  
[3.1] Measuring the Harm Caused to Copyright Owners 
According to the harm principle, a copyright offence would be legitimately justified if the 
infringement results in substantial harm being caused to the interests of a copyright owner. The 
extent of the harm caused to copyright holders by infringement has been the subject of much 
controversy.1020 The collection of industries that make up the entertainment industry have long 
maintained that copyright infringement has a substantial harmful effect on their businesses,1021 and 
have made substantial efforts to shape the law of copyright to promote their interests. 
One of the great difficulties in measuring the degree of harm caused to copyright owners is that not 
all infringement necessarily results in substantial harm. Some infringement will only cause a minor 
degree of harm to copyright owners, and this cannot be justified according to the harm principle. 
There are a number of variables which could be taken in account in determining the degree of harm 
caused by the infringement, but the core issue is the extent to which the infringement interferes 
with the ability of the copyright owner to exploit the work or subject matter. 
                                                            
1020 See Bernstein, K. J., ‘The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New Instrument in the Fight against 
Internet Piracy’ (1999) 7 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 325; Kachuriak, K. M., ‘Chinese Copyright Piracy: 
Analysis of the Problem and Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights’ (1995) 13 Dickinson Journal of 
International Law 599; Mousley, M. C., ‘Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry's Arsenal in Its War 
on Digital Piracy’ (2003) 46 Villanova Law Review 667; Friel, C. S., ‘The High Cost of Global Intellectual Property 
Theft: An Analysis of Current Trends, the TRIPS Agreement, and Future Approaches to Combat the Problem’ 
(2006) 7 Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal 209; Samuelson, P. and Wheatland, T., ‘Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform’ (2009) 51 William and Mary Law Review 439; 
Oberholzer-Gee F. and Strumpf K., ‘The Effect of File-Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (2007) 115(1) Journal of Political Economy 1; Zentner, A., ‘Measuring the Effect of File Sharing on 
Music Purchases’ (2006) 49 Journal of Law and Economics 63; Liebowitz, S. J., ‘File Sharing: Creative 
Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?’ (2006) 49 (1) Journal of Law and Economics 1; Peitz, M. and 
Waelbroeck, P., ‘The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence’ (2004) 1(2) Review of 
Economic Research on Copyright Issues 71   
1021 See generally: http://www.afact.org.au/index.php/core/content_protection/who_is_it_harming (Accessed 
3 May 2012); http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem 
(Accessed 3 May 2012); http://www.mipi.com.au/About-Piracy/What-is-music-piracy/ (Accessed 3 May 2012); 
http://www.fastiis.org/our_services/enforcement/software_theft/ (Accessed 12 May 2012);  
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[3.1.1] Unexploited works 
The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) grants a copyright term of the life of the author plus 70 years for Part III 
works, and 70 years from first publication for Part IV subject matter. However, the actual length of 
time that a copyright work can be successfully exploited varies considerably. Many copyright works 
go out of print after their first print run, while some can be successfully exploited for the entire 
length of the copyright term. It is unlikely that any infringement would cause substantial harm to the 
interests of a copyright owner if they are no longer exploiting the work.  
Some forms of copyright work fall into obsolescence even if they remain popular. The source codes 
of computer programs are literary works under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and are granted the 
same copyright term. Video game software provides example. It is possible for powerful modern 
computers to run programs that emulate the operation of older video game consoles with such 
accuracy that the operation of this “virtual console” is indistinguishable from the original console. 
This allows video games that ran on the original hardware to be played on personal computers 
running the emulation software without having to program the game;1022 the source code is simply 
copied from its original format to a standard computer file. Both the games files and the software 
used to emulate the video consoles have been available online to download at no cost through a 
number of websites.1023 The majority of these emulators mimic video game consoles that are 
considered obsolete, and neither the video game consoles nor the original games are available for 
sale by the manufacturers. It would be difficult to conclude that the interests of the copyright 
owners are substantially harmed by this activity, despite statements to the contrary.1024 
[3.1.2] Older Works 
The length of time remaining in the copyright term may also be a variable of the harm caused to 
copyright owners, although if the work is still being successfully exploited then substantial harm 
could still be caused. However, the monopoly to exploit the work is not the only privilege that the 
exclusive rights in copyright enable. They also allow copyright owners to exclude other people from 
exploiting the work even if they are not exploiting the work themselves. This can be illustrated by 
the controversial actions of the copyright owner of the book Ullyses by James Joyce who died in 
1941. The events in Ulysses occur in Dublin on 16 June 1904. Each year an event called the 
Bloomsday Festival is held on that date, which celebrates the life and work of Joyce. For many years 
one of Joyce’s descendents, who inherited the copyright in Ullyses, prevented public readings of the 
                                                            
1022 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_game_console_emulator (Accessed 3 May 2012) 
1023 See for example: www.romsite.net/ (Accessed 3 May 2012); www.romhustler.net/ (Accessed 3 May 2012) 
1024 http://www.nintendo.com/corp/legal.jsp (Accessed 3 May 2012) 
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book at the Festival1025 even for non-commercial purposes. This continued until the copyright term 
had expired. It is unlikely that the harm caused to the copyright owner by these performances would 
be substantial enough to justify criminal liability. 
[3.1.3] Scale of Infringement 
Another variable which can measure the degree of harm is the scale of the infringement. This 
consists of the value or volume of the infringing copies, or a combination of both. The greater the 
scale of the infringement, the more likely it is that substantial harm has been caused.  Many of the 
largest copyright infringers have been individuals or corporations that produce their own copyright 
works. In Bright Tunes Music Corp v Harrisongs Music, Ltd1026 a US court held that the George 
Harrison song “My Sweet Lord” had infringed copyright in the song “He’s So Fine” composed by 
Ronald Mack and owned by Bright Tunes Music Corporation. The court found that Harrison had 
“unconsciously” infringed the copyright by plagiarising the melody to the song. The damages to 
Bright Tunes Music were assessed at $1,599,987 in 1981.1027 In 1990, the American rapper Vanilla Ice 
“sampled” the baseline of song “Under Pressure” by Queen and David Bowie for his hit recording 
“Ice Ice Baby” without the licence of the copyright owners. No lawsuit was ever filed against Vanilla 
Ice, but it is believed he settled the dispute for an undisclosed amount.1028 In the Australian case 
of EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd,1029 the Federal Court of Appeal 
affirmed an earlier decision that the iconic Australian song “Down Under” had infringed copyright in 
the equally well known Australian nursery rhyme “Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree”. EMI were 
ordered to pay Larrikin 5% of the royalties earned since 2002. Perhaps the one of the largest awards 
in a copyright infringement case was when a United States jury awarded $1.3 billion in damages to 
the plaintiff in Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG.1030 This award was reduced on appeal to a mere $272 
million by Hamilton J who described the initial award as “grossly excessive”. Despite the obvious and 
substantial harm that these infringements caused to the interests of the copyright owners, none of 
these cases resulted in a criminal prosecution. One explanation for why this never happened is that 
the harm caused was mitigated by the awards of damages or the financial settlement.  
Commercial infringement on the scale discussed in the examples above tends to produce levels of 
profit that can be readily recovered from easily identified parties. The potential for recovering a 
                                                            
1025 See http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0608/1224298573383.html (Accessed 2 
November 2011) 
1026 Bright Tunes Music Corp v Harrisongs Music, Ltd 420 F.Supp. 177 (1976) 
1027 ABKCO Music, Inc. v Harrisongs Music, Ltd  508 F.Supp. 798 (1981) 
1028 See http://www.legalit.com.au/content/105.html (Accessed 10 November 2011) 
1029 EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 47 
1030 Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P30,123 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2011) 
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significant monetary remedy for an infringement, despite the usual risks of litigation, means dealing 
with an infringement through the civil courts is the preferred option if the infringement can be 
attributed to a competitor or another commercial entity. It makes more commercial sense to 
recover or divide the spoils of the infringement, than to attempt to deter future infringement 
through criminal sanctions. 
However, where the infringement is committed by a small or medium sized party, the potential for 
the harm to be mitigated is much lower. Even if the usual risk of litigation is discounted, the cost of 
recovering damages, and the decreased ability of the infringing party to meet the cost of a 
judgement, makes a civil suit a less commercially attractive outcome.1031 Where the party concerned 
is an individual, who is not profiting from the infringement, the likelihood of mitigating the harm 
caused is perhaps at its lowest. This has not prevented rights holders from pursuing such individuals 
in the United States,1032 but it is more likely that the motivation for these actions is more to deter 
infringement by third parties rather than to mitigate any harm caused by the actual infringement. 
[3.1.4] Purpose of the Infringement 
The final variable concerns the purpose for which the infringement occurs. Unlike the other variables 
discussed above which vary by degree, this variable is divided into two categories: infringement for 
commercial purposes and infringement for non-commercial purposes. The harm caused to copyright 
owners in terms of lost revenue is unclear due to the difficulties of establishing the actual loss of a 
legitimate sale. However, this is far easier to quantify where an infringing product has been sold 
since it can be assumed that demand for the product has been satisfied at a particular price.1033 
Where the unit price is close to zero, as it is for distribution by free file sharing, it is difficult or 
impossible to assess the price at which demand would have otherwise been satisfied, legitimately or 
otherwise.1034  
                                                            
1031 Luttrell, S., ‘Copyright Enforcement in Australia’ (2008) 11 International Trade and Business Law Review 3, 
27 
1032 Sony BMG Music Entertainment v Tenenbaum, 672 F.Supp.2d 217 (2009); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 
579 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008); Moseley, W.. ‘A New (Old) Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement 
After Thomas and Tenenbaum’ (2010) 25 (1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 311; DeBriyn, J., ‘Shedding Light 
on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages’ (2012) 19(1) 
 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 79  
1033 Moohr, G.S., ‘The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm and Criminal 
Theory’(2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 731, 755 
1034 Moohr, G.S., ‘The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm and Criminal 
Theory’(2003) 83 Boston University Law Review 731, 755; Goldman, E., ‘A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic 
Theft Act and Criminal Copyright Infringement’ (2003) 82 Oregon Law Review 369, 396 (“Piracy rates cannot 
realistically be measured accurately. For example, to measure the [No Electronic Theft Act’s] effect on piracy, 
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Under some circumstances it has been shown that a degree of infringement may actually stimulate 
the market for legitimate copies, which may mitigate the harm caused to copyright owners: the 
“sampling effect”.1035 The market for associated goods and services may also be stimulated, such as 
branded merchandise or live performance sales. However, the strength of this sampling effect is 
dependent on the nature of both the copyrighted work and the market for the work. For example, 
what might work to some extent for recorded music for the home market, may not work for the DVD 
rental market. 
As demonstrated in Part II of this thesis, the threshold for the application of criminal liability in many 
of the offences consists of a commercial purpose for the infringement: either for purposes of making 
a profit or gaining a commercial advantage, or in the course of trade. This infers that an infringement 
for commercial purposes can always be anticipated to cause sufficient harm to justify criminal 
sanctions. However, this is clearly at odds with the requirement to prove damages in civil copyright 
infringement actions. Bowen CJ in Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New 
South Wales1036 stated that the purpose of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss which 
he has suffered,1037 in other words to mitigate the harm caused. Applicants for awards of damages 
bear the onus of proving loss or depreciation,1038 and if this evidentiary burden is not discharged 
only nominal damages can be awarded. This was vividly illustrated in Aristocrat Technologies 
Australia Pty Ltd v Dap Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq)1039 where an order for damages under 
s 115(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) for the commercial infringement in the artwork of 400 
gaming machines was limited to just $1. 
Even where substantial harm has been proven, s 115(3) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) prevents an 
award of damages if the infringing party was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the proper analysis would compare current piracy rates against what the rate would be without the Act, an 
obviously impossible inquiry”) 
1035 See generally: Leibowitz, S.J., ‘Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals’ (1985) 93 
Journal of Political Economy 945; Croxon, K. “Promotional Piracy” (2007) 2 Oxonomics 13; Bakos, Y. et al 
‘Shared Information Goods’ (1999) 42 Journal of Law & Economics 117; Schultz, M. F., ‘Live Performance, 
Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business’ (2009) 43 University of Richmond Law Review 685; Peitz, M., 
‘Why the Music Industry May Gain from Free Downloading — The Role of Sampling’ (2006) 24 (5) International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 907  
1036 Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales (1975) 6 ALR 445 
1037 Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales (1975) 6 ALR 445, 446. See also 
Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102; Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 162 FCR 1; 
Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936] Ch 323 
1038 Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 378, 380 
1039 Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Dap Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 239 ALR 702 
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suspecting, that the act constituting the infringement was an infringement of the copyright.1040 Only 
an order for an account of profits may be awarded, mitigating the harm caused to the copyright 
owner. Section 115(3) applies to all claims for infringement, including cases of commercial 
infringement. In Kiama Constructions v MC Casella Building Co Pty Ltd1041 a firm of builders left 
architectural plans with a prospective customer who made a pencil sketch of one of the house plans. 
This pencil sketch was shown to another building firm who agreed to build the house and engaged a 
draftsman to provide a more detailed plan. It was held that although the defendant building firm 
had infringed copyright in the house plans, the plaintiffs could not recover damages because they 
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that they had infringed copyright.  
The criminal provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) previously precluded the prosecution of 
infringing parties by requiring a corresponding fault element. Since the Copyright Amendment Act 
2006 (Cth) created the strict liability offences, the only threshold for these offences to apply is a 
commercial purpose. It would be possible therefore, that under similar circumstances to Kiama 
Constructions v MC Casella Building Co Pty Ltd, a defendant could avoid an award of damages under 
s 115(3), but could be found guilty of one of the offence provisions and be liable to pay the 
Commonwealth a fine not exceeding 60 penalty points.1042 
Although infringement on a commercial scale might indicate that any harm caused is sufficient to 
warrant criminal punishment, not all commercial infringements of copyright are equally harmful. If 
damages cannot be proved or the infringement is innocent, it is arguably unreasonable to impose 
criminal liability where civil damages would not be available for the same conduct. Where damages 
can be proven, and harm has been suffered by the copyright owner, there would still need to be 
substantial harm for the offence to be consistent with the Feinberg harm principle. 
[3.1.5] Application to the Current Offences 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that there are parameters that can indicate with certainty if 
an infringement has caused substantial harm to a copyright owner. An infringement will be certain 
to have caused substantial harm to the copyright owner if:  
(1) it is a large scale infringement; and 
(2) of a work being exploited by the copyright owner; and 
                                                            
1040 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), s115(3) 
1041 Kiama Constructions v MC Casella Building Co Pty Ltd (1980) 10 IPR 345 
1042 The offence provision most likely to be applicable to the circumstances in Kiama Constructions v MC 
Casella Building Co Pty Ltd would be s132AD(5), although 132AJ(5) would probably also be available. 
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(3) which has resulted in a measurable loss; and 
(4) that cannot be mitigated  
These requirements would be enacted as a Commonwealth offence section as follows: 
 A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person engages in conduct; and  
(b) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or other 
subject matter; and  
(c) one or more of the rights in the work or other subject matter was being exercised by 
the copyright owner at the time of the infringement; and 
(d) the infringement or infringements result in a measurable loss which cannot be 
mitigated by the person; and 
(e) the infringement or infringements occur on a large scale 
Conversely, an infringement will not have caused substantial harm to the copyright owner if:  
(1) it is a small scale infringement; and 
(2) of a work not being exploited by the copyright owner; which  
(3) does not result in a measurable loss 
Between these parameters, there is a large area of uncertainty. Offences that can be directed at 
infringements that meet the definitions of the lower parameter cannot be legitimately justified in all 
circumstances that they can be applied. These offences would need to alter the threshold at which 
criminal liability attaches, to exclude the possibility of infringements that cause non-substantial 
harm from being prosecuted. 
Of the offences in Division V of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), only one offence section comes close to 
meeting the requirements of the upper parameter. Section 132AC requires the infringement to 
occur on a commercial scale, which is to be measured by take into account the volume and value of 
the infringing copies.1043 The infringement must also result in substantial prejudicial impact on the 
copyright owner.1044 This would approximate the requirements for the infringement resulting in an 
unmitigated and measurable loss. To prove a substantial prejudicial impact, the prosecution would 
have to prove that some loss had occurred. If this had already been mitigated by a civil action it is 
                                                            
1043 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC(5) 
1044 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AC(1)(c) and (2)(c) 
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likely that the prejudicial impact would have been lowered or eliminated, and the result element 
would not be satisfied. Also, if the work or other subject matter was out of print or not being 
exploited in any manner, it is unlikely that any prejudicial impact could be found.  
The remaining offences in Division 5 are not as clear cut. With the exception of ss 132AJ, 132AL and 
132AM, all of the offences in Subdivisions C and D consist of infringements in the copyright of works 
or other subject matter: making an infringing copy,1045 selling or letting for hire an infringing 
copy,1046 offering an infringing copy for sale or hire,1047 exhibiting an infringing copy,1048 importing an 
infringing copy,1049 distributing an infringing copy,1050 causing a work to be performed in public1051 
and causing a sound recording or cinematographic film to be heard or seen in public. 1052 
Consequently, all of the conduct elements in these offences would constitute conduct that results in 
one or more infringements of copyright for the purposes of s 132AC. The difference between 
s 132AC and these offences is that they do not require the infringements to have a substantial 
prejudicial impact on the copyright owner.  
Sections 132AI(2) and (5) require the distribution to affect the owner of the copyright prejudicially, 
but this may still not amount to the threshold of substantial harm. Sub-sections 132AH(1)(a)(vii), 
(3)(a)(vii) and (5)(a)(vii) have the same requirement as the fault element for importing an infringing 
article. In the remaining offences, the thresholds are either:  
(1) that infringing copies are dealt with commercially; or  
(2) that performances, sound recordings and cinematographic films are performed, seen or 
heard in a place of public entertainment.  
These thresholds are lower than the upper parameter for substantial harm, and are quite capable at 
being directed at conduct which meets the lower parameter. These offences cannot be legitimately 
justified for causing substantial harm to copyright owners as they are capable of being used in 
circumstances that results in lower levels of harm. 
                                                            
1045 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AD 
1046 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AE 
1047 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AF 
1048 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AG 
1049 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AH 
1050 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AI 
1051 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AN 
1052 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AO 
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Sections 132AJ, 132AL and 132AM prohibit activities that have not yet caused harm, but create a risk 
of harm occurring in the future. The level of harm that can potentially occur from this conduct is no 
different from the offence sections discussed above. The offences for possessing an infringing copy 
in s 132AJ state that the possession has to be with the intention of, or in preparation for, one of the 
Sub-division C offences. This precludes s 132AC and means that the offences are for creating a risk 
that harm will occur. Since the harm caused by violations of the Sub-division C offences cannot be 
legitimately justified, it follows that creating a risk of this harm occurring cannot be legitimately 
justified either. The same is true of the offences in ss 132AL and 132AM.  
The various offences for conduct related to technological protection measures in sub-division E are 
similar in that they prohibit activities that create a risk of infringement, however in this case the 
threshold of harm is even lower. Technological protection measures can prevent the acts of 
infringement that cause substantial harm to copyright owners, but they can also prevent activities 
that do not constitute infringements of copyright at all. In other words, they criminalise the creation 
of a risk of harm to copyright owners that can vary in degree from none to substantial. This 
obviously does not meet the threshold criteria discussed above. 
The electronic rights management information offences have similarly low thresholds of harm at 
which criminal liability is attached. Removing or altering electronic rights management information 
does not in itself cause harm, it only creates a risk of harm that caused by an infringement. An 
infringement alone does not meet the threshold criteria. Distributing or importing a copy that has 
had its electronic rights management information removed causes no more harm than the 
importation or distribution of an infringing copy and neither of these meets the threshold criteria. 
Importing electronic rights management information is probably not harmful in itself, again only 
creating a risk of further infringement. 
The offences in Part VAA Division 3 concern conduct that indirectly harms copyright owners, but 
causes direct harm to broadcasters. In applying the harm principle here, the interests of the 
broadcasters will be the subject of the harm. These offences are slightly different as the harm 
caused does not have as many variables that can be measured by degree. There can be a degree of 
scale, i.e. how many decoders have been sold, imported, etc., but there is no question of the 
broadcast not being exploited. The market for encoded broadcasts is much narrower, so there is 
both a greater chance that an unauthorised decoder will substitute for an authorised subscription 
and there is really little chance of the sampling effect having any impact. Once access to the encoded 
broadcast has been achieved, it is unlikely that an individual will subscribe to the service, unless the 
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unauthorised decoder no longer works. All of the offences in Part VAA therefore meet the threshold 
for causing substantial harm to the broadcaster. 
All of the direct recording offences in Part XIA fail to meet the threshold criteria. The reason for this 
is that the definition of performance is so broad that if can encapsulate performances that are not 
by professional performers in place of public entertainment. While it is arguable that substantial 
harm could be caused to a professional performer by recording their show in a venue for commercial 
purposes, recording an activity such as a juggling act performed by an amateur on a street is highly 
unlikely to cause any discernable harm to the juggler. None of the recording offences require a 
commercial purpose for the infringement of the performance right, nor do they require substantial 
prejudicial impact to be a result of the recording or other activity. The indirect recording offences do 
not include indirect recordings for personal and domestic use, but there is still no requirement for 
the offences to be committed on a large scale resulting in an unmitigated, measurable loss to the 
performer. This is true of all of the offences in Part XIA. While they unquestionably can be applied to 
situations where substantial harm is caused, the threshold for the application of criminal liability is 
so that completely harmless activities are subject to criminal sanction. There are a number of 
offences in Part XIA concerning the commercial exploitation of unauthorised recordings, but none of 
these meet the upper parameter of harm and are equally applicable to the lower parameter. 
However, some sections warrant further analysis. Sub-sections 248PJ(2) and (5), and 248QE(2) and 
(5) require the distribution of the unauthorised recording to prejudicially affect the financial 
interests of the performer. Sub-sections 248PK(1)(iv) and (3)(iv), and 248QF(1)(iv) and (3)(iv) contain 
a fault element with the same requirement for possession of an unauthorised performance. While 
this is a higher threshold than the lower parameter of harm, nonetheless it falls short of causing 
substantial harm. 
[3.1.6] Conclusion 
The offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) can be legitimately justified for causing substantial 
harm to the interests of copyright owners, broadcasters and performers only where the threshold 
for the offence is consistent with the upper parameters posited above at paragraph [3.1.5]. The 
majority of offences, while capable of being directed at conduct that causes substantial harm, create 
criminal liability for less harmful or entirely harmless activities. Unless these offences can be 
legitimately justified for addressing conduct that causes substantial harm to the public welfare, they 
will not be supported by the harm principle. This could potentially cause these offences to be 
perceived as illegitimate by the general public, and consequently dislodge the overarching 
obedience to law norm identified by norms theory, discussed in Chapter 3 at paragraph [4.2]. 
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[3.2] Assessing the Harm Caused to the Public Welfare 
Assessing the harm caused to the public welfare by copyright infringement requires different 
variables to be considered from the harm caused to copyright owners. This is particularly important 
where the interests of copyright owners and the public welfare diverge.  The Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs report Cracking Down on Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in 
Australia1053 discussed the harm caused to the public interest in 2000. It divided the cost of copyright 
infringement into direct costs1054 and indirect costs.1055 The report identified direct costs as the 
losses to the copyright industries, including the contraction of the industry, and cited a submission 
from Music Industry Piracy Investigations estimating the losses to the music industry in 1998 to be in 
excess of $67 million.1056 Quite how this estimation was arrived at is unclear, since the original 
submission contains no citation to any research or any calculation methodology.1057 While the 
providence of these losses is dubious, the measurement of indirect costs caused by infringement 
was even less rigorous, relying again on speculative figures proffered by industry representatives. 
The report categorised indirect costs as losses of tax revenue to government, loss of income to 
distributors, retailers and other service providers, and lost opportunities for employment.  These 
costs could all potentially be considered harmful to the public welfare. However, much of the 
economic harm will be depend on where any revenue that would have been spent on copyrighted 
works is diverted. Money that is not spent on copyrighted works by consumers does not simply 
disappear.  
[3.2.1] Harm Caused by Commercial Infringement 
Where an individual obtains an infringing copy of a work for free, it is difficult to establish whether 
they would have never bought a legitimate copy, or whether they would have bought a legitimate 
copy but chose instead to take the free infringing copy.1058 Under either circumstance, the money 
                                                            
1053 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Cracking Down on 
Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in Australia (2000) 
1054 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Cracking Down on 
Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in Australia (2000) 11 
1055 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Cracking Down on 
Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in Australia (2000) 12 
1056 Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Cracking Down on 
Copycats: Enforcement of Copyright in Australia (2000) 11 
1057 Submission to Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Inquiry 
into Enforcement of Copyright in Australia, June 1999 (Music Industry Piracy Investigations) (Available at: 
(http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=/l
aca/copyrightenforcement/sub26mipi.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2012)) 
1058 See generally: Leibowitz, S.J. ‘File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?’ (2006) 47 
Journal of Law and Economics 1; Oberholzer-Gee F. and Strumpf K., ‘The Effect of File-Sharing on Record Sales: 
An Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 115(1) Journal of Political Economy 1; Peitz, M. and Waelbroeck, ‘Why the Music 
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not spent on the legitimate copy will be diverted into other sectors of the economy, which will 
equally provide employment opportunities and taxation revenue. However, if a consumer buys an 
infringing copy, some of the money that would have been spent on a legitimate copy is saved, and 
yet again may flow into other legitimate sectors of the economy, but some will be diverted to those 
engaged in black market reproduction, even criminal groups.1059 This money is unlikely to produce 
any tax revenue for the state,1060 and the money from the sale of the infringing copy can be used to 
finance and support further criminal activity. This would certainly amount to substantial harm 
caused to the public welfare. 
[3.2.2] Harm Caused to Policy Aims of Copyright Law 
As discussed in Chapter 3 at paragraph [2], copyright law exists as a compromise between competing 
policy aims. One of these policy aims to incentivise the industrial production of new copyright works. 
If the incentive to produce of work is damaged by an infringement, then this would cause harm to 
the public welfare. The competing primary aim is to ensure access to copyright works. Far from 
harming this objective, infringement actually promotes it because it gives a greater number of 
people access to works than there would have been without the infringement. The relative weight 
given to these policy aims determines the balance to be struck through the utilisation of copyright 
law to give them effect. Following the reasoning of Landes and Posner1061 to its ultimate conclusion, 
an ideal economic outcome for the public welfare would be:  
(1) unlimited and free access to copyright works for the public;  
(2) sufficient financial incentive for artists to engage in the production of copyright works; and  
(3) sufficient financial incentive to invest in the production of copyright works.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Industry May Gain from Free Downloading - The Role of Sampling’ (2006) 24(5) International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 907; Peitz, M. and Waelbroeck, P., ‘The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-
Section Evidence’ (2004) 1(2) Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 71 
1059 In 1999 the Australian Federal Police stated it could not establish any significant evidence of the 
involvement of Australian organised crime groups in copyright infringement, but that the prospect of 
organised criminal activity needs to be taken into account. See Submission to Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Inquiry into Enforcement of Copyright in Australia, June 
1999, 4 (Australian Federal Police) (Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=/la
ca/copyrightenforcement/sub35.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2012) 
1060 Submission to Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, House of Representatives, Inquiry 
into Enforcement of Copyright in Australia, June 1999, 4 (Australian Federal Police) (Available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=/la
ca/copyrightenforcement/sub35.pdf (Accessed 18 July 2012) 
1061 Landes, W.M and Posner, R.A. ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 
325 
Offences in the Copyright Act 1968(Cth): Will They Be Effective? 
 
234 
The distribution of infringing copies through the internet provides the first outcome, but not the 
second and third outcomes. Copyright law as it stands provides sufficient incentives for artists and 
investors, but as yet cannot provide unlimited free access. The sale of infringing copies promotes 
none of these ideal public welfare outcomes and is therefore more harmful to the public welfare 
than the free distribution of infringing copies. Whether or not the harm caused amounts to 
substantial harm will depend once again on the nature of the copyright work, the scale of the 
infringement, and whether the damage has been mitigated by a civil remedy. 
[3.2.3] Application to the Current Offences 
For an offence to be legitimately justified for causing substantial harm to the public welfare, it would 
therefore require three elements:  
(1) the infringement is for commercial purposes; or  
(2) the infringement causes sufficient harm to the copyright owner that it removes the incentive 
to produce or invest in the production of new copyright works; and  
(3) the harm cannot be mitigated by a civil remedy.  
The offences under s 132AC once again come closest to fulfilling these criteria, but the offence is 
capable of being directed at non-commercial infringement. The absence of a commercial nexus 
means that in order to be legitimately justified, the harm caused by the infringement would have to 
be large enough to not only cause substantial harm to the copyright owner, but through doing this 
would substantially harm the incentive to produce new works. It is doubtful if the offence currently 
meets this threshold. 
The various offences for making and dealing in infringing copies in Part V Division 5 Subdivision C 
almost all contain an element requiring a commercial purpose or motivation. Where this is the case, 
the offences can be legitimately justified for causing harm to the public welfare. However, several 
offences can be directed at conduct that neither has a commercial purpose or motivation nor would 
cause enough harm to a copyright owner to substantially harm the incentive to produce or invest in 
the production of new work. Sections 132AI(2) and (5) require a distribution of infringing copies to 
affect the owner of the copyright prejudicially, but this does not have to be substantial enough to 
harm the incentives discussed above. Sub-sections 132AH(1)(a)(vii), (3)(a)(vii) and (5)(a)(vii) have the 
same requirement as the fault element for importing an infringing article. These offences can only 
be partially legitimately justified, the non-commercial offences attract criminal liability where 
neither substantial harm to the incentive to produce has been caused, nor where an unreasonable 
risk of this occurring is present. 
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Once again the offences under ss 132AJ, 132AL and 132AM do not require any harm to actually be 
caused, and therefore in order to be legitimately justified, there would be an unreasonable risk that 
the substantial harm would be caused to the public welfare. Section 132AJ requires the possession 
of an infringing copy to be accompanied by the intention to do any of nine acts. The strict liability 
offence under s 132AJ requires the possession to be in preparation for, or in the course of doing any 
of the same nine acts. Of these nine acts all but one consist of commercial dealings, the exception 
being to distribute the infringing article to the extent it will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright. As discussed above this would not meet the threshold of causing an unreasonable risk of 
substantial harm to the incentive to produce or invest in the production of new work. Sections 
132AL and 132AM are flawed for the same reasoning. The possession or making of tools that could 
be used for infringement does not create an unreasonable risk of an infringement occurring, since 
the same tools could be used for non-infringing copying. Advertising for the supply of an infringing 
copy would not in itself create an unreasonable risk of harm, since the magnitude of the harm 
caused would be sometimes be insufficient to cause substantial harm to the incentive to produce or 
invest in the production of new work even though the probability the infringing copy being supplied 
is high. 
 The absence of a commercial nexus for the offences in the offences under Part V Division 5 
Subdivision D also means that the harm caused to the public welfare would need to be substantial 
enough to remove the incentive to produce or invest in the production of new work. All of the 
offences in this subdivision can be applied to conduct that falls short of this threshold. 
The offences in Part V Division 5 Subdivision E all contain an element requiring an intention to obtain 
a commercial advantage or profit, so these offences can be legitimately justified for causing 
substantial harm to the public welfare. The offences for removing or altering electronic rights 
management information in s 132AR does do not contain such an element, and the very low 
threshold required to attract criminal liability falls far below an unreasonable risk of substantial 
harm occurring. The other offences in Part V Division 5 Subdivision F do have elements which require 
a commercial intention, but can also be applied a communication which does not need a commercial 
intention. This means that these offences can be partially justified. The offence for communicating 
copies after electronic rights management information has been removed can attract criminal 
liability where there has been no substantial harm caused to the incentive to produce or invest in 
production, so it cannot be legitimately justified. 
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The offences for decoding differ slightly since there is no policy aim to maintain access to 
subscription television, only to incentivise its continued operation. Where the offences require a 
commercial nexus there will still be substantial harm to the public welfare through the diversion of 
money to criminal enterprises. Although the remaining offences in ss 135ASA, 135ASF(1)(iii), 
135ASG, 135ASH and 135ASI do not require a commercial purpose or motivation, cannot be 
legitimately justified for causing harm to the public welfare since they can applied to conduct that 
falls short of removing the incentive to continue supplying subscription television. 
The threshold for criminal liability in the recording offences contained Part XIA is set at such a low 
level that they cannot be legitimately justified for causing harm to the public welfare by either of the 
qualifications. There is no commercial nexus in any of those offences nor does there need to be any 
harm actually caused at all. This is not to say that these offences could not be applied to recordings 
made or reproduced for commercial purposes or that cause enough harm to copyright owners that 
the incentive to authorise performances is damaged, but the offence sections are broad enough for 
criminal liability to attach to conduct that falls far short of either of these public interests. The 
offences for commercially dealing in unauthorised recording can be legitimately justified for causing 
substantial harm to the public interest, but the offences that create criminal liability for distribution, 
or an intention to distribute, to the extent that the distribution prejudicially harms the financial 
interests of the performer will not meet this qualification. Although this threshold is slightly higher 
than the equivalent offences for distributing infringing copies, it is still low enough to criminalise 
conduct that does not remove the incentive to perform. Offences containing these elements cannot 
be legitimately justified for causing harm to the public interest. 
[3.2.4] Conclusion 
In conclusion, all of the offences that contain commercial elements can be legitimately justified for 
causing substantial harm to the public welfare. The remaining offences for infringement or conduct 
for non-commercial purposes are not qualified by a requirement to cause enough harm to remove 
the incentives to produce, broadcast or perform copyright works, and therefore do not meet the 
threshold for their legitimate justification. 
[3.4] Overall Conclusion on Harm Assessment 
Table 7 below illustrates the assessment of harm completed in the previous two sections of this 
chapter. It shows that most of the offence sections can be legitimately justified for causing 
substantial harm to either the interests of copyright owners, broadcasters, performers or to the 
public welfare. There are a number of offences that fall short of this criteria, and need closer 
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attention. Some of these offences can be brought into the substantial harm category by simply 
adding a commercial nexus. Section 132AL for example, would be legitimised by adding an intention 
to sell, let for hire, etc. the infringing copy produced by the device. The same would be true of 
s 132AM for the supply of an infringing copy. As they stand, both offences can be applied to conduct 
that does not cause harm. This is of particular concern for s 132AL since the offence can attract a 
penalty of five years imprisonment on indictment. As the offence stands, being in possession of a 
computer, which can make an infringing copy of virtually any unprotected digital file, and forming 
the mental element of intending to make an infringing copy will activate the offence. There is no 
need to even make the infringing copy, let alone have a commercial motivation.  
The same argument applies to the offences for causing a work to be performed and causing a 
recording or film to be heard or seen in public. Although it might be usual for a place of public 
entertainment to charge some sort of entry fee or charge for the use of the facilities, it is not a 
requirement of the offences. The harm threshold is particularly low in the offences for making 
recordings of performance in Part XIA. This could also be addressed by requiring a commercial 
motivation or purpose for the offences to be complete. 
At least one of the offence sections could be partially repealed. The offences in sub-ss 132AI(2) and 
(5) for distributing an infringing copy to the extent that it affects prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright, would only be legitimately justified if the distribution met the threshold of substantial 
harm to the copyright owner. This harm threshold for distributing an infringing copy would be 
identical to the offences under s 132AC. Other offences that contain similar provisions for non-
commercial distribution would also need to raise the threshold to substantial harm to the copyright 
owner in order to be legitimately justified. 
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Table 7 Harm Principle Applied to Offence Sections 
Offence Sections Justified for causing substantial 
harm to copyright owners, 
broadcasters or performers? 
Justified for causing substantial harm to the 
public welfare? 
s 132AC Yes No 
ss 132AD – 132AG No Yes 
s 132AH (exc. sub-ss (1)(vii), 
(3)(vii) and (5)(vii)) 
No Yes 
s 132AH(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and 
(5)(vii) 
No No 
s 132AI(1), (3) and (7) No Yes 
s 132AI(2) and (5) No No 
s 132AJ (exc. sub-ss (1)(vii), 
(3)(vii) and (5)(vii)) 
No Yes 
s 132AJ(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and (5)(vii) No No 
ss 132AL – 132AO No No 
ss 132APC – 132APE No Yes 
s 132AQ No No 
s 132AR (exc. sub-ss (1)(b)(iii), 
(3)(b)(iii) and (5)(b)(iii)) 
No Yes 
s 132AR(1)(b)(iii), (3)(b)(iii) and 
(5)(b)(iii) 
No No 
s 132AS No Yes 
ss 135ASA – 135ASJ Yes Yes 
ss 248PA – 248 PH No No 
s 248PI No Yes 
s 248PJ(1), (4) and (7) No Yes 
s 248PJ(2) and (5) No No 
s 248PK (exc. sub-ss (1)(a)(iv) and 
(3)(a)(iv)) 
No Yes 
s 248PK (1)(a)(iv) and (3)(a)(iv) No No 
ss 248PL and 248PM No Yes 
ss 248QB and 248QC No No 
s 248QD No Yes 
s 248QE(1), (4) and (7) No Yes 
s 248QE(3) and (5) No No 
s 248QF (exc. sub-ss (1)(a)(iv) 
and (3)(a)(iv)) 
No Yes 
s 248QF (1)(a)(iv) and (3)(a)(iv) No No 
ss 248QG and 248QH No Yes 
  
In summary, to be legitimately justified according to the harm principle, where the offences can be 
applied to non-commercial activities, the offences either require the addition of a commercial 
element or a result element of substantial harm to the copyright owner. If these offences are not 
altered there is a risk that they will be perceived as illegitimate. 
The majority of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are tiered according to the culpability of 
the individual or corporation committing the offence, with a corresponding tiering of penalties. This 
has the potential to create serious criminal liability for conduct that has caused harm to neither 
copyright owner or to the public welfare, and conversely to only apply modest punishment to 
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offences that have caused substantial harm. Again, this creates a risk of the offences being perceived 
as illegitimate. 
[3.5] Social Norms Concerning Copyright Works 
Although theory predicts that social norms can be effective in controlling behaviour, the market for 
copyright works could not effectively function if the publishing industry were to rely solely on social 
norms as a restraint. Even if the CEO of The Walt Disney Company cared deeply about his company’s 
reputation among his competitors, it is unlikely that this would be sufficient for The Walt Disney 
Company to adhere to a social norm of “no copying” given the potential financial benefits of 
economic free-riding. The market would simply fail. However, at least some of the conditions for a 
social norm to emerge do exist. A “no copying” norm would maximise the aggregate welfare of the 
large media conglomerates, though it is arguable whether they could be reasonably regarded as a 
close-knit group which forms the second part of the Ellickson theory.1062 A “no copying” norm would 
certainly signal trustworthiness in cooperate ventures in accordance with the Posner theory of 
signalling,1063 but it is doubtful if there is a sufficient level of trading or cooperation that would make 
esteem withholding or boycotting an effective sanction.1064 The only sanction that would work to 
negate the benefit of free-riding is one that only the state can provide. A copyright owner cannot 
take any profits accumulated through a breach a “no copying” norm by force. Copyright law alone 
can provide the sanction that makes the parties “even”.1065 
It is evident that the various publishing industries regard the rules embodied in copyright law as 
being highly legitimate, and they certainly share the aggregate welfare that copyright law gives 
them. This can be described by social norm theory in two ways. Either copyright law is in fact the 
substantive social or business norms of the publishing industry codified in legislation,1066 or it is not 
                                                            
1062 Ellickson, R.C., Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle  Disputes (1991) 167 
1063 Posner, E.A., ‘Symbols, Signals and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 
765 
1064 Bernstein, L., ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ 
(1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115; Bernstein, L., ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765; 
Bernstein, L., ‘ The Questionable Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Strategy’ (1999) 66 
University of Chicago Law Review 710; Bernstein, L., ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2001) 99(7) Michigan Law Review 1724 
1065 In discussing the strategies of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Robert Ellickson and Axel Geisinger both claim that 
“evening-up” is the best strategy for ensuring future cooperative behavior: see See Ellickson R.C., Order  
Without Law: How Neighbours Settle  Disputes (1991) and Geisinger, A., ‘A Group Identity Theory of Social 
Norms and Its Implications’ (2003) 78 Tulane Law Review 605 
1066 This view is indirectly supported by a number of scholars who have commented about the influence the 
publishing industries have wielded in the legislative process: see – Litman, J.D., Digital Copyright (2001) 35; 
Litman, J.D., ‘Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History’ (1987) 72 Cornell Law Review 857, 903; Patry, 
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strictly speaking a substantive norm at all, because it relies upon the law to ensure compliance.  
Whichever view is correct, it is clear that there are ancillary norms in the publishing industry which 
determine the normative behaviour for a breach of the substantive law or norm. Evidence would 
suggest that the controller-seeking norm in the publishing industries is to use lawyers, and the 
remedial norm is to sue, or threaten to sue in order to reach a settlement. This at least appears to be 
true where the copyright infringer has the ability to pay sufficient damages or has made enough 
profit to make the legal process financially viable.1067 If this is not the case the controller-selecting 
norm may determine that the correct behaviour is to report the infringement to the police.1068 In 
support of the view that copyright law is in effect the legislated norms of the publishing industries 
there is evidence to support the idea that rights holders regard copyright law as their own. In 
Australia, after the case of Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty 
Limited (No 2),1069 the chief executives of four sporting bodies sought, and were granted, an 
audience with the Prime Minister of Australia, the Attorney-General, the Communications Minister 
and the Sports Minister to discuss making amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This 
occurred before the case was appealed successfully in the Full Federal Court.1070 The CEO of the 
National Rugby League was quoted as saying effectively that the law was wrong: 
“It is clear that the technology has overtaken the law. The previous changes to the Act were 
already expressed to protect the interest of copyright holders, and this development and the 
court decision supporting it, flies in the face of that.”1071 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
W.F., ‘Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective’ (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment 
Law Journal 139; Samuelson, P., ‘Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?’ in Takeyama, L. et 
al (eds), Development in the Economics of Copyright (2005); Jenson, C. ‘The More Things Change, the More 
They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 541 
(“The process of drafting copyright legislation often amounts to little more than negotiations among narrow 
interest groups; without a seat at the bargaining table, the public has no meaningful opportunity to participate 
in the legislative process. This process fosters the (often accurate) perception that copyright law is designed by 
and for the benefit of a small circle of vested interests.”) 
1067 Luttrell, S., ‘Copyright Enforcement in Australia’ (2008) 11 International Trade and Business Law Review 3, 
27 
1068 Luttrell, S., ‘Copyright Enforcement in Australia’ (2008) 11 International Trade and Business Law Review 3, 
27 (advocating this approach); Sugden, P., ‘You Can Click but You Can’t Hide: Copyright Pirates and Crime – The 
“Drink or Die” Prosecutions’ [2008](6) European Intellectual Property Review 220 
1069 Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 34; Knight, P., ‘TV Now or TV 
later? Case Note: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 34’ 
(2012) 24(8) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 202 
1070 National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 59; Hinchliffe, S. ‘Time for 
a Review of Automated Programmes and Free-to-air Services - Case Note; National Rugby League Investments 
Pty Ltd v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd’ (2012) 25(1) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 6 
1071 http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/sports-demand-protection-of-broadcast-rights-20120207-
1r5ko.html (Accessed 26 July 2012) 
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Many other groups comply with copyright law, such as librarians and traders who play music at their 
place of business, but even if the social norm of these groups is to obey the law of copyright, it 
would be unusual if the controller-seeking and remedial norms of these groups were the same as 
those of the publishing industry. It is far more likely that the controller-selecting norm would 
determine that it would be for the individual detecting the breach to enforce the remedial norm, 
which would most likely be to remind the infringer that they could be liable for copyright 
infringement. It would require an extreme belief in the legitimacy of copyright law for an individual 
to report the infringement to either the copyright owner or the police. 
For much of the history of copyright, the general population have not had access to the technology 
required to enable copyright infringement. The two ex ante facto regulatory mechanisms that Lessig 
describes,1072 the market and architecture, effectively restrained the ability of non-industrial actors 
to infringe copyright. The two ex post facto regulatory mechanisms,1073 the law and social norms, 
developed without the involvement of the public and among a narrow group of interested 
parties.1074 The public simply did not need to concern themselves with the ethics or lawfulness of 
copying, so would be very surprising if a “no-copying” norm developed in the various social groups 
that make up consumers of copyright works. None of the theories which explain the origins of 
norms1075 predict such a development. 
This does not mean that there was a total absence of norms concerning copyright works. The 
fundamental norm of reciprocity meant that within most social groups it would be permissible to 
share copyright works among friends, family and co-workers.1076 The lending of books, records and 
videotapes to friends would meet the conditions in all norm origin theories for it to develop. It 
maximises the aggregate welfare of the group, it signals a willingness to cooperate, and attracts 
esteem in the form of gratitude.  
The purchase and use of commercially pirated works presents a slightly more complex theoretical 
picture. There would be no real aggregate benefit for a social group if one of its members bought a 
                                                            
1072 Lessig, L., ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501, 510 
footnote 32 
1073 Lessig, L., ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review 501, 510 
footnote 32 
1074 Jenson, C. ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and 
Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 544 
1075 Ellickson, R.C., Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (1991); McAdams, R.H., ‘The Origin, 
Development and Regulation of Norms’ (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338; Posner, E.A., ‘Symbols, Signals 
and Social Norms in Politics and the Law’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 765 
1076 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 543 
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pirated work, but neither would there be any cost. Signalling theory and esteem theory might allow 
an “anti-pirated copy” norm to develop, since it might indicate that the purchaser was too cheap to 
buy a genuine copy. On the other hand, it might also indicate that the person had sufficient social 
connections to obtain an illicit copy. If the illicit copy was of an unreleased movie or was traded at a 
vastly cheaper price, esteem might be granted for the ingenuity of bypassing the copyright owner 
and obtaining a copy. Again it is unlikely that a strong “anti-pirated copy” norm would develop and 
more likely that a “tolerance norm” would develop.1077 This “tolerance norm” would probably be 
extended to the seller of the illicit work, so it would be unlikely that a remedial norm would go 
beyond showing a mild disapproval,1078 and equally unlikely for a controller-seeking norm to be to 
contact the authorities, unless perhaps the purchaser was “ripped-off” and could not obtain a 
refund.  
However, this does not mean that a norm that endorses commercial piracy would develop either. 
The social status of individuals conducting illegal businesses on the margins of society is perceived as 
fairly low. Selling an infringing copy does not signal a willingness to cooperate to the same extent as 
lending or gifting a copy. If Kahan’s global norm of reciprocity exists, the expected behaviour would 
be the swapping of infringing copies,1079 not the selling infringing copies. The introduction of money 
into the exchange puts it at arm’s length and the transaction changes from being one between 
members of a social group to a transaction between a vendor and a purchaser. It would be less likely 
for a purchaser to care if their vendor was sanctioned by the law than one of their friends, family 
members or co-workers, since the vendor would be less likely to form part of their social group. 
The introduction of home computers and the internet have had a profound effect on behaviour. 
Although private copying has been technologically possible since the introduction of domestic audio 
and video recorders in the 1970s, the volume of copies that could be made and distributed was 
                                                            
1077 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 544 discussing tolerance of file sharing (“While almost one-half 
of the American public believes that downloading copyrighted sound recordings from Napster, Gnutella, or the 
hybrids is morally wrong, there has been virtually no effort to use that sentiment to enforce laws against 
unauthorized downloading. Members of the public who believe that unauthorized downloading is theft have 
been unwilling to do anything to combat the practice. Nor has any social disapproval been directed at the 
millions of "thieves" who are stealing copyrighted content. File-swapping may well be like speeding on the 
freeway – widely tolerated, technical violation of a rule that invokes virtually no moral outrage when done in 
moderation”) 
1078 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 537 describing “the scorn that had previously been reserved for 
those who sold knock-off CDs on street corners.” 
1079 However, quite large networks engaging in this type of activity have been documented, even before the 
internet was available to domestic users: see - Irvine v Carson (1991) 22 IPR 107 and Irvine v Hanna-Rivero 
(1991) 23 IPR 295 
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limited by the architecture of the technology. The amount of distribution that occurred was mostly 
limited to small groups.1080 In any event, analogue technology could not produce copies that were of 
sufficient quality to act as substitutes for professionally produced copies. In contrast, digital 
reproduction produces exact copies. The demand for the physical containers diminished when 
people began to store their collections of music on the hard drives of their computers and their 
iPods. Instead of lending CD to a friend, it was possible to burn a copy for them instead at very little 
cost. The introduction of the internet and file sharing technology meant that individuals no longer 
needed to rely on their social group as a source for copies. Essentially, the ante-facto constraints on 
behaviour, architecture and the market, were removed within relatively short period of time.1081 
This has left social norms and the law as the only remaining constraints to prevent commercial scale 
copying and distribution by individuals.1082 
The existing norms about the use of copyright works have done little to constrain behaviour. The 
absence of a “no-copying” norm among most social groups has meant that very few individuals will 
have experienced a loss of esteem from their social group for downloading a copyrighted work.1083 
Even if this were the case, file sharing is an activity that largely takes place in private 
surroundings1084 which means there is little opportunity for a “no-copying” norm to be detected or 
enforced.1085 Any guilt cost from an internalised “no-copying” norm is also likely to be greatly 
outweighed by the value of material that can be downloaded. 
                                                            
1080 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 543 
1081 Jenson, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and 
Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 557 
1082 Jenson, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and 
Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 556 
1083 Jenson, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and 
Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 563; Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and 
the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 544 
(“Known unauthorized downloaders are not shunned, blackballed, or otherwise subjected to any form of social 
sanction”); Feldman, Y. and Nadler, J., ‘The Law and Norms of File Sharing’ (2006) 43 San Diego Law Review 
577, 590 (“If the law prohibits behaviours that are widely known to be common, it may lose legitimacy or 
credibility. This lack of alignment is exacerbated with file sharing because its social approval is perceived as so 
prevalent the many otherwise law abiding people simply do not care whether the activity is legally 
prohibited”) 
1084 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 544 
1085 A reported exception to this occurred in 2004 when Texas judge William Adams beat his daughter Hillary 
with a belt for downloading infringing copies of works at home: see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/03/texas-judge-william-adams-beats-daugther (Accessed 27 July 
2012); http://abcnews.go.com/US/judge-beat-daughter-remorseful/story?id=14873563#.UBIeU5hvBBk 
(Accessed 27 July 2012); http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2056582/Judge-William-Adams-beats-
disabled-daughter-Hillary-16-YouTube-video.html (Accessed 27 July 2012). The outrage expressed in response 
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Professor Lior Strahilevitz provides an explanation for the more puzzling aspect of file sharing: why 
so many internet users would apparently upload material for others to download. Ellickson’s theory 
on the origins of norms only predicted that they would emerge in small-close knit groups where 
neighbour had the opportunity to observe each other’s behaviour and make judgements about 
whether the behaviour maximised the group’s aggregate welfare. These conditions would appear to 
be the antithesis of the internet. However as Strahilevtz explains, file sharing platforms have 
mimicked the conditions for the origin of a social norm by prominently displaying the amount of 
users who are contributing to the pool of infringing copies, but masking the many downloaders who 
contribute nothing. This has the effect of creating an appearance that file sharing is the norm and 
that reciprocity is expected. Strahilevitz explains that reciprocating can alleviate feelings of guilt 
about being indebted to someone who has given something for free, even if this meant helping a 
third person.1086 This reciprocity cascades further solidifying reciprocating behaviour and avoids a 
“tragedy of the commons” from occurring. 
This has meant that the operators of file sharing platforms have been effective “norm 
entrepreneurs”, individuals who tap into existing norms and change them. Even the terminology 
used fosters a belief that the activity is normatively acceptable. The words “file sharing” connote 
cooperative and altruistic behaviour; “file stealing” would not. The publishing industries have also 
clearly made efforts to be “norm entrepreneurs”, with a number of campaigns seeking to persuade 
consumers that piracy is harmful and should be condemned as stealing.1087 However these appear to 
have been unsuccessful in persuading the general public to treat copyright law with the same 
respect as the publishing industries do.1088 This may be due to the perception that a powerful group 
is attempting to manipulate them, which Lessig contends leads to strong resistance to the 
manipulation. 1089 Even though there is a manipulation of perception by file sharing “norm 
entrepreneurs”, they are not perceived as a powerful group and therefore their message is not 
treated as suspect. The economics of file sharing can also explain why a norm permitting it has taken 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
to this story supports the Ellickson theory that selecting the wrong remedy can breach an ancillary remedial 
norm, triggering a remedial norm of disapproval.  
1086 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping 
Networks’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 505, 563 
1087 Loughlan P., ‘“You Wouldn’t Steal a Car”: Intellectual Property and the Language of Theft’ [2007] 10 
European Intellectual Property Review  401; Reyman J., The Rhetoric of Intellectual Property: Copyright Law 
and the Regulation of Digital Culture (2010); Sterk, S. E., ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94(5) 
Michigan Law Review 1197; Yu, P., ‘Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric’ (2011) 13(4) Vanderbilt Journal 
of Entertainment and Technology Law 881 
1088 Neri, G., ‘Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms - Unauthorized Music Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms’ 
(2004) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 733, 735 
1089 Lessig, L., ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 943, 1017 
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hold. As Professor Tim Wu correctly points out, complying with copyright law may serve the 
collective interest, but it is not in any given individual’s or sub group’s economic interest to 
comply.1090 Creating an environment that limits the evasion of copyright to an “in” group “is to live 
the game theorist’s version of utopia”.1091  It may well be the case that the maximisation of the 
aggregate welfare of file sharers is so large, 1092  that the requirement in Ellickson’s theory for there 
to be a close-knit group for a norm to develop is negated entirely or diminished.  
It is clear that social norms concerning the use of copyright works and other related rights vary 
according to the purpose for which they are used by social groups. For those who rely on the 
protection of copyright to generate income from works, there is a strong social norm that supports 
strict adherence to copyright law. The social norms of groups who use copyright for commercial 
purposes differ since copyright works are used for the purpose of enhancing the trade in other 
goods and services, rather than the trade in copyright works. In Australia at least, there is a high 
compliance rate with copyright law within this group. The role of social norms in supporting this 
conformity to copyright law is unclear, but the risk of non-compliance is usually outweighed by the 
benefits accrued from compliance. 
The social norms of consumers are different again. There is substantially less risk of the application 
of external sanctions to deter copyright infringement, so social norms are at the forefront of 
informing behaviour about copyright works. It would appear that far from sanctioning copyright 
infringement, the social norms of consumers either tolerate or support non-commercial private 
copying and distribution. The benefit of engaging in this behaviour, for both individuals and large 
online social groups, far outweighs the risks of legal sanctions being applied. On the other hand, 
commercial infringement is not supported by the social norms of consumers, but the norms of 
sanctioning such behaviour are weak. 
[3.5.1] Application to the Current Offences 
The application of the social norms of consumers to the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) is as 
simple as the social norm itself. Where an offence can be directed at non-commercial infringement 
of copyright or related rights, social norms will be at variance with the offence. This will mean that 
the behaviour that the offence prohibits will not be deterred unless there is a significant increase in 
the enforcement of the law or the social norm can be changed. Table 8 below illustrates the offences 
                                                            
1090 Wu, T., ‘When Code Isn't Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 679, 746 
1091 Wu, T., ‘When Code Isn't Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 679, 746 
1092 Wu, T., ‘When Code Isn't Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 679, 746 (“The intuitive answer is that 
everyone likes things for free […]) 
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where this gap between the law and norms exists, as an addition to the table illustrating the 
justifications for the offences for causing substantial harm in paragraph [3. 4]. As the table shows, 
there is a correlation between offences that can be legitimately justified for causing substantial harm 
to the public welfare and the social norms of consumers. Section 132AC provides an interesting 
problem area. Although the offence can be legitimately justified for causing substantial harm to a 
copyright owner, the absence of a commercial element to the offence put it at odds with the social 
norms of consumers. This supports the view taken by Christopher Jensen that the absence of a close 
relationship between the groups that produce copyright works and the consumers of that work will 
fail to produce a social norm that would sanction harming the producer of the copyright work.1093 
This differs from the view taken by Lior Strahilevitz, who suggests that “close-knittedness” is not 
always necessary to form a social norm. 1094 
  
                                                            
1093 Jenson, C. ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and 
Social Norms’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 531, 540 (“[…] there are victims of copyright infringement. In 
particular, the human (as opposed to corporate) victims of copyright infringement are the authors, composers, 
and other artists who would otherwise receive royalties from the use of their works. Nevertheless, these 
victims, where they exist, do not live next door to the online file-sharer; in fact, they are unlikely to ever meet. 
Thus, whereas Ellickson found that close-knit groups like the ranchers of Shasta County “develop and maintain 
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs 
with one another,” copyright law cannot fall back on this network of social relationships to enforce or 
supplement the content of the positive law.”) 
1094 Strahilevitz, L.J., ‘Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups’ (2003) 70 University of 
Chicago Law Review 359 
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Table 8 Harm Principle and Social Norms Applied to Offence Sections 
Offence Sections Justified for causing 
substantial harm to 
copyright owners, 
broadcasters or 
performers? 
Justified for causing 
substantial harm to the 
public welfare? 
Gap between social norms of 
consumers and law? 
s 132AC Yes No Yes 
ss 132AD – 132AG No Yes No 
s 132AH (exc. sub-ss 
(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and (5)(vii)) 
No Yes No 
s 132AH(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and 
(5)(vii) 
No No Yes 
s 132AI(1), (3) and (7) No Yes No 
s 132AI(2) and (5) No No Yes 
s 132AJ (exc. sub-ss 
(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and (5)(vii)) 
No Yes No 
s 132AJ(1)(vii), (3)(vii) and 
(5)(vii) 
No No Yes 
ss 132AL – 132AO No No Yes 
ss 132APC – 132APE No Yes No 
s 132AQ No No Yes 
s 132AR (exc. sub-ss 
(1)(b)(iii), (3)(b)(iii) and 
(5)(b)(iii)) 
No Yes No 
s 132AR(1)(b)(iii), (3)(b)(iii) 
and (5)(b)(iii) 
No No Yes 
s 132AS No Yes No 
ss 135ASA – 135ASJ Yes Yes No 
ss 248PA – 248 PH No No Yes 
s 248PI No Yes No 
s 248PJ(1), (4) and (7) No Yes No 
s 248PJ(2) and (5) No No Yes 
s 248PK (exc. sub-ss 
(1)(a)(iv) and (3)(a)(iv)) 
No Yes No 
s 248PK (1)(a)(iv) and 
(3)(a)(iv) 
No No Yes 
ss 248PL and 248PM No Yes No 
ss 248QB and 248QC No No Yes 
s 248QD No Yes No 
s 248QE(1), (4) and (7) No Yes No 
s 248QE(3) and (5) No No Yes 
s 248QF (exc. sub-ss 
(1)(a)(iv) and (3)(a)(iv)) 
No Yes No 
s 248QF (1)(a)(iv) and 
(3)(a)(iv) 
No No Yes 
ss 248QG and 248QH No Yes No 
 
One explanation is that the social groups to which Strahilevitz refers are engaging in behaviour that 
is more mutually beneficial for the individuals in that group that the interaction between copyright 
producers and consumers despite both relationships being “loose-knitted”.  However, s 132AC 
provides a rare opportunity for law enforcement to engage in effective norm entrepreneurship. If 
the offence is used judiciously in cases of extremely large scale online file sharing, a norm could 
emerge that sanctions “greedy” file sharing: downloading more material than can be possibly be 
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used. If this could be coupled with signalling through the expressive function of the law that less 
harmful copyright infringement can be tolerated, there is a chance that the law can be aligned with 
social norms and begin to guide them. 
[4] Recommendations for More Fundamental Changes 
While the remedial recommendations set out above will resolve the most egregious flaws in the 
current offence regime, the more fundamental theoretical problems identified in Chapter 3 are not 
as easily addressed. The gap between the social norms of consumers and the law of copyright 
cannot be plugged by criminal sanctions. The only real and permanent solution to this problem 
would be to redraft the law of copyright so that the social norms and practices of consumers are 
able to function within the law, and would need to permit private copying and distribution using the 
Internet. While this would promote the public welfare interest in maintaining and maximising access 
to works, it could cause great difficulties in incentivising authors, artists and investors. It would 
involve the adoption of new business models across a variety of sectors that presently use the law of 
copyright for protection. 
The monopoly granted by copyright is not the only model for raising revenue for artistic product or 
incentivising work. For example, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation is funded directly from 
appropriations of the Federal Government1095 and the British Broadcasting Corporation receives 
funding from the licensing of television reception equipment,1096 which now includes computers 
capable of receiving television signals through internet connections.1097 Direct funding for authors 
could be achieved through taxation and a system of measuring the quantity of downloaded works. 
William Fisher advocates such a solution in Promises to Keep.1098 Such ambitious proposals such as 
this would involve a transnational overhaul of the copyright system, which would require new 
international treaties to replace or amend the International Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (“the Berne Convention”),1099 the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
Copyright Treaty (“the WIPO Copyright Treaty”),1100 the World Trade Organisation Agreement on 
                                                            
1095Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth) s 67; 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/sp/fundingabc.htm (Accessed 27 April 2011) 
1096 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/licencefee/ (Accessed 19 May 2011) 
1097 The Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004 (England and Wales) reg 9 
1098 Fisher, W., Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (2004) 
1099 International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 
September 1886, 1 LNTS 218 
1100 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 20 December 1996, [2007] 
ATS 26 
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Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (“the TRIPS Agreement”),1101 the International Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (“the 
Rome Convention”),1102 the World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (“the WPPT”)1103 and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.1104 The practical difficulties in 
implementing such a change could not be overstated. It would be virtually impossible for the 
Australian Parliament to unilaterally change the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) so radically, without 
breaching its obligations under the above mentioned treaties. 
While bringing about changes which would align the law with social norm theory would be 
extremely difficult for the Australian Parliament, there would be less difficulty in bring the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) partially in line with harm theory. As this thesis has shown, the scope of the current 
offence regime in Australia is so wide that it has criminalised even the most trivial instances of 
copyright infringement which do not cause substantial harm to either the copyright owner or to the 
public welfare. Redrafting the offence provisions to incorporate the harm principle would still allow 
prosecutions to proceed against copyright infringement that causes genuine and substantial harm to 
copyright owners and to the public welfare, but would alleviate the risk of criminal prosecution for 
individuals and businesses who engage in low-level infringement which can be still be dealt with by 
the civil courts. Such changes could be made within Australia’s treaty obligations. 
[4.1] Incorporating the Harm Principle 
Incorporating the harm principle into the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) would not be a radical or 
revolutionary step for Parliament to take. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3 above, ss 132AC and 
132AI contain offences that have result elements which require harm of some degree to be proven 
in order for the offence to be complete. However, and with particular reference to s 132AI, the 
degree of harm required under these sections is not entirely clear and could well be interpreted to 
be at a level which would be below the theoretical level of “substantial harm”. One obvious option 
might be to incorporate a result element into each of the offences which requires that the conduct 
causes substantial harm to the interests of the copyright owner. This option, while probably being 
the closest to follow the harm principle theory, might not be greeted favourably by prosecutors who 
                                                            
1101 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 
299 
1102 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations, opened for signature 26 October 1962, 496 UNTS 43 
1103 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty, opened for signature 20 
December 1996, [2007] ATS 27 
1104 Australia-US Free-Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 
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would have to go about proving that substantial harm had occurred, nor would it be consistent with 
Australia’s treaty obligations. Before a more workable and practical  solution can be tendered, it is 
useful at this point to examine and contour Australia’s treaty obligations to implement criminal 
sanctions for copyright infringement, so that any recommendation will satisfy those obligations. 
[4.2] Treaty Obligations for Criminal Enforcement 
Australia has entered into several treaties which carry obligations related to copyright, among them 
the Berne Convention,1105 the WIPO Copyright Treaty,1106 the TRIPS Agreement,1107 the Rome 
Convention,1108 the WPPT1109 and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement.1110 Of these only the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement contain specific obligations for criminal 
procedures and penalties.1111 The WIPO Copyright Treaty requires that contracting parties ensure 
that enforcement procedures are available that permit effective action against infringement, 
including remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringement, but makes no requirement 
for this to be a criminal proceeding. 
Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement requires member states to provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale, with 
penalties including imprisonment or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistent with 
the level of penalties applied for crime of a corresponding gravity.1112 
This obligation covers the same ground as Article 17.11.26(a) of the Australia-US Free Trade 
Agreement, but Article 17.11.26(a) goes on to define “wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale” 
to include “significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no direct or indirect motivation of 
financial gain”1113 and “wilful infringements for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial 
                                                            
1105 International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 
September 1886, 1 LNTS 218 
1106 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty, opened for signature 20 December 1996, [2007] 
ATS 26 
1107 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 
299 
1108 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations, opened for signature 26 October 1962, 496 UNTS 43 
1109 World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances and Phonograms Treaty, opened for signature 20 
December 1996, [2007] ATS 27 
1110 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1 
1111 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 
299, art 61; Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17 
1112 Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 
299, art 61 
1113 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.11.26(a) 
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gain”.1114 Australia is also obligated under the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement to provide for 
criminal procedures for various acts concerning effective technological protection measures under 
Article 17.4.7,1115 and rights management information under Article 17.4.8 ,1116 if the acts are 
committed wilfully and for commercial advantage or for financial gain.1117 Further, under Article 
17.7, Australia is obligated to make criminal offences of various acts related to the supply of 
unauthorised encryption devices if a person knows or has reason to know that the device is primarily 
of assistance in decoding an encrypted program-carrying satellite signal.1118 Australia is also required 
to make it an offence to receive and make use of, or further distribute, such a signal if it is done 
wilfully and knowing that the signal has been decoded without the authorisation of the lawful 
distributor.1119 
As previously discussed, section 132AC of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) purports to discharge 
Australia’s obligations under Article 17.26.11 of the Agreement which are not discharged by the 
criminal offences existing at the time of the Treaty. Sections 132APC, 132APD and 132APE discharge 
obligations arising under Article 17.4.7; ss 132AQ, 132AR, 132AS and 132AT discharge obligations 
under Article 17.4.8; and the offences under Part VAA discharge obligations under Article 17.7. 
However, when the scope of the Australian offences are compared to that of the US copyright 
offences, it is clear that Australia’s treaty obligations can be discharged with offence provisions that 
would at least be partially consistent with the harm principle theory and that the Australian 
copyright offences are far from harmonised with the United States offences. 
[4.3] Copyright and Related Offences in US Law Compared 
The United States copyright offences are to be found in Title 17 of the Code of Laws of the United 
States of America (“the U.S. Code”). In contrast to the Australian offence provisions, the U.S. Code 
contains relatively few offence sections:  
(1) Chapter 5 §506, which deals with direct and indirect infringement, placement of fraudulent 
copyright notices, fraudulent removal of copyright notices, and false representations in 
connection with registration applications; and  
                                                            
1114 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.11.26(a) 
1115 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7 
1116 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.8 
1117 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.7; Australia-US Free-Trade 
Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.4.8 
1118 Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.7 
1119 Australia-US Free-Trade Agreement 18 May 2004, [2005] ATS 1, art 17.7 
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(2) Chapter 12 §1204, which criminalises circumvention of copyright protection systems and 
impairing the integrity of copyright management information. 
 These offence sections discharge obligations under the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement. In 
addition, the U.S. Code also contains offences for the unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in 
sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances at § 2319A, and for the 
unauthorized recording of motion pictures in a motion picture exhibition facility at § 2319B.  
[4.3.1] Title 17 Chapter 5 §506  
The first noteworthy observation about §506 is how closely the language and structure of the 
section resembles Article 17.11.26 of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement. The terms “wilful 
infringement”, “commercial advantage” and “financial gain” are used in both documents, terms 
which were never previously used in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) until the implementation of the 
Australia-Us Free Trade Agreement. Other uses of these terms can be seen in free trade agreements 
that the United States has reached with other nations.1120 
Under §506(a)(1)(A) any person who wilfully infringes a copyright for the purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial gain is guilty of an offence. However §506(a)(1)(A) must be read in 
conjunction with Title 18 Chapter 113 §2319(b) which tiers the penalties for infringement. The term 
“financial gain” is defined in §501 as including the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of 
value, including the receipt of other copyright works.  
If either the reproduction or distribution right1121 is infringed, a person can be imprisoned for up to 
five years only if during any 180-day period, they have reproduced or distributed at least ten copies 
or phonorecords, of one or more copyright works, which have a total retail value of more than 
$2,500.1122 If the offense is a felony, and is a second or subsequent offense, the person may be 
imprisoned for up to ten years.1123 Infringements of any other right in the copyright for the purposes 
of commercial advantage or private financial gain can only attract a maximum penalty of one year 
imprisonment.1124 
                                                            
1120 Cf Chile-US Free Trade Agreement 6 June 2003, 42 ILM 1026, art 17.25.22; Morocco-US Free Trade 
Agreement 15 June 2004, 44 ILM 544, art 15.30.36; Singapore-US Free Trade Agreement 6 May 2003, 42 ILM 
1026; Central America-Dominican Republic-US Free Trade Agreement 28 January 2004, 43 ILM 514 
1121 Under Title 17 Chapter 1 §106(3), this right consists of distributing copies or phonographs of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. This right 
is subject to the limitations contained in §109. 
1122 18 USC §2319(b)(1) 
1123 18 USC §2319(b)(2) 
1124 18 USC §2319(b)(3) 
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If the wilful infringement was committed other than for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain, a person can still be prosecuted under §506(a)(1)(B), but only if the 
infringement was committed by reproduction or distribution, including distribution by electronic 
means.1125 The infringement can consist of a single copy of a single copyrighted work, but may be 
more than one copy of more than one work.1126 However, the total retail value of the work or works 
reproduced or distributed must be over 1000 US Dollars and must have occurred during any 180-day 
period.1127 Section 2319(c) applies to this section, and tiers the penalty in an identical manner to 
§2319(b), however the maximum terms of imprisonment are different for the felony offences: three 
years for a first offence consisting of 10 copies with a retail value of $2500 or more,1128 six years for a 
second or subsequent offence1129 and one year imprisonment for the basic offence.1130 
A more specific offence exists under §506(a)(1)(C) for the online distribution of a work being 
prepared for commercial distribution. For the offence to be complete, the person must have known 
or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. 
These offences discharge, or purport to discharge, the obligations the United States has under 
Article 17.11.29 of the Australia-US Free-Trade Agreement. There has been no claim by the 
Australian government that the U.S. offences are insufficient to implement the agreement. There 
are a number of points to be made when the §506 offences are compared to the Australian offence 
provisions.  
[4.3.2] Distribution Right under U.S. Law 
The distribution right in U.S. copyright law has no direct equivalent in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
and grants owners the right to distribute copies or phonographs of the work by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.1131 This right is limited by the first sale doctrine, which 
entitles the owner of a particular copy to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy, 
provided the copy has been made lawfully.1132 This means that if the work or phonorecord is an 
infringing copy, the distribution right is infringed. 
                                                            
1125 17 USC §506(1)(B) 
1126 17 USC §506(1)(B) 
1127 17 USC §506(1)(B) 
1128 18 USC §2319(c)(1) 
1129 18 USC §2319(c)(2) 
1130 18 USC §2319(c)(3) 
1131 17 USC §106(3) 
1132 17 USC §109(a) 
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An infringement of the distribution right in the United States would therefore cover the equivalent 
ground to a number of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) for dealing in infringing copies: 
selling or letting for hire;1133 importing commercially;1134 and distributing.1135 However, there 
appears to be no equivalent United States offences for possessing an infringing copy for commercial 
purposes,1136 offering an infringing copy for sale or hire,1137 making or possessing a device for making 
an infringing copy,1138 or advertising the supply of an infringing copy.1139 These Australian offences 
could perhaps find their equivalent in the United States if a person was charged with attempting or 
conspiring to infringe the distribution right, but these substantive Australian offences have similar 
extensions for inchoate offences, and so the scope of the extended Australian offences is still likely 
to be wider than that of the extended United States offence. 
[4.3.3] Wilfulness 
The §506 offences all require wilful infringement, which is in stark contrast to the Australian position 
of including strict liability offences and offences that contain negligence as an element. Some courts 
in the United States have suggested that “wilful” may only mean an intention to copy,1140 but the 
better view is that “wilfulness” should be construed as a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known 
legal duty”.1141 This significantly narrows the scope of the application of criminal offences in the 
United States. As discussed in Chapter 5 at paragraph [4.1], most of the offences under Part V 
Subdivision C contain an element that the copy is an infringing copy of a work or other subject 
matter. For an indictable offence to be complete it would have to be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that the accused was reckless as to that fact. For the summary offences it is only necessary to 
prove that the accused was negligent as to that fact, and for the strict liability offences is not 
                                                            
1133 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AE 
1134 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 132AH 
1135 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AI 
1136 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AJ 
1137 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AF 
1138 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AL 
1139 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AM 
1140 See Matthew Bender, Nimmer on Copyright : A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, vol 4 (at 15), §15.01, citing United States v  Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 
1943) ; United States v  Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976) 
1141 See Matthew Bender, Nimmer on Copyright : A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, vol 4 (at 15), §15.01, citing United States v  Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 
1049 (D. Neb. 1991) (acquitting defendant based on his subjective belief structure). See also United States v  
Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S. Ct. 3014, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1980); 
United States v  Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (promulgating jury instructions that "an act is done 
wilfully if done voluntarily and purposely and with specific intent to do that which the law forbids--that is to 
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law"); United States v  Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (similar jury instruction). 
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necessary to examine the state of mind at all. None of these standards are equivalent to the U.S. 
offence under §506. 
[4.3.4] The Harm Principle Applied in §506 
While the penalties for infringement in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are tiered according to the 
culpability of the defendant, the offences under United States law are tiered according to the value 
and type of infringement. The tiering of offences according to the value and type of infringement has 
allowed the United States to incorporate the harm principle theory up to a point, and to ensure that 
de minimus copyright infringement is not capable of being prosecuted as an offence. While under 
§506(a)(1)(A) any infringement committed for the purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain constitutes an offence, only an infringement of the reproduction or distribution right 
can attract a penalty of more than one year imprisonment, and only if at least ten copies are 
reproduced within a 180 day period with a total value of US$2500. 1142 Any other type of 
infringement for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain only attracts a 
maximum term of one year imprisonment. Neither the indictable nor summary offences under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) take account of the volume of the infringement, and can be punished by up 
to five years imprisonment or two years imprisonment respectively. For example, under 17 U.S.C. 
§506, infringing the copyright in a work by performing it in a place of public entertainment could 
only attract a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment if the defendant did so for the purposes 
of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Under s 132AN(3) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
a term of imprisonment of double that period could be imposed for the summary offence and five 
years for the indictable offence. 
Where the motivation for the infringement is non-commercial the difference is even starker. Under 
§506(a)(1)(B) an infringement that is wilfully committed for a purpose other than commercial 
advantage or private financial gain is only offence if:  
(1) the reproduction or distribution right is infringed;  
(2) the copies reproduced or distributed have a total retail value of more than $1000;  
(3) the infringement or infringements occur within a 180 day period.  
There are a number of offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that do not require the purpose of 
the infringement or the dealing in the infringing copy to be for gaining a commercial advantage or 
making a profit:  
                                                            
1142 18 USC §2319(b)(1) 
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(1) any conduct (including reproduction) that substantially prejudices the owner of the 
copyright and occurs on a commercial scale; 1143  
(2) offering or exposing an infringing copy for sale or hire by way of trade;1144  
(3) exhibiting an infringing copy in public by way of trade;1145  
(4) importing an infringing copy with the intention of either:  
(a) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire,1146  
(b) distributing it to the extent it affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright,1147  
(c) by way of trade exhibiting an infringing copy in public;1148  
(5) distributing an infringing copy to the extent it affects prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright; 1149  
(6) possessing an infringing copy;1150  
(7) causing a work to be performed publicly;1151 and  
(8) causing a recording or a film to be seen or heard in public.1152  
All of these offences can be committed negligently and some are strict liability offences. Only 
ss 132AC and 132AI have an element that requires the infringement to meet a threshold 
criterion,1153 but even here the criteria are not numerically formulated as they are under the U.S 
provisions. 
A number of these offences would not constitute a criminal act at all in the United States, let alone 
be capable of being triggered by infringements that did not reach the $1000 threshold. For example, 
even wilfully causing a recording or a film to be seen or heard in public could not be an offence 
under 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(B), but under s 132AO of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) the same conduct 
could constitute either an indictable, summary or strict liability offence. If we take the value of a 
Blu-ray film as being US$39.99, a person could deliberately reproduce and distribute up to 
                                                            
1143 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AC (1) and (3) 
1144 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AF (1), (4) and (7) 
1145 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AG (1), (4) and (7) 
1146 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AH (1)(iii), (3)(iii), (5)(iii) 
1147 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AH (1)(iv), (3)(iv), (5)(iv) 
1148 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AH (1)(viii), (3)(viii), (5)(viii) 
1149 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AI (2) and (4) 
1150 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AJ (1), (3) and (5). These offences do not even require actual infringement 
by the defendant, merely the possession of an infringing article for one or more purposes, some of which are 
purposes other than gaining a commercial advantage or profit, selling or letting for hire.  
1151 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AN (1) and (3) 
1152 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 132AO (1), (3) and (5) 
1153 Section 132AC requires that the infringements have a “substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the 
copyright” and “occur on a commercial scale”. Section 132AI requires that the “extent of the distribution 
affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright”. 
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twenty-five copies before criminal liability under 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(B) was imposed at all, up to 60 
copies before they could be sentenced to more than one year imprisonment, and then only for a 
maximum of three years for any more than that.1154  Under s 132AI(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) the same conduct would attract a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment if the extent 
of the distribution was taken to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright and the defendant 
was sufficiently culpable. If the reasoning of Magistrate Colin Mackintosh (as he was then) is taken 
up by Australian courts, who was considering virtually identical Hong Kong Ordinance in Hong-Kong 
Special Administrative Region v Chan Nai Ming,1155 far more than the dollar value of the infringed 
works can be considered when assessing whether the extent of the distribution affects the owner of 
the copyright prejudicially. In that case he stated: 
“Potential lost sales are not the only measure of prejudice.  There is, for instance, the movie 
rental market to be considered.  And copyright owners plainly suffer prejudice from such 
piracy as this beyond simply their sales figures.  The widespread existence of counterfeits 
tends to degrade the genuine article and undermines the business of copyright owners.  The 
technology has developed to such a point that the prejudice to the copyright owners when 
their films are distributed in this fashion [illicit BitTorrent distribution] is, in my judgment, 
manifest.”1156 
Including a minimum level of infringement, while not a perfect manifestation of the harm principle, 
prevents the criminalisation of at least some infringement that does not cause substantial harm to 
the copyright owner or to the public welfare. 
[4.3.5] TPM, ERM Information and Performers Rights 
While the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contains six offence sections concerning conduct related to 
technological protection measures (“TPMs”) and electronic rights management Information 
(“ERM”), the U.S. Code manages to cover the same ground with the single offence in 17 U.S.C. 
§1204. The offences operates in conjunction with 17 U.S.C. §1201 and 17 U.S.C. §1202 which 
describe violations regarding the circumvention of technological measures and copyright 
management information respectively. The underlying conduct is identical for both the civil 
remedies and the criminal penalties, but for the criminal penalty to apply, a violation of either §1201 
                                                            
1154 18 U.S.C §2319(c)(1) (“Any person who commits an offence under section 506(a)(1)(B) of title 17 shall be 
imprisoned not more than 3 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offence consists 
of the reproduction or distribution of 10 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, 
which have a total retail value of $2500 or more.”)  
1155 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142 
1156 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Chan Nai Ming [2005] 4 HKLRD 142, 152 
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or §1202 must be wilful and for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. The 
penalty for a first offence is a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for not more than 
five years, or both. For second or subsequent offences, the maximum penalties are doubled. 
Both the Australian TPM offences and 17 U.S.C. §1204 require that the offending conduct is 
committed for the purposes of some sort of commercial purpose: to gain a commercial advantage or 
profit under the Australian provisions; for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain under the U.S. Code.  However, as previous discussed in Chapter 6 at paragraphs [3] and [4], the 
TPM and ERM offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) do not require any commercial purpose for 
the offence to be complete. The level of culpability under both offence regimes also differs: 17 U.S.C. 
§1204 requires the wilful violation of §1201 or §1202, whereas all three of the ERM offence sections 
in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contain the usual three offences tiered according to culpability. 
The performer’s protection offences under Part XIA Division 3 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) have 
an equivalent offence in 18 U.S.C. §2319A, but this is dramatically narrower in scope. Whereas the 
Australian offences apply to any live performance, §2319A only applies to live musical performances. 
Once again the offence can only be committed if it is wilful and for the purposes of commercial 
advantage or private financial. As previously described in Chapter 7 at paragraphs [3] and [4], the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) has a range of offences which are tiered according to culpability, and a 
complicated regime of exception provisions. 
Although the application of the harm principle is not as clearly evident in the U.S. Code offences 
described above as it is for the offence under 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(B), the scope of the offences is far 
narrower than that of the Australian counterpart offences. 
[4.3.6] Summary of Comparison 
Of the copyright or related right offences in either the Australian or United States law, there are two 
offences that come closest to embodying the harm principle: s 132AC of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) and §506(a)(1)(B) of the U.S. Code. Both of these offences seek to filter infringement that does 
not cause substantial harm, but take different approaches to achieve this result. While s 132AC uses 
language that closely reflects the harm principle, requiring the prosecution to prove that the 
infringements have a “substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the copyright”, the absence of 
a definition of “substantial prejudicial impact” means that the ambiguity this phrase could renderer 
it open to a broader interpretation than is necessary.  
Section 506(a)(1)(B) avoids this ambiguity by using monetary limits for both the threshold of the 
offence, and for the penalties through 18 U.S.C. §2319(c). This has the advantage of providing a clear 
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line that puts potential offenders on notice and prevents overzealous prosecution. However, by 
setting an arbitrary threshold of US$1000, copyright owners who sell a few copies of low value work 
could still suffer substantial harm to their interests which would not be addressed by the criminal 
law. For instance, a painter or photographer may propose to sell a limited number of prints of their 
work. If they decided to reproduce ten copies and sell them for US$100 each, US$1000 would 
represent the totality of their market. A copyright infringer could reproduce nine copies and give 
them away without committing the offence. Despite this problem, it would be preferable for the 
public, large copyright owners and for prosecutors to have a clear demarcation between acts that 
are considered to cause substantial harm and those that do not. Any infringements that do not reach 
this threshold could obviously still be dealt with by the civil law.  
With the exception of 17 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)(B), all of the offences under the U.S. Code for the 
infringement of copyright, and for related rights, require the offence to be committed:  
(1) wilfully; and  
(2) for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.  
While it cannot be stated with certainty that all infringements of copyright or the related rights with 
a commercial purpose cause substantial harm to either copyright owners or the public welfare, once 
again a clear boundary is set which provides all interested parties with certainty. Criminalising 
commercial copyright infringement also addresses the harm that can be caused to the public welfare 
through illicit economic activity and the moral turpitude of such behaviour. 
If it is accepted that securing and maintaining a favourable trading relationship with the United 
States promotes the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth of Australia, it is 
vital that the obligations under Australia-US Free-Trade Agreement are discharged. Providing the 
copyright owners of the United States with the same protection as they enjoy in their own country is 
one of these obligations, including attempting to deter copyright infringement through criminal 
offences. But it is less clear if going beyond these obligations is in Australia’s national interest, or 
indeed if by doing so, Australia is put in a disadvantaged trading position with the United States. A 
definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but where there is this 
uncertainty it would be better to harmonise the criminal offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
with those under the United States law. The following section proposes how this might be achieved. 
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[4.4] Proposed Legislative Amendments 
The most sweeping change proposed is the repeal of all of the offences in Part V Division 5 
Subdivisions B, C and D, and enacting the following two offence provisions to replace those offences: 
“132AC Commercial infringement   
Indictable offence 
(1) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person makes, sells, lets for hire, imports or distributes 10 or more articles 
within a period of 180 days, with the intention of:  
(i) trading; or 
(ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
(b) the articles are infringing copies of 1 or more works or other subject matter with a 
total retail value of $2500 or more; 
(c) copyright subsists in the works or other subject-matters at the time of the making, 
selling, letting for hire, importation or distribution of the article. 
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 550 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Summary offence 
(3) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person engages in conduct with the intention of: 
(i) trading; or 
(ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
(b) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or other 
subject-matter. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 1 year, or both 
132AD Significant commercial-scale infringement 
Indictable offence 
(1) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person makes, imports or distributes 10 or more articles within a period of 180 
days; and 
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(b) the articles are infringing copies of 1 or more works or other subject matter with a 
total retail value of $2500 or more; and 
(c) copyright subsists in the works or other subject-matters at the time of the making, 
importation or distribution of the article. 
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 550 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both. 
Summary offence 
(3) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person makes, imports or distributes 1 or more articles within a period of 180 
days; and 
(b) the articles are infringing copies of 1 or more works or other subject matter with a 
total retail value of $1000 or more; and 
(c) copyright subsists in the works or other subject-matters at the time of the making, 
importation or distribution of the article. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 1 year, or both.” 
The two offence provisions above would harmonise the offence provisions of the United States and 
Australia that concern direct and indirect copyright infringement. The enhanced penalties for a 
second or subsequent offence that are found under the U.S. Code are not included here, nor is the 
enhanced penalty for converting a work or other subject matter from analogue from into a digital 
form under s 132AK of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The Australia-US Free-Trade Agreement has no 
such requirement for enhanced penalties. Much of the subject areas of the existing Australian 
offences provision would remain, however the scope of the offences is substantially reduced by 
tiering the penalty to be consistent with the harm caused, rather than the culpability of the 
defendant.  All circumstance and result elements of these offences would require recklessness as the 
corresponding fault element which would be consistent with the offences under 17 U.S.C. §506. The 
current offence provisions for possessing an infringing copy for commercial purposes,1157 offering an 
infringing copy for sale or hire,1158 making or possessing a device for making an infringing copy,1159 
                                                            
1157 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AJ 
1158 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AF 
1159 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AL 
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and advertising the supply of an infringing copy1160 would no longer constitute criminal offences, 
which again would harmonise the scope of the Australian and United States criminal provisions. 
In order to be consistent with the scope of the offence under 17 U.S.C. §1201, the offences under 
Part V Division 5 Subdivision F would need to be repealed and replaced with the following: 
“132AQ Removing or altering electronic rights management information 
 Indictable offence 
(1) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
(b) either: 
(i) the person removes, from a copy of the work or subject-matter, with the 
intention of trading, obtaining a commercial advantage or profit, any 
electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter; or 
(ii) the person alters, with the intention of trading, obtaining a commercial 
advantage or profit, any electronic rights management information that 
relates to the work or subject-matter; and 
(c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright; and 
(d) the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of 
the copyright. 
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 550 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
132AR Distributing, importing or communicating copies after removal or alteration of 
electronic rights management information 
 Indictable offence 
(1) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
(b) the person does any of the following acts in relation to the work or subject-matter: 
                                                            
1160 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s  132AM 
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(i) distributes a copy of the work or subject-matter with the intention of 
trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
(ii) imports a copy of the work or subject-matter into Australia with the 
intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
(iii) communicates a copy of the work or subject-matter to the public with the 
intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
(c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright; and 
(d) either:  
(i) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been removed from the copy of the work or subject-
matter; or 
(ii) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been altered; 
without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright; 
and 
(e) the person knows that the information has been removed or altered without that 
permission; and 
(f) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 550 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
132AS Distributing, importing electronic rights management information 
 Indictable offence 
(1) A person commits an offence if: 
(a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
(b) the person does any of the following acts in relation to electronic rights 
management information that relates to the work or subject-matter: 
(i) distributes the electronic rights management information with the intention 
of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
(ii) imports the electronic rights management information into Australia with 
the intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
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(c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright; and 
(d) either:  
(i) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or subject-
matter without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright; or 
(ii) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or subject-
matter with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright but the information has been altered without that permission; and 
(e) the person knows that the information has been removed or altered without that 
permission; and 
(f) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
(2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 550 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.” 
This amendment would remove the summary and strict liability offences and ensure that there must 
be an intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit. 
[5] Conclusion 
The majority of offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) criminalise conduct that causes substantial 
harm to the interests of copyright owners, broadcasters and performers. This could legitimately 
justify the offences, where it not for the fact that they also create criminal liability for less harmful or 
entirely harmless activities. All of the offences require a commercial purpose can be legitimately 
justified for causing substantial harm to the public welfare since the conduct that these offences 
address results in illicit income. The remaining offences for infringement or conduct for non-
commercial purposes are not qualified by a requirement to cause sufficient harm to remove the 
incentives to produce, broadcast or perform copyright works, and therefore do not meet the 
threshold for their legitimate justification for causing harm to the public welfare. 
Some section could be legitimised by the addition of a commercial element. Sections 132AL and 
132AM for example, would be legitimised by adding an intention to sell, let for hire, etc. As they 
stand, both offences can be applied to conduct that does not cause harm. This is of particular 
concern for s 132AL since the offence can attract a penalty of five years imprisonment on 
indictment. The same applies to the offences for causing a work to be performed and causing a 
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recording or film to be heard or seen in public. Although it might be usual for a place of public 
entertainment to charge some sort of entry fee or charge for the use of the facilities, it is not a 
requirement of the offences. The harm threshold is particularly low in the offences for making 
recordings of performance in Part XIA. This could also be addressed by requiring a commercial 
motivation or purpose for the offences to be complete. 
In summary, to be legitimately justified according to the harm principle, where the offences can be 
applied to non-commercial activities, the offences either require the addition of a commercial 
element or a result element of substantial harm to the copyright owner. If these offences are not 
altered there is a risk that they will be perceived as illegitimate. 
There is a large gap between the social norms of consumers and the offences in the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth). Where an offence can be directed at non-commercial infringement of copyright or 
related rights, social norms will be at variance with the offence. This means that the behaviour 
prohibited by the offence will not be deterred unless there is a significant increase in law 
enforcement activity or the social norm can be changed.  
The Australian Parliament has limited scope to make workable improvements to either the copyright 
system or to the enforcement of the system through the criminal law. The amendments proposed 
above will not only rebalance the mutual liabilities incurred by Australia’s treaty obligations with its 
main trading partners, but would also close the existing gap between the social norms of consumers 
and the law. The current Australian offences are far wider in scope than those of the United States. If 
the laws of both countries were to be enforced to the same extent, Australia would be in a 
disadvantaged position against one its major trading partners.1161 Enforcement costs would be 
greater, and far more Australians than Americans would acquire criminal records for essentially the 
same conduct. By harmonising its criminal law with that of the United States, Australia could meet 
its obligations without the burden of this disadvantage. 
The recommended changes to the legislation would address this problem and would make progress 
toward making the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) consistent with the harm principle. 
However, this would not address the problem of the gap between the social norms of consumers 
and the law, since the same gap exists between the copyright law of the United States and the social 
norms and practices of consumers. It is highly unlikely that increasing criminal liability will halt or 
slow the increase in infringement by non-commercial entities due to the current gap between the 
                                                            
1161 See Productivity Commission 2010, Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Research Report (2010), 164-
167 
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law of copyright and the social norms of consumers, and would actually aggravate this problem, 
further entrenching the norms. 
If the gap between social norms and the law can be narrowed, Parliament has a greater chance of 
changing social attitudes toward file sharing. The changes that have occurred in social norms 
regarding smoking, drink driving and seat belts show that it is not impossible to implement 
significant changes in the behaviour, attitudes and practices of the public. Careful “norm 
entrepreneurship” can modify social norms, but the law must be aligned with the existing norms in 
order to begin this process.    
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
While it is clear that copyright infringement is capable of substantially harming both the interests of 
rights holders and the public welfare, the scope of the offences in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), as 
they are currently drawn, is so broad that they are quite capable of being directed at conduct that 
does not substantially harm either interest. Theoretically, the best way to ensure that the offences 
are always legitimately justified would be to include a requirement to prove that substantial harm 
was caused by the conduct or, in the case of an attempted offence, that the result was intended. In 
reality, the costs of discharging such an evidential burden would be prohibitive in many cases. 
Although infringement for commercial purposes does not always cause substantial harm, it is the 
best candidate for a category of offences that can reasonably be assumed to cause some harm to 
the interests of both rights holders and to the public welfare. The harm caused by non-commercial 
infringement is less clear cut, and has the additional complication of advancing the public welfare 
through increased access to copyright works, without benefiting individuals who are operating illicit 
businesses. The social norms of most groups do not award esteem to such individuals, so the 
potential for a gap to exist between the social norms and the law is less likely. 
However, the gap between the law and social norms that permit, and even encourage, non-
commercial infringement, the breaking of TPMs, the stripping of ERM information and the recording 
of some performances, is substantial. Efforts to reshape these norms through the expressive 
function of law and by rhetorical campaign will be ineffective at best and will be more likely to 
achieve the opposite result than that which is intended. The gap simply makes these norms too 
“sticky”. The better approach will involve tolerating low level non-commercial infringement, thereby 
closing the gap and unstacking the norms. Only if the gap has been sufficiently closed will it be 
possible for legislators and copyright owners to act as “norm entrepreneurs”. Following the 
recommendations made in Chapter 8 will go some way to achieving this objective, particularly if the 
Australian copyright offences are adapted to more closely mirror the copyright offences in the 
United States. However, even this may not be sufficient since the tolerated maximum value of $1000 
within a 180 day period has been shown to be very easy to reach. 
The actions that the Australian government can take have been severely restricted by the various 
treaty obligations it has entered into. Unless agreement can be reached at an international level that 
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would permit a greater tolerance for non-commercial infringement, it is unlikely that Australia will 
be able to take legislative steps to close the gap between norms and the law, without breaching its 
existing obligations. All indications show that this is not likely to occur in the very near future, 
despite the recent recognition of deficiencies in intellectual property policy for the digital 
environment by the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Dr Francis 
Gurry.1162  
It would also appear that the silent majority are no longer prepared to remain silent, as 
demonstrated by the campaigns in the United States against the enactment of the Stop Online Piracy 
Act1163 and the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act.1164  Political parties are being formed that challenge the legitimacy of intellectual 
property. Professor Tim Wu has written that when groups do not want to comply with a law they 
react by either avoiding it or by organising to change the law.1165 These campaigns and organisations 
suggest that the avoidance that has taken place over the past fifteen years will be supplemented by 
efforts to change the law. We may yet see the type of public representation in the drafting of 
copyright law amendments advocated by Professor Jessica Litman in 2001.1166 
While the social norms of file sharing permit non-commercial infringement, these offences are 
unlikely to prevent the mass online infringement that commenced in 1999 with Napster. The 
offences may be more successful in assisting to prevent commercial infringement, but law 
enforcement is unlikely to receive the public involvement necessary to be fully effective. In 
summary, this thesis demonstrates that the offence provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) will 
not be fully effective in preventing copyright infringement and should be amended. Lord Templeton 
stated in CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics1167: 
“Whatever the reason for home copying, the beat of Sergeant Pepper and the soaring 
sounds of the Miserere from unlawful copies are more powerful than law-abiding instincts 
                                                            
1162 Dr Francis Gurry, ‘The Future of Copyright’ (Speech delivered at the Blue Sky Conference, Sydney, 25 
February 2011). Available at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/speeches/dg_blueskyconf_11.html 
(Accessed 26 August 2012) 
1163 H.R. 3261, 112th Congress (2011-2012) 
1164 S. 968, 112th Congress (2011-2012) 
1165 Wu, T., ‘When Code Isn't Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 679 
1166 Litman, J., Digital Copyright (2001) 
1167 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics [1988] 2 All ER 484 
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or twinges of conscience. A law which is treated with such contempt should be amended or 
repealed.”1168 
                                                            
1168 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics [1988] 2 All ER 484, 498 
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Appendix: Relevant Legislation 
The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
“Part 2.2—The elements of an offence 
Division 3—General 
3.1  Elements 
 (1) An offence consists of physical elements and fault elements. 
 (2) However, the law that creates the offence may provide that there is no fault element 
for one or more physical elements. 
 (3) The law that creates the offence may provide different fault elements for different 
physical elements. 
3.2  Establishing guilt in respect of offences 
  In order for a person to be found guilty of committing an offence the following must be 
proved: 
 (a) the existence of such physical elements as are, under the law creating the offence, 
relevant to establishing guilt; 
 (b) in respect of each such physical element for which a fault element is required, one 
of the fault elements for the physical element. 
Note 1: See Part 2.6 on proof of criminal responsibility. 
Note 2: See Part 2.7 on geographical jurisdiction.  
Division 4—Physical elements 
4.1  Physical elements 
 (1) A physical element of an offence may be: 
 (a) conduct; or 
 (b) a result of conduct; or 
 (c) a circumstance in which conduct, or a result of conduct, occurs. 
 (2) In this Code: 
conduct means an act, an omission to perform an act or a state of affairs. 
engage in conduct means: 
 (a) do an act; or 
 (b) omit to perform an act. 
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4.2  Voluntariness 
 (1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary. 
 (2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is. 
 (3) The following are examples of conduct that is not voluntary: 
 (a) a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement; 
 (b) an act performed during sleep or unconsciousness; 
 (c) an act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will 
to act. 
 (4) An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one which the 
person is capable of performing. 
 (5) If the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the state of 
affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable of exercising 
control. 
 (6) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether 
conduct is voluntary. 
 (7) Intoxication is self-induced unless it came about: 
 (a) involuntarily; or 
 (b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable 
mistake, duress or force. 
4.3  Omissions 
  An omission to perform an act can only be a physical element if: 
 (a) the law creating the offence makes it so; or  
 (b) the law creating the offence impliedly provides that the offence is committed by 
an omission to perform an act that by law there is a duty to perform. 
Division 5—Fault elements 
5.1  Fault elements 
 (1) A fault element for a particular physical element may be intention, knowledge, 
recklessness or negligence. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not prevent a law that creates a particular offence from specifying 
other fault elements for a physical element of that offence. 
5.2  Intention 
 (1) A person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that 
conduct. 
 (2) A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes that it exists 
or will exist. 
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 (3) A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
5.3  Knowledge 
  A person has knowledge of a circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists 
or will exist in the ordinary course of events. 
5.4  Recklessness 
 (1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if: 
 (a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; 
and 
 (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take 
the risk. 
 (2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if: 
 (a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and 
 (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take 
the risk. 
 (3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact. 
 (4) If recklessness is a fault element for a physical element of an offence, proof of intention, 
knowledge or recklessness will satisfy that fault element. 
5.5  Negligence 
  A person is negligent with respect to a physical element of an offence if his or her 
conduct involves: 
 (a) such a great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise in the circumstances; and 
 (b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist; 
that the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence. 
5.6  Offences that do not specify fault elements 
 (1) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element 
that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element. 
 (2) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element 
that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that 
physical element. 
Note: Under subsection 5.4(4), recklessness can be established by proving intention, knowledge or 
recklessness. 
Division 6—Cases where fault elements are not required 
6.1  Strict liability 
 (1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of strict 
liability: 
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 (a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and 
 (b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available. 
 (2) If a law that creates an offence provides that strict liability applies to a particular 
physical element of the offence: 
 (a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and 
 (b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is available in relation to that 
physical element. 
 (3) The existence of strict liability does not make any other defence unavailable. 
6.2  Absolute liability 
 (1) If a law that creates an offence provides that the offence is an offence of absolute 
liability: 
 (a) there are no fault elements for any of the physical elements of the offence; and 
 (b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable. 
 (2) If a law that creates an offence provides that absolute liability applies to a particular 
physical element of the offence: 
 (a) there are no fault elements for that physical element; and 
 (b) the defence of mistake of fact under section 9.2 is unavailable in relation to that 
physical element. 
 (3) The existence of absolute liability does not make any other defence unavailable. 
Division 9—Circumstances involving mistake or ignorance 
9.1  Mistake or ignorance of fact (fault elements other than negligence) 
 (1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for 
which there is a fault element other than negligence if: 
 (a) at the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the person is under 
a mistaken belief about, or is ignorant of, facts; and 
 (b) the existence of that mistaken belief or ignorance negates any fault element 
applying to that physical element. 
 (2) In determining whether a person was under a mistaken belief about, or was ignorant of, 
facts, the tribunal of fact may consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
9.2  Mistake of fact (strict liability) 
 (1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for 
which there is no fault element if: 
 (a) at or before the time of the conduct constituting the physical element, the 
person considered whether or not facts existed, and is under a mistaken but 
reasonable belief about those facts; and 
 (b) had those facts existed, the conduct would not have constituted an offence. 
 (2) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed if: 
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 (a) he or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts existed in 
the circumstances surrounding that occasion; and 
 (b) he or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding 
the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as those 
surrounding the previous occasion. 
 Note: Section 6.2 prevents this section applying in situations of absolute liability. 
9.3  Mistake or ignorance of statute law 
 (1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the 
conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the 
existence or content of an Act that directly or indirectly creates the offence or directly 
or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the 
offence in those circumstances, if the Act is expressly to the contrary effect. 
9.4  Mistake or ignorance of subordinate legislation 
 (1) A person can be criminally responsible for an offence even if, at the time of the 
conduct constituting the offence, he or she is mistaken about, or ignorant of, the 
existence or content of the subordinate legislation that directly or indirectly creates 
the offence or directly or indirectly affects the scope or operation of the offence. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply, and the person is not criminally responsible for the 
offence in those circumstances, if: 
 (a) the subordinate legislation is expressly to the contrary effect; or 
 (c) at the time of the conduct, the subordinate legislation: 
 (i) has not been made available to the public (by means of the Register under 
the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 or otherwise); and 
 (ii) has not otherwise been made available to persons likely to be affected by it 
in such a way that the person would have become aware of its contents by 
exercising due diligence. 
 (3) In this section: 
available includes available by sale. 
subordinate legislation means an instrument of a legislative character made directly or 
indirectly under an Act, or in force directly or indirectly under an Act. 
9.5  Claim of right 
 (1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element 
relating to property if: 
 (a) at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, the person is under a 
mistaken belief about a proprietary or possessory right; and 
 (b) the existence of that right would negate a fault element for any physical 
element of the offence. 
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 (2) A person is not criminally responsible for any other offence arising necessarily out of the 
exercise of the proprietary or possessory right that he or she mistakenly believes to 
exist. 
 (3) This section does not negate criminal responsibility for an offence relating to the use of 
force against a person. 
Part 2.4—Extensions of criminal responsibility 
Division 11   
11.1  Attempt 
 (1) A person who attempts to commit an offence is guilty of the offence of attempting to 
commit that offence and is punishable as if the offence attempted had been 
committed. 
 (2) For the person to be guilty, the person’s conduct must be more than merely 
preparatory to the commission of the offence. The question whether conduct is more 
than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence is one of fact. 
 (3) For the offence of attempting to commit an offence, intention and knowledge are fault 
elements in relation to each physical element of the offence attempted. 
Note: Under section 3.2, only one of the fault elements of intention or knowledge would need to be 
established in respect of each physical element of the offence attempted. 
 (3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6A). 
 (4) A person may be found guilty even if: 
 (a) committing the offence attempted is impossible; or 
 (b) the person actually committed the offence attempted. 
 (5) A person who is found guilty of attempting to commit an offence cannot be 
subsequently charged with the completed offence. 
 (6) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to an offence 
apply also to the offence of attempting to commit that offence. 
 (6A) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of 
attempting to commit that offence. 
 (7) It is not an offence to attempt to commit an offence against section 11.2 (complicity 
and common purpose), section 11.2A (joint commission), section 11.3 (commission by 
proxy), section 11.5 (conspiracy to commit an offence) or section 135.4 (conspiracy to 
defraud). 
11.2  Complicity and common purpose 
 (1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by 
another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable 
accordingly. 
 (2) For the person to be guilty: 
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 (a) the person’s conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled or procured the 
commission of the offence by the other person; and 
 (b) the offence must have been committed by the other person. 
 (3) For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that: 
 (a) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any 
offence (including its fault elements) of the type the other person committed; or 
 (b) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an 
offence and have been reckless about the commission of the offence (including its 
fault elements) that the other person in fact committed. 
 (3A) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (6). 
 (4) A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of an offence if, before the offence was committed, the person: 
 (a) terminated his or her involvement; and 
 (b) took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence. 
 (5) A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the 
commission of an offence even if the other person has not been prosecuted or has not 
been found guilty. 
 (6) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of 
subsection (1). 
 (7) If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person either: 
 (a) is guilty of a particular offence otherwise than because of the operation of 
subsection (1); or 
 (b) is guilty of that offence because of the operation of subsection (1); 
but is not able to determine which, the trier of fact may nonetheless find the person 
guilty of that offence. 
11.2A  Joint commission 
Joint commission 
 (1) If: 
 (a) a person and at least one other party enter into an agreement to commit an 
offence; and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) an offence is committed in accordance with the agreement (within the 
meaning of subsection (2)); or 
 (ii) an offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement (within 
the meaning of subsection (3)); 
the person is taken to have committed the joint offence referred to in whichever of 
subsection (2) or (3) applies and is punishable accordingly. 
Offence committed in accordance with the agreement 
 (2) An offence is committed in accordance with the agreement if: 
  
308 
 (a) the conduct of one or more parties in accordance with the agreement makes up 
the physical elements consisting of conduct of an offence (the joint offence) of the 
same type as the offence agreed to; and 
 (b) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a result of 
conduct—that result arises from the conduct engaged in; and 
 (c) to the extent that a physical element of the joint offence consists of a 
circumstance—the conduct engaged in, or a result of the conduct engaged in, 
occurs in that circumstance. 
Offence committed in the course of carrying out the agreement 
 (3) An offence is committed in the course of carrying out the agreement if the person is 
reckless about the commission of an offence (the joint offence) that another party in 
fact commits in the course of carrying out the agreement. 
Intention to commit an offence 
 (4) For a person to be guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section, the 
person and at least one other party to the agreement must have intended that an 
offence would be committed under the agreement. 
Agreement may be non-verbal etc. 
 (5) The agreement: 
 (a) may consist of a non-verbal understanding; and 
 (b) may be entered into before, or at the same time as, the conduct constituting any 
of the physical elements of the joint offence was engaged in. 
Termination of involvement etc. 
 (6) A person cannot be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section 
if, before the conduct constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence 
concerned was engaged in, the person: 
 (a) terminated his or her involvement; and 
 (b) took all reasonable steps to prevent that conduct from being engaged in. 
Person may be found guilty even if another party not prosecuted etc. 
 (7) A person may be found guilty of an offence because of the operation of this section 
even if: 
 (a) another party to the agreement has not been prosecuted or has not been found 
guilty; or 
 (b) the person was not present when any of the conduct constituting the physical 
elements of the joint offence was engaged in. 
Special liability provisions apply 
 (8) Any special liability provisions that apply to the joint offence apply also for the purposes 
of determining whether a person is guilty of that offence because of the operation of 
this section. 
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11.3  Commission by proxy 
  A person who: 
 (a) has, in relation to each physical element of an offence, a fault element 
applicable to that physical element; and 
 (b) procures conduct of another person that (whether or not together with conduct 
of the procurer) would have constituted an offence on the part of the procurer if 
the procurer had engaged in it; 
is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly. 
11.4  Incitement 
 (1) A person who urges the commission of an offence is guilty of the offence of 
incitement. 
 (2) For the person to be guilty, the person must intend that the offence incited be 
committed. 
 (2A) Subsection (2) has effect subject to subsection (4A). 
 (3) A person may be found guilty even if committing the offence incited is impossible. 
 (4) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to an offence 
apply also to the offence of incitement in respect of that offence. 
 (4A) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of 
incitement in respect of that offence. 
 (5) It is not an offence to incite the commission of an offence against section 11.1 
(attempt), this section or section 11.5 (conspiracy). 
Penalty: 
 (a) if the offence incited is punishable by life imprisonment—imprisonment for 10 
years; or 
 (b) if the offence incited is punishable by imprisonment for 14 years or more, but is 
not punishable by life imprisonment—imprisonment for 7 years; or 
 (c) if the offence incited is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more, but is 
not punishable by imprisonment for 14 years or more—imprisonment for 5 years; 
or 
 (d) if the offence is otherwise punishable by imprisonment—imprisonment for 3 
years or for the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence incited, 
whichever is the lesser; or 
 (e) if the offence incited is not punishable by imprisonment—the number of penalty 
units equal to the maximum number of penalty units applicable to the offence 
incited. 
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Note: Under section 4D of the Crimes Act 1914, these penalties are only maximum penalties. 
Subsection 4B(2) of that Act allows a court to impose an appropriate fine instead of, or in 
addition to, a term of imprisonment. If a body corporate is convicted of the offence, subsection 
4B(3) of that Act allows a court to impose a fine of an amount not greater than 5 times the 
maximum fine that the court could impose on an individual convicted of the same offence. 
Penalty units are defined in section 4AA of that Act. 
11.5  Conspiracy 
 (1) A person who conspires with another person to commit an offence punishable by 
imprisonment for more than 12 months, or by a fine of 200 penalty units or more, is 
guilty of the offence of conspiracy to commit that offence and is punishable as if the 
offence to which the conspiracy relates had been committed. 
Note: Penalty units are defined in section 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914. 
 (2) For the person to be guilty: 
 (a) the person must have entered into an agreement with one or more other persons; 
and 
 (b) the person and at least one other party to the agreement must have intended that 
an offence would be committed pursuant to the agreement; and 
 (c) the person or at least one other party to the agreement must have committed an 
overt act pursuant to the agreement. 
 (2A) Subsection (2) has effect subject to subsection (7A). 
 (3) A person may be found guilty of conspiracy to commit an offence even if: 
 (a) committing the offence is impossible; or 
 (b) the only other party to the agreement is a body corporate; or 
 (c) each other party to the agreement is at least one of the following: 
 (i) a person who is not criminally responsible; 
 (ii) a person for whose benefit or protection the offence exists; or 
 (d) subject to paragraph (4)(a), all other parties to the agreement have been 
acquitted of the conspiracy. 
 (4) A person cannot be found guilty of conspiracy to commit an offence if: 
 (a) all other parties to the agreement have been acquitted of the conspiracy and a 
finding of guilt would be inconsistent with their acquittal; or 
 (b) he or she is a person for whose benefit or protection the offence exists. 
 (5) A person cannot be found guilty of conspiracy to commit an offence if, before the 
commission of an overt act pursuant to the agreement, the person: 
 (a) withdrew from the agreement; and 
 (b) took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence. 
 (6) A court may dismiss a charge of conspiracy if it thinks that the interests of justice 
require it to do so. 
 (7) Any defences, procedures, limitations or qualifying provisions that apply to an offence 
apply also to the offence of conspiracy to commit that offence. 
 (7A) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to the offence of 
conspiracy to commit that offence. 
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 (8) Proceedings for an offence of conspiracy must not be commenced without the consent 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions. However, a person may be arrested for, charged 
with, or remanded in custody or on bail in connection with, an offence of conspiracy 
before the necessary consent has been given. 
11.6  References in Acts to offences 
 (1) A reference in a law of the Commonwealth to an offence against a law of the 
Commonwealth (including this Code) includes a reference to an offence against 
section 11.1 (attempt), 11.4 (incitement) or 11.5 (conspiracy) of this Code that relates to 
such an offence. 
 (2) A reference in a law of the Commonwealth (including this Code) to a particular offence 
includes a reference to an offence against section 11.1 (attempt), 11.4 (incitement) or 
11.5 (conspiracy) of this Code that relates to that particular offence. 
 (3) Subsection (1) or (2) does not apply if a law of the Commonwealth is expressly or 
impliedly to the contrary effect. 
 (4) In particular, an express reference in a law of the Commonwealth to: 
 (a) an offence against, under or created by the Crimes Act 1914; or 
 (b) an offence against, under or created by a particular provision of the Crimes Act 
1914; or 
 (c) an offence arising out of the first-mentioned law or another law of the 
Commonwealth; or 
 (d) an offence arising out of a particular provision; or 
 (e) an offence against, under or created by the Taxation Administration Act 1953; 
does not mean that the first-mentioned law is impliedly to the contrary effect. 
Note: Sections 11.2 (complicity and common purpose), 11.2A (joint commission), and 11.3 
(commission by proxy) of this Code operate as extensions of principal offences and are 
therefore not referred to in this section.” 
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The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
“An Act relating to copyright and the protection of certain 
performances, and for other purposes 
Part I—Preliminary 
   
9A  Application of the Criminal Code 
  Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code applies to all offences against this Act. 
Note: Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code sets out the general principles of criminal responsibility. 
Part II—Interpretation 
   
10  Interpretation  
 (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears: 
access control technological protection measure means a device, product, technology 
or component (including a computer program) that: 
 (a) is used in Australia or a qualifying country: 
 (i) by, with the permission of, or on behalf of, the owner or the exclusive 
licensee of the copyright in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (ii) in connection with the exercise of the copyright; and 
 (b) in the normal course of its operation, controls access to the work or other 
subject-matter; 
but does not include such a device, product, technology or component to the extent 
that it: 
 (c) if the work or other subject-matter is a cinematograph film or computer program 
(including a computer game)—controls geographic market segmentation by 
preventing the playback in Australia of a non-infringing copy of the work or other 
subject-matter acquired outside Australia; or 
 (d) if the work is a computer program that is embodied in a machine or device—
restricts the use of goods (other than the work) or services in relation to the 
machine or device. 
For the purposes of this definition, computer program has the same meaning as in 
section 47AB. 
accessory, in relation to an article, means one or more of the following: 
 (a) a label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, 
the article; 
 (b) the packaging or container in which the article is packaged or contained; 
 (c) a label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, 
the packaging or container in which the article is packaged or contained; 
 (d) a written instruction, warranty or other information provided with the article; 
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 (e) a record embodying an instructional sound recording, or a copy of an instructional 
cinematograph film, provided with the article; 
but does not include any label, packaging or container on which the olympic symbol 
(within the meaning of the Olympic Insignia Protection Act 1987) is reproduced. 
Note: See also section 10AD for an expanded meaning of accessory in relation to certain imported 
articles. 
adaptation means: 
 (a) in relation to a literary work in a non-dramatic form a version of the work 
(whether in its original language or in a different language) in a dramatic form; 
 (b) in relation to a literary work in a dramatic form a version of the work (whether in 
its original language or in a different language) in a non-dramatic form; 
 (ba) in relation to a literary work being a computer program—a version of the work 
(whether or not in the language, code or notation in which the work was originally 
expressed) not being a reproduction of the work; 
 (c) in relation to a literary work (whether in a non-dramatic form or in a dramatic 
form): 
 (i) a translation of the work; or 
 (ii) a version of the work in which a story or action is conveyed solely or 
principally by means of pictures; and 
 (d) in relation to a musical work—an arrangement or transcription of the work. 
alternative dispute resolution processes means procedures and services for the 
resolution of disputes, and includes: 
 (a) conferencing; and 
 (b) mediation; and 
 (c) neutral evaluation; and 
 (d) case appraisal; and 
 (e) conciliation; and 
 (f) procedures or services specified in the regulations; 
but does not include: 
 (g) arbitration; or 
 (h) court procedures or services. 
Paragraphs (b) to (f) of this definition do not limit paragraph (a) of this definition. 
approved label means a label approved under: 
 (a) Part 2 of the Agvet Code of a State or of the Northern Territory; or 
 (b) Part 2 of the Agvet Code of the participating Territories within the meaning of the 
Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Act 1994. 
archives means: 
 (a) archival material in the custody of: 
 (i) the National Archives of Australia; or 
 (ii) the Archives Office of New South Wales established by the Archives Act 1960 
of the State of New South Wales; or 
 (iii) the Public Record Office established by the Public Records Act 1973 of the 
State of Victoria; or 
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 (iv) the Archives Office of Tasmania established by the Archives Act 1965 of the 
State of Tasmania; or 
 (aa) archival material in the custody of a person (other than the National Archives of 
Australia) in accordance with an arrangement referred to in section 64 of the 
Archives Act 1983; or 
 (b) a collection of documents or other material to which this paragraph applies by 
virtue of subsection (4). 
artistic work means: 
 (a) a painting, sculpture, drawing, engraving or photograph, whether the work is of 
artistic quality or not; 
 (b) a building or a model of a building, whether the building or model is of artistic 
quality or not; or 
 (c) a work of artistic craftsmanship whether or not mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b); 
but does not include a circuit layout within the meaning of the Circuit Layouts Act 1989. 
Australia includes the external Territories. 
author, in relation to a photograph, means the person who took the photograph. 
authorized officer, in relation to a library or archives, means the officer in charge of that 
library or archives or a person authorized by that officer to act on his or her behalf. 
broadcast means a communication to the public delivered by a broadcasting service 
within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. For the purposes of the 
application of this definition to a service provided under a satellite BSA licence, assume 
that there is no conditional access system that relates to the service. 
Note: A broadcasting service does not include the following: 
(a) a service (including a teletext service) that provides only data or only text (with or without 
associated images); or 
(b) a service that makes programs available on demand on a point-to-point basis, including a 
dial-up service. 
building includes a structure of any kind. 
calendar year means a period of 12 months commencing on 1 January. 
carriage service provider has the same meaning as in the Telecommunications Act 
1997. 
carrier has the same meaning as in the Telecommunications Act 1997. 
chemical product has the same meaning as in the Schedule to the Agricultural and 
Veterinary Chemicals Code Act 1994. 
cinematograph film means the aggregate of the visual images embodied in an article or 
thing so as to be capable by the use of that article or thing: 
 (a) of being shown as a moving picture; or 
 (b) of being embodied in another article or thing by the use of which it can be so 
shown; 
and includes the aggregate of the sounds embodied in a sound-track associated with 
such visual images. 
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circumvention device for a technological protection measure means a device, 
component or product (including a computer program) that: 
 (a) is promoted, advertised or marketed as having the purpose or use of 
circumventing the technological protection measure; or 
 (b) has only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or 
use, other than the circumvention of the technological protection measure; or 
 (c) is primarily or solely designed or produced to enable or facilitate the 
circumvention of the technological protection measure. 
For the purposes of this definition, computer program has the same meaning as in 
section 47AB. 
circumvention service for a technological protection measure means a service that: 
 (a) is promoted, advertised or marketed as having the purpose or use of 
circumventing the technological protection measure; or 
 (b) has only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or 
use, other than the circumvention of the technological protection measure; or 
 (c) is primarily or solely designed or produced to enable or facilitate the 
circumvention of the technological protection measure. 
communicate means make available online or electronically transmit (whether over a 
path, or a combination of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work 
or other subject-matter, including a performance or live performance within the 
meaning of this Act. 
computer program means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result. 
construction includes erection, and reconstruction has a corresponding meaning. 
controls access: a device, product, technology or component (including a computer 
program) controls access to a work or other subject-matter if it requires the application 
of information or a process, with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright in the work or other subject-matter, to gain access to the work or other 
subject-matter. 
copy, in relation to a cinematograph film, means any article or thing in which the visual 
images or sounds comprising the film are embodied. 
device includes a plate. 
dramatic work includes: 
 (a) a choreographic show or other dumb show; and 
 (b) a scenario or script for a cinematograph film; 
but does not include a cinematograph film as distinct from the scenario or script for a 
cinematograph film. 
drawing includes a diagram, map, chart or plan. 
educational institution means: 
 (aa) an institution at which education is provided at pre-school or kindergarten 
standard; 
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 (a) a school or similar institution at which full-time primary education or full-time 
secondary education is provided or both full-time primary education and full-time 
secondary education are provided; 
 (b) a university, a college of advanced education or a technical and further education 
institution; 
 (c) an institution that conducts courses of primary, secondary or tertiary education by 
correspondence or on an external study basis; 
 (d) a school of nursing in relation to which a notice published under subsection 
10A(4) is in force; 
 (e) an undertaking within a hospital, being an undertaking: 
 (i) that conducts courses of study or training in the provision of medical 
services, or in the provision of services incidental to the provision of medical 
services; and 
 (ii) in relation to which a notice published under subsection 10A(4) is in force; 
 (f) a teacher education centre in relation to which a notice published under 
subsection 10A(4) is in force; 
 (g) an institution in relation to which there is in force a notice published under 
subsection 10A(4) that includes a declaration that the principal function of the 
institution is the provision of courses of study or training for one of the following 
purposes: 
 (i) general education; 
 (ii) the preparation of people for a particular occupation or profession; 
 (iii) the continuing education of people engaged in a particular occupation or 
profession; 
 (iv) the teaching of English to people whose first language is not English; 
 (h) an undertaking within a body administering an educational institution of a kind 
referred to in a preceding paragraph of this definition in relation to which there is 
in force a notice published under subsection 10A(4) that includes a declaration 
that the principal function, or one of the principal functions, of the undertaking is 
the provision of teacher training to people engaged as instructors in educational 
institutions of a kind referred to in a preceding paragraph of this definition, or of 2 
or more such kinds; or 
 (i) an institution, or an undertaking within a body administering an educational 
institution of a kind referred to in a preceding paragraph of this definition, in 
relation to which there is in force a notice published under subsection 10A(4) that 
includes a declaration that the principal function, or one of the principal functions, 
of the institution, or undertaking, is the providing of material to educational 
institutions of a kind referred to in a preceding paragraph of this definition, or to 
educational institutions of 2 or more such kinds, and that that activity is 
undertaken for the purpose of helping those institutions in their teaching 
purposes. 
electronic literary or music item means: 
 (a) a book in electronic form; or 
 (b) a periodical publication in electronic form; or 
 (c) sheet music in electronic form; 
regardless of whether there is a printed form. 
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electronic rights management information, in relation to a work or other 
subject-matter, means information that: 
 (a) is electronic; and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) is or was attached to, or is or was embodied in, a copy of the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) appears or appeared in connection with a communication, or the making 
available, of the work or subject-matter; and 
 (c) either: 
 (i) identifies the work or subject-matter, and its author or copyright owner 
(including such information represented as numbers or codes); or 
 (ii) identifies or indicates some or all of the terms and conditions on which the 
work or subject-matter may be used, or indicates that the use of the work or 
subject-matter is subject to terms or conditions (including such information 
represented as numbers or codes). 
engraving includes an etching, lithograph, product of photogravure, woodcut, print or 
similar work, not being a photograph. 
exclusive licence means a licence in writing, signed by or on behalf of the owner or 
prospective owner of copyright, authorizing the licensee, to the exclusion of all other 
persons, to do an act that, by virtue of this Act, the owner of the copyright would, but 
for the licence, have the exclusive right to do, and exclusive licensee has a 
corresponding meaning. 
free-to-air broadcast means: 
 (a) a broadcast delivered by a national broadcasting service, commercial broadcasting 
service or community broadcasting service within the meaning of the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992; or 
 (b) a broadcast delivered by a broadcasting service within the meaning of the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 that does no more than transmit program material 
supplied by National Indigenous TV Limited. 
future copyright means copyright to come into existence at a future time or upon the 
happening of a future event. 
infringing copy means: 
 (a) in relation to a work—a reproduction of the work, or of an adaptation of the work, 
not being a copy of a cinematograph film of the work or adaptation; 
 (b) in relation to a sound recording—a copy of the sound recording not being a 
sound-track associated with visual images forming part of a cinematograph film; 
 (c) in relation to a cinematograph film—a copy of the film; 
 (d) in relation to a television broadcast or a sound broadcast—a copy of a 
cinematograph film of the broadcast or a record embodying a sound recording of 
the broadcast; and 
 (e) in relation to a published edition of a work—a facsimile copy of the edition; 
being an article (which may be an electronic reproduction or copy of the work, 
recording, film, broadcast or edition) the making of which constituted an infringement 
of the copyright in the work, recording, film, broadcast or edition or, in the case of an 
article imported without the licence of the owner of the copyright, would have 
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constituted an infringement of that copyright if the article had been made in Australia 
by the importer, but does not include: 
 (f) a non-infringing book whose importation does not constitute an infringement of 
that copyright; or 
 (g) a non-infringing accessory whose importation does not constitute an infringement 
of that copyright; or 
 (h) a non-infringing copy of a sound recording whose importation does not infringe 
that copyright; or 
 (i) a non-infringing copy of a computer program whose importation does not infringe 
that copyright; or 
 (j) a non-infringing copy of an electronic literary or music item whose importation 
does not infringe that copyright. 
institution includes an educational institution. 
institution assisting persons with an intellectual disability means: 
 (a) an educational institution; or 
 (b) any other institution which has as its principal function, or one or its principal 
functions, the provision of assistance to persons with an intellectual disability and 
in relation to which a declaration under paragraph 10A(1)(d) is in force. 
institution assisting persons with a print disability means: 
 (a) an educational institution; or 
 (b) any other institution which has as its principal function, or one of its principal 
functions, the provision of literary or dramatic works to persons with a print 
disability and in relation to which a declaration under paragraph 10A(1)(c) is in 
force. 
international organization to which this Act applies means an organization that is 
declared by regulations made for the purposes of section 186 to be an international 
organization to which this Act applies, and includes: 
 (a) an organ of, or office within, an organization that is so declared; and 
 (b) a commission, council or other body established by such an organization or organ. 
judicial proceeding means a proceeding before a court, tribunal or person having by law 
power to hear, receive and examine evidence on oath. 
law of the Commonwealth includes a law of a Territory. 
literary work includes: 
 (a) a table, or compilation, expressed in words, figures or symbols; and 
 (b) a computer program or compilation of computer programs. 
manuscript, in relation to a literary, dramatic or musical work, means the document 
embodying the work as initially prepared by the author, whether the document is in 
hardcopy form, electronic form or any other form. 
material form, in relation to a work or an adaptation of a work, includes any form 
(whether visible or not) of storage of the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the 
work or adaptation, (whether or not the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the 
work or adaptation, can be reproduced). 
  
319 
non-infringing accessory means an accessory made in: 
 (a) a country that is a party to the International Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works concluded at Berne on 9 September 1886 as revised 
from time to time; or 
 (b) a country that is a member of the World Trade Organization and has a law that 
provides consistently with the TRIPS Agreement for: 
 (i) the ownership and duration of copyright or a related right in works, sound 
recordings and cinematograph films; and 
 (ii) the owner of the copyright or related right to have rights relating to the 
reproduction of the work, sound recording or cinematograph film; 
where: 
 (c) the making of any copy of a work, or any reproduction of a published edition of a 
work, that is, or is on, or is embodied in, the accessory; or 
 (d) the making of any record embodying a sound recording, or any copy of a 
cinematograph film, that is the accessory; 
was authorised by the owner of the copyright in that country in the work, edition, 
recording or film, as the case may be. 
non-infringing book means a book made (otherwise than under a compulsory licence) 
in a country specified in regulations made for the purposes of subsection 184(1), being a 
book whose making did not constitute an infringement of any copyright subsisting in a 
work, or in a published edition of a work, under a law of that country. 
non-infringing copy: 
 (a) in relation to a sound recording, has the meaning given by section 10AA; and 
 (b) in relation to a computer program, has the meaning given by section 10AB; and 
 (c) in relation to an electronic literary or music item, has the meaning given by 
section 10AC. 
officer in charge means: 
 (a) in relation to archives—the archivist or other person having, for the time being, 
immediate care and control of the collection comprising the archives; and 
 (c) in relation to a library—the librarian or other person having, for the time being, 
immediate care and control of the collection comprising the library. 
person with a print disability means: 
 (a) a person without sight; or 
 (b) a person whose sight is severely impaired; or 
 (c) a person unable to hold or manipulate books or to focus or move his or her eyes; 
or 
 (d) a person with a perceptual disability. 
photograph means a product of photography or of a process similar to photography, 
other than an article or thing in which visual images forming part of a cinematograph 
film have been embodied, and includes a product of xerography, and photographic has 
a corresponding meaning. 
plate includes a stereotype, stone, block, mould, matrix, transfer, negative or other 
similar appliance. 
  
320 
private and domestic use means private and domestic use on or off domestic premises. 
prospective owner means: 
 (a) in relation to a future copyright that is not the subject of an agreement of a kind 
referred to in subsection 19(1)—the person who will be the owner of the 
copyright on its coming into existence; or 
 (b) in relation to a future copyright that is the subject of such an agreement—the 
person in whom, by virtue of that subsection, the copyright will vest on its coming 
into existence. 
qualifying country means: 
 (a) a country that is a party to the International Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works concluded at Berne on 9 September 1886 as revised 
from time to time; or 
 (b) a country that is a member of the World Trade Organization and has a law that 
provides consistently with the TRIPS Agreement for: 
 (i) the ownership and duration of copyright or a related right in works, sound 
recordings and cinematograph films; and 
 (ii) the owner of the copyright or related right to have rights relating to the 
reproduction of the work, sound recording or cinematograph film. 
reception equipment means equipment whose operation, either alone or together with 
other equipment, enables people to hear or see a work or other subject-matter that is 
communicated. 
record includes a disc, tape, paper, electronic file or other device in which sounds are 
embodied. 
Registrar means the Registrar of the Tribunal provided for by section 170. 
retransmission, in relation to a broadcast, means a retransmission of the broadcast, 
where: 
 (a) the content of the broadcast is unaltered (even if the technique used to achieve 
retransmission is different to the technique used to achieve the original 
transmission); and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) in any case—the retransmission is simultaneous with the original 
transmission; or 
 (ii) if the retransmission is in an area that has, wholly or partly, different local 
time to the area of the original transmission—the retransmission is delayed 
until no later than the equivalent local time. 
satellite BSA licence means a commercial television broadcasting licence allocated 
under section 38C of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. 
satellite BSA licensee means the licensee of a satellite BSA licence. 
sculpture includes a cast or model made for purposes of sculpture. 
simulcasting means simultaneously broadcasting a broadcasting service in both analog 
and digital form in accordance with the requirements of the Broadcasting Services Act 
1992 or of any prescribed legislative provisions relating to digital broadcasting. 
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sound broadcast means sounds broadcast otherwise than as part of a television 
broadcast. 
sound recording means the aggregate of the sounds embodied in a record. 
sound-track, in relation to visual images forming part of a cinematograph film, means: 
 (a) the part of any article or thing, being an article or thing in which those visual 
images are embodied, in which sounds are embodied; or 
 (b) a disc, tape or other device in which sounds are embodied and which is made 
available by the maker of the film for use in conjunction with the article or thing in 
which those visual images are embodied. 
sufficient acknowledgement, in relation to a work, means an acknowledgement 
identifying the work by its title or other description and, unless the work is anonymous 
or pseudonymous or the author has previously agreed or directed that an 
acknowledgement of his or her name is not to be made, also identifying the author. 
technological protection measure means: 
 (a) an access control technological protection measure; or 
 (b) a device, product, technology or component (including a computer program) that: 
 (i) is used in Australia or a qualifying country by, with the permission of, or on 
behalf of, the owner or the exclusive licensee of the copyright in a work or 
other subject-matter; and 
 (ii) in the normal course of its operation, prevents, inhibits or restricts the doing 
of an act comprised in the copyright; 
  but does not include such a device, product, technology or component to the 
extent that it: 
 (iii) if the work or other subject-matter is a cinematograph film or computer 
program (including a computer game)—controls geographic market 
segmentation by preventing the playback in Australia of a non-infringing 
copy of the work or other subject-matter acquired outside Australia; or 
 (iv) if the work is a computer program that is embodied in a machine or device—
restricts the use of goods (other than the work) or services in relation to the 
machine or device. 
For the purposes of this definition, computer program has the same meaning as in 
section 47AB. 
television broadcast means visual images broadcast by way of television, together with 
any sounds broadcast for reception along with those images. 
the Australian Broadcasting Commission means the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission that was established under the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942. 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation means the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation established under the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983. 
the Commonwealth includes the Administration of a Territory. 
the Copyright Act, 1911 means the Imperial Act known as the Copyright Act, 1911. 
the Copyright Tribunal or the Tribunal means the Copyright Tribunal of Australia 
provided for by Part VI, and includes a member of that Tribunal exercising powers of 
that Tribunal. 
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the Crown includes the Crown in right of a State, the Crown in right of the Northern 
Territory and the Crown in right of Norfolk Island and also includes the Administration 
of a Territory other than the Northern Territory or Norfolk Island. 
the National Librarian has the same meaning as in the National Library Act 1960-1967. 
the National Library means the National Library established under the National Library 
Act 1960-1967. 
the Special Broadcasting Service means the Special Broadcasting Service that was 
referred to in section 5 of the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991. 
the Special Broadcasting Service Corporation means the body corporate preserved and 
continued in existence as the Special Broadcasting Service Corporation under section 5 
of the Special Broadcasting Service Act 1991. 
to the public means to the public within or outside Australia. 
TRIPS Agreement means the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World 
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. 
Note: The English text of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization is set 
out in Australian Treaty Series 1995 No. 8. 
will includes a codicil. 
work means a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work. 
work of joint authorship means a work that has been produced by the collaboration of 
two or more authors and in which the contribution of each author is not separate from 
the contribution of the other author or the contributions of the other authors. 
writing means a mode of representing or reproducing words, figures or symbols in a 
visible form, and written has a corresponding meaning. 
 (1A) Without limiting the meaning of the expression educational purposes in this Act, a copy 
of the whole or a part of a work or other subject-matter shall be taken, for the purposes 
of the provision in which the expression appears, to have been made, used or retained, 
as the case may be, for the educational purposes of an educational institution if: 
 (a) it is made or retained for use, or is used, in connection with a particular course of 
instruction provided by the institution; or 
 (b) it is made or retained for inclusion, or is included, in the collection of a library of 
the institution. 
 (2) Without limiting the meaning of the expression reasonable portion in this Act, where a 
literary, dramatic or musical work (other than a computer program) is contained in a 
published edition of that work, being an edition of not less than 10 pages, a copy of part 
of that work, as it appears in that edition, shall be taken to contain only a reasonable 
portion of that work if the pages that are copied in the edition: 
 (a) do not exceed, in the aggregate, 10% of the number of pages in that edition; or 
 (b) in a case where the work is divided into chapters exceed, in the aggregate, 10% of 
the number of pages in that edition but contain only the whole or part of a single 
chapter of the work. 
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 (2A) Without limiting the meaning of the expression reasonable portion in this Act, if a 
person makes a reproduction of a part of: 
 (a) a published literary work (other than a computer program or an electronic 
compilation, such as a database); or 
 (b) a published dramatic work; 
being a work that is in electronic form, the reproduction is taken to contain only a 
reasonable portion of the work if: 
 (c) the number of words copied does not exceed, in the aggregate, 10% of the 
number of words in the work; or 
 (d) if the work is divided into chapters—the number of words copied exceeds, in the 
aggregate, 10% of the number of words in the work, but the reproduction 
contains only the whole or part of a single chapter of the work. 
 (2B) If a published literary or dramatic work is contained in a published edition of the work 
and is separately available in electronic form, a reproduction of a part of the work is 
taken to contain only a reasonable portion of the work if it is taken to do so either 
under subsection (2) or (2A), whether or not it does so under both of them. 
 (2C) If: 
 (a) a person makes a reproduction of a part of a published literary or dramatic work; 
and 
 (b) the reproduction is taken to contain only a reasonable portion of the work under 
subsection (2) or (2A); 
subsection (2) or (2A) does not apply in relation to any subsequent reproduction made 
by the person of any other part of the same work. 
 (3) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears: 
 (a) a reference to the body administering an institution shall be read as: 
 (i) in a case where the institution is a body corporate—a reference to the 
institution; or 
 (ii) in any other case—a reference to the body or person (including the Crown) 
having ultimate responsibility for the administration of the institution; and 
 (b) a reference to the body administering a library or archives is to be read: 
 (i) in the case of archives covered by paragraph (aa) of the definition of archives 
in subsection (1)—as a reference to the person having the custody of the 
archives in accordance with the relevant arrangement referred to in that 
paragraph; or 
 (ii) otherwise—as a reference to the body (whether incorporated or not), or the 
person (including the Crown), having ultimate responsibility for the 
administration of the library or archives; and 
 (c) a reference to a copy of a sound recording shall be read as a reference to a record 
embodying a sound recording or a substantial part of a sound recording being a 
record derived directly or indirectly from a record produced upon the making of a 
sound recording; and 
 (e) a reference to the Crown in right of a State shall be read as including a reference 
to the Crown in right of the Northern Territory and the Crown in right of Norfolk 
Island; and 
 (f) a reference to the custodian in charge of the copying records of an educational 
institution, an institution assisting persons with a print disability or an institution 
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assisting persons with an intellectual disability shall be read as a reference to the 
person having responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the institution; 
and 
 (g) a reference to the making, by reprographic reproduction, of a copy of a 
document, or of the whole or a part of a work, shall be read as a reference to the 
making of a facsimile copy of the document or the whole or that part of the work, 
being a facsimile copy of any size or form; and 
 (h) a reference to a copy of a work, or of a part of a work, for a person with a print 
disability is taken to be a reference to: 
 (i) a record embodying a sound recording of the work, or of the part of the 
work, being a record made by, or on behalf of, the body administering an 
institution assisting persons with a print disability and so made for the sole 
purpose of use in the provision, whether by the institution or otherwise, of 
assistance to a person or persons with a print disability; or 
 (ii) a Braille version, large-print version or photographic version of the work, or 
of the part of the work, being a Braille version, large-print version or 
photographic version, as the case may be, made by, or on behalf of, the body 
administering an institution assisting persons with a print disability and so 
made for the sole purpose of use in the provision, whether by the institution 
or otherwise, of assistance to a person or persons with a print disability; and 
 (ha) a reference to a copy for a person with an intellectual disability, in relation to the 
whole or a part of an eligible item within the meaning of Part VB, shall be read as 
a reference to a copy, within the meaning of that Part, of an eligible item, or of a 
part of an eligible item, as the case may be, made by, or on behalf of, the body 
administering an institution assisting persons with an intellectual disability, being 
a copy that is made for the sole purpose of use in the provision, whether by the 
institution or otherwise, of assistance to a person or persons with an intellectual 
disability; and 
 (j) a reference to a microform copy of the whole or a part of a work shall be read as a 
reference to a copy of the whole or a part of the work produced by miniaturizing 
the graphic symbols of which the work is composed; and 
 (k) a reference to a periodical publication shall be read as a reference to an issue of a 
periodical publication and a reference to articles contained in the same periodical 
publication shall be read as a reference to articles contained in the same issue of 
that periodical publication; and 
 (l) a reference to a record embodying a sound recording shall be read as a reference 
to: 
 (i) a record produced upon the making of a sound recording; or 
 (ii) another record embodying the sound recording directly or indirectly derived 
from a record so produced; and 
 (m) a reference to a relevant record, or a relevant declaration, in relation to the 
making, in reliance on a particular section (other than section 49): 
 (i) of a copy, or a copy for a person with a print disability, of the whole or a part 
of a work; or 
 (ia) of a copy for a person with an intellectual disability of the whole or a part of 
an eligible item; or 
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 (ii) of a copy of a sound recording or a cinematograph film; 
  shall be read as a reference to any record or declaration of a kind referred to in 
that section that is required by this Act to be made in relation to the making of 
that copy; and 
 (ma) a reference to a relevant declaration, in relation to the making, in reliance on 
section 49, of a copy of the whole or a part of a work, shall be read as a reference 
to: 
 (i) in a case where the copy is made in reliance on subsection 49(2)—a 
declaration of the kind referred to in subsection 49(1) that is furnished in 
relation to the making of the copy; or 
 (ii) in a case where the copy is made in reliance on subsection 49(2C)—a 
declaration of the kind referred to in paragraph 49(2C)(b) that is made in 
relation to the making of the copy; or 
 (iii) in any case—a declaration of the kind referred to in subsection 49(5) that is 
made in relation to the making of the copy; and 
 (n) a reference to a State shall be read as including a reference to the Northern 
Territory and Norfolk Island and a reference to a Territory shall be read as not 
including a reference to the Northern Territory or Norfolk Island. 
 (3A) For the purposes of this Act, something held in, or forming part of, the collection of any 
archives covered by paragraph (aa) of the definition of archives in subsection (1) is 
taken not to be held in, and not to form part of, the collection of the National Archives 
of Australia. 
Note: Paragraph (aa) of the definition of archives covers archival material in the custody of a person 
other than the National Archives of Australia under an arrangement referred to in section 64 of 
the Archives Act 1983. 
 (4) Where: 
 (a) a collection of documents or other material of historical significance or public 
interest that is in the custody of a body, whether incorporated or unincorporated, 
is being maintained by the body for the purpose of conserving and preserving 
those documents or other material; and 
 (b) the body does not maintain and operate the collection for the purpose of deriving 
a profit; 
paragraph (b) of the definition of archives in subsection (1) applies to that collection. 
Example: Museums and galleries are examples of bodies that could have collections covered by 
paragraph (b) of the definition of archives. 
 (5) For the purposes of the definition of copy in subsection (1), such a copy includes any 
form (whether visible or not) of storage of a cinematograph film, or a substantial part of 
a cinematograph film, (whether or not the copy of the film, or a substantial part of the 
film, can be reproduced). 
 (6) For the purposes of paragraph 10(3)(c), a reference to a copy of a sound recording 
includes any form (whether visible or not) of storage of the sound recording, or a 
substantial part of the sound recording, (whether or not the copy of the recording, or a 
substantial part of the recording, can be reproduced). 
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10AA  Non-infringing copy of a sound recording 
Minimum requirements 
 (1) A copy of a sound recording is a non-infringing copy only if it is made by or with the 
consent of: 
 (a) the owner of the copyright or related right in the sound recording in the country 
(the copy country) in which the copy was made; or 
 (b) the owner of the copyright or related right in the sound recording in the country 
(the original recording country) in which the sound recording was made, if the 
law of the copy country did not provide for copyright or a related right in sound 
recordings when the sound recording was made; or 
 (c) the maker of the sound recording, if neither the law of the copy country nor the 
law of the original recording country (whether those countries are different or 
not) provided for copyright or a related right in sound recordings when the sound 
recording was made. 
Extra requirements for copies of recordings of works subject to Australian copyright 
 (2) If the sound recording is of a work that is a literary, dramatic or musical work in which 
copyright subsists in Australia, the copy is a non-infringing copy only if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in the work under the law of the copy country; and 
 (b) the making of the copy does not infringe the copyright in the work under the law 
of the copy country; and 
 (c) the copy country meets the requirements of subsection (3). 
To avoid doubt, the requirements of this subsection are additional to those of 
subsection (1). 
Requirements for copy country 
 (3) The copy country mentioned in subsection (2) must: 
 (a) be a party to the International Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works concluded at Berne on 9 September 1886 as revised from time to 
time; or 
 (b) be a member of the World Trade Organization and have a law that provides 
consistently with the TRIPS Agreement for: 
 (i) the ownership and duration of copyright in literary, dramatic and musical 
works; and 
 (ii) the owner of the copyright in the work to have rights relating to the 
reproduction of the work. 
Australian copyright may result from Act or regulations 
 (4) For the purposes of subsection (2) it does not matter whether the copyright in the work 
subsists in Australia as a result of this Act or as a result of the regulations made for the 
purposes of section 184. 
10AB  Non-infringing copy of a computer program 
  A copy of a computer program is a non-infringing copy only if: 
 (a) it is made in a qualifying country; and 
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 (b) its making did not constitute an infringement of any copyright in a work under a 
law of that country. 
10AC  Non-infringing copy of an electronic literary or music item 
  A copy of an electronic literary or music item is a non-infringing copy only if: 
 (a) it is made in a qualifying country; and 
 (b) its making did not constitute an infringement of any copyright in a work, or in a 
published edition of a work, under a law of that country. 
Division 5—Offences and summary proceedings 
Subdivision A—Preliminary 
132AA  Definitions 
  In this Division: 
article includes a reproduction or copy of a work or other subject-matter, being a 
reproduction or copy in electronic form. 
copyright material means: 
 (a) a work; or 
 (b) a published edition of a work; or 
 (c) a sound recording; or 
 (d) a cinematograph film; or 
 (e) a television or sound broadcast; or 
 (f) a work that is included in a sound recording, a cinematograph film or a television 
or sound broadcast. 
distribute, except in Subdivision E, includes distribute by way of communication. 
place of public entertainment includes premises that are occupied principally for 
purposes other than public entertainment but are from time to time made available for 
hire for purposes of public entertainment. 
profit does not include any advantage, benefit, or gain, that: 
 (a) is received by a person; and 
 (b) results from, or is associated with, the person’s private or domestic use of any 
copyright material. 
132AB  Geographical application 
 (1) Subdivisions B, C, D, E and F apply only to acts done in Australia. 
 (2) This section has effect despite section 14.1 (Standard geographical jurisdiction) of the 
Criminal Code. 
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Subdivision B—Substantial infringement on a commercial scale 
132AC  Commercial-scale infringement prejudicing copyright owner 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person engages in conduct; and 
 (b) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or 
other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the infringement or infringements have a substantial prejudicial impact on the 
owner of the copyright; and 
 (d) the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person engages in conduct; and 
 (b) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or 
other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the infringement or infringements have a substantial prejudicial impact on the 
owner of the copyright and the person is negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale and the person is 
negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Determining whether infringements occur on commercial scale 
 (5) In determining whether one or more infringements occur on a commercial scale for the 
purposes of paragraph (1)(d) or (3)(d), the following matters are to be taken into 
account: 
 (a) the volume and value of any articles that are infringing copies that constitute the 
infringement or infringements; 
 (b) any other relevant matter. 
Defence relating to law enforcement and national security 
 (6) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done for the purposes of law 
enforcement or national security by or on behalf of: 
 (a) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or 
 (b) an authority of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory. 
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Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (6) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence for certain public institutions etc. 
 (7) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by the following in 
performing their functions: 
 (a) a library (other than a library that is conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of 
an individual or individuals); 
 (b) a body mentioned in: 
 (i) paragraph (a) of the definition of archives in subsection 10(1); or 
 (ii) subsection 10(4); 
 (c) an educational institution; 
 (d) a public non-commercial broadcaster, including: 
 (i) a body that provides a national broadcasting service within the meaning of 
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992; and 
 (ii) a body that holds a community broadcasting licence within the meaning of 
that Act. 
Note 1: A library that is owned by a person conducting a business for profit might not itself be 
conducted for profit (see section 18). 
Note 2: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
 (8) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by a person in 
connection with a work or other subject-matter if: 
 (a) the person has custody of the work or other subject-matter under an 
arrangement referred to in section 64 of the Archives Act 1983; and 
 (b) under subsection (7), it would be lawful for the National Archives of Australia to 
do that thing. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (8) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Subdivision C—Infringing copies 
132AD  Making infringing copy commercially 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an article, with the intention of: 
 (i) selling it; or 
 (ii) letting it for hire; or 
 (iii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter when the article is made. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an article, with the intention of: 
 (i) selling it; or 
 (ii) letting it for hire; or 
 (iii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter when the article is made 
and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an article in preparation for, or in the course of: 
 (i) selling it; or 
 (ii) letting it for hire; or 
 (iii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter when the article is made. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AE  Selling or hiring out infringing copy 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person sells an article or lets an article for hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the sale or 
letting. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person sells an article or lets an article for hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the sale or 
letting and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person sells an article or lets an article for hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the sale or 
letting. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AF  Offering infringing copy for sale or hire 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade offers or exposes an article for sale or hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person offers or exposes an article for sale or hire, with the intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade offers or exposes an article for sale or hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person offers or exposes an article for sale or hire, with the intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offences 
 (7) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade offers or exposes an article for sale or hire; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (8) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person offers or exposes an article for sale or hire, in preparation for, or in the 
course of, obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the offer or 
exposure. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (9) Subsections (7) and (8) are offences of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
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132AG  Exhibiting infringing copy in public commercially 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits an article in public; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
exhibition. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person exhibits an article in public, with the intention of obtaining a 
commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
exhibition. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits an article in public; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the exhibition 
and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person exhibits an article in public, with the intention of obtaining a 
commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the exhibition 
and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offences 
 (7) A person commits an offence if: 
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 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits an article in public; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
exhibition. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (8) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person exhibits an article in public in preparation for, or in the course of, 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
exhibition. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (9) Subsections (7) and (8) are offences of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AH  Importing infringing copy commercially 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports an article into Australia, with the intention of doing any of the 
following with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the import. 
 (2) An offence against this section is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
650 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
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Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports an article into Australia, with the intention of doing any of the 
following with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the import 
and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports an article into Australia in preparation for, or in the course of, 
doing any of the following with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the import. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
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 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AI  Distributing infringing copy 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes an article, with the intention of: 
 (i) trading; or 
 (ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
distribution. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes an article; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
distribution; and 
 (d) the extent of the distribution affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes an article, with the intention of: 
 (i) trading; or 
 (ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
distribution and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes an article; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
distribution and the person is negligent as to that fact; and 
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 (d) the extent of the distribution affects prejudicially the owner of the copyright and 
the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (7) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes an article in preparation for, or in the course of: 
 (i) trading; or 
 (ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
distribution. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (9) Subsection (7) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AJ  Possessing infringing copy for commerce 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses an article, with the intention of doing any of the following 
with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
possession. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note 1: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Note 2: If the infringing copy was made by converting the work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form, there is an 
aggravated offence with a higher maximum penalty under section 132AK. 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses an article, with the intention of doing any of the following 
with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
possession and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses an article in preparation for, or in the course of, doing any of 
the following with the article: 
 (i) selling it; 
 (ii) letting it for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or hire; 
 (iv) offering or exposing it for sale or hire to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (v) distributing it for trade; 
 (vi) distributing it to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (vii) distributing it to an extent that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright in the work or other subject-matter of which the article is an 
infringing copy; 
 (viii) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; 
 (ix) exhibiting it in public to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the article is an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
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 (c) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
possession. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AK  Aggravated offence—work etc. converted to digital form 
 (1) An indictable offence against a provision (the basic offence provision) of this 
Subdivision (except sections 132AL and 132AM) relating to an infringing copy is an 
aggravated offence if the infringing copy was made by converting a work or other 
subject-matter from a hard copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic 
machine-readable form. 
 (2) An aggravated offence is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 850 
penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
 (3) To prove an aggravated offence, the prosecution must prove that the defendant was 
reckless with respect to the circumstance that the infringing copy was made by 
converting a work or other subject-matter from a hard copy or analog form into a digital 
or other electronic machine-readable form. 
Note: The prosecution must also prove all the physical and fault elements of the offence against the 
basic offence provision. 
 (4) If the prosecution intends to prove an aggravated offence, the charge must allege that 
the infringing copy was made by converting a work or other subject-matter from a hard 
copy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form. 
132AL  Making or possessing device for making infringing copy 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a device, intending it to be used for making an infringing copy 
of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the making of 
the device. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a device, intending it to be used for making an infringing 
copy of a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
possession. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a device; and 
 (b) the device is to be used for copying a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the copy will be an infringing copy and the person is negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the making of 
the device and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a device; and 
 (b) the device is to be used for copying a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the copy will be an infringing copy and the person is negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the 
possession and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) To avoid doubt, recklessness is the fault element for the circumstance in 
paragraphs (4)(b) and (5)(b) that the device is to be used for copying a work or other 
subject-matter. 
 (7) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (8) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a device; and 
 (b) the device is to be used for copying a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the copy will be an infringing copy; and 
 (d) copyright subsists in the work or other subject-matter at the time of the making of 
the device. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (10) Subsection (8) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
No need to prove which work etc. is to be copied 
 (11) In a prosecution for an offence against this section, it is not necessary to prove which 
particular work or other subject-matter is intended to be, or will be, copied using the 
device. 
132AM  Advertising supply of infringing copy 
Summary offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
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 (a) the person, by any means, publishes, or causes to be published, an advertisement 
for the supply in Australia of a copy (whether from within or outside Australia) of 
a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the copy is, or will be, an infringing copy. 
Penalty: 30 penalty units or imprisonment for 6 months, or both. 
Location of supply of copy by communication resulting in creation of copy 
 (2) For the purposes of this section, a communication of a work or other subject-matter 
that, when received and recorded, will result in the creation of a copy of the work or 
other subject-matter is taken to constitute the supply of a copy of the work or other 
subject-matter at the place where the copy will be created. 
Subdivision D—Airing of works, sound recordings and films 
132AN  Causing work to be performed publicly 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes a literary, dramatic or musical work to be performed; and 
 (b) the performance is in public at a place of public entertainment; and 
 (c) the performance infringes copyright in the work. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes a literary, dramatic or musical work to be performed; and 
 (b) the performance is in public at a place of public entertainment; and 
 (c) the performance infringes copyright in the work and the person is negligent as to 
that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
132AO  Causing recording or film to be heard or seen in public 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes: 
 (i) a sound recording to be heard; or 
 (ii) images from a cinematograph film to be seen; or 
 (iii) sound from a cinematograph film to be heard; and 
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 (b) the hearing or seeing occurs in public at a place of public entertainment; and 
 (c) causing the hearing or seeing infringes copyright in the recording or film. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes: 
 (i) a sound recording to be heard; or 
 (ii) images from a cinematograph film to be seen; or 
 (iii) sound from a cinematograph film to be heard; and 
 (b) the hearing or seeing occurs in public at a place of public entertainment; and 
 (c) causing the hearing or seeing infringes copyright in the recording or film and the 
person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes: 
 (ii) images from a cinematograph film to be seen; or 
 (iii) sound from a cinematograph film to be heard; and 
 (b) the hearing or seeing occurs in public at a place of public entertainment; and 
 (c) causing the hearing or seeing infringes copyright in the recording or film. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
Subdivision E—Technological protection measures 
132APA  Definitions 
  In this Subdivision, computer program has the same meaning as in section 47AB. 
132APB  Interaction of this Subdivision with Part VAA 
  This Subdivision does not apply to encoded broadcasts (within the meaning of 
Part VAA). 
132APC  Circumventing an access control technological protection measure 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
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 (a) the person engages in conduct; and 
 (b) the conduct results in the circumvention of a technological protection measure; 
and 
 (c) the technological protection measure is an access control technological protection 
measure; and 
 (d) the person engages in the conduct with the intention of obtaining a commercial 
advantage or profit. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
Defence—permission 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if the person has the permission of the 
copyright owner or exclusive licensee to circumvent the access control technological 
protection measure. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—interoperability 
 (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the person circumvents the access control technological protection measure to 
enable the person to do an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program (the original program) that is not an 
infringing copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the original program; and 
 (iia) relates to elements of the original program that will not be readily available 
to the person when the circumvention occurs; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with the original program or any 
other program. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—encryption research 
 (4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the person circumvents the access control technological protection measure to 
enable: 
 (i) the person; or 
 (ii) if the person is a body corporate—an employee of the person; 
  to do an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a work or other subject-matter that is not an infringing 
copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the work or other subject-matter; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of identifying and analysing flaws and 
vulnerabilities of encryption technology; and 
 (c) the person or employee is: 
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 (i) engaged in a course of study at an educational institution in the field of 
encryption technology; or 
 (ii) employed, trained or experienced in the field of encryption technology; and 
 (d) the person or employee: 
 (i) has obtained permission from the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright to do the act; or 
 (ii) has made, or will make, a good faith effort to obtain such permission. 
In this subsection, encryption technology means the scrambling and descrambling of 
information using mathematical formulas or algorithms. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (4) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—computer security testing 
 (5) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the person circumvents the access control technological protection measure to 
enable the person to do an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program that is not an infringing copy; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the computer program; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of testing, investigating or correcting the 
security of a computer, computer system or computer network; and 
 (iv) will be done with the permission of the owner of the computer, computer 
system or computer network. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (5) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—online privacy 
 (6) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the person circumvents the access control technological protection measure to 
enable the person to do an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a work or other subject-matter that is not an infringing 
copy; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the work or other subject-matter; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of identifying and disabling an undisclosed 
capability to collect or disseminate personally identifying information about 
the online activities of a natural person; and 
 (iv) will not affect the ability of the person or any other person to gain access to 
the work or other subject-matter or any other work or subject-matter. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (6) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—law enforcement and national security 
 (7) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to anything lawfully done for the purposes of: 
 (a) law enforcement; or 
 (b) national security; or 
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 (c) performing a statutory function, power or duty; 
by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an authority of one of 
those bodies. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—libraries etc. 
 (8) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by the following 
bodies in performing their functions: 
 (a) a library (other than a library that is conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of 
an individual or individuals); 
 (b) a body mentioned in: 
 (i) paragraph (a) of the definition of archives in subsection 10(1); or 
 (ii) subsection 10(4); 
 (c) an educational institution; 
 (d) a public non-commercial broadcaster (including a body that provides a national 
broadcasting service, within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, 
and a body that holds a community broadcasting licence within the meaning of 
that Act). 
Note 1: A library that is owned by a person conducting a business for profit might not itself be 
conducted for profit (see section 18). 
Note 2: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (8) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
 (8A) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by a person in 
connection with a work or other subject-matter if: 
 (a) the person has custody of the work or other subject-matter under an 
arrangement referred to in section 64 of the Archives Act 1983; and 
 (b) under subsection (8), it would be lawful for the National Archives of Australia to 
do that thing. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (8A) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—prescribed acts 
 (9) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the person circumvents the access control technological protection measure to 
enable the person to do an act; and 
 (b) the act will not infringe the copyright in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (c) the doing of the act by the person is prescribed by the regulations. 
Note 1: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (9) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Note 2: For the making of regulations prescribing the doing of an act by a person, see section 249. 
132APD  Manufacturing etc. a circumvention device for a technological protection 
measure 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts with a device: 
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 (i) manufactures it with the intention of providing it to another person; 
 (ii) imports it into Australia with the intention of providing it to another person; 
 (iii) distributes it to another person; 
 (iv) offers it to the public; 
 (v) provides it to another person; 
 (vi) communicates it to another person; and 
 (b) the person does the act with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage 
or profit; and 
 (c) the device is a circumvention device for a technological protection measure. 
Penalty: 550 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. 
Defence—no promotion, advertising etc. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the device is a circumvention device for the technological protection measure only 
because it was promoted, advertised or marketed as having the purpose of 
circumventing the technological protection measure; and 
 (b) both of the following apply: 
 (i) the person did not do such promoting, advertising or marketing; 
 (ii) the person did not direct or request (expressly or impliedly) another person 
to do such promoting, advertising or marketing. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—interoperability 
 (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the circumvention device will be used to circumvent the technological protection 
measure to enable the doing of an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program (the original program) that is not an 
infringing copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the original program; and 
 (iia) relates to elements of the original program that will not be readily available 
to the person doing the act when the circumvention occurs; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with the original program or any 
other program. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—encryption research 
 (4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the technological protection measure is an access control technological protection 
measure; and 
 (b) the circumvention device will be used to circumvent the access control 
technological protection measure to enable a person (the researcher) to do an 
act; and 
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 (c) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a work or other subject-matter that is not an infringing 
copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the work or other subject-matter; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of identifying and analysing flaws and 
vulnerabilities of encryption technology; and 
 (d) the researcher is: 
 (i) engaged in a course of study at an educational institution in the field of 
encryption technology; or 
 (ii) employed, trained or experienced in the field of encryption technology; and 
 (e) the researcher: 
 (i) has obtained permission from the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright to do the act; or 
 (ii) has made, or will make, a good faith effort to obtain such permission. 
In this subsection, encryption technology means the scrambling and descrambling of 
information using mathematical formulas or algorithms. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (4) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—computer security testing 
 (5) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the technological protection measure is an access control technological protection 
measure; and 
 (b) the circumvention device will be used to circumvent the access control 
technological protection measure to enable the doing of an act; and 
 (c) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program that is not an infringing copy; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the computer program; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of testing, investigating or correcting the 
security of a computer, computer system or computer network; and 
 (iv) will be done with the permission of the owner of the computer, computer 
system or computer network. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (5) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—law enforcement and national security 
 (6) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to anything lawfully done for the purposes of: 
 (a) law enforcement; or 
 (b) national security; or 
 (c) performing a statutory function, power or duty; 
by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an authority of one of 
those bodies. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (6) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
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Defence—libraries etc. 
 (7) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by the following 
bodies in performing their functions: 
 (a) a library (other than a library that is conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of 
an individual or individuals); 
 (b) a body mentioned in: 
 (i) paragraph (a) of the definition of archives in subsection 10(1); or 
 (ii) subsection 10(4); 
 (c) an educational institution; 
 (d) a public non-commercial broadcaster (including a body that provides a national 
broadcasting service, within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, 
and a body that holds a community broadcasting licence within the meaning of 
that Act). 
Note 1: A library that is owned by a person conducting a business for profit might not itself be 
conducted for profit (see section 18). 
Note 2: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
 (8) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by a person in 
connection with a work or other subject-matter if: 
 (a) the person has custody of the work or other subject-matter under an 
arrangement referred to in section 64 of the Archives Act 1983; and 
 (b) under subsection (7), it would be lawful for the National Archives of Australia to 
do that thing. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (8) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
132APE  Providing etc. a circumvention service for a technological protection measure 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person: 
 (i) provides a service to another person; or 
 (ii) offers a service to the public; and 
 (b) the person does so with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit; and 
 (c) the service is a circumvention service for a technological protection measure. 
Penalty: 550 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. 
Defence—no promotion, advertising etc. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the service is a circumvention service for the technological protection measure 
only because it was promoted, advertised or marketed as having the purpose of 
circumventing the technological protection measure; and 
 (b) both of the following apply: 
 (i) the person did not do such promoting, advertising or marketing; 
 (ii) the person did not direct or request (expressly or impliedly) another person 
to do such promoting, advertising or marketing. 
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Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—interoperability 
 (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the circumvention service will be used to circumvent a technological protection 
measure to enable the doing of an act; and 
 (b) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program (the original program) that is not an 
infringing copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the original program; and 
 (iia) relates to elements of the original program that will not be readily available 
to the person doing the act when the circumvention occurs; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with the original program or any 
other program. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—encryption research 
 (4) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
 (a) the technological protection measure is an access control technological protection 
measure; and 
 (b) the circumvention service will be used to circumvent the access control 
technological protection measure to enable a person (the researcher) to do an 
act; and 
 (c) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a work or other subject-matter that is not an infringing 
copy and that was lawfully obtained; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the work or other subject-matter; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of identifying and analysing flaws and 
vulnerabilities of encryption technology; and 
 (d) the researcher is: 
 (i) engaged in a course of study at an educational institution in the field of 
encryption technology; or 
 (ii) employed, trained or experienced in the field of encryption technology; and 
 (e) the researcher: 
 (i) has obtained permission from the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright to do the act; or 
 (ii) has made, or will make, a good faith effort to obtain such permission. 
In this subsection, encryption technology means the scrambling and descrambling of 
information using mathematical formulas or algorithms. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (4) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—computer security testing 
 (5) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if: 
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 (a) the technological protection measure is an access control technological protection 
measure; and 
 (b) the circumvention service will be used to circumvent the access control 
technological protection measure to enable the doing of an act; and 
 (c) the act: 
 (i) relates to a copy of a computer program that is not an infringing copy; and 
 (ii) will not infringe the copyright in the computer program; and 
 (iii) will be done for the sole purpose of testing, investigating or correcting the 
security of a computer, computer system or computer network; and 
 (iv) will be done with the permission of the owner of the computer, computer 
system or computer network. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (5) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—law enforcement and national security 
 (6) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to anything lawfully done for the purposes of: 
 (a) law enforcement; or 
 (b) national security; or 
 (c) performing a statutory function, power or duty; 
by or on behalf of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, or an authority of one of 
those bodies. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (6) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Defence—libraries etc. 
 (7) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by the following 
bodies in performing their functions: 
 (a) a library (other than a library that is conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of 
an individual or individuals); 
 (b) a body mentioned in: 
 (i) paragraph (a) of the definition of archives in subsection 10(1); or 
 (ii) subsection 10(4); 
 (c) an educational institution; 
 (d) a public non-commercial broadcaster (including a body that provides a national 
broadcasting service, within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992, 
and a body that holds a community broadcasting licence within the meaning of 
that Act). 
Note 1: A library that is owned by a person conducting a business for profit might not itself be 
conducted for profit (see section 18). 
Note 2: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
 (8) This section does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by a person in 
connection with a work or other subject-matter if: 
 (a) the person has custody of the work or other subject-matter under an 
arrangement referred to in section 64 of the Archives Act 1983; and 
 (b) under subsection (7), it would be lawful for the National Archives of Australia to 
do that thing. 
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Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (8) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Subdivision F—Electronic rights management information 
132AQ  Removing or altering electronic rights management information 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) the person removes, from a copy of the work or subject-matter, any 
electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) the person alters any electronic rights management information that relates 
to the work or subject-matter; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement 
of the copyright. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) either: 
 (i) the person removes, from a copy of the work or subject-matter, any 
electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) the person alters any electronic rights management information that relates 
to the work or subject-matter; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement 
of the copyright and the person is negligent as to that result. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
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 (b) either: 
 (i) the person removes, from a copy of the work or subject-matter, any 
electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) the person alters any electronic rights management information that relates 
to the work or subject-matter; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) the removal or alteration will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement 
of the copyright. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AR  Distributing, importing or communicating copies after removal or alteration of 
electronic rights management information 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does any of the following acts in relation to the work or 
subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes a copy of the work or subject-matter with the intention of trading 
or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports a copy of the work or subject-matter into Australia with the 
intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (iii) communicates a copy of the work or subject-matter to the public; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been removed from the copy of the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been altered; 
  without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright; and 
 (e) the person knows that the information has been removed or altered without that 
permission; and 
 (f) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does any of the following acts in relation to the work or 
subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes a copy of the work or subject-matter with the intention of trading 
or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports a copy of the work or subject-matter into Australia with the 
intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (iii) communicates a copy of the work or subject-matter to the public; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been removed from the copy of the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been altered; 
  without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright; and 
 (e) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright and the person is negligent as to that result. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does any of the following acts in relation to the work or 
subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes a copy of the work or subject-matter in preparation for, or in the 
course of, trading or for obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports a copy of the work or subject-matter into Australia in preparation 
for, or in the course of, trading or in preparation for, or in the course of, 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (iii) communicates a copy of the work or subject-matter to the public; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been removed from the copy of the work or 
subject-matter; or 
 (ii) any electronic rights management information that relates to the work or 
subject-matter has been altered; 
  without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright; and 
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 (e) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
132AS  Distributing or importing electronic rights management information 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does either of the following acts in relation to electronic rights 
management information that relates to the work or subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes the electronic rights management information with the intention 
of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports the electronic rights management information into Australia with 
the intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; or 
 (ii) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright but the information has been altered without that permission; and 
 (e) the person knows that the information has been removed or altered without that 
permission; and 
 (f) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does either of the following acts in relation to electronic rights 
management information that relates to the work or subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes the electronic rights management information with the intention 
of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports the electronic rights management information into Australia with 
the intention of trading or obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
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 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; or 
 (ii) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright but the information has been altered without that permission; and 
 (e) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright and the person is negligent as to that result. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) copyright subsists in a work or other subject-matter; and 
 (b) the person does either of the following acts in relation to electronic rights 
management information that relates to the work or subject-matter: 
 (i) distributes the electronic rights management information in preparation for, 
or in the course of, trading or in preparation for, or in the course of, 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (ii) imports the electronic rights management information into Australia in 
preparation for, or in the course of, trading or in preparation for, or in the 
course of, obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (c) the person does so without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; and 
 (d) either: 
 (i) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter without the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of 
the copyright; or 
 (ii) the information has been removed from a copy of the work or 
subject-matter with the permission of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright but the information has been altered without that permission; and 
 (e) the act referred to in paragraph (b) will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an 
infringement of the copyright. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
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132AT  Defences 
Law enforcement and national security 
 (1) This Subdivision does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done for the purposes of 
law enforcement or national security by or on behalf of: 
 (a) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or 
 (b) an authority of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (1) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Certain public institutions etc. 
 (2) This Subdivision does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by the following in 
performing their functions: 
 (a) a library (other than a library that is conducted for the profit, direct or indirect, of 
an individual or individuals); 
 (b) a body mentioned in: 
 (i) paragraph (a) of the definition of archives in subsection 10(1); or 
 (ii) subsection 10(4); 
 (c) an educational institution; 
 (d) a public non-commercial broadcaster, including: 
 (i) a body that provides a national broadcasting service within the meaning of 
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992; and 
 (ii) a body that holds a community broadcasting licence within the meaning of 
that Act. 
Note 1: A library that is owned by a person conducting a business for profit might not itself be 
conducted for profit (see section 18). 
Note 2: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (2) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
 (3) This Subdivision does not apply in respect of anything lawfully done by a person in 
connection with a work or other subject-matter if: 
 (a) the person has custody of the work or other subject-matter under an 
arrangement referred to in section 64 of the Archives Act 1983; and 
 (b) under subsection (2), it would be lawful for the National Archives of Australia to 
do that thing. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (3) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
1. Part VAA—Unauthorised access to encoded broadcasts 
Division 1—Preliminary 
135AL  Definitions 
  In this Part: 
action means a proceeding of a civil nature between parties, including a counterclaim. 
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broadcaster means a person licensed under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 to 
provide a broadcasting service (as defined in that Act) by which an encoded broadcast is 
delivered. 
channel provider means a person who: 
 (a) packages a channel (which might include programs produced by the person); and 
 (b) supplies a broadcaster with the channel; and 
 (c) carries on a business that involves the supply of the channel; 
where, apart from any breaks for the purposes of the transmission of incidental matter, 
the channel is broadcast as part of an encoded broadcast service. 
decoder means a device (including a computer program) designed or adapted to 
decrypt, or facilitate the decryption of, an encoded broadcast. 
encoded broadcast means: 
 (a) a subscription broadcast; or 
 (b) a broadcast (except a radio broadcast or subscription broadcast) that is encrypted 
and is delivered by a commercial broadcasting service, or a national broadcasting 
service, within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992. 
subscription broadcast means a broadcast that is encrypted and is made available by 
the broadcaster only to persons authorised by the broadcaster to access the broadcast 
in intelligible form. 
unauthorised decoder means a device (including a computer program) designed or 
adapted to decrypt, or facilitate the decryption of, an encoded broadcast without the 
authorisation of the broadcaster. 
135AM  Counterclaim 
  In the application of this Part in relation to a counterclaim, references to the defendant 
are to be read as references to the plaintiff. 
135AN  This Part does not apply to law enforcement activity etc. 
  This Part does not apply in relation to anything lawfully done for the purposes of law 
enforcement or national security by or on behalf of: 
 (a) the Commonwealth or a State or Territory; or 
 (b) an authority of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory. 
Note: A defendant in proceedings for an offence against this Part bears an evidential burden in 
relation to the matter in this section (see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Division 3—Offences 
Subdivision A—Offences 
135ASA  Making unauthorised decoder 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an unauthorised decoder; and 
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 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASB  Selling or hiring unauthorised decoder 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person sells or lets for hire an unauthorised decoder; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASC  Offering unauthorised decoder for sale or hire 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or profit, the person 
offers or exposes an unauthorised decoder for sale or hire; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person offers or exposes an unauthorised decoder for sale or hire; and 
 (b) the offer or exposure is by way of trade; and 
 (c) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASD  Commercially exhibiting unauthorised decoder in public 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person exhibits an unauthorised decoder in public with the intention of 
obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person exhibits an unauthorised decoder in public; and 
 (b) the exhibition is by way of trade; and 
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 (c) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASE  Importing unauthorised decoder commercially 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports an unauthorised decoder into Australia with the intention of 
doing any of the following with the unauthorised decoder: 
 (i) selling the unauthorised decoder; 
 (ii) letting the unauthorised decoder for hire; 
 (iii) offering or exposing the unauthorised decoder for sale or hire, by way of 
trade or to obtain a commercial advantage or profit; 
 (iv) exhibiting the unauthorised decoder in public by way of trade or to obtain a 
commercial advantage or profit; 
 (v) distributing the unauthorised decoder for trade; 
 (vi) distributing the unauthorised decoder to obtain a commercial advantage or 
profit; 
 (vii) distributing the unauthorised decoder in preparation for, or in the course of, 
engaging in an activity that will prejudicially affect a channel provider or 
anyone with an interest in the copyright in either an encoded broadcast or 
the content of an encoded broadcast; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASF  Distributing unauthorised decoder 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes (including by exporting from Australia) an unauthorised 
decoder with the intention of: 
 (i) trading; or 
 (ii) obtaining a commercial advantage or profit; or 
 (iii) engaging in any other activity that will prejudicially affect a channel provider 
or anyone with an interest in the copyright in either an encoded broadcast or 
the content of an encoded broadcast; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
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Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASG  Making unauthorised decoder available online 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an unauthorised decoder available online; and 
 (b) the unauthorised decoder is made available online to an extent that will 
prejudicially affect a channel provider or anyone with an interest in the copyright 
in either an encoded broadcast or the content of an encoded broadcast; and 
 (c) the unauthorised decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to an 
encoded broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASH  Making decoder available online for subscription broadcast 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) a decoder was supplied (to the person or anyone else) by, or with the 
authorisation of, the broadcaster of a subscription broadcast; and 
 (b) the person makes the decoder available online; and 
 (c) the decoder is made available online without the authorisation of the 
broadcaster; and 
 (d) the decoder will be used to enable a person to gain access to a subscription 
broadcast without the authorisation of the broadcaster; and 
 (e) the decoder is made available online to an extent that will prejudicially affect any 
of the following: 
 (i) anyone with an interest in the copyright in a subscription broadcast by the 
broadcaster; 
 (ii) anyone with an interest in the copyright in the content of a subscription 
broadcast by the broadcaster; 
 (iii) a channel provider who supplies the broadcaster with a channel for a 
subscription broadcast. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
135ASI  Unauthorised access to subscription broadcast etc. 
  A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does an act; and 
 (b) the act (either alone or in conjunction with other acts) results in the person 
gaining access in intelligible form to a subscription broadcast or sounds or images 
from a subscription broadcast; and 
 (c) the access is not authorised by the broadcaster and the person knows that; and 
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 (d) the act does not consist merely of one or more of the following: 
 (i) starting the playing of sounds or images in or from the broadcast on a device 
(for example by switching the device on); 
 (ii) listening to sounds in or from the broadcast and/or seeing images in or from 
the broadcast; 
 (iii) distributing the sounds or images within a single dwelling that is occupied by 
a single household and is the subject of an arrangement involving a member 
of the household and the broadcaster about authorisation of private access 
to the broadcast; and 
 (e) the access to the sounds or images is not gained from: 
 (i) a cinematograph film, or sound recording, made of the encoded broadcast; 
or 
 (ii) a copy of such a film or recording. 
Note: The making of such a film, recording or copy may be an infringement of copyright: see 
paragraphs 87(a) and (b) and section 101. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
135ASJ  Causing unauthorised access to encoded broadcast etc. 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does an act; and 
 (b) the act is done by way of trade; and 
 (c) the act results in the person or anyone else gaining access in intelligible form to an 
encoded broadcast or sounds or images from an encoded broadcast; and 
 (d) the access is not authorised by the broadcaster; and 
 (e) the access to the sounds or images is not gained from: 
 (i) a cinematograph film, or sound recording, made of the encoded broadcast; 
or 
 (ii) a copy of such a film or recording. 
Note: Paragraph (e)—the making of such a film, recording or copy may be an infringement of 
copyright: see paragraphs 87(a) and (b) and section 101. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does an act with the intention of obtaining a commercial advantage or 
profit; and 
 (b) the act results in the person or anyone else gaining access in intelligible form to an 
encoded broadcast or sounds or images from an encoded broadcast; and 
 (c) the access is not authorised by the broadcaster; and 
 (d) the access to the sounds or images is not gained from: 
 (i) a cinematograph film, or sound recording, made of the encoded broadcast; 
or 
 (ii) a copy of such a film or recording. 
Note: Paragraph (e)—the making of such a film, recording or copy may be an infringement of 
copyright: see paragraphs 87(a) and (b) and section 101. 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does an act; and 
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 (b) the act results in anyone else gaining access in intelligible form to an encoded 
broadcast or sounds or images from an encoded broadcast; and 
 (c) the access is not authorised by the broadcaster and the person knows that; and 
 (d) the act does not consist merely of one or more of the following: 
 (i) starting the playing of sounds or images in or from the broadcast on a device 
(for example by switching the device on); 
 (ii) distributing the sounds or images within a single dwelling that is occupied by 
a single household and is the subject of an arrangement involving a member 
of the household and the broadcaster about authorisation of private access 
to the broadcast; and 
 (e) the access to the sounds or images is not gained from: 
 (i) a cinematograph film, or sound recording, made of the encoded broadcast; 
or 
 (ii) a copy of such a film or recording. 
Note: Paragraph (e)—the making of such a film, recording or copy may be an infringement of 
copyright: see paragraphs 87(a) and (b) and section 101. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (1), (2) or (3) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
2. Part XIA—Performers’ protection 
Division 1—Preliminary 
248A  Interpretation 
 (1) In this Part: 
20-year protection period of a performance means the period: 
 (a) beginning on the day when the performance was given; and 
 (b) ending at the end of 20 calendar years after the calendar year in which the 
performance was given. 
50-year protection period of a performance means the period: 
 (a) beginning on the day when the performance was given; and 
 (b) ending at the end of 50 calendar years after the calendar year in which the 
performance was given. 
action means a proceeding of a civil nature between parties and includes a 
counterclaim. 
authorised, in relation to a recording of a performance, means made with the authority 
of the performer. 
cinematograph film includes an article in which visual images are embodied and which 
is capable of being used to show those images as a moving picture, and a sound-track 
associated with those images. 
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direct, in relation to a sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance, means 
made directly from the live performance. 
exempt recording means: 
 (a) an indirect cinematograph film of a performance, being a film made solely for the 
purpose of the private and domestic use of the person who made it; or 
 (aaa) an indirect cinematograph film or sound recording of a performance, being a film 
or recording that: 
 (i) is made from a communication that is a broadcast of the performance; and 
 (ii) is made in domestic premises; and 
 (iii) is made solely for private and domestic use by watching or listening to the 
performance at a time more convenient than the time when the broadcast is 
made; or 
 (aa) an indirect sound recording of a performance, being a recording that is a fair 
dealing with the performance for the purpose of research or study; or 
 (b) an indirect cinematograph film of a performance, being a film made solely for the 
purpose of use in scientific research; or 
 (c) an indirect cinematograph film of a performance, being a film made by, or on 
behalf of, the body administering an educational institution solely for the 
educational purposes of that institution or of another educational institution; or 
 (d) an indirect cinematograph film of a performance, being a film made by, or on 
behalf of, the body administering an institution assisting persons with a print 
disability solely for the purpose of the provision, whether by the institution or 
otherwise, of assistance to persons with a print disability; or 
 (e) an indirect cinematograph film of a performance, being a film made by, or on 
behalf of, the body administering an institution assisting persons with an 
intellectual disability solely for the purpose of the provision, whether by the 
institution or otherwise, of assistance to persons with an intellectual disability; or 
 (f) a direct or indirect cinematograph film of a performance made: 
 (i) for the purpose of, or associated with, the reporting of news or current 
affairs; or 
 (ii) for the purpose of criticism or review; or 
 (fa) a direct or indirect sound recording of a performance, being a recording that is a 
fair dealing with the performance: 
 (i) for the purpose of criticism or review, whether of that performance or 
another performance; or 
 (ii) for the purpose of, or associated with, the reporting of news in a newspaper, 
magazine or similar periodical; or 
 (iii) for the purpose of, or associated with, the reporting of news by means of a 
communication or in a cinematograph film; or 
 (g) a direct or indirect sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance made 
solely for the purpose of a judicial proceeding or the giving of professional advice 
by a legal practitioner; or 
 (h) a direct sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance made by a 
broadcaster who has the authority of the performer to broadcast the 
performance, being a recording or film made solely for the purpose of making that 
broadcast; or 
  
364 
 (j) a direct or indirect sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance made 
by a person who reasonably believes, due to a fraudulent or innocent 
misrepresentation made to the person, that the performer has authorised the 
making of the recording or film by the person; or 
 (ja) a copy of a sound recording referred to in paragraph (aa), (fa) or (g), being a copy 
made solely for a purpose referred to in any of those paragraphs; or 
 (k) a copy of a cinematograph film referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or 
(g), being a copy made solely for a purpose referred to in any of those paragraphs; 
or 
 (m) a copy of a sound recording or cinematograph film referred to in paragraph (h), 
being a copy made solely for the purpose referred to in that paragraph; or 
 (n) a copy of a sound recording or cinematograph film referred to in paragraph (j), 
being a copy made: 
 (i) by a person who believes, due to a fraudulent or innocent representation 
made to the person, that the performer has authorised the making of the 
copy; or 
 (ia) if the copy is of a sound recording—solely for a purpose referred to in 
paragraph (aa), (fa) or (g); or 
 (ii) if the copy is of a cinematograph film—solely for a purpose referred to in 
paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) or (g); or 
 (p) a copy of an authorised recording of a performance, other than a copy of an 
authorised sound recording where the copy was made for use in a sound-track but 
the making of the sound recording was not authorised for the purpose of use in a 
sound-track. 
indirect, in relation to a sound recording or cinematograph film of a performance, 
means made from a communication of the performance. 
performance means: 
 (a) a performance (including an improvisation) of a dramatic work, or part of such a 
work, including such a performance given with the use of puppets; or 
 (b) a performance (including an improvisation) of a musical work or part of such a 
work; or 
 (c) the reading, recitation or delivery of a literary work, or part of such a work, or the 
recitation or delivery of an improvised literary work; or 
 (d) a performance of a dance; or 
 (e) a performance of a circus act or a variety act or any similar presentation or show; 
or 
 (f) a performance of an expression of folklore; 
being a live performance: 
 (g) that is given in Australia, whether in the presence of an audience or otherwise; or 
 (h) that is given by one or more qualified persons (even if it is also given by one or 
more persons who are not qualified persons), whether in the presence of an 
audience or otherwise. 
performer, in relation to a performance that is given outside Australia, does not include 
a person who is not a qualified person at the time of the performance. 
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protection period, in relation to a performance, has the meaning given by 
section 248CA. 
qualified person means an Australian citizen or a person resident in Australia. 
recording means a sound recording or cinematograph film, other than an exempt 
recording. 
sound recording includes an article in which sounds are embodied. 
unauthorised, in relation to a recording of a performance, means made without the 
authority of the performer. 
unauthorised use has the meaning given by section 248G. 
 (1A) For the purposes of paragraph (aa) of the definition of exempt recording, in 
determining whether a recording is a fair dealing with a performance for the purpose of 
research or study, regard must be had to the following matters: 
 (a) the purpose and character of the recording; 
 (b) the nature of the performance; 
 (c) the possibility of obtaining an authorised recording of the performance within a 
reasonable time at an ordinary commercial price; 
 (d) the effect of the recording upon the potential market for, or the value of, 
authorised recordings of the performance; 
 (e) if only part of the performance is recorded—the amount and substantiality of the 
part recorded when compared to the whole performance. 
 (2) The following shall be taken not to be performances for the purposes of this Part: 
 (a) a performance referred to in subsection 28(1); 
 (b) a reading, recital or delivery of any item of news and information; 
 (c) a performance of a sporting activity; or 
 (d) a participation in a performance as a member of an audience. 
 (3) In this Part: 
 (a) a reference to the doing of an act in relation to a performance includes a 
reference to the doing of that act in relation to a substantial part of the 
performance; 
 (b) a reference to the doing of an act in relation to a performance, or a recording of a 
performance, with the authority of the performer is, in the case of 2 or more 
performers, a reference to the doing of the act where each of the performers has 
authorised the doing of the act; 
 (c) a reference to the doing of an act in relation to a performance, or a recording of a 
performance, without the authority of the performer is, in the case of 2 or more 
performers, a reference to the doing of the act where at least one of the 
performers has not authorised the doing of the act; and 
 (d) a reference to a sound-track is a reference to a sound-track associated with visual 
images forming part of a cinematograph film. 
248B  Educational purposes 
  Without limiting the meaning of the expression educational purposes in paragraph (c) 
of the definition of exempt recording in subsection 248A(1), a cinematograph film of a 
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performance shall be taken to have been made for the educational purposes of an 
educational institution if it is made: 
 (a) for use in connection with a particular course of instruction provided by the 
institution; or 
 (b) for inclusion in the collection of a library of the institution. 
248C  Exempt recordings cease to be exempt recordings in certain circumstances 
 (1) If any copies of a sound recording or a cinematograph film of a performance, being a 
sound recording or film that is an exempt recording under paragraph (h) of the 
definition of exempt recording in subsection 248A(1), are not destroyed before the end 
of the period of 12 months beginning on the day on which any of those copies is first 
used for broadcasting the performance, the sound recording or film shall, at the end of 
that period, cease to be an exempt recording. 
 (1A) A sound recording, or a copy of a sound recording, that is an exempt recording because 
it was made for a purpose referred to in paragraph (aaa), (aa) or (fa) of the definition of 
exempt recording in subsection 248A(1) ceases to be an exempt recording if it is used 
for any other purpose without the authority of the performer. 
 (2) A cinematograph film, or a copy of a cinematograph film, that is an exempt recording 
because it was made for a purpose referred to in paragraph (a), (aaa), (b), (c), (d), (e) or 
(f) of the definition of exempt recording in subsection 248A(1) ceases to be an exempt 
recording if it is used for any other purpose without the authority of the performer. 
248CA  Protection period 
 (1) Subject to subsection (3), the protection period of a performance is the period 
beginning on the day when the performance was given and ending at the end of the 
period of 20 calendar years after the calendar year in which the performance was given. 
 (3) For the purposes of the operation, in relation to a sound recording of a performance, of 
a provision of this Part listed in subsection (4), the protection period of a performance is 
the period beginning on the day when the performance was given and ending at the 
end of the period of 50 calendar years after the calendar year in which the performance 
was given. 
 (4) Subsection (3) applies to the following provisions of this Part: 
 (a) paragraphs 248G(1)(a), (2)(a), (2)(b) and (2)(d) to (g); 
 (b) section 248PA; 
 (c) section 248PB; 
 (d) section 248PE; 
 (e) section 248PF; 
 (f) section 248PG; 
 (g) section 248PI; 
 (h) section 248PJ; 
 (i) section 248PK; 
 (j) section 248PL; 
 (k) section 248PM. 
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248D  Private and domestic use 
  For the purposes of this Part, a cinematograph film is taken not to have been made for 
the private and domestic use of the person who made it if it is made for the purpose of: 
 (a) selling it, letting it for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing it for sale or 
hire; or 
 (b) distributing it, whether for the purpose of trade or otherwise; or 
 (c) by way of trade exhibiting it in public; or 
 (d) broadcasting the film; or 
 (e) causing the film to be seen or heard in public. 
248F  Application 
 (1) This Part, except Subdivisions A, B and C of Division 3, applies to acts done on or after 
1 October 1989 in relation to a performance given on or after that day. 
Note 1: That day was the day this Part commenced. 
Note 2: Sections 248P and 248QA apply Subdivisions A and B of Division 3 to acts done at or after the 
time those Subdivisions commence as a result of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Copyright 
Amendment Act 2006. Subdivision C of that Division is merely ancillary to those Subdivisions. 
 (2) Nothing in this Part affects any copyright subsisting in a work that is performed or in any 
sound recording, cinematograph film or broadcast of a performance, or any other right 
or obligation arising otherwise than under this Part. 
 (3) In the application of this Part to a counterclaim, the reference in section 248J to the 
defendant shall be read as a reference to the plaintiff. 
Division 3—Offences 
Subdivision A—General offences 
248P  Scope of this Subdivision 
 (1) This Subdivision applies to acts done in Australia on or after the commencement of this 
Subdivision. 
Note: This Subdivision commenced when it was included in this Act by Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006. 
 (2) This section has effect despite section 14.1 (Standard geographical jurisdiction) of the 
Criminal Code. 
248PA  Unauthorised direct recording during protection period 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a direct recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the recording is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is made without the authority of the performer. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
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(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a direct recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the recording is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is made without the authority of the performer and the person is 
negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
248PB  Unauthorised indirect recording during protection period 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an indirect recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the recording is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is made without the authority of the performer. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an indirect recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the recording is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is made without the authority of the performer and the person is 
negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
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 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes an indirect recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the recording is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is made without the authority of the performer. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
Defence 
 (7) Subsection (1), (3) or (5) does not apply if the recording was made solely for the 
person’s private and domestic use. 
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
248PC  Unauthorised communication to public during 20-year protection period 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person communicates a performance to the public; and 
 (b) the communication is made during the 20-year protection period of the 
performance; and 
 (c) the communication is made without the authority of the performer; and 
 (d) the communication is made either directly from the live performance or from an 
unauthorised recording of the performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person communicates a performance to the public; and 
 (b) the communication is made during the 20-year protection period of the 
performance; and 
 (c) the communication is made without the authority of the performer and the 
person is negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the communication is made either directly from the live performance or from an 
unauthorised recording of the performance. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
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 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Defence 
 (7) To avoid doubt, subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to the communication to the public 
of an authorised recording of the performance. 
Note 1: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter in subsection (7) (see 
subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code). 
Note 2: An educational or other institution can also copy and communicate a broadcast of a 
performance without contravening this section in some circumstances (see sections 135E and 
135F). 
248PD  Playing unauthorised recording publicly during 20-year protection period 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes a recording of a performance to be heard or seen in public; and 
 (b) the recording is heard or seen in public during the 20-year protection period of 
the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is unauthorised. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person causes a recording of a performance to be heard or seen in public; and 
 (b) the recording is heard or seen in public during the 20-year protection period of 
the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is unauthorised and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
248PE  Possessing equipment to make or copy unauthorised recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a plate or recording equipment, intending it to be used for 
making: 
 (i) an unauthorised recording of a performance; or 
 (ii) a copy of an unauthorised recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the possession occurs during the protection period of the performance. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
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(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a plate or recording equipment; and 
 (b) the plate or equipment is to be used for making: 
 (i) a recording of a performance; or 
 (ii) a copy of an unauthorised recording of a performance; and 
 (c) either: 
 (i) the recording to be made using the plate or equipment will be an 
unauthorised recording of the performance; or 
 (ii) the recording to be copied using the plate or equipment is an unauthorised 
recording of the performance; 
  and the person is negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the possession occurs during the protection period of the performance. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) To avoid doubt, recklessness is the fault element for the circumstance that the plate or 
equipment is to be used for making: 
 (a) a recording of a performance; or 
 (b) a copy of an unauthorised recording of a performance. 
 (5) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
No need to prove which performance or recording is to be involved 
 (8) In a prosecution for an offence against this section, it is not necessary to prove: 
 (a) which particular performance is intended to be, or will be, recorded using the 
device; or 
 (b) which particular recording is intended to be, or will be, copied using the device. 
248PF  Copying unauthorised recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
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(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PG  Unauthorised copying of exempt recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer; and 
 (d) the recording is an exempt recording; and 
 (e) the copy is not an exempt recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
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Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the recording is an exempt recording; and 
 (e) the copy is not an exempt recording and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer; and 
 (d) the recording is an exempt recording; and 
 (e) the copy is not an exempt recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PH  Unauthorised copying of authorised sound recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance, intending that 
the copy be used in a sound-track; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 20-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer; and 
 (d) the sound recording is an authorised sound recording; and 
 (e) the making of the sound recording was not authorised for the purpose of use in 
that or any other sound-track. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
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Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance, intending that 
the copy be used in a sound-track; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 20-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the sound recording is an authorised sound recording; and 
 (e) the making of the sound recording was not authorised for the purpose of use in 
that or any other sound-track and the person is negligent as to that fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance in preparation for 
use in a sound-track; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 20-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the copy is made without the authority of the performer; and 
 (d) the sound recording is an authorised sound recording; and 
 (e) the making of the sound recording was not authorised for the purpose of use in 
that or any other sound-track. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PI  Selling etc. unauthorised recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a recording of a performance; 
 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
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 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a recording of a performance; 
 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a recording of a performance; 
 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PJ  Distributing unauthorised recording 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a recording of a performance, with the intention of trading; 
and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
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(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the distribution will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in 
the performance; and 
 (d) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a recording of a performance, with the intention of trading; 
and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the distribution will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in 
the performance; and 
 (d) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (7) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a recording of a performance in preparation for, or in the 
course of, trade; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (9) Subsection (7) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
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248PK  Commercial possession or import of unauthorised recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a recording of a performance, 
with the intention of doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording either for the purpose of trade or to an extent that 
will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in the 
performance; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a recording of a performance, 
with the intention of doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording either for the purpose of trade or to an extent that 
will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in the 
performance; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
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 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a recording of a performance in 
preparation for, or in the course of, doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording for trade; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PL  Exhibiting unauthorised recording in public by way of trade 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the exhibition occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the exhibition occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a recording of a performance; and 
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 (b) the exhibition occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248PM  Importing unauthorised recording for exhibition by way of trade 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a recording of a performance, with the intention 
of exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Note: Under section 248CA, the protection period of a performance is: 
(a) a 20-year protection period so far as this section relates to a cinematograph film of the 
performance; and 
(b) a 50-year protection period so far as this section relates to a sound recording of the 
performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a recording of a performance, with the intention 
of exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a recording of a performance, in preparation for 
exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
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Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
Subdivision B—Acts relating to sound recordings of performances given before 
1 July 1995 
248QA  Scope of this Subdivision 
 (1) This Subdivision applies to an act done in Australia on or after the commencement of 
this Subdivision, in relation to a performance given at any time before 1 July 1995. 
Note 1: That day was the day on which Part 4 of the Copyright (World Trade Organization Amendments) 
Act 1994 commenced. 
Note 2: This Subdivision commenced when it was included in this Act by Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 
Copyright Amendment Act 2006. 
 (2) This Subdivision has effect despite section 14.1 (Standard geographical jurisdiction) of 
the Criminal Code. 
248QB  Possessing equipment for copying unauthorised sound recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a plate or recording equipment, intending it to be used for 
making a copy of an unauthorised sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the possession occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses a plate or recording equipment; and 
 (b) the plate or recording equipment is to be used for making a copy of a sound 
recording of a performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording of the performance and the person is 
negligent as to that fact; and 
 (d) the possession occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) To avoid doubt, recklessness is the fault element for the circumstance that the plate or 
recording equipment is to be used for making a copy of a sound recording of a 
performance. 
 (5) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
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No need to prove which recording is to be copied 
 (8) In a prosecution for an offence against this section, it is not necessary to prove which 
particular recording is intended to be, or will be, copied using the device. 
248QC  Copying unauthorised sound recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person makes a copy of a sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the copy is made during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248QD  Selling etc. unauthorised sound recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a sound recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a sound recording of a performance; 
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 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a sound recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a sound recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a sound recording of a performance; 
 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a sound recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person does any of the following acts: 
 (i) sells a sound recording of a performance; 
 (ii) lets for hire a sound recording of a performance; 
 (iii) by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire a sound recording of a 
performance; and 
 (b) the act is done during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248QE  Distributing unauthorised sound recording 
Indictable offences 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a sound recording of a performance, with the intention of 
trade; and 
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 (b) the distribution occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the distribution will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in 
the performance; and 
 (d) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (3) An offence against subsection (1) or (2) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not 
more than 550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offences 
 (4) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a sound recording of a performance, with the intention of 
trade; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a sound recording of a performance; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the distribution will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in 
the performance; and 
 (d) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (6) An offence against subsection (4) or (5) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (7) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person distributes a sound recording of a performance in preparation for, or in 
the course of, trade; and 
 (b) the distribution occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
  
384 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (9) Subsection (7) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248QF  Commercial possession or import of unauthorised sound recording 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a sound recording of a 
performance, with the intention of doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording either for the purpose of trade or to an extent that 
will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in the 
performance; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the 
performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a sound recording of a 
performance, with the intention of doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording either for the purpose of trade or to an extent that 
will affect prejudicially the financial interests of the performer in the 
performance; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the 
performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
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 (a) the person possesses, or imports into Australia, a sound recording of a 
performance in preparation for, or in the course of, doing any of the following: 
 (i) selling the recording; 
 (ii) letting the recording for hire; 
 (iii) by way of trade offering or exposing the recording for sale or hire; 
 (iv) distributing the recording for trade; and 
 (b) the possession or import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the 
performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248QG  Exhibiting unauthorised sound recording in public by way of trade 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a sound recording of a performance; 
and 
 (b) the exhibition occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a sound recording of a performance; 
and 
 (b) the exhibition occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person by way of trade exhibits in public a sound recording of a performance; 
and 
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 (b) the exhibition occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; 
and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
248QH  Importing unauthorised sound recording for exhibition by way of trade 
Indictable offence 
 (1) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a sound recording of a performance, with the 
intention of exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
 (2) An offence against subsection (1) is punishable on conviction by a fine of not more than 
550 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 
Note: A corporation may be fined up to 5 times the amount of the maximum fine (see subsection 
4B(3) of the Crimes Act 1914). 
Summary offence 
 (3) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a sound recording of a performance, with the 
intention of exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording and the person is negligent as to that 
fact. 
Penalty: 120 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
 (4) An offence against subsection (3) is a summary offence, despite section 4G of the 
Crimes Act 1914. 
Strict liability offence 
 (5) A person commits an offence if: 
 (a) the person imports into Australia a sound recording of a performance in 
preparation for exhibiting the recording in public by way of trade; and 
 (b) the import occurs during the 50-year protection period of the performance; and 
 (c) the recording is an unauthorised recording. 
Penalty: 60 penalty units. 
 (6) Subsection (5) is an offence of strict liability. 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.” 
 
  
 
 
